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ABSTRACT 
Two influential twentieth-century theorists of religion, Emile Durkheim and Roy Rappaport, 
analyzed religious communities in terms of distinctive features that emerge under special 
circumstances from the complex dynamics of ordinary human sociality. Durkheim was deeply 
impressed by the emergent features of religious sociality, to the point that he interpreted a 
religious community as expressing the way society- thought of as a system of active forces 
arising from and operating on the constituent individuals- can become self-aware, thinking and 
feeling through individuals. The status of Durkheim's strong language about religious 
communities having states of consciousness is a matter of debate but, however his usage is 
construed, he does make a strong claim on behalf of the emergent properties of complex social 
systems. Rappaport proposed that a religious community is an adaptive system maintaining 
itself in an environment, in a manner formally similar to biological organisms. In both cases, 
emergence is a central theme, yet it is insufficiently explained and theorized. 
This dissertation argues that emergence theory as it has been developed in the years since 
Durkheim and Rappaport published, most notably by Terrence Deacon, illuminates the 
arguments of Durkheim and Rappaport and can render their claims about emergent properties 
and adaptive social dynamics more precisely and more fruitfully. In general terms, emergence 
theory analyzes the way relational and organizational features of an aggregate play a causal role 
iii 
in system dynamics, resulting in new system capabilities and qualities. Deacon's achievement is 
to characterize different kinds of emergent systems in terms of the different ways meaning and 
reference (semiotics) function in system dynamics. This conceptual linkage between emergence 
and semiotics is extremely promising for interpreting the emergent features of forms of sociality 
in which religious meanings and beliefs play vital roles. In applying Deacon's account of 
emergence to the theories of religious community presented by Durkheim and Rappaport, this 
dissertation characterizes religious communities as semiotic-emergent systems, and from this 
perspective analyzes the organizational form of religious community dynamics. 
iv 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. vii 
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... viii 
1 Introduction to a semiotic and emergent theory of religion ...................................................... 1 
1.1 Emergence, Durkheim, and Rappaport ........................................................................... 1 
1.2 How important is the divine in classic 'theory of religion'? ............................................ 8 
1.3 How important is the divine in 'science of religion' approaches to religion? ............... 14 
1.4 'Broad' evolutionary psychology affords new visions of culture .................................. 26 
1.5 Broad evolutionary psychology opens new possibilities for the function of religious 
belief .............................................................................................................................. 28 
1.6 What divine concepts mean for the religious ............................................................... 30 
1.7 Method of this dissertation: The hard problem and the easy problem ....................... 31 
2 Background for an updated theory of religion 1: Emergence and Semiosis ............................ 34 
2.1 Emergent systems ......................................................................................................... 34 
2.2 Semiotics ........................................................................................................................ 45 
2.3 Summary ........................................................................................................................ 58 
3 Background for an updated theory of religion II: Self-reproducing Automata, Semantic 
Closure, Strange Loops, and Teleodynamics ............................................................................ 59 
3.1 Self-reproducing automata- Von Neumann ................................................................. 61 
3.2 Semantic closure- Pattee .............................................................................................. 67 
3.3 Strange Loops- Hofstadter ........................................................................................... 78 
3.4 Teleodynamics- Deacon ................................................................................................ 93 
3.5 Four key principles of semiotic emergence ................................................................. 118 
3.6 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 129 
4 Teasing apart biology and culture in human forms of sociality .............................................. 131 
4.1 Distinguishing biological and cultural sociality ............................................................ 131 
4.2 The emergence of biologically-undergirded social organisms .................................... 134 
4.3 The emergence of symbolically-undergirded cultural sociality ................................... 148 
5 The 'emergent' theories of religious communities proposed by Durkheim and Rappaport .. 166 
5.1 Durkheim's emergent definition of a religious community and its failures ................ 167 
5.2 Rappaport's emergent definition of a religious community and its failures ............... 176 
5.3 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 203 
6 Religious communities as a 'symbolic teleodynamic' socio-cultural organism ...................... 204 
v 
6.1 Defining 'religion'- the psychic, the social, and a peculiar type of sign connecting 
them ............................................................................................................................ 204 
6.2 'Where' does the religious community exist? ............................................................. 207 
6.3 How ritual and 'tokens of transcendence' invite a peculiar approach to experience and 
entail a peculiar kind of social organization ................................................................ 208 
6.4 Example of the interaction- a Haitian sevis ............................................................... 250 
7 Summary and two test cases .................................................................................................. 254 
7.1 Religious communities and the principles of symbolic semiotic emergence .............. 254 
7.2 Two Test Cases ............................................................................................................ 266 
8 Entailments of symbolic social teleodynamics ....................................................................... 308 
8.1 New types of truth ....................................................................................................... 308 
8.2 The emergence of revelation and the divine/worshipper relationship an entailment of 
symbolic teleodynamics .............................................................................................. 311 
8.3 Seats of subjectivity? The occult power of spontaneous imagination within religious 
teleodynamics? ............................................................................................................ 313 
8.4 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 320 
Works Cited .................................................................................................................................. 322 
Curriculum Vitae .......................................................................................................................... 333 
vi 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Hofstadter's canonical example of a Strange Loop ................................................ 81 
Figure 2: Religious communities as social symbolic teleodynamics ................................... 237 
vii 
List of Abbreviations 
DNA- Deoxyribonucleic acid 
DS- Dominant Symbol 
El- Emergencel 
E2 - Emergence2 
E3 - Emergence3 
GIT- Godellncompleteness Theorem 
MPD- Multiple personality disorder 
PFC- Prefrontal cortex 
PM- Principia Mathematica 
SC- Semantic Closure 
tRNA- Transfer ribonucleic acid 
USP- Ultimate Sacred Postulates 
viii 
1 
1 Introduction to a semiotic and emergent theory of religion 
1.1 Emergence, Durkheim, and Rappaport 
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the ways emergence played a role in the theories 
of two significant 201h century theorists of religion, Emile Durkheim and Roy Rappaport, and to 
recast Rappaport's (1999) theory of religion using up-to-date categories of emergence theory. 1 
Emergence theory characterizes the way relational and organizational features of an aggregate 
play a causal role in system dynamics, resulting in new system capabilities and qualities. An 
emergentist approach to religious communities would describe how the robust types of 
meaning and patterns of behavior found in certain social groups flow from the particular way 
people are organized with respect to ideas, authority, and experience. Rappaport analyzed the 
structure and function of religious communities using a 40-year-old approach to emergence; this 
theoretical perspective has been importantly revised since then, most notably by Terrence 
Deacon.2 Deacon's achievement is to characterize different types of emergent systems, and 
suggest how meaning and reference (semiotics) can play a role in organizing some of them. This 
dissertation will utilize Deacon's more adequate semiotic view of emergence in order to 
advance Rappaport's religious theories. 
1 In this dissertation, I will be using the terms 'emergence,' 'systems theory,' and 'cybernetics' largely 
interchangeably, though these terms have had different historical trajectories. This is due to the fact that 
the two theorists most central to my analysis, anthropologists Roy Rappaport and Terrence Deacon, use 
these different terms to cover the same idea. Rappaport uses the terms 'systems theory' and 
'cybernetics,' while Deacon largely uses the term 'emergence.' Both of these thinkers, however, use 
these terms to reference a concern for how relational and organizational features of an aggregate play a 
causal role in system dynamics, resulting in new system capabilities and qualities. 
2 The most characteristic version of Deacon's approach to emergence that I reference is found in Deacon 
(2006a), though as this dissertation was defended, Deacon published his most comprehensive statement 
to date, in Deacon (2012). In Ch. 3 I will footnote a few updates to the argument of this dissertation 
required by Deacon's recent revision of his theory. 
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An important reason for undertaking this task is to create a framework for placing classic 
'theory of religion' in conversation with the newly emerging field of 'science of religion.' Science 
of religion, which builds on insights growing out of cognitive science and evolutionary 
psychology, attempts to explain religious phenomena at the level of individual brains and even 
brain subsystems. Rappaport's approach to the study of religion, on the other hand, is at a level 
of analysis more broad and general; his account of religion is informed by his years as a field 
anthropologist, and his approach is attuned to explaining the powerful subjective experience of 
truth and meaningfulness found in religious community participation, the importance of 
religious belief for religious community life, the central role religion plays in most cultures, and 
the robust persistence of religious community identity over time and cultural change. These 
two different approaches to religion may be bridged by Deacon's promising development of 
emergence theory, especially as it brings together emergence and semiotics. Deacon's theory 
gives us a robust tool for analyzing forms of sociality in which religious meaning and belief plays 
a vital role, and does so while fully respecting 'bottom-up' research investigating the lower-level 
systems presumably behind religious belief, experience, and expression. 
Rappaport argues that concepts of the divine are responsible for a religious community's 
unique form of social organization, acting as a dynamical center in support of its emergent and 
adaptive qualities. Yet I argue Rappaport was handcuffed by his conception of emergence to 
fully explicate the way concepts of the divine function in individual participant's lives. By 
offering better emergence categories than Rappaport had at his disposal, this dissertation gives 
more adequate theoretical support for the central role these concepts play in religious 
community life. These concepts link together the psychic world of religious participants and the 
3 
social world of religious community organization. This is a counterbalance to overly reductive or 
dismissive accounts of concepts of the divine common in current scientific accounts of religion. 
Durkheim (1995/1915) was the first theorist to demonstrate religion could be productively 
analyzed from a 'systems' or an 'emergent' approach to social organization. 3 For Durkheim, 
society is a uniquely human accomplishment that transcends the individual, and plays an active 
and even self-centered role in the lives of the individuals who compose it. He writes, 
Man is not simply an animal, plus certain qualities: He is something different. Human 
nature is the product of a recasting, so to speak, of animal nature .... man is in 
relationship not only with a physical milieu, but also with a social milieu ... In order to 
live, then, he must adapt to it. Now, to maintain itself, society often needs us to see 
things from a certain standpoint and feel them in a certain way. It therefore modifies 
the ideas we would be inclined to have about them, and the feelings to which we would 
be inclined if we obeyed only our animal nature- even to the extent of replacing them 
with quite opposite feelings. Does society not go so far as to make us see our own life 
as a thing of little value, while for animals life is property par excellence? (62, italics 
mine). 
Durkheim here describes the effects society as a relational, holistic entity has on individual 
minds, emotions, and values. This exemplifies the essence of an emergence approach. For 
Durkheim, a religious community is not distinguishable from society as a form of sociality; 
rather, religious expression is the means by which a group of people becomes aware of and 
intensifies the emergent qualities they possess when in society with one another. It is the 
means by which the very abstract nature of collective thought and collective emotions becomes 
salient and intensified in individual's lives. He writes, 
Religion is first and foremost a system of ideas by means of which individuals imagine 
the society of which they are members and the obscure yet intimate relations they have 
3 He did this without the benefit of an established 'field' of either emergence, which had an initial 
blossoming in the 1920's, or systems theory, which did not develop until the 1940's. 
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with it. Such is its paramount role .... it is true with a truth that is eternal that there exists 
outside us something greater than we and with which we commune (227). 
How does Durkheim think religion helps individuals imagine the society of which they are 
members? He writes, 
If society is to be able to become conscious of itself and keep the sense it has of itself at 
the required intensity, it must assemble and concentrate. This concentration brings 
about an uplifting of moral life that is expressed by a set of ideal conceptions in which 
the new life thus awakened is depicted (424). 
In traditional human societies, the 11ideal conceptions" that awaken the new moral life of 
society are the sacred concepts and symbols of religious life. Since, however, there is actually 
nothing unique about religious communities vis-a-vis emergent sociality, he suggests that 
collective political ideals serve just as well as religious ideas to facilitate and intensify the 
emergent nature of sociality (215). One is merely the other 11transfigured" (327). Thus, there is 
no real difference 11between Christians' celebrating the principle dates of Christ's life ... and a 
citizens' meeting commemorating the advent of a new moral charter or some other great event 
of national life" (429). Non-religious festivals and religious ceremonies have exactly the same 
end- to 11bring individuals together, to put the masses into motion, and thus induce a state of 
effervescence4 (386-7). And there is no difference in the type of deference people show to 
political and religious leaders, or between the actual moral authority they possess (215). 
I suggest Durkheim, though boldly and creatively investigating religion from an emergence 
perspective he almost single-handedly forges, inappropriately conflates religious sociality and 
political sociality. From the perspective of his theory, communities defined by statements such 
as 'all men are created equal,' and 'the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
4 His term for the collective strengthening of social ties and awareness of the moral community to which 
they belong. 
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class struggles' are not distinguishable from communities defined by statements such as 'The 
Tao that can be named is not the true Tao' and 'Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is 
One.' This theoretical failure in Durkheim's account of religion leads directly to a legacy in the 
sociological analysis of religion that cannot distinguish the Tao from the Constitution of the 
United States. I will examine in the next section how he was interpreted by later theorists, who 
left no place for the divine in the sociological study of religion. First, however, let us briefly turn 
to Roy Rappaport's Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, which takes up themes from 
Durkheim with much better and more explicit emergence categories, and attempts to correct 
the error I have pointed to in Durkheim's theory. In fact, Hart {1999) and Lambek (2001) 
consider Ritual and Religion to be the most significant treatment of its subject since the 
Elementary Forms. 
Rappaport follows Durkheim in characterizing religion as being eminently social and 
suggesting there are emergent qualities to religious community life. Rappaport writes there are 
"cybernetic processes at the very heart of religion's relationship to society and its evolution" 
{287). Rappaport draws heavily on the cybernetic thought of Gregory Bateson; 5 following 
Bateson, he argues that cybernetic systems are identified by two chief characteristics: they are 
adaptive and self-regulating, and they result from a circular causal structure. Adaptive, self-
regulating systems are those that hold some parts ofthe system to be invariant by insulating 
them from perturbation through a 'protective belt' of more variable components, and that 
organize matter and energy transactions by their own activity. A circular causal structure means 
that the system regulates itself based on both internal and external constraints, sampling both 
its own self-states and its environmental conditions reciprocally (411-2, 422). 
5 For an example of the kind of argument relevant to this discussion, see Bateson (2000a). 
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Rappaport's characterization of religion improves Durkheim's by offering theoretical 
reasons to distinguish between 'properly religious' sacred representations and political, 
economic, and moral sacred representations. Rappaport argues that the survival of a ritually-
organized community depends on its ability to persist by adapting to different material and 
cultural situations. For this to happen, the most central beliefs established in ritual must be able 
to authorize (as well as criticize) any possible material or cultural order. This would be assured if 
the most basic beliefs made sacred in ritual were empty of material and cultural content- that 
is, non-meaningful with respect to political or economic or moral considerations. And this is the 
case, Rappaport argues, in 'properly religious' communities, and not the case for 
politically/economically/morally organized communities. 6 Groups that set apart and make 
sacred political or material content are inherently time- and culture-bound. For Rappaport, 
then, there are more and less adaptive versions of communities organized by ritual and the 
sacred. The most adaptive kinds adapt because they can use their sacred beliefs to both 
support and condemn 'lesser,' mundane concerns of human life to support system persistence 
in a changing cultural and ecological environment. Thus, Rappaport argues that a religious 
community is a kind of adaptive organism whose proper functioning is due to the fact that its 
most basic representations are empty of meaningful social content. 
Rappaport is not content to describe religious communities as cybernetic systems. He 
specifically wants to discuss them as adaptive systems similar to biological organisms. He 
defines 'living' as II any association that can be shown to have inhering in it as a unit distinct 
processes at least occasionally initiated in response to, as response to, and in attempted 
correction of, perturbation" (408). Thus, for Rappaport, both biological organisms and religious 
6 For example, the Tao is not in any way about political/moral/economic/cultural aspects of human life. 
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communities are living things, as they both exemplify membership in the class adaptive systems 
(409). The family resemblance Rappaport sees between religious communities and biological 
organisms allows him to make comparisons between the evolutionary processes guiding each 
kind of adaptive system through time. He describes the relationship of people bound to each 
other by the same ritually-established first principles as "communities as fundamental in nature 
as those defined by descent from common ancestors" (326). He suggests religious communities 
change their sacred content in response to environmental pressure in a manner "formally 
similar to that prevailing in genetic processes." And for the same reasons that all living things 
are thought to descend from earliest life, he suggests "it is plausible to think that, despite the 
birth of gods and their banishment, [the continuity of religious communities] has remained 
unbroken from the moment when first our ancestors spoke words in ritual" (341). 
I believe the details of Rappaport's characterization are insufficient to fully account for 
everything he tries to account for; I will argue inCh. 5 that Rappaport does not adequately 
connect the relationship of his functional theory of adaptive sociality with participant's 
individual psychology and spirituality. Categories from more recent emergence theory will allow 
clearer conceptualizations of religious communities and their relationship to beliefs, ritual order, 
and religious experience. But his view is a step forward over Durkheim's emergent account, and 
offers a theoretical distinction between /better' and 1Worse' religious communities. 7 It is 
important, though, to note how bold is his claim that a religious community is an adaptive 
organism, equal in boldness to Durkheim's own characterization. 
7 Rappaport connects this to Paul Tillich's characterization of religion as being about Ultimate Concern, 
which similarly can have 'true' and 'idolatrous' referents; see (443). 
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1.2 How important is the divlne8 in classic 'theory of religion'? 
Since my goal is to work at the intersection of classic 'theory of religion' and the growing 
field of 'science of religion,' I want to spend the next two sections noting that mainstream 
religious studies and many 'science of religion' theorists share something in common- a 
theoretical difficulty finding a positive place for the divine (or the experience of the divine) in 
their theories. The sociological study of religion- one of the central pillars of classic religious 
studies- largely followed Durkheim's analysis of religion. Thus, this field has found it difficult to 
distinguish the politically sacred from the religiously sacred. On the other hand, the field largely 
has ignored Durkheim's fundamental insight: that 'society' is an emergent entity, causally 
effective as a whole operating on its parts. Durkheim's reasoning about religion is tied to this 
assumption; since the gods play a central role in religious community life, arousing majesty and 
representing something greater than the individual, if a scientific account of religion is going to 
do justice to its topic, it must come up with something that can play the role the gods do 
(Durkheim 1995/1915, 65-6). Durkheim thought that 'society' as he conceived it lived up to this 
billing. As David Sloan Wilson notes, Durkheim believed that the social whole is more than the 
sum of its parts, and early theorists of sociology were unashamed to think of and describe a 
'group mind.' Yet over the course of the 201h century, methodological individualism swept 
through the social sciences, eclipsing 'organicism'. Sociology was purged of what some 
considered Durkheim's 'mystical' view of the social entity (Wilson 2002, 66-7), and the 
sociological study of religion was largely reduced to the study of roles (Dahrendorf 1968), the 
8 In this dissertation, I will follow the Comparative Religious Ideas Project in characterizing the two 'poles' 
of cognitive content in religion as "ontological ultimates" and "ultimate ways." Thus, the general term 
'the divine' and the correlative phrase 'divine beings and ways' will be used to cover both of these poles. 
See Neville and Wildman (2001, 209). For a fuller explication of this project's conclusions, see Neville 
(2001). 
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sociology of knowledge (Berger 1967), and functionalist explanations for religious behavior.9 
This 'cleansing' of the study of religion from anything resembling the supernatural (which 
Durkheim championed) also meant the cleansing of the study of religion from anything 
resembling holism, and from the possibility that religious believers in fact were engaging 
something that could do justice to their conceptions of the divine. 
Consider how Durkheim's distinction between the sacred and the profane was taken up in 
later sociology of religion as developed by Weber, Shils, and Eisenstadt. Max Weber's 
(1978/1925) study of charisma argues certain people are viewed by others as being particularly 
close to the divine. The charismatic figure II demonstrates a highly personal experience of divine 
grace and strength" by II embodying or voicing the divine" (1115). Charisma depends upon 
II revelation." But Weber notes that revelation can include ideas from other realms than the 
religious, including artistic, ethical, and scientific ideas, since they too can be rooted in the 
'depths' of psychology. Thus, he suggests we may need to extend the category and not strongly 
discriminate between military, judicial, and ascetic charismatic figures (1116). 
Shils (1975/1965) takes up this secular extension of the concept, focusing on charisma in 
secular societies and institutions. For him, membership in political society answers the human 
need to be incorporated into something which ~~transcends and transfigures" concrete individual 
existence. The political society is the ~~transcendent body" which maintains values closer to the 
ultimate structures of reality than does the individual person (7). The fundamental point Shils 
makes is there is 11a unity of the religious and the secular conception of charisma" (258). The 
most fundamental laws of a country, its constitutions, its deepest traditions and institutions call 
9 Both Dahrendorf (cited) and Berger (1974) offer excellent critiques of reducing religion to either the 
study of roles, or to the functional replacement for genetic determination of social behavior, even as their 
work is most often used in support of such tasks. 
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forth awe, arousing "the sense of tremendum mysteriosum which Rudolf Otto designated as the 
central property of the 'idea of the holy"' (265}.10 Shils further argues our need for a rationally 
intelligible cognitive map of an ordered cosmos is what provides the impetus for the 'geniuses' 
who penetrate to the heart of order- whether scientific, moral, or political. Any connection 
with central features of our existence is charismatic, and all forms of genius demonstrate being 
permeated by 'spirit' (258-9). 
By the time we get to Eisenstadt (1968), charisma has become "individual freedom and 
creativity in a social setting" (xviii). Eisendstadt considers charisma as a close analogy of the 
biological concept of mutation, producing variation of institutional order contributing to 
institutional survival (xl). Further, he redefines religious charisma so that it doesn't involve the 
social realm at all, being about the individual's "symbolic-emotive" sphere, useful for 
restructuring "the emotional components of personality." It is only the politically charismatic 
that is social, organizing and restructuring the symbolic ordering of social stability (xxxi). 
Note how thoroughly the divine has been removed from the concept of charisma! For 
Weber, charisma was largely divine revelation, but extendable to other domains. For Shils, 
charisma was largely closeness to the political center, but also any form of genius peering into 
the ultimate structures of reality. For Eisenstadt, it is merely individual freedom in the social 
setting. In addition, by the time we get to Eisenstadt, 'religion' isn't about sociality at all; it has 
become privatized and separated from the 'real world' of social life. I suggest that much of this 
turns on the move by Durkheim and Weber to note a functional similarity in the social roles of 
set-apart political and religious ideas and authority, without distinguishing them. To 
10 Note that this position is simply the extension of Durkheim's thesis concerning the sacred to charismatic 
authority. 
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foreshadow the argument I will make inCh. 5, to say that the political and the religious might be 
exemplifications of a more general category is not to say that they are the same thing. 
Further examples of the failure to account for the divine and the experience of the divine in 
classic religious studies can be noted even in descriptions of religious community life. According 
to Gardner (1983), this happens whenever ritual is analyzed as a 'performative utterance.'11 
Gardner criticizes those who would reinterpret the ritual behavior of certain religious 
communities such that their ritual is seen to be about creating conventional social conditions, 
and not seen as interaction with the supernatural. Though this might be done with the 
'apologetic' purpose of making such a community appear more 'rational,' it does damage to a 
clear understanding of what is going on for participants in such ritual. Gardner writes: 
Because the rituals do not work through the mediation of chains of observable, material 
causes and effects, it is inferred that they must be largely conventional. But the 
Buddhists discussed by Tambiah, or the Chinese discussed by Ahern, are the only people 
who can establish whether what they are doing is an act performed to constitute a 
conventional state of affairs. And since they believe in ghosts and the capacity of 
ancestors to help the living ... attempts to involve them in the world are no more 
performative than a person's attempts to persuade his bank manager to lend him 
money ... It is true that the addressees of the illocutionary acts performed during 
magical and religious rituals are not empirically observable. However it needs to be 
emphasized that this provides no grounds for ignoring or reinterpreting the beliefs the 
actors have about the object of the ritual ... The atheistic scientist and the believer 
cannot be distinguished by reference to whether or not their activities involve belief in 
chains of causality. They do however differ in their beliefs about the kinds of possible 
causal chains that can exist. Rituals are invariably performed with some aim in view and 
in accordance with beliefs about the constitution of the universe and its fundamental 
processes. The place for Austinian performatives would seem therefore to be limited 
(349-50, 358). 
11 Austin's term. See section 3.3.4.1, p. 86 for a more complete analysis. Gardner is mainly criticizing 
Tambiah (1981, 2002). 
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Gardner's critique is based on the fact that religious communities claim belief in and 
experiences of the nonmaterial-yet-supremely-meaningful divine; religious theorists must keep 
this in mind when attempting to explain religious behavior. The theorists Gardner criticize want 
to reframe ritual as being about mundane social tasks and purposes, and not about the 'really 
real' divine world. 
A final example of this is found in Seligman et al.'s Ritual and its Consequences (2008). The 
authors argue that there are two different ways social organization can be facilitated. One way 
is through individual sincerity, where individuals come to shared agreement on a vision of the 
world as it is believed to be, 'truly.' Sociality built on sincerity requires a totalistic and 
unambiguous vision. Ritual, to the contrary, is not about something believed internally, but 
something conformed to externally: "formalism, reiteration, and externally dictated 
obligations" (8-9). Ritual, according to these authors, depends upon a shared participation in an 
'as-if' possible worldview, not upon a truly-true worldview which requires dismissing other 
worldviews as 'false.' Sincerity produces social forms that are monolithic and assumed to be 
'natural;' ritual produces social forms that are ambiguous and clearly conventional (20). The 
authors suggest that the sincerity pole leads to religious fundamentalism and radicalism, but the 
ritual pole gives tools that allow negotiable, labile ways to engage socially. For the authors, 
social organization is best served by conventions, not platonic assumptions about the real, so 
that people can negotiate subjunctive boundaries seen as such; these can be short-circuited by 
approaches that emphasize sincerity (87). 
As theoretically rich as this work is, it emphasizes only one use to which ritual can be put-
creating conventional agreements that 'grease the wheels' of human social organization. What 
about the kind of social organization produced when, through ritual, individuals approach and 
13 
respond to a particular vision of the divine? In fact, Rappaport argues persuasively that a certain 
kind of ritual performance--:- what he calls 'metaperformative' ritual-creates visions and 
experiences of the divine, resulting in a 'sincere' mode of engagement. 
Berger, whose The Sacred Canopy {1967) influentially suggests religion functions to 
undergird a shared ordering of the social world, had second thoughts about reducing religion to 
this sociological function. He argues in a later paper that functional definitions of religion have 
the tendency to violate what religion is understood to be from within. Functional definitions of 
religion legitimize a secularized worldview. The uniqueness of religious phenomena is simply 
ignored in these approaches, artificially equated with other phenomena. Berger argues this is 
due to the fact that a scientific account of religion must work without reference to 
transcendence. But in religious experiences, paramount or normal reality no longer appears so 
paramount. It appears as the 'outer court,' and the characteristics that define 'breaches' of 
paramount reality are drastically 'other' but immensely significant. Berger says he is now more 
militant against functional definitions of religion. He doesn't believe translating transcendence 
into the language of immanence takes into account the intentions and experiences of those who 
adhere to the meanings (Berger 1974, 126-9, 130-1). 
I agree with Berger on this point. As Durkheim noted, a key idea of religion concerns a 
transcendent power to which people are subordinate and on which they lean. 12 His description 
of religion attempts to reframe that transcendent power in terms of the collective social mind, a 
system of active forces- something on the model of a collective and social 'super-person.'13 
And Rappaport envisions a religious community as an adaptive and living thing- something on 
12 Durkheim (1995/1915, 80). 
13 I will demonstrate this in Ch. 5. 
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the model of a biological organism. For both, conceptions of the divine play a central role in 
these emergent characteristics. 14 If characterizations of the divine are in fact central to the 
formal organization of religious communities, we have reason to give religious belief a more 
important theoretical role than it usually has, against the tendency to dismiss or ignore it. This 
will particularly be the case if, in addition to organizing sociality, divine concepts mediate the 
profound experiences religious communities foster. We need not agree with any particular 
religious community that their account of divine beings or ways is the one true characterization 
of the 'real world,' but neither need we assume religious belief is an embarrassing 'extra' that 
need to be swept under the rug. 
1.3 How important is the divine in 'science of religion' approaches to religion? 
If the divine has suffered in sociological approaches to religion, it hasn't fared much better 
in 'science of religion' approaches. In fact, when mainstream evolutionary psychologists and 
cognitive scientists look at religion, one of the primary issues they focus on is the 'problem' of 
"supernatural (mis)beliefs" (McKay and Dennett 2009). Barrett (2010) describes this problem as 
follows: 
Evolutionary psychologists, and cognitive scientists in general, tend to define religion as 
professed belief in supernatural beings ... The falsity of this belief is usually taken for 
granted, so that the starting point of inquiry is some version of the question, "Why do so 
many people hold irrational beliefs in supernatural beings"? ... The fact that such beliefs 
are still so widespread long after the rise of scientific inquiry suggests to evolutionary 
psychologists that there is a deeper cause, rooted in our cognitive architecture, which, 
in turn, is rooted in our genes. Accordingly what distinguishes evolutionary psychology 
of religion is its attempt to explain how beliefs in supernatural beings are generated, 
selected, and maintained by universal mechanisms lodged in the human brain, and 
furthermore, to explain how these mechanisms functioned as adaptations in our 
evolutionary past (584). 
14 1 will examine how inCh. 5. 
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Barrett notes that there are two fundamental problems with this approach to concepts of 
the divine. The first is that it is deeply biased towards western theological categories, as Roth 
(2008) has pointed out. The second is that evolutionary psychology approaches have a very 
limited picture of the way cognition- including cognition utilizing religious beliefs- works. This 
is due to an assumption that dominates mainstream evolutionary psychology. 15 Barrett writes: 
... mainstream evolutionary psychology is distinguished ... by its insistence that the mind 
comprises a collection of functionally discrete, domain-specific processors or "modules" 
rather than a single general-purpose processor ... it understands the unique capabilities 
of the human mind in terms of the sheer number of modules rather than the 
computational power of a single mechanism (595) . 
... modules are "domain-specific" structures whose special functions are {/triggered" by 
pre-specified {/stimuli" ... If one asks where the brain systems get their inherent 
functional identity, the buck is often passed to genes ... , which contain information for 
the construction of the human brain (598). 
According to Barrett, one of the problems of this perspective is the tendency "to 
overemphasize natural selection as the determinant of phenotypic traits, such that nearly all 
traits are assumed to be adaptations" (590). 16 One such phenotypic trait assumed to be strongly 
determined by genes is culture. The mainstream view of evolutionary psychology tends to 
assume our evolutionary heritage creates a 'short leash' for culture, where culture largely 
expresses the biases of our 'mental modules' encoded in genes, and is not an independent 
location from genes to produce intelligible change. An example of this perspective is found in 
Pinker (1994), when he argues against the 'Standard Social Science Model' that holds humans, in 
distinction to animals, are largely determined by culture, an autonomous system of symbols and 
values. According to this model Pinker criticizes, cultures can vary from one another arbitrarily 
15 See Barkow et al. (1992), Pinker (1997), Buss (2012). 
16 Barrett calls this the 'adaptionist' bias. 
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and without limit. Further, humans are born with nothing but reflexes and a general purpose 
ability to learn, useful in all domains of knowledge. Pinker proposes that a better starting point 
for understanding human culture is the 'Integrated Causal Model' of Too by and Cosmides, which 
describes how evolution has caused us to have the brains we have, how the brains we have 
cause us to have the psychological processes we have, and how the psychological processes we 
have cause the values and knowledge that make up culture. Culture is not, on Pinker's terms, a 
disembodied ghostly force or fundamental force of nature. 17 Pinker defines culture as a meme, 
a contagiously spread 'virus' that fits the biases of our evolved minds, allowing them to become 
coordinated into shared patterns (Ch. 13). 
The 'adaptationist bias' leads many in mainstream 'science of religion' to argue that belief 
in divine beings must be explained either as the product of an evolved domain-specific module 
(usually conceived as having evolved for its contribution to sociality), or as an accidental and 
error-producing byproduct of evolved mental modules (McKay and Dennett 2009, 502-3). Let us 
look at these two positions. 
1.3.1 Sociality-supporting, evolved belief in divine beings 
Those who argue that belief in divine beings is a sociality-supporting, evolved, domain 
specific trait propose that it evolved for one of three reasons. 1) It evolved due to the pro-social 
effect of believing these supernatural agents mete out punishment for anti-social behavior 
(Newberg, D'Aquili, and Rause 2001; Johnson, Stopka, and Knights 2003; Johnson 2005; Bering 
and Johnson 2005; Roes and Raymond 2003; Johnson and Kruger 2004; Bering, Mcleod, and 
Shackelford 2005; Bering 2006; Johnson and Bering 2009); 2) It evolved due to the pro-social 
17 And more to the point, neither is it an independent locus for evolutionary processes, as others have 
proposed. 
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effect of believing these supernatural beings have full-access to what everyone thinks, which 
distracts us from cognitions that might spoil our faith in group endeavors (Bulbulia 2009); 3) It 
evolved as a sort of 'catalyst' that makes participation in group endeavors attractive to insiders 
and repulsive to outsiders (Sosis 2003). 
Preliminary evidence has been gathered in favor of the first proposal- religious beliefs 
evolved due to the pro-social effect of believing these supernatural agents mete out 
punishment for anti-social behavior. Johnson (2005) found that belief in 'high' gods- gods that 
have the power and desire to mete out punishment for human behavior- are associated with 
societies that are larger, norm compliant (on some tests), that loan and use abstract money, 
that are centrally sanctioned and policed, and that pay taxes. As McKay and Dennett point out, 
however, the causal relationship between these two was not established by this correlation. Is 
there evidence to suggest a causal connection between a 'mental module' supporting belief in 
supernatural agents and pro-social behavior? McKay and Dennett have critically surveyed the 
literature that claims to support this causal connection 18 and conclude that at this point there is 
no strong evidence to indicate supernatural beliefs generated by a mental module affect 
behavior, nor any demonstrating supernatural beliefs generated by a mental module exert their 
effects by activating reputational concerns involving supernatural agents (504). 
With respect to the second proposal, that religious belief evolved due to the pro-social 
effect of believing these supernatural beings have full-access to what everyone thinks, Bulbulia 
(2009) argues there are inherent limitations to what a group of people possessing a 'theory of 
mind' module can accomplish together. This is due to fact that an ability to imagine what others 
are thinking cripples our faith in group endeavors, as we may imagine others will cheat or pull-
18 Particularly Bering, Mcleod, and Shackelford (2005) and Shariff and Norenzayan (2007). 
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out of a potentially costly undertaking. He postulates that if something solving this problem had 
appeared in the gene pool, it would have spread because it would allow groups to undertake 
high-payoff endeavors, increasing individual reproductive capacity. In fact, he thinks what has 
evolved to overcome this limitation on high-payoff endeavors is a domain-specific belief in 'full-
access strategic agents'- imaginary agents who have access to the secret thoughts of every 
individual. This belief evolved since interaction with such entities through visualized 
communication would preoccupy our theory of mind module and suppress its activation with 
respect to other humans, overcoming the risk assessment problem. Public ritual enacting large-
scale community interaction with such full-access strategic agents would reduce anxiety about 
large-scale cooperative efforts, modulating what is in individual working memory, aligning goal-
states towards common sacred values. The success of the resulting large-scale cooperative 
ventures would (correctly!) be associated with a group's mutual submission to the strategic 
agents in question, reinforcing commitment and thus further supporting successful large-scale 
cooperative ventures. 
With respect to the third proposal, that religious belief evolved as a sort of 'catalyst' that 
makes participation in group endeavors attractive to insiders and repulsive to outsiders, Sosis 
(2003) argues religious belief is an evolved cultural innovation19 disguising to outsiders the 
group biological value of social participation (by obfuscating it through unnecessary and costly 
ritual behavior), and disguising to insiders the individual biological costliness of social 
participation (by making it feel meaningful). In other words, religious belief supports the 
19 It is his commitment to evolutionary psychology assumptions concerning the 'cultural innovation' he 
appeals to that makes his argument tangled and unconvincing, to my mind at least. 
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functional end of social solidarity produced by costly signals, but does so in an encoded, indirect 
way. 
The strength of each of these arguments is based in the fact that religious communities do 
seem to function in ways that strongly support human sociality, leading many to believe it has 
had an impact on the survival of hominins in evolutionary history. At first glance, this suggests 
that religion is an evolved group-level adaptation to support individual survival. David Sloan 
Wilson (2002, 2008) has made perhaps the strongest comprehensive argument to this effect. 20 
want to point out, however, that even if belief in supernatural agents does lead to pro-social 
behavior in ways related to these proposals, we are not required to think those beliefs are the 
outcome of domain-specific evolved processes, as these approaches assume. Religious beliefs 
may make us respect group morality more, they may make us trust in others more, they may 
serve as a sort of code connecting individual meaningfulness and group participation. But they 
may do these things for reasons other than being a genetically-given mechanism or bias that 
evolved for this purpose. Unfortunately, the mainstream cognitive science/evolutionary 
psychology perspective doesn't allow for this claim. From within that approach, there is an 
either/or forced choice between claiming religious beliefs result from evolved mental modules, 
and concluding they must be the accidental byproduct of other mental modules, having no 
functional outcome. Before branching out to explore alternatives to this forced choice, 
however, let us finish our brief survey of cognitive science/evolutionary psychology approaches 
to supernatural belief. Perhaps the mainstream approach holds that belief in supernatural 
agents is not an evolved product but a byproduct of evolved, domain-specific modules. These 
20 Although it should be noted that at times he seems to support the idea that religion might represent a 
cultural innovation that 'evolves' by its own dynamics. My read of him, however, is that more often than 
not he leans towards a genetic explanation for religion. 
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beliefs, though demonstrably cognitive error, when combined with evolved sources of human 
sociality are 'exapted' to play a role in human social organization. 
1.3.2 Belief in divine beings a byproduct of evolved, domain-specific modules that 
are exapted to play a role supporting human social organization 
Perhaps the clearest suggestion as to the origin and role of supernatural beliefs from this 
perspective is found in Kirkpatrick (2008). Kirkpatrick argues 1) that religion is not the direct 
result of natural selection due to its effects on survival and reproductive success; 2) we possess 
no genes for religion, in the sense of producing belief or behavior unique to religion; and 3) we 
possess no evolved psychological mechanisms whose primary adaptive function is/was to 
produce religion. He suggests religion in more like literacy than breathing, in that literacy is a 
cultural phenomenon that has proven to be useful to humans, though not necessarily 
supporting their biological survival. Similarly, we have no genes for playing soccer, yet the game 
is somewhat universal. This is due to the fact that it utilizes specific brain regions and 
neurological processes that did evolve for other reasons, and ability for and interest in the game 
(and other sports) is probably moderately heritable. 
He argues religion appears to be a cobbled together patchwork, and that is what we would 
expect to see if religion was not an adaptation, but rather composed of a mixture of 
psychological mechanism by-products and cultural evolution. With respect to religious beliefs, 
Kirkpatrick argues religious beliefs fade fuzzily into superstitions, extra-sensory perception, 
belief in UFO's, and other beliefs equally puzzling. These are best accounted for as unevolved 
byproducts (spandrels) of psychological mechanisms for understanding the natural world. But 
these beliefs are exapted by cultural and memetic evolutionary processes in service of evolved 
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social-cognitive mechanisms for negotiating distinct types of relationships such as attachment, 
kinship, social exchange, coalitions, and dominance hierarchies. 
The most common account for the origin of belief in supernatural entities, in line with 
Kirkpatrick's opinion as stated above, argues they result from the misapplication of evolved 
cognitive modules in some way. Some researchers argue the central components of religious 
belief are remembered and transmitted easily because they minimally violate evolved 
categories for efficiently processing experience, making them easy to recall (Kirkpatrick 1999; 
Boyer 1994, 2001, 2003; Boyer and Ramble 2001; Boyer 2005; Barrett 2000, 2004; Atran 2002, 
2006). Others argue supernatural concepts result from an overextended application of an 
evolved bias towards agency detection (Guthrie 1993; Barrett 2000). Other alleged evolved 
modules that can lead to religious ideas- cognitive error- when misapplied include the module 
that reasons from cause to effect (Kirkpatrick 1999), the module that examines the material 
world in terms of function (Kelemen 2004), and the module that reads off the behavior of others 
what they are thinking (Bulbulia, noted above). 
If religious beliefs are mere cognitive error, why are they so persistently held when 
scientific accounts of have long shown them to be so? The answer from those in this camp is 
that religious beliefs have become associated with powerful sources of pro-social emotions, and 
have become useful for 'authorizing' particular visions of social relations and extending them 
across large swaths of space and time. Many scholars argue supernatural beliefs are an 
epiphenomenal add-on to what actually drives sociality in all its manifestations. Concepts of the 
divine are associated with biological sources of social emotions, such as 'rhythmic drivers' like 
dance, drumming, and music, which produce 'general feelings of good.' We have evolved to 
have these feelings in these circumstances because of their impact on social organization and 
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coordination. These biological 'triggers' of sociality do their work regardless of the cultural 
trappings laid on top of them, and whether or not the cultural trappings are 'good' or 'bad.' 
Sosis and Alcorta (2003) offer an example of this approach, arguing that the 'sacred things' 
of religion result from the positive and negative emotional charging given to them through their 
association with costly ritual, rather than by their intrinsic properties such as their cognitive 
aspects. With the right emotional charging, anything can be sacred (265). Bulbulia (2009) sums 
up the social science data on cooperation priming to conclude there are all sorts of evolved, 
automatic cues behind the sociality found in religion, and none of them are unique to religious 
life. "The implicit priming literature illustrates how we become more predictably cooperative in 
response to our circumstances, apparently without requiring partner-specific assessment, and 
without harboring explicit religious beliefs" (525-6). He concludes from this that biology, not 
concepts of the divine, is the center and source of religious emotions. 
Another example suggesting that divine concepts have become associated with evolved 
sources of sociality is 'costly signaling' approaches to religion. Costly signaling theory in its 
original guise is a biological theory proposing a solution to problems believed to plague the 
evolution of sociality. The theory proposes some organisms have evolved to 'show off' their 
health to potential reproductive partners through hard-to-fake signals of genetic fitness, since 
evolutionary pressures would lead less fit organisms to cheat, faking their fitness to prospective 
mates. The logic of costly signaling theory as applied to religious forms of sociality is: 1. There 
are genetic advantages to individuals from group coordination; 2. Cheaters can exploit this by 
enjoying the benefits without paying the costs; 3. Genetic mechanisms to limit cheating must 
evolve; 4. High cost signals of cooperative intention are the only credible signal of cooperative 
intentions; these can create trust and commitment even in the presence of cheaters by giving a 
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·way to identify in-group members; 5. Costly religious ritual is an example of high-cost signaling 
(Sosis 2003, 93). In support of this theory, research has shown that the frequency of permanent 
symbolic markings on a warrior's body correlates with the frequency his group engages in war 
(Bulbulia 2009, 522). This theory, then, suggests divine concepts are non-necessary 'add-ons' 
that have become associated with the actual evolved purpose of religious ritual- signaling 
costly commitment to the group. 
Neither the 'costly signaling' nor the 'rhythmic driver add-on' argument offers any good 
reason why concepts of the divine should have become attached to evolved emotional sources 
of sociality, just that they are. Rhythmic drivers- drumming, music, dancing- have always 
existed in human culture, probably having roots in our deep evolutionary past. Why should 
some forms of this behavior be associated with divine concepts, and some forms not? What is 
gained by having a Haitian voodoo sevis where the ancestors (lwa) are worshipped, when next 
door a dance club offers, according to this theory, exactly the same product? What is gained by 
having a painful and costly initiation ceremony into the beliefs of a tribe, filled with accounts of 
gods, ancestors, and their interactions with the living, when tattoos, military boot camps and 
hazing techniques, and fraternity initiations offer the same painful opportunities to display hard-
to-fake signals of group commitment without the added cultural baggage? These facts suggest 
there needs to be a further reason divine concepts are 'stickily' associated with biological 
sources of sociality. The answer suggested is that they are useful for 'authorizing' particular 
visions of social relations and extending them across large swaths of space and time. 
Examples of arguments of this kind are given by many of the same theorists just 
mentioned, since they think, similar to Kirkpatrick, that religion is a cobbled-together group of 
phenomena that has developed within culture to play useful roles in support of human sociality. 
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For example, Alcorta and Sosis (2005) suggest that religious rituals communicate and coordinate 
social behaviors through the elicitation of neurophysiological responses, providing a mechanism 
for cooperative action and the reintegration of social groups. The fact that symbols are made 
emotionally salient through ritual allows them to represent that emotional salience over 
distance in time and space, providing "dispersed groups with a tangible and motivational symbol 
of the abstract social relationships codified through the ritual process" (348). The symbolic, the 
social, and the affective are linked, meaning religious symbols can motivate individual behavior, 
forge inter-group alliances, and distinguish between friends and enemies. 
An example of how religious beliefs authorize the particular social arrangements of 
particular societies is given by Wildman (2011). Expanding on themes by Berger (1967), he 
argues that unseen strategic agents became associated with genetically underdetermined, 
conventional visions of human sociality as expressed linguistically, giving them their authority. 
Why did this happen? In general, linguistically-encoded expressions of human sociality can be 
described as having their authority through a dynamic interaction between individual 
experience and social reality. Socially-shared beliefs about the proper state of social reality are 
communicated to and internalized by individuals; once internalized, they take on a life of their 
own, exerting themselves on individual behavior; occasionally, some individuals modify this 
reality and communicate their modified vision to others; when embraced, they become the new 
status-quo of socially-shared beliefs about the proper state of social reality. This cycle continues 
indefinitely. It is stable when it is not questioned or challenged, and this is maximally the case 
when it operates transparently to individuals, is embraced whole-heartedly by individuals, and 
can only be questioned at great price. The way the unseen agents of religious beliefs contribute 
to this process is that they, not the community itself, are seen as the source of the conventional 
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social patterns embodied by a community. These social patterns are 'written on the sky,' seen 
as commandments. Thus the conventional nature and the evolving, dynamic interaction 
between symbolized social system and individual is disguised, the cost of challenging it is high, 
and individuals value the system because they value the gods and value the certainty of the 
system they embrace against alternatives. This dynamic interaction between individuals and 
conventional social systems made transparent by their association with the gods facilitates 
confidence in one's peers, allowing the coordination of activities far outside of what normal 
human trust could provide. 
The perspective of this dissertation could broadly be included in this second group of 
theories. I don't argue religion is the direct result of natural selection due to its effects on 
survival and reproductive success; I don't argue we possess genes for religion in the sense of 
producing belief or behavior unique to religion; I don't argue we possess evolved psychological 
mechanisms whose primary adaptive function is/was to produce religion. But I would want to 
distinguish myself from the group whose work I have recounted by noting that I emphasize the 
way authority, entailed by ritual participation, combines with the formal features of religious 
belief to change the way individuals approach and experience the divine content of their 
community (see chapter 5). The meaningfulness and importance of authoritative divine beliefs 
are found in their effects facilitating and guiding alternative states of consciousness, which have 
both individual and group effects. Their 'truth' is found in what they produce, not what they 
describe. I can further be distinguished from this group by my suggestion that religion is not just 
a 'cobble-together patchwork,' but rather demonstrates a holistic organization best described 
by one of Deacon's categories of emergence. I base my theory on the proposal that domain-
general and symbolic minds suggest culture may be a place for the creative exploration of 
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symbolic thought, and a crucible where such explorative variation is selected for its value in 
bringing individual brains, social groups, and environments into agreement with each other. It 
can also be a domain in which emergent organizational dynamics arise. 
1.4 'Broad' evolutionary psychology affords new visions of culture 
Barrett, whose critique of the 'narrow' model of evolutionary psychology I have been 
following, offers us an alternative approach to culture and cognition; he writes, 
My proposal draws from a family of cognitive theories that emphasize cognition as a 
dynamic process wherein information is constructed by interactions between organisms 
and their environments, and offers the process of evolution itself, pictured as the 
exploration of adaptive landscapes, as a new metaphor for cognition. From this 
perspective, human religiosity is not so much a product of past evolution-and thus an 
archaic remainder-as a continually changing aspect of an ongoing evolutionary process 
(Barrett 2010, 587-8, italics mine). 
When we consider that culture itself can act as an independent locus for evolutionary 
change (Campbell1960, 1965, 1974; Durham 1991; Plotkin 1993; Deacon 1997; Mithen 1998; 
Donald 2001; Tomasello 1999, 2003), we have stepped outside the strict binary reasoning 
implied in the beliefthat culture is the expression ofthe genetic 'programming' of a series of 
mental modules and neurological mechanisms and biases. Thus, 'evolutionary psychology' can 
be construed broadly as involving evolutionary processes in cognitional/cultural domains, as 
well as in genes, contra mainstream evolutionary psychology. The debate between these two 
versions of 'evolutionary psychology' turns on how much flexibility culture is perceived to give 
humans to transcend the bounds of biologically determined cognition, and this in turn depends 
on the degree to which a domain-general intelligence21 and the unique referential possibilities 
21 Mithen (1998), Donald (2001), Fauconnier and Turner (2002). 
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found in symbol use22 are embraced. I would argue that culture does in fact allow us to 
transcend domain-specific and programmed cognition. As a simple example of this kind of 
flexibility, consider Spelke's (2003) set of experiments demonstrating that something as simple 
as counting past the number four involves the ability of language (and probably a general 
intelligence) to bridge domain-specific 'modules' of the brain involving number. General 
intelligence and the flexible type of reference made possible by symbolic thought makes 
possible the counter-intuitive speculation about the physical world found in Einstein's use of 
non-Euclidian physics, and the ability of humans to overturn natural biases towards racism. 23 
agree with Geertz {1973) that there may be cognitive biases given by our biological heritage, but 
these underdetermine what thought and culture may explore, and even create. Geertz argues, 
as does Donald and Deacon, that our brains and cultural patterns co-evolved. We are 
unfinished, undefined animals without culture, distinguished from other animals by how much 
and how widely we need to learn to be able to function. From this perspective, we are 
'degraded apes,' 24 rather weakly reliant on highly tuned, mental'modules' and much more 
reliant on generalized intelligence and symbolic culture. 25 Without input from culture, our 
brains wouldn't know how to direct or organize our behavior (Geertz 1973, 45-49). 
Our lessened reliance on domain specific intelligence explains why culture can change, 
adapt, and evolve. And contra Pinker, following Geertz, I believe cultural evolution has taken 
over from biological evolution as the main driver of human progress. All humans are equally 
capable of engaging culture, and are distinct from animals in this respect (Geertz 1973, 69). 
22 Deacon (1997), Hofstadter (1979, 2007), Tomasello (1999). 
23 To be examined a bit more in Ch. 4. 
24 This is Deacon's term. See Ch. 3 for a fuller explication of the idea. 
25 See Mithen (1998). 
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Even our sense of our personal uniqueness, importance, and value is the result of culturally-
given categories and agreements (Durkheim 1995/1915, 229). This is not to argue that 'culture 
comes from culture' and deny that culture is based in and biased by lower-level biological 
processes. Culture, though relatively free to evolve independent of biological requirements, 
must eventually serve biological ends, even as it hijacks biological purposes to serve culture's 
ends (Messer 2001, 8-9; Rappaport 1999, Ch. 1). From this perspective, the findings of cognitive 
science with respect to the impact of our evolved psychology on religion is certainly relevant, 
but not necessarily the whole story. We may have a natural way of framing our universe as a 
result of our evolutionary history, played out in the way religious beliefs may have certain 
biases. But religious belief and the role it plays in religious community life might be due to other 
factors than cognitive error or evolved mental modules. 
1.5 Broad evolutionary psychology opens new possibilities for the function of 
religious belief 
On a mainstream evolutionary psychology approach to the human person, religious 
concepts are either the result of evolved mental modules (and thus an aspect of biology), or the 
result of the misapplication of evolved mental modules (and thus an embarrassment, a failure, 
of human cognition and culture). However, if culture itself is distinguishable from our genes as a 
symbolically-mediated, independent locus for evolution, there exists an alternative to genes for 
grounding religion's emergent, functional, and adaptive attributes. Religious belief may be part 
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and parcel of a form of sociality that has emerged out of culturally-mediated sociality, and which 
exists relatively independent of other social forms. 26 
Deacon and Cashman (2009} have begun to explore how symbolic culture allows for 
alternative possible explanation for religion in its psychic aspects. They suggest religion's 
psychological dynamics have an emergent nature deriving from the way our symbolic capacities 
reorganize both cognition and emotion, fundamentally reframing human life experience. 
According to Deacon and Cashman, symbolic capacity explains 1} a predisposition to see the 
world and one's own place in it narratively; 2} a predisposition to see the world as two-layered, 
with mundane experience being contrasted with a more fundamental yet hidden reality; and 3} 
a capacity for emergent emotional experiences of a higher order than primary primate 
emotions, which ground transcendent experiences (2009, 490}. Further, they suggest the 
cognitive and emotional [and I would add, social] integration found in religious communities 
may be an emergent 'good,' valuable in itself (513}. 
Deacon and Cashman's perspective suggests the possibility that belief in divine beings and 
ways might both organize sociality and be psychically meaningful, and yet also be free (or 
relatively free} with respect to evolved mental modules. There is, in fact, a minority school 
within scientific perspectives on religious belief that suggests divine concepts rationalize, 
organize, and direct alternate states of consciousness in ways that are biologically or culturally 
adaptive (Winkelman 1986, 2002a; Winkelman and Baker 2010; Clottes and Lewis-Williams 
1998; Lewis-Williams 2002, 2009; McCienon 1997, 2001; Kydd 2008; McNamara 2009}; others 
suggest divine concepts are an affordance of the emergence of symbolic thought, representing 
26 Here I mean logically emergent from and independent of, not necessarily temporally so. Evidence 
suggests that religion is extremely old, and may be the 'original culture.' See for example Lewis-Williams 
{2002). 
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possible ways of being in the world worth exploring (Mithen 1998, 2009; Deacon and Cashman 
2009). 
1.6 What divine concepts mean for the religious 
I want to recall Durkheim's insight that, on a scientific account of religion, whatever is going 
to take the place of the gods in religious believer's lives must be adequate to the task. To be 
religious, I would argue, is to have something that is worthy of worship in some capacity or 
other; as Durkheim noted against the reductionist approaches of his own day, the idea of 
majesty is essentially religious, and we have to find out where majesty comes from, what it 
corresponds to, and what could awaken it (Durkheim 1995/1915, 58-9). Anthropologists and 
even critics of religion have noted that a typical retort of the religious to a challenge from an 
alternative religious or secular scientific point of view is a claim concerning their experience of 
the efficacy of the divine, a claim that says, 'my gods are more powerful than yours' (Van de 
Port 2005; Dawkins 2006, 154; Kirsch 2004). How and when are such opinions formed? In 
religious education classrooms, or in the ongoing, dynamic, existential engagement of the 
individual, the community, and the wider world with the divine as conceived? At the end of the 
day, in mainstream evolutionary psychology/cognitive science approaches to religion, belief in 
supernatural entities is either the result of mechanistic, programmed reactions, or 
nonfunctioning, correctible cognitive error. A broader view of evolutionary psychology opens 
up other alternatives. I suggest that the approaches of Durkheim and Rappaport point us in the 
right direction. For both, the dynamics of religious community life represent something special; 
divine concepts link individual psychic life and emergent social communities, and perhaps even 
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facilitate ontological novelty.27 It is this intuition that has inspired this dissertation. But that 
leads us to the question of method. 
1.7 Method of this dissertation: The hard problem and the easy problem 
What can I hope to argue within the scope of this dissertation? To answer that, consider 
the difference between how Durkheim and Rappaport approach their analysis of religious 
communities. Durkheim claims he is describing how religious life allows the emergent aspects 
of a community, conceived on analogy to a super-mind or person, to reconstitute and magnify, 
resulting in it thinking and feeling through and in individual participants. 28 Rappaport, on the 
other hand, is interested in describing a religious community as an adaptive system, formally 
similar to a living organism. The difference between these two approaches mirrors the story of 
emergence theory itself, which has always had two poles of concern. One pole is the concern to 
make room for new qualities, such as 'life' and subjective human experience, in scientific 
accounts of the otherwise ordinary chemical processes defining living things and human brains. 
The other pole of concern is to account for the way organization matters in the function of such 
things as living organisms and human brains. These two concerns- functional organization and 
unexpected qualities- were memorably united in David Chalmers' (1996) characterization of 
the 'easy' problem and the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Chalmers argues that explaining 
how and why conscious experience should be associated with a 3lb mass of cells called the brain 
is unequivocally a hard problem, in principle. Understanding the functional organization of a 
brain that has conscious experiences, on the other hand, as difficult as that may be, poses no 
corresponding difficulty in principle, and as such is an easy problem. With respect to thinking of 
27 See fn 34, p. 39. 
28 We will examine this aspect of Durkheim's thought inCh. 5. 
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religious communities on emergence terms, if Durkheim's exalted language about society 
pushes us in the direction of asking the 'hard problem' of religious communities, Rappaport 
explicitly cybernetic approach pushes us towards asking the 'easy problem.' I, in this 
dissertation, follow Rappaport in an attempt to explicate the easy problem. And the most 
central claim I make is the way forward is to use the best emergent categories available to 
recast Rappaport's conception of the functional organization of a religious community. 
Beyond what is possible in this dissertation, however, there is some hope that this 
approach could ground a potentially richer research program. Consider that Chalmers holds the 
easy problem and the hard problem to be related; the one may 'supervene' on the other. That 
is, conscious experience may simply be an added, brute fact tied to brains organized in a specific 
way. Chalmers argues that if we understand the organizational conditions of consciousness-
the easy problem- we would also establish the grounds necessary for positing the presence of 
conscious experience- the hard problem. And that suggests a reason why we might want to 
embrace Rappaport's program using the best emergence categories available: when we 
understand the organizational features of a religious community, we might conclude there could 
be a 'hard problem' to study as well. 
Suggesting this is the fact that both the organizational structure of living things and the 
organizational structure of conscious selves have been profitably advanced by Deacon's version 
of emergence theory. That is, that theory is relevant to understanding the intelligent function of 
an organism with respect to its environment, as well as to understanding the presence of 
meaningful, narrative selves with respect to symbolically-mediated society. If we can reasonably 
argue that religious communities have this same organizational structure, we have tentatively 
linked together the organizational structure of living things, human persons as selves, and 
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religious communities. To the degree that this dissertation makes compelling that link, we may 
want to be bold enough to ask if there are phenomenal, qualitative, and experiential features 
unique to religious community life, on analogy with the conscious experience of human selves. 
By profitably engaging Rappaport, we might be getting Durkheim's exalted conceptions thrown 
in, for free as it were. 
But that would be a task for another time. For now, the question is, What can we gain from 
recasting Rappaport's conception of religious communities using 'semiotic emergent' 
categories? 
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2 Background for an updated theory of religion 1: Emergence and Semiosis 
If the problem with Rappaport's account is that the cybernetic theory he draws on is out of 
date, it becomes necessary to explicate what might be considered the 'state of the art' of 
cybernetic theory to improve his account. For the rest of this chapter, I will develop the 
groundwork for a set of theoretical devices most helpful for a precise account of the logical 
structure of religious communities, which will enable us to make clear and helpful distinctions 
between 'properly religious' religious communities and their political, aesthetic, and moral 
cousins. I will examine the key ideas surrounding the terms 'semiotic' and 'emergence' as used 
in this dissertation. In the next chapter, I will outline the work of four theorists who have 
explicitly attempted to combine symbolic reference and emergence into theories of 'semiotic 
emergence.'29 As a result of these two chapters, we should gain the tools to better account for 
the relationship between religious experience and ritual order, which I have argued that 
Rappaport develops incorrectly. 
2.1 Emergent systems 
Terrence Deacon30 has been one of the ablest expositors of what is often called 
'emergence,' which represents an updated version of the cybernetic theory Rappaport draws 
upon. In this section, I will outline the key features of his theory. 
2.1.1 Emergence complements reduction 
In Deacon's hands, emergence is not a new 'field' of the sciences, nor does it introduce new 
causal factors or forces into established scientific fields. It is more like a metaphor change, a 
change in perspective that draws attention to problems previously ignored, and asks questions 
29 Although none of them will use this category name explicitly. 
30 Deacon has argued for emergence in a series of papers; perhaps his most comprehensive account is 
found in Deacon (2006a). 
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previously unasked. The metaphor change suggested by emergence allows Deacon to ask how it 
is that the 'cast of characters' taken from physics can be organized into living organisms 
exhibiting functional adaptation, and into human persons who can engage the natural world 
with intelligence and intentionality. Emergence draws attention to organization rather than 
component parts, and tries to account for the increase in organizational complexity exhibited by 
systems, as well as the self-serving causal arrangements some of them manifest. 
Emergence theory emphasizes certain aspects of phenomena usually ignored by 
reductionist approaches. Deacon suggests what a few of these aspects are: 
• While reductionist approaches give us a 'cast of characters' that make up all 
phenomena, characterizing parts and their potential for interaction, emergence 
approaches focus on how contextual relations between component parts and external 
objects matters to what happens across larger spans of space, time, and referential 
fields (Goodenough and Deacon 2006, 853-5). 31 
• Reductionist approaches give us the basic physical laws describing cause and effect that 
apply to all parts everywhere; emergence approaches focus on novel arrangements of 
causality which sometimes appear, without invoking unprecedented physical laws 
(Deacon 2006a, 122). Emergence approaches focus on specific types of organization of 
global causal dynamics (Sherman and Deacon 2007, 878). 
• Reductionist approaches focus on parts in isolation, what they are intrinsically. 
Emergence approaches focus on how those parts interact causally in systems, and are 
often reflected in "research paradigms sensitive to systemic factors" (Deacon 2003a, 
274). Systemic emergent effects are often the most critical causal processes behind 
phenomena to be explained (Weber and Deacon 2000, 23). 
31 Thus, one could argue that emergence is simply the attempt to track the narrative story of how both 
energy and form interact to produce complexity, function, and intentionality across the 'hierarchy of the 
sciences'- from physics to chemistry to biology, etc. What is crucial to distinguish the emergent account 
of this story from reductionist account of the hierarchy of the sciences is the conviction that what is 
known at any lower level science underdetermines what would count as knowledge to a higher-level 
science. To know that the theoretical entities of a higher level science are made up of the theoretical 
entities taken from a lower level science (which reductionism as a strategy suggests) does not give an 
account of what specifically characterizes the way those characters interact at a higher level, and why. 
See Bechtel and Richardson (1992). For a reductionist account of the hierarchy of the sciences, see 
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). 
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• Reductionist approaches are concerned with the specific material composition and 
causal processes underlying a particular phenomenon; emergence approaches are 
interested in phenomena demonstrating the same systemic causal dynamics operating 
in diverse domains, and across different structural implementations, motivating the 
suspicion that these phenomena are relatively independent of specific material 
composition (Deacon 2003a, 274-5).32 
• Reductionist approaches tend to prioritize isolated, closed systems in order to 
understand their lawful behavior; emergence approaches note that open, far-from-
equilibrium, thermodynamically self-organizing systems can also serve as the means for 
perpetuating and maintaining form across time (Weber and Deacon 2000, 19).33 
2.1.2 Emergence is about the spontaneous recruitment of self-organizing 
tendencies 
If in Deacon's hands emergence is a complement- not a competitor- to a reductionist 
perspective, the fundamental advancement an emergence approach offers is it demonstrates 
the necessity of abandoning the 'machine metaphor' to describe complex systems, which views 
them as designed mechanisms. There are two aspects of this metaphor. The first is that 
complex, organized systems are the result of an intelligent, intentional designer. The second is 
that a complex, organized system is delicate, precise, and not robust. The idea that designers 
are necessary to explanations in nature has been replaced in the sciences by the Darwinian 
mechanism, particularly by the 'blind luck' aspect of random variation. The idea that a complex 
organized system is 'highly machined,' however, is still widely held. Thus we currently think in 
terms of random machines (Deacon 2000, 1-2). 
Deacon thinks we need to replace the 'highly machined' aspect of the metaphor with the 
idea of self-organizing processes. Self-organizing processes provide better intuitions to gain 
insight into the ordering impetus of complex systems like biological organisms. First, machines 
32 Thus, Deacon argues that emergence is related to the logic of functionalism. See Deacon (2003a, 7). 
33 For a discussion of this from a physicist's perspective, see Davies (2006). 
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involve pre-specified specialized parts brought together in a highly constrained order to form a 
whole, which suggests that only highly unlikely chance events would allow organized complex 
systems to exist. Self-organizing processes, to the contrary, are first naturally-occurring dynamic 
wholes which only later separate out into specialized parts (Deacon 2006a, 115). Second, a 
machine is not allowed to vary physically. It must always act consistently with an externally 
determined order, its function. Self-organizing processes, on the other hand, must recruit 
spontaneous intrinsic tendencies, which can and will vary, and must be able to use them in 
novel ways. Only later are varieties of self-organizing processes made subject to selection (115). 
Third, a machine whose outputs-to-inputs are determined in advance is informationally static. It 
is like a deductive proof- from its inputs, its outputs are necessary. The opposite is true of a 
self-organized process. At the core of such a system is a fundamental informational openness, a 
vagueness of determination, an incompleteness. By having no 'preset' inputs tied to preset 
outputs, a self-organized process can find use for noise, while machines have to have noise 
eliminated for the sake of predictability. Noise for a machine is a problem to overcome (Deacon 
2000, 26-7). 
Deacon notes that natural selection, a process usually considered critical to understanding 
biological organisms, already assumes the existence of processes of non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics, self-maintenance, reproduction, and adaptation that it improves upon but 
cannot itself explain (Deacon 2007, 5). Thus, self-organization should be considered a primitive 
feature of biology, and information and natural selection derived features (Weber and Deacon 
2000, 21). This conceptual shift towards understanding biology as self-organized processes 
upon which natural selection acts makes clear that the full plan of an organism does not have to 
be encoded in a genome. In the place of a fully specified genome, genes need only act as 
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biasing mechanisms that "coax otherwise spontaneous processes down predictable pathways" 
(Deacon 2000, 6). 
2.1.3 Emergence is about relational properties, not constituent properties. 
As mentioned above, emergent approaches to the sciences distinguish between the 
material features and specific properties of constituents, and relational, configurational, and 
topological features of aggregates. What a focus on topologies of relations suggests is that 
emergent phenomena are not new things, but stable, robust patterns of dynamic processes 
where relational properties dominate over constituent properties. New relational properties, 
not new substances or physical laws, are what justifies the connotations of the word 
'emergence.' Formal or pattern novelty is generated via relations (Deacon 2003a, 276). Mark 
Bickhard has given a nice picture of this; he writes, "Flames, waves, vortexes- none are 
supervenient on underlying constituents. They are more like knots or twists in an underlying 
flow- nothing remains persistent other than the organization of the knot itself. They are 
topological entities, not substantive entities" (Bickhard and Cambell 2000, 334). 
2.1.4 Deacon's identification of three types of emergent systems 
Deacon's general definition of emergence is unprecedented global regularity generated 
within a composite system by virtue of the higher-order consequences of the interaction of 
component parts (Deacon 2006a, 122). In Deacon's theory, this definition covers three types of 
emergent phenomena; the distinction between these types will be important for understanding 
religious communities from a systems perspective. The three-tiered characterization suggests a 
way to distinguish a hierarchy of 'natural kinds,' a hierarchy of ontology; the first two emergent 
types distinguish between intra-level relations, the third emergent type marks the transition to a 
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new ontological level (Graves 2009, 503, 510). 34 These intra- and inter-level distinctions suggest 
how wholes differ organizationally, not materially, from each other and from parts. At each 
level, what is 'determined' to happen at the level of physics is less relevant for understanding 
future states of the system than relational properties at some higher level of assessment 
(Deacon 2006a, 143). 
The three types of emergence, to be explicated more fully below, are: 
1. The supervenience35 of simple thermodynamics (Emergencel or El), where aggregates 
'fall towards regularities' by virtue of canceling effects that dampen difference, leading 
to systemic relational properties. In these cases, structural and thermodynamic effects 
are averaged (Graves 2009, 509). 
2. The self-organization of morphodynamics (Emergence2 or E2), where systems, through 
iteration and a circular causal structure, amplify one form over others by virtue of the 
continual cancellation of discordant alternatives. In these cases, structural and 
thermodynamic effects from the first category above are amplified into dynamic form 
and pattern (Deacon 2006a, 144). 
3. The evolution and semiosis36 ofteleodynamics (Emergence3 or E3), where some 
systems are selected over others through the "differential preservation of more 
contextually fitted variants." In these cases, representations of form and pattern from 
the second category above are 'memorized,' re-produced, and fine-tuned by after-the-
34 Van Gulick (1995, 250-2) has argued that ontological levels studied by the special sciences can be 
defended from reductionist claims by noting how the causal powers of objects described at these 'higher' 
levels are explained by the organization of the causal roles of the constituents. The special sciences pick 
out stable recurring sets of boundary conditions for physical forces. They isolate a level of causal order 
and regularity in the natural world. According to Van Gulick, there is much to be said about considering 
these patterns as real: they are stable and recurring; they are stable despite changes in their underlying 
constituents; many are self-sustaining and self-productive in the face of perturbing forces; it is the larger 
context of their patterns that affect which causal powers of their constituents are activated or are likely to 
be so; and the selective activation of causal powers of parts can contribute to the maintenance and 
preservation of the pattern itself. 
35 Supervenience, according to David Chalmers (1996, Ch. 2), formalizes the notion that fixing lower-level 
facts simultaneously fixes higher-level facts. While noting property differences between levels, in a 
supervenience relationship there can be no upper-level property change without some kind of lower-level 
change. Supervenience as a concept is meant to remove any sense of mystery surrounding the high-level 
phenomena; it does this by reducing the arbitrariness of high-level phenomena to the arbitrariness of 
low-level phenomena; it eliminates the idea that something extra is going on. 
36 Semiosis will be explicated in the next major section of this paper. 
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fact selection to produce contextually useful, functional variants with respect to 
something else- an environment (Deacon 2006a, 144). 
Each of these types of emergent phenomena are the result of interaction and relational 
effects, and what we consider emergent about them falls out of interaction. Relational 
properties distributed across the many interactions of a closed set are averaged in Emergence1; 
in Emergence2 a circular causal structure leads to amplification of certain interaction constraints 
and biases, and in Emergence3 a circular causal structure combined with a type of memory 
means interaction constraints and biases are sampled and re-presented (Deacon 2003a, 288-99; 
2006a, 124). 
2.1.4.1 Emergence1 
A key exemplar of the supervenience of simple thermodynamics is liquidity. Liquidity is not 
a property that applies to individual molecules, only to aggregates. Relational molecular 
properties are responsible for liquidity, as opposed to intrinsic molecular properties such as 
mass or charge. In repeated molecular interactions across spatial scales, "the specific unique 
features of individual molecules (e.g. their charge, geometry, orientation, momentum, internal 
vibration, etc.) distribute in such a way as to cancel one another in aggregate, 
thus ... converg[ing] to similar results across a wide range of substrates and modes of interaction" 
(Deacon 2006a, 126-127). 
The fact that relational properties are separable from intrinsic properties means liquidity 
can be multiply realized; different micro-configurations of the same molecules can demonstrate 
liquidity, as can different kinds of molecules altogether. As Deacon writes, 
Liquid properties supervene on lower-order properties, including their interaction 
effects, and are therefore entirely determined by them. And yet we require a separate 
explanation for the fact that these properties are also to some extent independently 
converged upon despite a diversity of substrates. Liquid properties reveal an 
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independence37 from the details of matter and energy with ascent in scale, even though 
these details contribute to the particular values of liquid behavior parameters (Deacon 
2006a, 126-7). 
The relational characteristic of liquidity (and other supervenient properties) explains why 
liquidity requires a separate explanation from merely pointing to lower-order properties. It is 
the form of interaction dynamics of components, not their intrinsic substance, which determines 
the properties of liquidity. 
2.1.4.2 Emergence2 
In Emergence1, properties emerge from averaged interactions; in Emergence2, also called 
'morphodynamics' by Deacon, emergent properties come from dynamically propagated 
constraints (Graves 2009, 509). The self-organization of morphodynamics can be characterized 
as ((Emergence1) +iteration). A key exemplar of this kind of self-organizing system is an 
autocatalytic set. Autocatalytic sets are chemical interaction sets with "elaborate self-
organizing features." Molecules bond with some but not other molecules to produce far-from-
equilibrium systems that exhibit coherent behavior over time by virtue of their dynamical 
regularity. A simple example might involve molecule A catalyzing the chemical transformation 
of B into C, C then catalyzing the transformation of D into E, and E then catalyzing the 
transformation ofF into A. As long as substrates B, D, and Fare available to the system, 
catalysts A, C, and E will continue to be produced at ever greater rates as each traverse of the 
cycle generates more catalysts that can in turn catalyze the formation of more catalysts 
(Goodenough and Deacon 2006, 857). 
Thus, in an autocatalytic set, distinctive iterative interaction patterns reinforce 
components, which then reinforce interaction patterns. Both the dynamics and the components 
37 Better, a "relative independence." 
42 
are amplified, and a closed loop of synthesis is the result. The dynamical loop will play an 
inordinate role in determining "how the whole soup will be constituted." It is the distributed, 
higher-order circularity of the set that matters in determining the set's ultimate properties over 
time (Goodenough and Deacon 2006, 857; Deacon 2003a, 296; Sherman and Deacon 2007, 884). 
The critical issue in defining Emergence2 is that "something irreversible happens ... [t]he 
propagation and amplification of form and constraint result in asymmetric emergent constraints 
that converge toward global attractors" (Graves 2009, 509). Higher level regularities affect 
lower level regularities when iterated and "configurational features at the ensemble level 
drastically change the probabilities of certain whole classes of component interactions" (Deacon 
2003a, 293). 
2.1.4.3 Emergence3 
Deacon characterizes Emergence3, what he also calls 'teleodynamics,' as "information and 
memory get[ting] involved in evolving ... self-organizing systems" (Deacon 2006a, 137). Thus, we 
can characterize Emergent 3 phenomena as (((Emergentl) + Emergent2) +memory, variation, 
and selection). A key exemplar of Emergence3 is biological evolution. Emergence3 represents a 
kind of systematic activity where new categories need to be introduced to capture the logic and 
account for the activities of these systems. Representation, which is the source of memory, 
requires "historical and semiotic analysis." Other concepts such as adaptation, function, 
purpose, and information need to be introduced and accounted for as well, justifying 
considering Emergence3 a new ontological'level' of nature (Deacon 2006a, 138; 2003a, 300). 
Emergent3 systems, as is the case with all self-organized systems, will persist depending on 
their correspondence with their environment in some way; what differentiates Emergence3 
from Emergence2 is that this correspondence is a result of the variable memory informing their 
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development. By virtue of the variable memory, the biased behavior of the system changes 
over time, giving rise to different configurations of the systems. This means that the boundary 
of a unit of a single Emergence3 system is extended in space and time, as well as in 
'configuration space.' In the case of simple biology, the Emergence3 unit is a lineage of 
organisms, not a single organism (Deacon 2006a, 140). 
An Emergence2 system is dependent on energetic continuity; a hurricane whirling through 
the atmosphere stops if energy is pulled out of the system, and once stopped, putting the 
energy back in will not 'resurrect' the hurricane. However, an Emergence3 system depends on 
morphodynamic, not energetic continuities. That is, teleodynamic systems are linked by 
similarities of form, not by the same dynamic process. A dinosaur species long extinct can be 
'resurrected' in theory if the DNA from that dinosaur survives. As Deacon describes it, " ... there 
is a 're-membered' trace of each prior 'self' state contributing to the dynamics of future 
states ... [thus] such systems can develop with respect to this prior 'self,' rather than just with 
respect to the immediately prior state of the whole" (Deacon 2003a, 299). This 'detachment' 
from direct matter/energy exchange allows teleodynamic systems to participate in a vast 
domain of amplification (Deacon 2006a, 138). 
The combination of iteration, variable memory, and after-the-fact selection processes 
produces the kind of constraints necessary for Emergent3 systems to be organized with respect 
to something else. The thermodynamic processes that do the 'work' in an Emergent3 system 
have been harnessed by a 'least-discordant-remainder' effect to eliminate all but organizations 
of those processes able to recreate themselves in an environment. The selection dynamic in 
Emergence3 can be compared to the canceling dynamic of self-undermining chaos leading to 
stable dynamic patterns in Emergence1 and 2 (Deacon 2006a, 140-1). In persistent Emergent3 
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phenomena, "component processes and structures are indeed organized 'for the sake of 
achieving future target states of least discord and best fit." This licenses functional language 
with respect to their environment (Deacon 2006a, 145). 
Though teleodynamic, Emergent3 phenomena like biological organisms and intentional 
human agents are materially bounded, they are defined by a fundamental incompleteness, a 
perpetually updated relational connection to something else. This 'something else' is their own 
future interactions with their environment. The circular causality of their dynamics, their ability 
to re-enter informational components into that circular causality, and their potential to vary is 
what gives them their 'future-and-other-oriented' organization. Discordant alternatives to their 
organization with respect to these characteristics will fail to persist. Rather than being designed 
positively to achieve their target state, teleodynamic phenomena 'fall' toward their target state 
through a process of exploration and selection-producing feedback (Deacon 2006a, 143). 
This brief analysis of Emergent3 'logic' demonstrates that a key feature of Emergence3 is 
that the informational component- constraints derived from the represented 'memory' of 
certain past states as they interacted with their environment- gets re-entered with variation 
into lower order dynamics, leading to future states. This is why semiotic analysis is required to 
explain these systems. An Emergence3 system functions in such a way that it selects among 
possible 2nd order systems (Deacon 2006a, 137-8; Graves 2009, 510; Deacon 2003a, 297; 2004, 
28-9). 
2.1.5 Least discordant remainders 
Note how in all three emergent categories, the 'negative causality' of what is left over after 
other things are canceled- what Deacon calls least discordant remainders- play a crucial causal 
role in the production of form. Positive lawful behaviors usually studied in scientific accounts 
45 
are not enough to account for the form of emergent phenomena; stable relational 
characteristics and properties in emergence result from what happens when variations of 
interactions between lawfully-behaving parts cancel each other out (E1), selectively amplify as a 
result of what other things are canceled (E2), and are selected from (E3). 
2.2 Semiotics 
Rappaport's appropriation of older cybernetic theories prevented him from including 
semiotics- a theory of reference- into his account of the cybernetic systems he described. 
Rappaport is obviously interested in semiotics; it figures large in his account of religious 
communities. Happily, theory has advanced and we can now talk about 'semiotic emergent 
systems,' as my account of Deacon's category of teleodynamics indicates. Since so much of my 
analysis of Rappaport will depend on semiotic categories, it will be necessary to take a brief tour 
of semiotics on the way to a fuller appreciation of teleodynamics and Rappaport's intuitions 
about religious communities. Semiosis, particularly as it is conceived by American philosopher 
Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), is not just a study of reference, but is part and parcel of a 
phenomenological and epistemological standpoint built around the 'action' of signs. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, I will focus on two critical aspects of semiotics: Peirce's analysis of 
the three types of signs- icons, indexes, and symbols; and the process of interpretation, which is 
central to understanding how a sign 'acts.' 
Terrence Deacon has, in his analysis of these three types of signs, contributed convincingly 
to their respectability in terms of the sciences, and I willfollow both Peirce and Deacon in 
explicating them. Further, I will highlight one of Deacon's central themes: that the 'action' of 
signs results from the fact that certain dynamic systems interpret. Anything can serve as a sign 
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of something else; only certain systems can take some things as standing in a relation to other 
things. 
2.2.1 Peirce's categories of signs 
A quick word about Peirce's phenomenological theory will suffice to ground our discussion. 
Peirce categorized the world of phenomenal experience into three categories; these categories 
were not proposed to tell us what is in the objective world independent of the mind, nor were 
they proposed to catalog the mind's own workings in developing experience. The three 
categories were meant to express the three ways a mind can be in relation to its object, and to 
"express the interweave of mind-dependent and mind-independent relations which constitute 
human experience" (Deely 2001, 662). Peirce argued that signification- how one thing refers to 
another thing for some third thing- accounts for how we experience our world relationally. 
Anything experienced at all is experienced because signification makes present one thing 
through another thing. For Peirce, signification is the pattern according to which things and 
objects of mind interweave, making up experience (Deely 1990, 61, 55). 
Corresponding to each of the three categories of experience is a characteristic kind of sign, 
embodying experience in the way it represents something other than itself. Each type of sign 
captures different aspects of experience and brings the mind into relationship with that aspect 
in the same way that the sign itself is in relationship with it. Peirce called these three kinds of 
signs icons, indexes, and symbols (Deely 2001, 634). According to Peirce none of the three kinds 
of signs function as signs unless interpreted. This is what gives a sign its peculiar, non-causal 
relationship to its object (Peirce 1998g, Memoir 12). 
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2.2.1.1 Icons of qualia 
For experience to be had at all, a kind of sign is required that captures aspects of reality in 
its self-relation. Icons are the type of sign that can represent an object as it exists in its self-
relation; icons refer by virtue of a quality they share with what they signify. Self-similarity 
characterizes icons, they represent the ground of experience, from which all further 
discriminations of reality flow (Peirce 1998g, Memoir 12, 13). 
For Peirce each individual qualitative experience in each sensory domain is an iconic sign to 
someone or something of itself, and acts as the background against which determinate 
experiences flow. The experience of red, had without the experience of anything else, is not 
'red', but merely potential experience- the place from which the experience of something other 
than red, some other shade of color, is registered. This is an important but unintuitive 
consideration; it bears explanation. An icon 'refers' by providing space for something else to be 
noted; an icon refers in the same way zeros 'count;' a zero is a number, but a number of a 
peculiar type; it serves as a placeholder for some potential value, but in itself does not indicate 
any value. Similarly, icons are the default kind of reference; they are the ground from which 
other reference flows, but they themselves suggest an undistinguished class, an unproblematic 
expectation, an empty set, a 'field' of similars. 
Deacon gives an illuminating example of this most important type of sign, the basis for all 
other signs. He writes, 
Consider camouflage, as in the case of natural protective coloration. A moth on a tree 
whose wings resemble the graininess and color ofthe bark ... can ... escape being eaten by 
a bird if the bird ... interprets the moth's wings as just more tree ... If the moth had been a 
little less matching, or had moved, or the bird had been a little more attentive, then any 
of the differences between the moth and the tree made evident by those additional 
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differences would have indicated to the bird that there was something else present 
which wasn't just more tree ... 
lconism is where the referential buck stops when nothing more is added ... Whether 
because of boredom or limitations of a minimal nervous system, there are times when 
almost anything can be iconic of anything else (stuff, stuff, stuff ... ) (Deacon 1997, 74-6). 
That icons are the ground for experience is related to an insight of Gregory Bateson: we 
only know difference; substances are what we don't know, yet they exist for us as the ground of 
differentiation. Just as a physical map is a map of differences between items left undetermined 
in themselves, when we desire to get to the bottom of signifying relationships, we find ourselves 
referencing differences between things in terms of things that in themselves remain 
uncharacterized. A 'substance' is an unknown, a basic; it is unmapped and undistinguishable. 
Bateson's insight can be explained by the fact that icons are at the base of experience, referring 
only to themselves, and only provide sameness that gives the ground for differentiation 
(Bateson 2000b, 460-1). 
2.2.1.2 Indexes of here-now interactions 
If an icon serves as a kind of placeholder for potential interaction, registering the 
undistinguished self-sameness of experience, an index is the form of reference that turns 
potential experience into real experience; it references an actual, here-now interaction; it 
registers reality. As something exists in its reaction or relation to other things, it can index those 
things. Consider the pain of being hit in the nose. Against the background iconism of whatever 
a nose feels like when it is not hit,38 pain indexes some contact, here, now; it says that 
something has happened, something has changed. The product of an index in the mind is to 
register difference, change (Peirce 1998g, Memoir 12, 13). 
38 And note that this feeling is precisely the iconic, unindexed, unfelt, but necessary qualitative referential 
ground from which distinguishable feeling appears. 
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Indexes are most commonly thought of as associations, and associative learning is how 
both animals and humans learn indexes. Associations in themselves have no clear connection to 
causality; that something is associated with something else does not mean they are causally 
connected. Yet as a 'first draft' for registering experience, indexes are those associations that 
allow us to connect things to each other, whether correctly or incorrectly. There are natural 
indices that are causally connected to their object (i.e. the symptom of a disease), and non-
natural indices that are constructed for the purpose of indicating something (i.e. a 
weathervane). With constructed indices, the ground of reference is selected so that it clearly 
indexes something for some purpose. Natural indices are more vague, with multiple possible 
grounds of reference (Rappaport 1999, 62-5). 
Indexes can be 'chained' to one another, producing more and more distant connections 
between their referents. This is the heart of the method oftraining animals to do more and 
more complex 'tricks'- by gradually increasing the intermediate steps between a stimulus and a 
reward, the first in a series of complicated behaviors can become an index of the reward 
(Deacon 2003c, 121).39 
2.2.1.3 Symbols of abstracted general habits 
As an object exists in systematic relations with other things, it can be represented 
symbolically, a form of reference that refers neither by a quality it shares with its object nor by 
virtue of an associative connection with its object. Symbolic reference depends on the 
isomorphism between two systems of behaviors- the systemic behavior of natural relations in 
39 Deacon notes that this fact, in the case of natural relations, introduces a vagueness of reference to 
causal stories in scientific investigation. What is the 'proper' indexical referent to a natural occurrence? 
Is it the immediate 'triggering' cause, or that which triggered that trigger? The question of what a sign 
properly indexes has no determinate answer. Indexes, to function as signs, require the selection of a 
specific contextual ground to determine what the correct referent is; thus interpretation is central to 
creating indexical signs. See Deacon (2008a). 
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the world, and the systematic use of symbols in relation to each other. A particular symbol-
token points to a particular object by occupying a node in a network of symbol-tokens that 
mirrors the node that an object occupies in its actual relations (Peirce 1998g, Memoir 12, 13). 
Symbolic reference is "a system of exchange between two domains involving a third thing, 
the way the domains are related to each other" (Smith 1968, 27). Deacon has analyzed symbolic 
reference by comparing the semiotic perspective of Peirce and the experimental results of Ape 
Language Research (ALR), particularly the work of Sue Savage-Rumbaugh.40 His analysis is that 
... although a symbol token can be a simple object or action that is without similarity to 
or regular physical correlation with its referent, it maintains its fluid and indirect 
referential power by virtue of its position within a structured set of indexical 
relationships among symbol tokens. Even though a symbol can, under certain 
circumstances, stand on its own, its representational power is dependent on being 
linked with other symbols in a reflexively organized system of indexical relationships. 
How we come to know the meaning and referential use of symbols involves two 
interdependent levels of correlational relationships. We individually and collectively 
elaborate this system by learning how each symbol token both points to objects of 
reference and (often implicitly) points to other symbol tokens (and their paintings) 
(Deacon 2003c, 8-9). 
Perhaps the simplest example of this kind of reference is found in the way a street map 
refers. One recognizes something is a map of something else by noting the similarities of 
relations distributed across all the individual elements of the map compared to the relations 
found distributed across a// the individual elements ofthe neighborhood one is in. No individual 
elements of a map identifies what it refers to; that this particular 'X' represents the intersection 
of Brighton Ave. and Cambridge St. is not made obvious by anything inhering in the 'X' itself. It 
is the position of the 'X' in relation to a host of other represented elements on the map, when 
40 See Deacon (1997). 
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compared to the environment, which allows me to say 'I am at the intersection of Brighton Ave. 
and Cambridge St.' 
Hofstadter gives a mathematical example of symbolic reference: formal mathematical 
systems, when defining mathematical objects, might use everyday words like 'point' and 'line', 
but their definition within the formal system is not given by what 'we mean' by those words but 
rather is implicit in the totality of all propositions in which they occur. The connection between 
the terms of the formal system and what 'we mean' by it is made only through interpretation, 
where individual components of the formal system are compared as part of a system to the 
individual elements of mathematical reality (Hofstadter 1979, 87, 93-4). 41 
If icons of qualia have no intrinsic meaning beyond themselves, and signify nothing but the 
potential for indication; and if indexes give instances of factual here-now connections, symbols 
are the form of reference that carries the intellectual component of experience, the intelligibility 
of experience. Since symbolic signification relies on similarities between patterns of things, not 
things in their uniqueness, symbolic reference can bring about the achievement of some 
purpose towards classes ofthings. Consider scientific 'laws of nature', which exemplify symbolic 
reference. No law of nature points only to some event that once occurred in the past, but to 
41 He gives a wonderful example: in discussing a particular set of historical mathematical postulates meant 
to define something very simple and basic to all mathematics, Hofstadter changes the key words in the 
postulates from what they 'normally' are to other terms. He then asks the reader to figure out what the 
postulates are meant to describe, only by their abstract relational definitions. This demonstrates 
compellingly how symbolic reference works. He writes, "We will replace [the normal term] with the 
undefined term djinn, a word that comes fresh and free of connotations to our mind. Then [the] five 
postulates place five restrictions on djinns. There are two other undefined terms: Genie, and meta. The 
five postulates are: 1. Genie is a djinn; 2. Every djinn has a meta (which is also a djinn); 3. Genie is not 
the meta of any djinn; 4. Different djinns have different metas; 5. If Genie has X, and each djinn relays X 
to its meta, then all djinns get X. [The creator of these postulates] hoped that his five restrictions on the 
concepts "Genie," "djinn," and "meta" were so strong that if two different people formed images in the 
minds of the concepts, the two images would have completely isomorphic structures." If you go to the 
trouble of following the postulates, you will see that they match our natura I conception of the counting 
numbers, starting with 0. See Hofstadter (1979, 216-7). 
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what will surely happen to everyone in the future who will fulfill certain conditions. Habits of 
nature represented symbolically say when we act according to a certain scheme, something will 
happen (Peirce 1998a, 340-1). Symbols represent the patterned, the general, the rational; they 
register the 'rules of engagement' for objects. Symbolic reference by itself does not determine 
specific referents; for that to occur, indexes must be present or invoked (Peirce 1998c, 401-2; 
1998b, 393).42 
Peirce notes that symbols, besides representing general, patterned aspects of nature, 
create general, patterned behaviors for symbol-users in the world. Symbolic language produces 
effects in symbol-users that apply to future behavior towards classes of things. For example, 
Peirce notes that giving is a transfer of ownership, applying across a class of actions, and not a 
matter of movement in a specific case; to transfer ownership causes implications for future 
behavior; it is the result of a symbolic convention of social behavior. Consider further the 
corporation, the existence of which is mediated through symbolic reference; it is a general, 
habitual, pattern of events, a symbolic reality that has future consequences in both the world of 
physical events and mental states, though not being either exclusively. So in addition to the fact 
that habits of nature are registered by symbolic reference, symbolic reference constitutes habits 
of symbol-users (Peirce 1998e, 171; 1998d, 181-4; Dewey 1958, 197). 
2.2.2 Interpretation 
Deacon puts great emphasis on the importance of interpretation in his discussion of 
semiotics. His reasoning is that if it is the case that there is nothing inherent to a sign-vehicle to 
make it a sign, then all the work to make a sign-vehicle a sign comes from the side of 
42 That is, to know what is referred to when someone asks, "what is that?" ultimately requires an index, 
either in the present (the question is accompanied by pointing a finger; the questioner adds "to your 
right"), or in the past (adding "on John's face/' when we already know indexically who John is). No 
amount of further clarification, without eventual indexical reference, would clarify what that is. 
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interpretation. Sign-vehicles don't do anything; they do not act. He writes concerning iconic 
signs: 
Usually, people explain icons in terms of some respect or other in which two things are 
alike. But the resemblance doesn't produce the iconicity ... The interpretive step that 
establishes an iconic relationship is essentially prior to this, and it is something negative, 
something that we don't do. It is, so to speak, the act of not making a distinction ... 
To clarify the shift in emphasis I want to make from the relationship to the process 
behind it...what makes the moth wings iconic is an interpretive process produced by the 
bird, not something about the moth's wings. Their coloration was taken to be an icon 
because of something that the bird didn't do. What the bird was doing was actively 
scanning bark, its brain seeing just more ofthe same (bark, bark, bark ... ). What it didn't 
do was alter this process (e.g., bark, bark, not-bark, bark ... ). It applied the same 
interpretive perceptual process to the moth as it did to the bark. It didn't distinguish 
between them, and so confused them with one another. This established the iconic 
relationship between moth and bark (Deacon 1997, 74-6, emphasis mine). 
Keeping in mind that interpretation is the key to the 'action' of signs, I want to clarify some 
distinctions concerning interpretation that give us tools to analyze the symbolic nature of 
religious communities in light of systems theory. There are at least three terms used in the 
semiotic literature to discuss a halo of ideas surrounding interpretation- interpretation itself, 
interpreters, and interpretants. I believe at least one more term is justified, which I will call 
interpretant-vehic/es. This means there are at least 4 terms that capture different ideas that all 
contribute to the concept of interpretation. I will outline the concepts captured by each of 
these ideas as I plan to use them, with examples taken from the semiotic literature. 
First, an interpreter is, in the language of systems theory, that dynamic system whose 
functioning and processes provides the background physical grounds for interpretation to occur. 
An interpreter can exist apart from any interpretation; to note an interpreter is merely to 
acknowledge the physical location and organized processes where interpretation is occurring. 
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To use an example that I will continue to refer to in this section, imagine a thermometer in an 
environment, where differences of temperature affect the relative expansion of mercury. The 
interpreter of the thermometer would be that dynamic system that 'reads' the thermometer. It 
might be, for example, some person who would differentially respond to the different states of 
the thermometer (Peirce 1998f, 478). 
Second, interpretation is an action of taking two things as being 'the same' in some respect. 
It is the result of a history of engagement with two things that are determined to be isomorphic 
with each other. Peirce, who used the term 'interpretant' to cover examples of 'interpretation' 
as I am using the term here, speaks of an 'interpretant' (read 'interpretation') being like a 
foreign-language interpreter who says that a foreigner says in his language the same thing that 
he himself says. The process of translation involves knowing two languages, and concluding 
sentence A in language X is the same as sentence Bin language Y. This is the gist of 
interpretation. Interpretation necessarily involves living in two worlds at once, seeing two 
things at once such that a comparison can be prosecuted, and acting in some way that 
demonstrates the taking of one thing as being the same as another thing (Peirce 1992, 5; 1998b, 
388). 
In our thermometer example, interpretation is the act of taking the relative height of 
mercury as an indication of the relative temperature of the environment. Prior to being read, a 
thermometer is a physical object involved in dynamic relations only. When 'read', it has become 
a sign, due to an act of interpretation. Prior experiences of changes in mercury expansion as 
compared to changes in ambient temperature have convinced the interpreter that one can be 
used as an interpretation of the other. The thermometer now stands for something besides 
itself; the relational change in height is taken as being 'the same' as the relational change in 
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temperature. Note that a particular act of interpretation may be incorrect- the thermometer 
might be broken. But due to a pattern noticed in prior engagements with both thermometers 
and temperature, the two are taken to be isomorphically connected (Deely 1990, 24). 
Third, an interpretant is a specific, here-now result that is the effect of taking up one thing 
as another thing. It is this term that is the source of the most confusion in the semiotic 
literature, because it is often given double-duty (even by Peirce), conflated with interpretant-
vehicle as I will explicate that term. I propose that we should consider the interpretant to 
always involve the meaning, the outcome of interpretation. When the discoverers of the 
Rosetta Stone first translated Egyptian by way of Greek, if the Stone happened to be a record of 
Egyptian recipes, an interpretant of the Egyptian recipes might involve the actual creation of a 
particular Egyptian dish for the first time in three thousand years. Or it might involve merely the 
imagined smell in the translator's mind of the delightful dish described, complete with mouth-
watering. Or it might involve the decision not to record the relevant passages in a journal, since 
the passage was considered trivial in content. In each case, the interpretant is some produced 
outcome that represents some respect in which the two things are taken to be related to each 
other. The interpretant is not the fact that Greek sentences on the Rosetta Stone stand for 
Egyptian sentences, but the way particular pairs of sentences exemplifying this fact are brought 
into a kind of unity of completion in some third thing, some outcome, outside the sentences 
themselves, but in which they both participate. 
This view of what Peirce meant- at least sometimes- by interpretant explains why he 
called the interpretant a sign itself, able to be taken up in future semiosis. The action that is the 
interpretant can itself be interpreted. We can look at the interpretant for clues as to what the 
object of the sign was, and in what respect that object was taken. It also explains why Peirce 
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always wanted to note that the interpretant involved a respect in which something interpreted 
is contained in the interpretant. A selection among possible alternatives is made by the 
interpreter to make this the interpretant of the object rather than that. The interpreter is 
contributing to the process of making interpretants by making choice as to how to construct the 
interpretant. 
In terms of the thermometer story I've been telling, the fact that a relative rise in mercury 
is taken as being coordinated with a change in relative ambient temperature says nothing about 
how this correlation affects the interpreter. The interpretant would be the specific behavioral 
modification that results from reading the temperature, taken from a pool of possible 
expectations and behavioral modifications that could potentially result. Is a change in mercury 
height taken as a sign to turn on an air conditioner? Plant crops? Move to a different climate 
for a period oftime? Investigate a possible malfunction of the thermometer? Launch a space 
shuttle? Each of these could be the case, and each serves as a sign for some later act of 
interpretation that attempts to figure out what the sign was about, what object was taken in 
what respect. The interpretant is the action resulting from taking one thing as a sign of another 
thing (Deely 1994, fn 16, p. 171). 
Fourthly and finally, we reach the interpretant-vehicle. This concept is necessary to tease 
apart the two uses Peirce put the word interpretant to.43 An interpretant-vehicle is the physical, 
structural, embodied connection between two domains that suggests and enables all 
interpretants, interpretations, and interpreters. It is the ground upon which the sign is seen to 
be related to something else as signified. In a French-English dictionary, the interpretant-vehicle 
43 At times Peirce describes the interpretant as the objective element of the situation involving 
representation of one by another, which is in conflict with the conception of interpretant just articulated. 
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is the placing of homme opposite man on the page, in the context of the architecture of an 
entire book where French words are placed opposite English words. Something about the 
physical structure of the interpretant-vehicle suggests that an interpretant be created to 
account for the physical arrangement. Consider the Rosetta stone again; the fact that the 
physical lines of Egyptian figures were engraved on the stone in an isomorphic way with the 
physical lines of Greek text suggested to the interpreters that the lines of Egyptian be taken as 
saying the same thing as the lines of Greek, allowing an interpretant to be created which acted 
as the mediating relationship between the two. Importantly, interpretant-vehicles 'do their 
work' independent of the content of what they represent; there is something about their 
physical orientation in space and time that enables their being taken together (Deely 1990, 26). 
The interpretant-vehicle structurally connects independent domains; it is a kind of coding, 
and does not change relative to the different uses it is put in creating interpretants. Hofstadter 
notes the importance of just such a code in the action of tRNA and ribosomes, linking nucleic 
acids in DNA with amino acids in proteins. This code is responsible for the referential nature of 
genes (Hofstadter 1979, 18). 
In the thermometer example I've been using, the interpretant-vehicle is the physical fact 
that a scale of numbers representing air temperature is placed next to a tube of mercury, where 
the height of the mercury corresponds to a different number on the scale. A thermometer joins 
two worlds through a code; correlational rules connect a change in mercury height to a change 
in air temperature. 
To summarize this section on the use of different terms surrounding interpretation in 
signification, we note that it involves a) some physical fact that connects two domains according 
to a code (the interpretant-vehic/e) b) which grounds certain expectations, acts, and habits of 
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behavior (the interpretant) c) of some dynamic open system in an environment (the interpreter). 
When the interpreter d) treats one system of relationships as being isomorphic with another 
(interpretation), e) one domain is used by the interpreter as a 'sign' of the other domain 
(semiosis). 
2.3 Summary 
Early systems theorists like Bateson, whom Rappaport follows in his analysis of religious 
communities, did not have a way to include semiosis into their picture of a system. In our 
terms, emergence and semiosis were left separate and independent of each other. 
Nevertheless, going back at least to Peirce, the idea that semiosis and emergence might need to 
be considered in the same breath has been suggested by some theorists who have worked to 
combine the two ideas. In the next chapter, we will examine the thought of four such thinkers, 
as we consider ways to conceive of religious communities that takes the intuitions of Durkheim 
and Rappaport and puts them on sounder footing. 
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3 Background for an updated theory of religion II: Self-reproducing 
Automata, Semantic Closure, Strange Loops, and Teleodynamics 
The previous chapter offers a picture ofthe state-of-the-art of emergence theory and 
semiotics. I have stated that a theory of 'semiotic emergence'- what Deacon has called 
'teleodynamics'- would allow us to advance Rappaport's intuition about the cybernetic nature 
of religious communities. Before we can do that, however, we must explore what theorists have 
done with teleodynamics in other domains. Several theorists have already used some version of 
teleodynamics as a general description of both living organisms and human mental activity. 
It is not a new idea to see a resemblance between living organisms and human mental 
activity. Some form of 'intelligent design' has been seen in nature for thousands of years 
(Glacken 1967}. Naturalists, too, have made the connection, believing that a common process 
must account for the similarities. Peirce believed that semiosis was active in both living things 
and in intellectual relations; his description of how humans gain pragmatic knowledge mirrors 
Darwin's description of how evolution occurs.44 Gregory Bateson made the correlation between 
biological and mental systems one of his central themes, believing that both demonstrated 
intelligence, which he explained from a systems perspective that included environmental 
factors. Bateson wrote, "Mind is cybernetic system- a total information processing, trial and 
error completing unity. This is precisely the unit of evolution. There is an identity between 
mind-in environment and organism-in-environment" (Bateson 2000b, 466}. Deacon argues 
similarly; he notes that both biological evolution and mental processes are information-creating 
processes, and we identify ourselves- what we consider 'us' to be- with both of these 
44 Briefly, simple, na'lve belief in epistemology is equated with self-reproduction in biology; what 
challenges simple belief is the shock of error, and what challenges self-reproduction is the shock of 
environmental selection pressure. In both cases, the shock of outside challenges to expectation, 
combined with variation, forces intelligent change on the part of the mental or biological system. 
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processes. He writes, "To generate new information is to be aware; this underlies the deep 
analogy between life and mind" (Deacon 2000, 28). 
If we take into account Rappaport's intuition that the nature of a religious community is 
similar to the nature of living beings, I suggest we might have good reason to consider living 
things, human mental life, and religious communities as examples of semiotic emergent 
phenomena, fitting Deacon's general description: 
A physically bounded system, partially closed to inside-outside diffusion of components 
and environmental influences which includes a repository of information sufficient to 
instruct the maintenance, reconstitution, and reproduction of every part of the entire 
system, including this information and which is organized into a dynamic process able to 
maintain a far-from-equilibrium state indefinitely given appropriate boundary 
conditions and external resources (Deacon 2007, Slide 9).45 
While this definition is largely inspired by biology, the principles that undergird the 
particular biological language he used can be generalized. More generally stated, we can say 
that life, mind, and perhaps religious communities can be profitably viewed as self-organizing 
systems that have as part of their organization some subset of symbolically-encoded relations 
that control their development such that they self-reproduce and grow increasingly isomorphic 
to relations that constitute their environment (both natural and social}.46 
As Hoffmeyer (2007, 153) has pointed out, semiotics in principle is always connected with 
some kind of inside/outside interaction. Favareau says it this way: semiotic systems interact 
with their environment by "those genuinely existing, materially manifested relations that join 
45 Note this definition describes systems that symbolically reference structures in their environment; 
Deacon will note that there can be semiotic emergent systems that do NOT use symbolic reference. This 
insight will ground some of the distinctions I will make in this section. 
46 This definition would serve as an updated alternative to Rappaport's definition of an adaptive 
cybernetic system, which does not include explicit reference to symbols: an "association that can be 
shown to have inhering in it as a unit distinct processes at least occasionally initiated in response to, as 
response to, and in attempted correction of, perturbation" (Rappaport 1999, 408). Rappaport applied 
this definition to cover both biological lineages organisms and religious communities. 
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system-internal and system-external relations into a web of utilizable experience" (Favareau 
2007, 13). Semiosis occurs when a network of symbolically-encoded relations internal to the 
system act as signs- representations- guiding future interactions with a particular 
environment. The process by which the match grows between a system's sign-relations and its 
relations with an environment is what is meant by interpretation, which is a term necessary for 
explaining the existence and functioning of these systems. To paraphrase Howard Pattee, to 
explain how a semiotic system functions in an environment requires understanding both the 
physical laws of the system and its environment, and the interpretation processes it uses to 
relate to its environment; physical laws describe those events over which organisms have no 
control, interpretation describes how organisms control events (Pattee 1995, 24). 
I have mentioned Terrence Deacon as one theorist who has developed a theory of semiotic 
emergence applicable to the origin and analysis of living systems and human mental life. In 
analyzing the thought of three other thinkers who have taken upon themselves the same task-
John von Neumann, Howard Pattee, and Douglas Hofstadter- I would like to identify principles 
of semiotic emergent systems that I believe are directly relevant to Rappaport's explicit 
articulation of the structure of religious communities. 
3.1 Self-reproducing automata- Von Neumann47 
3.1.1 Automata as semiotic emergent systems 
John von Neumann's many contributions to mathematics and computer science include a 
theory intended to cover how natural and artificial systems that process language and 
information are organized and controlled. He called this a 'theory of automata.' He specifically 
wanted to investigate the logical organization that would be sufficient for such an automaton to 
47 Von Neumann (1966). 
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reproduce itself (Burks 1966, 18-19). In our terms, because his approach involved examining 
systems of component parts, none of which by themselves had the properties he was interested 
in, the phenomena he was investigating could be considered 'emergent.' Further, since a key to 
the properties he was interested in involved symbols, we can define his systems 'semiotic.' 
3.1.2 A model of self-reproducing automata 
Von Neumann notes that information-processing systems such as computers normally have 
output, such as patterns on a video screen, which are nothing like themselves. He notes, 
however, that it is possible to consider artificial automata that have outputs something like 
themselves. He imagines that an automata with access to defined parts in large enough supply 
could reproduce wholes like itself (Von Neumann 1966, 74-5). 
Von Neumann describes an example of such a device made up of four interdependent 
parts, able to reproduce itself. Imagine that there is an automata, A, which is able to take a 
linear, encoded pattern (i.e. a recipe for making something) and, using parts available to it, 
translate the pattern to make a functional device. Further, consider a different automata, B, 
which can typographically copy a linear encoded pattern, such that there are two copies as a 
result. Finally, consider a third automata, C, which can direct the other two automata and 
organize the copying and translation of descriptions such that a copy of the description is always 
associated with a translated automata. If the description given to A, B, and Cis a description of 
A, B, and C, the result would be a self-reproducing aut.omata.48 Von Neumann notes that none 
48 Exactly, the logic goes as follows: Assume the existence of automaton A, which produces X and only X 
when a description of X- (cj:>X)- is given to it. Assume the existence of automaton B, which when given a 
description of something, can make two copies of that description. Assume automaton C, which is control 
equipment that actuates Band A according to this pattern: C causes B to make two copies of cj:>(X) (the 
description of X). C then causes A to construct X at the price of destroying one copy of cj:>(X). C then ties X 
and the remaining copy of cj:>(X) together and cuts them loose. Thus at the end, X and cj:>(X) has been 
produced. Now, make (A+B+C) to be X, and cj:>(A+B+C) to be cj:>(X). In this case, the universal constructor 
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of the pieces of this self-reproducing automata- A, B, C, or the description of each- are self-
reproducing by themselves or in incomplete combination. Only when all four pieces are 
arranged in combination does a self-reproducing system exist (86). 
By analyzing this simple pattern for a self-reproducing automata, we can note the critical 
functional pieces each component embodies. The description of A, B, and C corresponds to a 
symbolic code, a digital pattern of serial elements that when interpreted in a particular way 
translates the pattern of digital relations into an isomorphic pattern of physical interaction 
among embodied, analog parts. Automaton A corresponds to a device translating a symbolic 
code from one domain to another via an interpretant-vehicle. Automata B corresponds to the 
action of analog, embodied parts which typographically copy the linear, digital elements. 
Automaton C corresponds to the physical association and disassociation of reproduced 
descriptions and translated analog parts, and the organization and ordering of the processes of 
reproduction and translation. Thus, a symbolic code, an interpretant-vehicle, constructed 
objects that can perform functional tasks like reproducing a symbolic code, and clear boundaries 
facilitating the ordering and organization of processes can produce something that self-
reproduces in certain circumstances. 
3.1.3 Self-reproduction plus development 
Von Neumann goes one step further than producing an abstract model of self-reproducing 
automata. He recognizes that mere self-reproduction is not all there is to a real-life organism; 
the morphological and functional organization of organisms has, in many cases, gotten more 
(A+B+C) has attached to it a description of itself, <jl(A+B+C). Control C directs B to copy the description 
twice, resulting in (A+B+C) + <jl(A+B+C} + <jl(A+B+C). C directs A to produce automaton (A+B+C} from one 
copy of the description, resulting in (A+B+C} + (A+B+C} + <jl(A+B+C}. Lastly, C ties the new automaton and 
its description together and cuts them lose. Thus (A+B+C) + <jl(A+B+C) have produced (A+B+C} + 
<jl(A+B+C), and self-reproduction has taken place (Von Neumann 1966, 85). 
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elaborate over the course of time. A simple, abstract theory of combinatorial artificial automata 
can help answer why. Von Neumann uses the simplified abstract automata from above as a 
foundation for a self-reproducing automata that can demonstrate the ability to elaborate 
function and form (78-9). 
The key to the 'proper arrangement' of a system to support increases in complexity is to 
distinguish between those parts of the automata responsible for self-reproduction and those 
responsible for the production of byproducts having some role outside of and secondary to 
immediate self-reproduction. Assuming the self-reproductive scheme above, we can introduce 
a digital representation of D, which is some byproduct feature or functional addition to the self-
reproducing automata. Thus, in addition to the components of self-reproduction, A, B, C, and 
the digital representations of these, D gives the system features extraneous to the direct issues 
of self-reproduction (86). 
Von Neumann notes that the typographical copying automaton B (which simply reproduces 
whatever serial, digital pattern is given to it) reproduces what will be 'inherited' by the next 
generation. He notes that we can introduce the notion of mutation here; it is possible forB, 
when fed the proper encoded description of the automaton, to make an error, a mutant. Thus, 
an accidental change in the description of A, B, C, and D would not produce itself, but a modified 
version of itself. Importantly, Von Neumann notes that the mutant generation can only 
reproduce if the mutation was in D, which doesn't directly affect reproduction, and not in A, B, 
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or C. If it was in A, B, or C, the proper functioning of the reproductive portion of the system 
would be compromised (86-7).49 
3.1.4 The abstract logic of automata 
By comparing biological to artificial systems like his automata, Von Neumann thought 
general principles involved in the organization of functional organisms might be abstracted (Von 
Neumann 1966, 77; Burks 1966, 21). I want to note four such general principles he contributes 
to a theory of semiotic emergence. 
3.1.4.1 Self-organization, not design, is a feature of natural automata 
Von Neumann recognizes some crucial differences between natural and artificial automata 
that limit the usefulness of his abstract model. Specifically, he notes there is a difference 
between a designed system, in which error at any point can be catastrophic, and more robust 
self-organizing50 biological systems where error can be handled in a variety of ways. Von 
Neumann notes that biological systems seem to have a variety of strategies that indicate a self-
healing ability that machines do not have. Further, he notes that many of these strategies 
involve a fundamental ability to reorganize. Though this kind of robustness can certainly be 
'built in' to machines, it seems to occur in biological organisms naturally, requiring a different 
logic to explain it (Von Neumann 1966, 71, 73). 
3.1.4.2 Self-reproduction is distinguishable from by-products 
The second principle relevant to semiotic emergence is the distinction between 
components leading to self-reproduction and components leading to by-products, and that the 
first always takes precedence over the second. If there is no self-reproduction, there is no 
49 Thus the abstract pattern of self-reproducing, mutating automata is as follows: the original automata 
(A+B+C+D) + <j:>(A+B+C+D) produces a copying error that leads to (A+B+C+D) + <j:>(A+B+C+D*), which when 
implemented, produces the mutant generation (A+B+C+D*) + <j:>(A+B+C+D*). 
50 Von Neumann did not use this term himself, though he describes it beautifully. 
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longer an automata. By noting that mutations must not directly affect the machinery of self-
reproduction itself, von Neumann justifies an idea of 'center' and 'periphery' in teleodynamic 
systems. 
3.1.4.3 Advantages of a 'hardwarejsoftware' distinction 
The third conclusion has to do with the advantages inherent in a system taking advantage 
of a 'hardware/software' distinction, the distinction between the serial, digital encoded input 
and the machinery itself. Von Neumann recognizes several potential advantages to this 
organization with respect to system reproduction and persistence. First, simply by changing the 
pattern of the input software description, the same relatively simple hardware translation 
machinery can produce any automata that can possibly be produced. This is due to the fact that 
the serial, digital input is kept simple in its form and in its ability to be manipulated, yet is 
informationally complex. Simplicity of input structure and translation mechanisms can produce 
radically flexible, complex, and variable outcomes. Second, Von Neumann notes that a digital, 
serial representation is easily copied, negating the necessity of trying to replicate a finished 
product by some means. Third, Von Neumann notes that a distinction between dumb hardware 
and informationally complex software is what really grounds the idea of heritability and 
mutation, and thus the potential for growth in complexity and diversity (50-1, 84). Fourth, 
unless there is a categorical distinction between the description of the automata and the 
automata itself, self-reproduction and self-reference would be paradoxical, impossible 
phenomena51 (Pattee 1995, 2). 
51 On the order of an eye seeing itself. 
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3.1.4.4 Stable code that mediates between two domains 
Von Neumann realizes that the production of any possible automata can be realized by a 
simple, basic 'hardware' component, and a flexible instruction set capable of nearly infinite 
elaboration; yet a critical part of the process is how the two pieces are related to each other. He 
argues that two simple rules involving the way hardware and software interact are a 
requirement for self-reproducing automata to explore the space of all possible automata. The 
two rules are "a rigorous theory of how one describes objects and a rigorous routine of how to 
look up statements in a dictionary and obey them" (Von Neumann 1966, 50-1). 
My interpretation of what Von Neumann means here is that the representational elements 
of the construction process must be able to reference unambiguously all elements that form the 
structure of the system to be produced, and rich enough to capture salient features of what 
needs to be described. Further, the organization of the symbol system must contain features 
that support the consistency, proper timing, and coordination of the processes it governs. In 
summary, a stable production environment and a consistent, stable, and effective interpretant-
vehicle, as discussed in the previous chapter, is necessary to translate instruction set to 
hardware components. 
3.2 Semantic closure- Patteesz 
To introduce the ideas of Howard Pattee, consider that two contradictory demands are 
placed on self-organizing, teleodynamic phenomena such as life and human personhood. One 
demand is that of persistence; such a system must demonstrate continuity and self-identity of 
processes across time. The other demand is that the system must demonstrate intelligently 
changing behavior. A dynamic system that is conservative and repetitious must also be flexible 
52 Pattee (1969, 1972, 1982a, 1982b, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007). 
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and interactive. Howard Pattee has argued that there is only one possible way for those two 
competing demands to be met in a system- a conservative yet potentially varying symbolic 
'memory' must be linked in a closed causal loop with dynamic, material processes that interact 
with a larger environment. He calls this closed loop of symbolic and dynamic processes 
'semantic closure.' Pattee has argued that this concept is the key logical principle put forward 
by Von Neumann. The closed semantic loop is what in fact defines the 'self' in self-replication 
(Pattee 1982b, 334). 
In this section, I will summarize not only Pattee's approach, but the work of his most 
insightful followers, since my goal is to produce a theoretically potent picture of semiotic 
emergence, and not to give a complete account of Pattee and his influence on theorists since his 
work in the 1970's. 
3.2.1 The problem of univocal descriptions of life and mind 
Pattee has strongly criticized two important and influential perspectives on life and mind 
that only emphasize either material embodiment or symbolic function. He has argued against 
the perspective of Dynamic Systems Theorists (DST), which suggests that the only model 
required to understand life and mind is a mathematically-governed physical-law model, and 
against the perspective of functionalists and computationalists, who disregard materiality as 
that which function and computation should be abstracted from, not related to (Pattee 1995, 3, 
8). 
As Pattee sees it, the problems in the approaches of the alternative schools of 
computationalism and DST are not their obvious weaknesses, but their misleading strengths: 
they both have the ability to model powerfully the processes under discussion. On the one 
hand, a logical or computer model of life or mind can mimic everything that can be described 
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using language, lending support to the approach of computationalism. On the other hand, 
everything composing a symbol system is composed of matter, obeying the laws of physics and 
chemistry, lending support to the approach of the physical reductionist (Pattee 1982b, 328-9). 
Yet each side is incomplete in itself for modeling life and mind, which always involve both 
material processes and symbolic reference. Functionalists and computationalists ignore this 
interrelation, believing a symbolically encoded computer simulation is a realization of the 
process in question. The logical or computer model is not a self-organized system, however, and 
the success of such a model is not demonstrated by the impact of the model's functioning on 
the persistence of the computer system that models it. Rather, its success is in the eyes of the 
modeler, who interprets the model as being a good picture of a process. Similarly, physical 
reductionists ignore the matter/symbol relationship by believing that symbols are only illusions 
that do not play any real role; they posit a complete physical-law model of these systems ideally 
should replace epiphenomenal explanations using 'symbols.' However, this approach cannot 
account for the multiply realizable concepts such as "function, adaptation, and selection," 
which must be 'read into' the systems by outside modelers who do see and use such symbolic 
and relational concepts (Rocha 2001, 11). Thus, neither pure functionalist nor pure Dynamic 
System Theorist can account for living things or persons like us. That both approaches can 
ignore the contribution of the other and offer what seem on first blush to be complete accounts, 
given their starting points, blinds each side to the fact that a complementary approach is needed 
to gain insight into living and mental processes (Pattee 1995, 10).53 
53 Pattee has noted that the only place the matter-symbol relationship appears in the biological sciences 
as now practiced is in theories of the origin of the genetic code. There, the physical and logical basis of 
the distinction between matter and symbol, and the question of how matter and symbol are related, is 
discussed (Pattee 1995, 24). 
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3.2.2 Complementarity needed to describe the work of the scientist 
Pattee points to the 'measurement process' in physics as an example of the necessity of 
matter and symbols being related in mental activity, even in the science most strongly based in 
objectification and 'bracketing' a subjective viewpoint. To measure anything in any way, as 
physicists do all the time, the world must be simplified, many things ignored, one or a few things 
'put under the microscope.' To choose the parameters of a measurement is a local, contextual, 
functional act, it is not a physically-determined fact. It is an act of classification. Thus, whatever 
the scientific findings of physics are, they are not adequate to explain the practice of physicists, 
who act contextually and functionally in ways that fall outside of the purview of physical objects 
and their laws. Importantly, to classify in order to make a measurement is not just an activity 
that human physicists do; it is the fundamental fact of any organism's interaction with its 
environment. To follow an analogy Pattee offers, in the same way that cells do not have feet 
and ears, but they do have motility and irritability, a lineage of cells don't have minds, but they 
do operate according to a matter/symbol distinction (Pattee 1982b, 328). 
Physicists making theories about their environment and organisms functioning within their 
environment are both classifying their world in order to gain leverage over it. In Pattee's view, 
this means the distinction between universal, lawful, material behavior and local and contextual 
classification, distinction, and utilization of material behavior runs as deep as biological 
organisms (Pattee 1995, 3-6; 1982b, 335-6). 
3.2.3 Complementarity needed to distinguish between dynamic, lawful material 
processes and symbolic 'rules' 
The above consideration leads Pattee to the conclusion that the behavior of biological and 
human entities is not just the result of physical law; rather, it is, in addition, a contextual 
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phenomenon dependent upon symbolically-encoded rules. Rocha, commenting on Pattee's 
view, says rules are "context dependent constraints which affect the behavior and success of 
agents in specific environments, and ... only make sense in these environments" (Rocha 2001, 11; 
Pattee 1995, 4). Consider a biological entity. A 'rule' contributing to its behavior above and 
beyond physical law would be a particular encoded initial condition selected from a wider pool 
of theoretically possible encoded initial conditions that biases its ongoing dynamic development 
in a direction permitted but underdetermined by physical law. A lineage of biological organisms 
develops over time through a 'culling' of all possible rules to the few that lead to organism 
persistence in an environment. Pattee argues that "a productive approach to theories of life, 
evolution and cognition must focus on the complementary contributions of non-selective law-
based material self-organization and natural selection-based symbolic organization" (Pattee 
1995, 14). Pattee makes this principle of complementarity a central point in his thought. For 
him, both matter and symbol, laws and rules, play a role in the emergent evolution of living 
things and mental processes. And this, in a nutshell, is the idea of semantic closure (SC). 
3.2.4 Semantic closure 
SC is the "autonomous closure between the dynamics of the material aspects and the 
constraints of the symbolic aspects of a physical organization" (Pattee 1995, 1). Fundamentally, 
semantic closure involves something that acts as symbolic memory, as well as a closed pattern 
of recursive iteration (Rocha and Hordijk 2005, 9). Symbol strings are transformed by a 
decoding process into arrangements of matter, which are transformed by physical laws into 
machines that transform symbol strings by a decoding process into arrangements of matter, ad 
infinitum. Symbol strings have no meaning apart from the semantically closed organism. The 
symbol/matter complementarity is self-defining and self-constructing (Pattee 1982b, 339). 
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Pattee points to biology as an example of this kind of closure. He notes that a cell's 
behavior is partly defined by symbolic processes having to do with DNA base sequences, which 
are important for the information they embody (not for their chemical effects), and partly 
defined by material dynamics, such as protein folding (tertiary structure) and protein 
combinations (quaternary structure). Pattee goes so far as to define life by its semantic closure. 
The symbols in such a system are interpreted internally, by the very products they specify. No 
external observe needs to interpret them (as is the case with a computer's symbolic activity). 
What the symbols represent comes into view functionally, from the cell's own dynamic 
interpreting structures (Pattee 1995, 5; Etxeberria and Moreno 2001, 7). 
3.2.5 What a symbol is to Pattee and his followers 
How should we envision the 'symbolic dimension'? In the hands of Pattee's followers, 
symbols are a kind of shortcut, creating conditions that depend for their fulfillment on material 
dynamics and lawful habits of nature. What symbols 'mean' are determined by the physical and 
material attributes of the conditions they help create. Pattee's followers have emphasized that 
the laws of matter and self-organization give 'for free' what does not have to be encoded in 
genes. This means that the genetic 'blueprint' of an organism is not a description of that 
organism, but something different- "encoded initial conditions or constraints for material, 
developing, self-organizing systems" that interact with the laws of their environment (Rocha 
2001, 1, 8-10, 12-13; Rocha and Hordijk 2005, 12-13). 
These symbols are often separated from regular dynamic processes and thus 'stored' in a 
way analogous to random access memory in a computer. The behaviors they produce are 
significant and functional, since they represent a selection from a range of possibilities. 
Physically, symbols are material structures exerting limitations on the many possible ways 
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natural laws could be obeyed- they represent selections from alternative ways laws can be 
instantiated. They are made up of matter that always obeys the laws of nature, but in addition 
represents a constraint to behavior that could have been otherwise (Pattee 1995, 6; Etxeberria 
and Moreno 2001, 8-9). 
In systems that utilize symbolic representation, the symbol-token's material dynamics are 
largely irrelevant. Their dynamic components do not elicit a response from the dynamic 
components of the system. Rocha calls this characteristic of a symbol-token 'dynamic 
incoherence', and notes it is a relative, not an absolute concept; the lack of direct influence of 
symbol tokens on material dynamics is relative to their much greater indirect influence on 
material dynamics when a framework of stable decoding machinery mediates between the two. 
It is the symbol-token's information value- what choice of initial conditions it represents- that 
is most relevant to the system when extracted via decoding (Rocha 2001, 6; Rocha and Hordijk 
2005, 10). 
The fact that symbol-tokens encode particular selections of material results from 
alternative possibilities is a fact of biological organization, and not the result of human observers 
imputing subjective meaning to symbol-tokens. Selected alternatives- choices- are part-and-
parcel of what it means for an organism to evolve. Symbol function is internal to an organism, 
defining it in critical ways, and not an anthropomorphic projection (Etxeberria and Moreno 
2001, 9). 
Rocha has laid out three key criteria for determining whether a structure is a symbol-
token:54 
54 Rocha calls this a 'material representation.' 
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1. The syntactic structure of information in symbolic representations can be accessed and 
utilized without reference to its content, and is implemented in non-reactive 
structures. This is the concept of dynamically incoherent memory. 
2. The coded semantic 'content' of information in symbolic representations is used to 
construct dynamic configurations; representations encode alternative initial conditions 
for a dynamical system-environment coupling. This is the concept of a construction 
code. 
3. What symbolic representations construct are material structures existing under the 
constraints of self-organization, and are pragmatically selected in an evolutionary 
process. This is self-organization and selection (Rocha and Hordijk 2005, 13-14, 26). 
3.2.6 Discussion of Pattee 
3.2.6.1 Pattee underemphasizes material continuity in real biology 
Some critics of Pattee have noted he overstates how the causal loop of a symbol phase and 
a material dynamics phase alternate in a completely distinguishable way in semantic closure. 
Pattee has said semantic closure occurs in biology only if a) the interpreting components of cells 
do not demonstrate any dependence on string processing during their actual functioning, and b) 
no interpreting structures exist that were not constrained by strings during their synthesis 
(Pattee 1982b, 333). Etxeberria and Moreno point to the material continuity between parent 
and offspring that is 'background' to the process of symbolically-aided reproduction: "the 
construction of the new system may be aided by records, but does not follow a description" 
(Etxeberria and Moreno 2001, 11, italics mine). Logically, it is not possible that every 
component of the interpreting system could be the result of the symbols; 55 else, the symbols 
would be able to produce an organism out of themselves, without needing any contextual 
55 At least initially. Interpreting structures may end up getting coded for once an organism's semantically 
closed dynamic processes are underway, but in that case the products of such coded-for, interpreting 
structures would be dependent on a previous generation of already present, non-coded-for interpreting 
structures. Some interpreting components are a necessary precondition for symbol interpretation, a 
critical point that throws a wrench in 'replicator' theories of genes. 
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support. A 'dynamic description strategy' suggests that symbols in the end depend on 
independent development dynamics for their fulfillment (Etxeberria and Ibanez 1999, 299, 306-
9). 
In my previous chapter on emergence, I noted that Deacon has argued we must replace a 
'design' metaphor with a self-organization metaphor. That is, systems cannot appear out of 
nowhere, parts tailor-made to fit with each other, without invoking some intelligent designer 
somewhere to account for this fit. A scientifically responsible approach to function and 
intelligence in nature requires us to see how lower-level, simpler forms are the grounds out of 
which higher-level forms come (hence the term, 'emergence'). A dynamic description strategy is 
more in line with this way of thinking. While it is certainly possible for a human designer to 
construct completely separate parts of a self-reproducing machine, one part being symbolic 
code, the other part being interpreting physical construction devices, it could not have emerged 
out of natural, non-symbolic material dynamics that way. Symbol systems must have co-opted 
earlier, simpler processes involved in self-reproduction. 56 
3.2.6.2 What do genes reference? 
Pattee has argued that the symbol system of a cell is a 'self-description.' Etxeberria and 
Moreno, criticizing this view, have said, "Nucleic acids are just records or annotations to 
construct molecules used by the cell, not descriptions of the system." Genetic information is 
not a representation of a given reality, because it is "only some sort of instruction for protein 
synthesis" (Etxeberria and Moreno 2001, 11-12). Similarly, Rocha has stated that there is no 
reason to say that the symbol system 'refers' to anything, as it is simply a construction code, and 
56 1 will investigate this more in a following section on Deacon's model of the autocell (section 3.4.4.2, 
p.lll). In that model, I will explore different ways that representation can progressively complexity, 
following Peirce's model of icons, indexes, and symbols. 
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this "construction is not about correspondence between internal and external elements, but 
about a material process of controlling the behavior of embodied agents in an environment" 
(Rocha and Hordijk 2005, 14). 
These critics are raising a question of reference- to what do genes refer?- and I think 
Peirce's analysis of semiosis is useful here. Do genes just refer to proteins, or do they refer to an 
environment? If the symbol-system is only a construction code, then it makes sense to say that 
a codon refers to an amino acid. If, however, the symbol system- by virtue of its variability 
within a system that has an iterative, pragmatic relationship with the environment- becomes 
connected to it and is indirectly sculpted by the results of that interaction, we can say the 
symbols refer to things outside the organism itself. In that case, there is a correspondence 
between internal and external elements. Given feedback, what is constructed by a construction 
code will eventually correspond to features in that environment, and thus the symbol system 
encoding that correspondence is 'referencing' relevant environmental features. 
Our discussion of the difference between 'interpretant' and 'interpretant-vehicle' in the 
previous chapter might be of some use here. Recall that in that discussion, an interpretant-
vehicle is some physical fact instantiating the correlation of two domains according to some 
rules. It is the ground upon which the sign is seen to be related to something else, its object. It 
is a kind of coding, and does not change relative to the different uses it is put in creating 
interpretants. An interpretant, on the other hand, is a specific, here-now interpretive or 
functional result, the effect of broader relationships implicated in the connections wrought by 
the interpretant-vehicle. The interpretant always involves the meaning, the outcome of the 
mediating relationship. The interpretant involves a respect in which something is taken up. A 
selection among possible alternatives is made by the interpreter to make this the interpretant of 
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the object rather than that. Some contribution from the interpreter is making some choice as to 
how to construct the interpretant. 
In examining a string of DNA, the interpretant-vehicle is the genetic code translation 
machinery, which converts codons to amino acids. So in terms of a 'construction code,' nucleic 
acids have an encoded relationship to amino acids. But to answer what the interpretant of a 
string of DNA is, we must venture out into the question of the meaning and function of the 
string as interpreted, the outcome and use, and the respect in which the string is taken up, and 
its relations to a broader environment. This will determine what we can say the string of DNA 
represents.57 
3.2.6.3 Semantic closure means interpretive autonomy 
Pattee's followers have emphasized that the force behind the idea of semantic closure is 
that symbolic constraints on the dynamics of a reproducing system function within the system 
itself. Symbolic records preserve the control constraints of a hierarchical system, and daughter 
generations "re-produce the parents' dynamical configurations by self-organizing their material 
components according to the inherited conditions" (Etxeberria and Moreno 2001, 5; Rocha 
57 Pattee himself, without utilizing the interpretant/interpretant-vehicle distinction, has pointed out that 
what a string of DNA represents depends on the respect in which we take up the representation of the 
symbols in question. He has said that to answer what is represented by a string of DNA, the correct 
"syntactic-semantic loop" needs to be specified, and there are several possibilities. For any particular cell, 
it would represent the primary sequence of a protein. Why? Because the rules needed for interpreting 
the string are part of the cell's "semantically closed self-replication loop." In this particular loop, the gene 
does NOT represent 3.6 billion years of history and environmental features that played into the cell's 
current state, but merely what the nucleic acids refer to in light of cell activity. Pattee asks us to consider 
the evolutionary selection loop, on the other hand, which, on my read, means he wants us to consider a 
lineage of cells, not a particular cell. A lineage of cells translating DNA is dependent on the functional 
outcomes and environmental interactions between proteins at many different levels, including their 
secondary, tertiary, and quaternary structure. On this read, the 'evolutionary selection loop' gives a much 
wider context for what DNA could 'mean' to a cell. "A given syntactic string can ... represent as many 
properties as there are semantic loops in which it acts as a constraint" (Pattee 1982b, 337-8). This is 
much more in line with my argument based on a distinction between interpretant-vehicles and 
interpretants. 
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2001, 4). Thus, interpretive autonomy is the crucial idea. This means the "mutual 
complementarity or closure between symbols and the dynamical processes that interprets them 
accounts for the autonomy- in the sense of independence of external control- of the process" 
(Etxeberria and Moreno 2001, 7). 58 Symbols internal to a system play a role in constraining the 
system; this is the ground for making a distinction between semiotic inside constraints and 
material/dynamical outside constraints on an organism. 
3.3 Strange Loops- Hofstadter59 
Douglas Hofstadter believes the Godel incompleteness Theorem is a potential model for 
emergent phenomena like biology and self-consciousness. He argues living things and conscious 
persons are self-referring, self-reproducing systems in which a symbol system translates 
relations from one domain to another, resulting in phenomena demonstrating new types of 
'top-down' causal efficacy. He calls such systems 'Strange Loops.' 
Hofstadter has several leading examples of what he means by a Strange Loop. I will 
attempt to account for two of them, drawing attention to how something he largely ignores-
the interpreter- plays a crucial role in the phenomena he describes. 
3.3.1 His first example of a Strange Loop- "Strange Feedback" 
Hofstadter is interested in audio and video feedback for the interesting types of self-
organization it demonstrates. He distinguishes between "simple feedback" and the strange 
feedback of "looping-back between different informational levels." He offers as an example of 
simple feedback the amplified audio feedback of a microphone that has been placed too closely 
58 This can be compared to the functioning of a computer, which also involves symbols; however, symbol 
interpretation is not done by the computer, for the computer. The 'closure' of interpretation is provided 
by the human user of the computer, who feeds symbols in and takes symbols out, using the computer as 
an extension of his/her own symbolic capacities. 
59 Hofstadter (1979, 2007). 
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to an amplifier, which amplifies signals that the microphone picks up. The component elements 
of a signal- whatever they may be- get explosively amplified until the signal feedback loop has 
saturated the output volume capacity of the amplifier. What is important about simple 
feedback is that the constituent parts of the signal being amplified do not matter in any 
informational way. The signals do not have to mean anything to be amplified. Specifically, the 
relative differences between component parts of the signal are not causally implicated in the 
amplification of the signal (Hofstadter 1979, 545). 
On the other hand, with 'strange feedback,' the informational component of the signal 
does matter. The relative differences between component parts of the signal- its informational 
content- are causally implicated in the amplification of the signal. Imagine the microphone and 
amplifier from the above example, except this time, the distance between the amplifier and 
microphone is great enough that simple feedback does not occur. In this case, however, the 
signal coming out of the amplifier is repeating in English, "Please rotate to the right the first 
knob on the amplifier." If an interpreting system understands the signal, it will'use' it- it will 
do what the signal says- to create feedback of increasing intensity. In this case, "information 
inside the radio signal gets 'decoded' and translated into mental structures"- a completely 
different informational domain (Hofstadter 1979, 545). Hofstadter suggests consciousness may 
be the result of this kind of Strange Feedback. He describes consciousness as an interaction 
between different hierarchical levels: a top 'symbol level' reaches down and influences a 
bottom neurological level, while at the same time being determined by it. A self-reinforcing 
'resonance' between levels results. Critical to this interaction between levels is the presence of 
a kind of translation mechanism between the domains, what I have called an interpretant-
vehicle. 
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3.3.2 His second example of a Strange Loop- Self-reference in the Godel Theorem 
Related to his first example of a Strange Loop, but much more clearly expounded and with 
different emphases, is his second example, based on the 'self-referential' mathematical 
statements found in the G6dellncompleteness Theorem. The key to this kind of Strange Loop is 
that it involves a "paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop," where the paradox is the result of 
self-reference. He also describes it as "an abstract loop in which, in the series of stages that 
constitute the cycling-around, there is a shift from one level of abstraction (or structure) to 
another, which feels like an upwards movement in a hierarchy, and yet somehow the successive 
'upwards' shifts turn out to give rise to a closed cycle" (Hofstadter 2007, 102). 
Hofstadter gives several metaphorical examples of a Strange Loop of this type; the one he 
is most fond of is seen in the M.C. Escher drawing, Drawing Hands: 
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Figure 1: Hofstadter's canonical example of a Strange Loop60 
In this picture, the abstract shift in levels from drawn to drawer is violated; what is normally 
presumed to be clean distinctions between hierarchical levels becomes tangled in that the 
circuit closes and drawer in turn becomes drawn. Normally, a frozen, immobile, two-
dimensional, determined image cannot 'jump levels' to the world of sentient, mobile, three-
dimensional, free artists. In this drawing, however, the lower-level depends on the upper-level, 
which in turn depends on the lower-level. .. , ad infinitum (Hofstadter 2007, 102-3; 1979, 691). 
6
° From http://www.worldofescher.com/gallery/A13L.html. Used by permission of 
http://www.worldofescher.com. All M.C. Escher works (c) 2011 The M.C. Escher Company- the 
Netherlands. All rights reserved. Used by permission. www.mcescher.com 
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Hofstadter notes that though the abstract structure of the drawing is correct for a Strange 
Loop, the drawing itself is an illusion; it requires a 'suspension of disbelief' as the viewer enters 
into the drawing to see it is a Strange Loop. Yet there are 'real' examples of this kind of Strange 
Loop, according to Hofstadter, and the most enlightening to investigate is the Godel 
incompleteness Theorem of 1931. The critical feature of this theorem is its incorporation of a 
self-referential mathematical statement, which in the context of Godel's proof has a similar 
effect as the paradox attributed to Epimenides the Cretan, "All Cretans are liars" (Hofstadter 
2007, 109).61 
Instead of walking through the entire logical construction of the proof, I want to highlight 
key aspects of it relevant to a discussion of semiotic emergence. The first is discussed by 
Hofstadter, and it has to do with the role of interpretation. Hofstadter writes that the formal 
mathematical system Godel worked with- the Principia Mathematica (PM) of Russell and 
Whitehead- "though terribly cumbersome, had enormous power to talk about whole numbers 
-in fact, to talk about arbitrarily subtle properties of whole numbers." Hofstadter adds 
parenthetically to this statement, "By the way, that little phrase 'arbitrarily subtle properties' 
already gives the game away, though the hint is so veiled that almost no one is aware of how 
much the words imply ... " (Hofstadter 2007, 113-4). I believe what Hofstadter is hinting at is that 
the relations embedded in the system of whole numbers are robust enough to allow them to be 
used in support of self-reference, which is specifically what Godel takes advantage of. But he 
61 The mathematical statement that Godel produced reads, when interpreted into English, "This 
statement of the formal system of Principia Mathematica has no proof in the formal system of Principia 
Mathematica." Thus, to prove the statement true would paradoxically make it false; to be unable to 
prove it true would be to paradoxically demonstrate its truth. Later theorists, jumping on Godel's self-
referential trick, learned to produce cousins such as, 'Some proof in the formal system of Principia 
Mathematica exists which proves me true.' These sentences, "by merely asserting [their] own provability, 
actually become provable" (Hofstadter 1979, 542, 709). 
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may also be suggesting that arbitrary choices determine precisely what properties of whole 
numbers in all their subtleness are under consideration through the proofs of PM. The proofs 
are interpretants,62 determined as the interpreter decides precisely how the objects under 
consideration- whole numbers and their relational interactions- will be referenced. 
How does interpretation find its way into the Incompleteness Theorem? Godel invented a 
code (the Godel code) that allows theorems about numbers in the symbolic language of PM to 
be turned into numbers, and vice versa. This trick allowed statements in PM about numbers to 
also 'say' things like 'This statement in PM has no proof' when interpreted at a higher level as a 
result of the code. Thus, he made it possible for investigations into properties of numbers using 
PM to be investigations into theorems of PM at the same time. Notice that this curious result is 
due to the action of interpretation. Contrary to what we might think, both the lower-level, 
number-theoretical investigation into numbers and their properties and relations through PM, 
and the higher-level, meta-statements about theorems of PM, result from different ways to 
interpret the symbols. There is nothing in the symbols themselves that determine to what they 
refer. That is always in the eye of the mathematician, who is the interpreting system 
(Hofstadter 2007, 132, 134). 
But if flexibility in interpreting symbols is the key to Godel's theorem, self-referentiality is 
key to a new kind of mathematical truth that Hofstadter thinks mirrors what a 'self' is, and this is 
the second key point relevant to semiotic emergence. How did Godel pull off the trick of self-
referentiality, the ability of a meta-level statement of PM to say something like "This 
sentence ... "? The crucial mathematical'sentence' in Godel's theorem didn't actually say the 
62 Recall that I defined an interpretant in the previous chapter as "a specific, here-now constructed result 
that is the effect of taking up of one thing as another thing." 
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equivalent of the English word 'this;' rather, it described a typographical entity that was identical 
to itself. Hofstadter offers an analogous English sentence, first developed by W.V.O. Quine, to 
illustrate how this works. The sentence is:63 
"preceded by itself in quote marks yields a full sentence." preceded by itself in quote 
marks yields a full sentence. 
The sentence makes a truth claim; to confirm the claim you need to do something, namely, 
act on the instructions in the second part of the sentence. When you have done so, you find 
that the statement is true, and also that the result is the same as the original. Godel carefully 
constructed the mathematical equivalent of this sentence so that he could interpret the 
equivalent of the part in quotes as just a number, the other half as a statement of number 
theory in the language of PM, all the while keeping in mind that through the Godel code the part 
in quotes was also the same as the second half of the statement in the language of PM. This 
conceptual moves highlights what Hofstadter thinks is the key to a Strange Loop (Hofstadter 
1979, 497-9). 
Hofstadter sees two significant facts in the logical structure of this feature of the Godel 
Incompleteness Theorem. The first is how the sentence reproduces itself because of the way 
the same string in this sentence functions in two ways: first, as data, and second, as instructions 
as to how to act on the data. The same string of numbers plays the role of 'acted upon,' and 
'actor,' depending on context. Seemingly, something in the system jumps out and acts on the 
system, as if outside of it (Hofstadter 1979, 691). Like Escher's drawing, the clean hierarchy 
seems to be broken. However, the key to untangling this 'Tangle' is to note the role of the 
interpreter. In the Escher drawing some interpreter- Escher, as well as the person viewing the 
63 Taken from Hofstadter (2007, 142). 
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drawing- is attributing reference as to which is the 'real' hand and which is the 'drawn' hand, 
and in addition can alternate judgment about which is which. So too in the Godel proof; the 
interpreting mathematician is attributing reference at both the 'lower-level' and the 'higher-
level' statements of PM alternately. 54 
The second significant fact Hofstadter sees in the logical structure of the GIT is that the 
mathematical sentence makes a truth claim that turns out to be true. However, it is not true 
about some other thing to which its truth refers, as would be the case in a mathematical version 
of some claim such as 
'D'oh!' when spoken aloud is a funny exclamation. 
In the GIT, the 'other thing' that it is true about is an exact copy of itself. It is what it is true 
about; it is self-referentially true. A sufficiently flexible symbol system can be turned on itselfto 
make statements that accurately reference realties that are created by the very act of self-
reference. A truthful'story can be told' about things that didn't even exist before the story was 
told. That is the heart of the 'incompleteness' implicated in mathematical languages by Godel's 
proof- true reference can be 'created on the fly' when self-reference is involved, and what is 
truthfully referenced are self-referential entities themselves. 
3.3.3 Summary of Hofstadter's two models 
In conclusion, we can see Hofstadter emphasizes different things through the two models 
of a Strange Loop. Strange Feedback, the first model, emphasizes the closed circuit from object 
64 For this reason, I think Hofstadter is wrong to think that the Godel proof is a more 'real' example of a 
Strange Loop than is the Escher drawing; both have the same abstract structure, and both rely on a kind 
of level-jumping only possible for interpreting systems. I think this mistake is a result of Hofstadter 
temporarily forgetting the role of the mathematical interpreter in formal mathematical proofs. Godel 
himself did not make this mistake. He argued that determining the truth of a mathematical statement 
requires more than demonstrating a proposition has a certain, decidable formal structure; it also requires 
"some extra mathematical element concerning the psychology of the being which deals with 
mathematics." See Godel (1965, 87). 
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to symbol to interpretant and back to object; and the Godel Theorem model emphasizes the 
flexible symbol system along with the translating code- the Godel code- which enables self-
referential possibilities found in switching between strings taken as data and strings taken as 
instructions. 
3.3.4 Conclusions taken from Hofstadter 
3.3.4.1 Performative utterances capture something of the logic of semiotic emergence 
The strange result of a mathematical statement that becomes true simply by being stated, 
which seems to be the result of the self-referencing possibilities of flexible symbol systems, has 
been studied in other contexts. Consider 'performative utterances,' a category of linguistic 
statements that J.L. Austin (1962) noted have a peculiar quality to them. He noted that some 
utterances that on the surface look like a statement of fact are not actually statements of fact. 
They are a special kind of statement that does not describe or report anything, is not true or 
false in any traditional way, but does something when uttered that makes them true. To make 
such a statement is not to describe the doing, or to state that the doing is being done, but is 
rather to do it. Examples include saying "I do" in the context of a wedding ceremony, saying "I 
christen thee H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth" in the context of a military dedication, or when the 
bartender says, "The bar is closed" in the context of his place of employment. To issue such a 
statement in these circumstances is to perform an action that makes truth (Austin 1962, 2-6). 
In performative utterances, the authority of some agent doing the action is essential to the 
explanation (Austin 1962, 61). Searle has noted that the purest form of a performative 
utterance is one in which a speaker in authority brings about a state of affairs that is specified in 
the propositional content of a performative (Searle 1979, 26). What is the relationship between 
the creation of truth in a Godel-like self-referential mathematical statement and the 
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actualization of authority in an Austin-like performative utterance? In short, the performative 
utterances of Godel rely on a single interpreter recursively organizing symbolic self-reference to 
create truth.65 The performative utterances of Austin rely on multiple interpreters agreeing 
upon (by submitting to) a symbolically-constructed and shared world to create truth. Both, 
then, rely on the action of interpretation, where authority is created. Both represent the 
creative potential of symbols and their interpretation. 
C.S. Peirce analyzed self-referring sentences- English sentences, not the mathematical 
sentences of Godel- and his discussion of them may shed light on the issue. Peirce first notes 
that in general, to judge a proposition requires looking to something outside of the sentence for 
confirmation or disconfirmation of its truth. If I say, 'the sky is cloudy,' we would look outside of 
the proposition- probably at the sky- to confirm its truth. Peirce notes further that the very 
act of making such a judgment as 'the sky is cloudy' creates information in the world. Just like 
the cloudy sky is a datum in the world, my claim 'the sky is cloudy' becomes a datum in the 
world. My proposition is something that once stated exists 'in the world,' and becomes another 
fact that can be monitored and assessed. 
Peirce notes that something strange happens when propositions are made concerning 
propositions themselves, not concerning things in the world outside of propositions. Consider 
some paradisiacal world, where all the propositions ever made about things in the world outside 
of propositions were in fact true. Then consider that in that context, the proposition 'there is 
such a thing as a false proposition' is uttered. Prior to its uttering, there was no such thing as a 
false proposition. However, in this paradisiacal world, if the above statement is uttered, it 
becomes necessarily true, and it becomes true because it is false. Precisely because there hadn't 
65 That is, the authority comes from an act of the interpreter. 
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been false statements in the world prior to its uttering, the statement would be false, and 
because of its falsity, there would now be false statements in the world, making it true. The fact 
that the proposition 'there is such a thing as a false proposition' is about propositions as things 
in the world is what makes the statement true. Its utterance creates truth out of nowhere, so to 
speak. As Peirce said, "the existence of this proposition constitutes the certainty that a false 
proposition is enunciated, although the assertion of this proposition itself is perfectly true" 
(Peirce 1998g, Memoir 10). 
In the paradisiacal world, 'There is such a thing as a false proposition' is in fact a 
performative utterance. When propositioned it performs, enacts, and constitutes the truth of 
its claim. By being a proposition about propositions, it can be true or false, or true AND false, in 
two domains, two hierarchic levels, at the same time. In the real world, where false 
propositions exist all over the place, its truth would be in virtue of the falsehood of other 
propositions; in the paradisiacal world, its truth would be in virtue of itself as a proposition, 
since as a proposition it adds to what is the case about propositions, which is what is under 
consideration. In the paradisiacal world, the statement would be false when applied to the 
domain of the world outside of itself, and true in the domain that recognizes 'itself' as part of 
the world. 
Notice how the interpreter is involved, judging the truth claim made in both cases, whether 
the proposition is 'merely' true about other propositions, or whether the proposition is 
constitutively true since it is itself a 'proposition' that is false concerning other propositions. 
Propositions don't enact themselves; interpreters take sentences as claims; they choose to what 
they will be applied. This is the heart of Godel's insight concerning mathematics, what allows 
Godel to note the 'incompleteness' of mathematics. Because symbols are not attached directly 
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to what they reference, as are indexes, they have a flexibility about them that allows them to be 
recursive, to be about themselves. Peirce's proposition is about propositions, which makes it 
possible for an interpreter validly to take the proposition as referring to itself, in which case a 
different comparison than normal is made between the proposition and reality; reality now 
includes the proposition. The utterance of the proposition adds information to the world, and it 
is possible to judge its truth assuming the presence of that added information at a secondary 
level- or perhaps better, a later time- than at the primary level (at the earlier time of its 
utterance), when its reference was conventionally taken to be to things outside of itself. The 
circular nature of self-reference creates a location 'downstream' from primary reference from 
which virgin, secondary-level claims can flow. According to Hofstadter, the simplest, tersest 
articulation of this kind of creation of a locus for future truth is the English word, "1," as in 11 1 am 
unprovable" (Hofstadter 2007, 145), or in Peirce's example, 11 1 am a false proposition." 
Similarly, the authority to enact reality in Austin's performative utterance comes through 
the role of the interpreter[s]. As Searle points out, performative utterances require constitutive, 
institutional'background' rules that must be submitted to for the performative to take effect. 
To effect a marriage by saying 111 do" presupposes marriage as a human institution, a non-
natural, non-required institutional fact, not a brute fact (Searle 1969, 51-2). Obedience to 
institutional facts is not required, as is obedience to laws of nature. When a duly designated 
employee says, 11The bar is closed," the authority for that performative comes from the patrons 
in the bar who interpret that statement as being authoritative, who grant the authority of the 
bartender according to institutional rules, not natural facts. Imagine the employee saying, 'the 
bar is closed,' and a patron pulling out a gun and laying it on the table, saying, 11 1 say it is open." 
The patron is refusing to live by the institutional, conventional, interpreter-dependent rules that 
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grant a performative its efficacy.66 Performative utterances depend on the fact that "when one 
enters an institutional activity by invoking [or following] the rules of the institution one 
necessarily commits oneself in such and such ways, regardless of whether one approves or 
disapproves of the institution" (Searle 1969, 189). 
Therefore, the key to the authority of a performative utterance and the ability of self-
referring statements to create truth is the action of the interpreter in the use of symbols. Shared 
symbols among a community of people allow social truth to be determined by agreement; 
taking advantage ofthe flexibility of symbols to self-refer allows an interpreter to create a locus 
for establishing future truth. Both invent new realms for true statements to be explored. 
3.3.4.2 Rules are responsible for semiotic emergence, not laws of nature. 
A second result of Hofstadter's analysis is the distinction between the 'rules' that are 
responsible for the appearance of a Strange Loop, and the laws of nature that ground the 
possibility. How does Hofstadter distinguish these? He notes that the recursive, tangled 
hierarchical structure of a Strange Loop is 'held together' by the consistent performance of a 
translation between two domains. In Godel's mathematical logic, Godel numbering consistently 
links the domain of 'strings of PM' with the natural numbers, which can then be examined by 
strings of PM. The status of the translation code is determined neither by strings of PM, nor by 
requirements of natural numbers, but is arbitrary to both. Though arbitrary, its consistent 
application means it functions like a rule rather than a law. In an embodied semiotic emergent 
system, what corresponds to the rules is the translating code connecting two domains. This 
66 Hofstadter notes a corresponding example from the world of Godel and PM- he notes that Lord 
Russell, one of the creators of PM, never saw the higher-level meaning that Godel created. By an act of 
will (or perhaps a habit of mind), he simply wrote off the higher level as not-existing. That is, as an 
interpreter, he refused to allow the isomorphic, higher-level coding be the ground for interpretants. See 
Hofstadter (2007, 147, 148, 202). 
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translating code is not a law of nature, though of course it operates as one by being instantiated 
in material entities that do act consistent with the laws of nature. It acts as a 'structuring 
cause.'67 For example, the fact that the construction of certain proteins results from this pattern 
of nucleotides rather than that pattern when translated is not a necessary fact, though the 
translation process itself takes place because the component parts work according to necessary 
facts. The translating code provides the arbitrary but consistent structure to relations between 
two domains, insuring isomorphic relations that can become causally linked to each other in 
both directions. 
Because rules like the genetic code and the Godel code are not laws of nature, yet are 
critical to the linking of otherwise different domains, they become what might be called the 
'center' of semiotic emergent systems. The translation code- embedded in the interpretant-
vehicle in semiotic emergent systems -links together activity in different domains that are not 
linked to each other naturally. The inflexibility of the code allows the exploration of variant 
pattern isomorphisms between domains, and is what makes fitness in an environment possible. 
Once symbols get involved in self-reference and self-reproduction, the code is a 'core' that is 
protected at all costs. The survival of the translation code and minimal interpreting support 
system, together with its necessary semiotic co-components- symbol patterns on one hand, 
embodied physical activity on the other- is what all other flexibility in the organism functions to 
protect.68 
67 As opposed to a 'triggering' cause. See Dretske (1993). 
68 Note the previous discussion of Austin's performative utterances suggested that what makes for the 
success of such an utterance is the permanence of the perceived 'institutional rules' that members of a 
community tacitly agree to. If these rules were to be broken, as in the example I gave of a patron with a 
gun, that kind of truth-producing, rule based system breaks down as well. 
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3.3.4.3 Strange Loops offer an abstract model of'downward' causality 
We can combine both of Hofstadter's examples of a Strange Loop into one model. Through 
the mediation of a translation code, an interpreting context first uses the informational content 
contained 'within' a passive, stored, typographically-manipulable pattern to create active, 
structured, dynamical physical interactions; next, the interpreting context, perhaps aided by the 
very structures it helped to create via the symbol pattern, manipulates the pattern by producing 
copies of the symbols and the minimal structures necessary to support future iterations of the 
symbol translation system. In this model, isomorphic relations recursively pass through multiple 
modes of expression- from passive symbol pattern to dynamic structural systems and back to 
symbol pattern, etc. 
This, I believe, gives us a picture of what is sometimes referred to as 'downward causality.' 
If a pattern in one embodied form is causally linked through a consistent translation code to 
some other form, the pattern of relations exists in two worlds independently. Because the same 
pattern of relations exists in different domains, each version of the pattern will be susceptible to 
different causal interactions, interactions relevant to the domain of the pattern's embodiment. 59 
Due to their interrelation, manipulations of form in one domain can produce isomorphic 
manipulations of form in the other domain, and vice versa. 70 This 'tangle' of causality means the 
cause of the change in the form of the overall system can legitimately be said to occur at either 
locus. If causes at the secondary locus of pattern instantiation affect the pattern, what happens 
69 That is to say, nucleotides in a string of DNA have chemical and physical properties and potentialities 
that differ from the chemical and physical properties and potentialities of folded-over proteins, though 
the two domains are linked isomorphically to each other by the genetic translation code. Because of their 
different properties and potentialities, the interactions possible for nucleotides- what can causally act 
upon them- are different from the interactions possible for folded-over proteins. 
70 This is complicated a bit by the nature of Darwinian selection, since the causal efficacy of the 
environment on an organism is not direct, but results from a selection sieve. Nevertheless, there is causal 
interaction from the environment back to the domain of genes, indirect as it is. 
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at the secondary locus has changed the pattern at the level of primary instantiation. Thus, what 
is meant by 'upward' and 'downward' causation can be defined: the differential causal 
relevance of factors as they interact with domain-specific properties on either side of a causally 
closed circuit of pattern-preserving translations. 
3.4 Teleodynamics- Deacon71 
Although I have outlined Terrence Deacon's account of Emergence3, teleodynamics, inCh. 
2, a more focused examination of aspects of his theory will be recounted here. Deacon has not 
published his complete theory of teleodynamics in one place yet; 72 rather, a sense of where he 
is heading with his account will be given by noting his recent published and not-yet published 
works that deal with the topic. 73 
One of Deacon's critical contributions is to ground teleodynamics in lower-level, self-
organizing emergent phenomena ('morphodynamics'- Emergence2). He argues that 
teleodynamics are a special case of morphodynamics, and are constrained by morphodynamic 
considerations and boundaries. Since the form-producing processes of an organism are located 
primarily in self-organizing morphodynamics, not in the memory components (like DNA), this 
removes the need for a teleodynamic system to be designed from the ground up. 74 Thus, 
Deacon avoids the problems associated with the metaphor of Emergence3 as 'designed 
mechanisms.' 
71 Deacon(2006a,2000,2003a,2005,2004,2003b,2006c,2006b,2008a,2008b,2003c); Deacon and 
Sherman (2006); Sherman and Deacon (2007); Goodenough and Deacon (2003-4, 2006). 
72 Just as this dissertation was being defended, his book-length account of emergence was published, 
Incomplete Nature. 
73 Many of his unpublished works can be found at his website, www.teleodynamics.com. 
74 The way Von Neumann's automata had to be designed, for example. 
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Deacon argues that convergent evolution demonstrates the primacy of morphodynamics 
over informational components.75 In convergent evolution, different historical processes of 
genetic change have led to different genetic patterns undergirding similarly functioning parts in 
an organism. This suggests that the functional role of the physical organization of parts that 
successfully exist in an environment is what drives genetic development; genetic patterns that 
support such organization are selected precisely because they contribute to such function. In 
effect, 'morphodynamic fitness' is more basic than 'genetic fitness' (Deacon and Sherman 2007, 
9-10; personal communication). 
3.4.1 Particular features of teleodynamics 
If teleodynamic systems are not designed machines, and if they depend on self-organizing 
processes as Deacon argues, why do we need to speak of telos at all? What do we mean when 
we use such a term as 'teleo-dynamics' in the context of a self-organized system? We can find 
the answer in the logic of the way such systems behave, a logic that requires such concepts as 
representation, adaptation, selection,Jitness, and function. These are all philosophically 
troublesome terms for traditional conceptions of science. Deacon thinks that emergence, as a 
paradigm for approaching scientific data, has its raison d'etre in explaining the unprecedented 
causal properties of teleological phenomena in a way compatible with physical causality 
(Deacon 2006a, 138; Sherman and Deacon 2007, 875). 76 
3.4.1.1 How telos evolves 
Deacon has attempted to capture the 'evolutionary history' of telos from its primordial 
roots in thermodynamic and morphodynamic processes, through its first appearance in 
75 The eye is a classic example of convergent evolution, having evolved independently many different 
times over the course of life on earth. 
76 As opposed to an approach that eliminates telos as epiphenomenal or attempts to ground it in 
something supernatural. 
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reciprocally-organized systems, to its final development in semiotic and nested-semiotic 
processes. I will outline that history focusing on teleodynamics, since that is where the story is 
most relevant for my account of religious communities. 
According to Deacon, all processes of emergence- whether thermodynamic, 
morphodynamic, or teleodynamic- take advantage of the logic of affordances, which might be 
loosely defined as those possibilities left over after what is less likely has been eliminated. 
When a liquid is carefully boiled in a flat-bottomed container, the regular, hexagonal pattern of 
cells of boiling liquid that appear77 are not the result of some law imposing the pattern from 
within or from without; the geometric pattern is what is left over after countervailing biases are 
taken into account. Dynamic and energetic instabilities result in irregular patterns of flow build-
up and dissipation that explore possibilities, and the result is a dynamic that minimizes the 
constantly building instabilities. This results in a convergence to a regular hexagonal pattern. All 
of the examples of affordances Deacon discusses are sometimes called 'attractors,' as if they 
exerted a pull (Deacon 2006a, 120-1, 132). 
If, as discussed in the previous chapter, morphodynamics amplify what is left over after the 
cancellation of the 'pushes' of alternative configurations, teleodynamics amplifies 
"morphodynamic synergies due to the differential preservation of more contextually fitted 
variants." Typically called Darwinian selection in honor of its discoverer in biology, the 'least-
discordant-remainder' process that occurs in teleodynamic systems is a cancelling dynamic 
leaving "serendipitously non-discordant" morphodynamic processes pitted against one another. 
Variants not eliminated by the environment get to persist another day. A teleodynamic 
organism persists better than alternative forms through the exploration of alternative 
77 Called a Benard cell; see Deacon (2007, Slide 7) 
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arrangements of morphodynamic processes. The systematic iteration of varying 
morphodynamic 'versions' takes advantage of what 'remembering' offers and contributes to the 
success of future self-similar organisms. A teleodynamic system acts as if a target state is 
attracting the evolution of its dynamics (Deacon 2006a, 143-4). 
The differential persistence of re-produced organisms results in a reduction in the number 
of variant phenotypes,78 due to the greater correspondence of 'fit' phenotypes to the 
environment. Features of the persisting variants can be said to be 'about' features of the 
external environment as they survive as least discordant remainders. These features have 
become organized with respect to something else (Deacon 2006c, Slide 26; 2008a, 9). This is 
why in biological teleodynamics we first see telos playing a conventionally recognized role, in 
the concept of adaptive function. 79 The 'function' hemoglobin plays, for example, in the 
dynamics of an oxygen-using organism is analogous to an 'attractor' in a self-organizing, 
morphodynamic process. Its presence is due to alternative organizational forms that have been 
eliminated. An evolutionary least-discordant-remainder selection process has 'produced' a 
particular synergistic relationship between hemoglobin and organism after self-undermining 
causal chaos has winnowed out alternatives, similar to the way hexagonal cells of boiling liquid 
are what are left over after self-undermining causal chaos cancels alternatives. Least discordant 
remainder dynamics are how emergent systems act- not by top-down 'forces' but by a 
continuous 'culling' of more discordant combinations (Deacon 2006a, 140-1; 2008a, 9). 
78 This corresponds to the definition of information in the strict, mathematical sense, and explains why 
the form of teleodynamic systems communicate something about the environment in which they live. 
See Shannon and Weaver (1949). 
79 Aristotle first recognized the causality of 'final causes' in his analysis of biological organisms and 
function. 
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Deacon notes it is legitimate to speak of function when system persistence is the result of 
"reciprocal cofacilitation" or "indecomposable interdependence" between parts in a process 
whose organization demonstrates circular causal closure. The circular causal closure of 
interdependent parts is what gives the organism a memory, and what allows parts to be both 
means and ends. The action of some part or process here-and-now contributes to a future 
action of a self-similar version of that part or process. Reciprocal cofacilitation is why 
hemoglobin exists, as far as we know, in one place in the universe: planet earth. Its random 
presence in the past was taken up in a living teleodynamic process, where it facilitated other 
processes and structures that rebounded back to insure its continued presence. It's not that 
hemoglobin can't exist elsewhere; it's that there is nothing to preserve it when it does. It is 
precisely the circular causal structure and indecomposable interdependence of a teleodynamic 
process that makes such a system a 'self,' having a unique identity (Deacon and Sherman 2007, 
8, 17; Deacon 2003a, 20; 2006c, Slide 42). 
Deacon argues that 'function' and 'purpose' in biology can be defined over 4 domains 
(Deacon 2006c, Slide 7). We can summarize these four domains by reducing them to two: 
function and purpose is defined for teleodynamic processes by the domain of internal 
coherence, a label for system persistence due to reciprocal organization and closed circular 
causality; and the domain of external correlation, a label for environmental form-fitting 
adaptation and selective change. In summary then, the telos of teleodynamic systems is due to 
parts and processes being organized with respect to two things: indecomposable 
interdependence and a closed circular causal chain undergirding persistence, and significant 
outside constraints imposed by the environment undergirding adaptation. The 'self' defined by 
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indecomposable interdependence must be correlated with 'non-self' constraints, the "non-self 
becoming re-presented as an adaptation" (Deacon 2006c, Slide 45, 58). 
3.4.1.2 The growth ofsigns 
Adaptation- when a system demonstrating circular causal closure becomes organized with 
respect to something else- is the basis of reference, which makes semiotic analysis relevant to 
teleodynamic systems. How does reference get involved in a teleodynamic system? According 
to Deacon, any incidental physical system/context correlation can become adaptive information 
through the information creation ability of Darwinian selection. Through the circular causal 
structure of the system, if either a change in the system produces a fortuitous correlation with 
the environment, or a change in the environment produces a fortuitous correlation with an 
already existing aspect of the system, the system can gain a functional relationship with the 
environment. Basically, noise can become information about environmental constraints "with 
respect to the boundary conditions for system persistence" (Deacon 2006c, Slides 30, 26). 
3.4.1.3 The 'downward causation' of context on signs 
How does the external context of a system's environment influence the signs involved in 
producing that system? The causal connection is not direct; we must appeal to the logic of 
least-discordant-remainders for an answer. As we saw in the example of convergent evolution, 
the kind of 'downward causation' we see is the result of the environmental niche of an organism 
providing the boundary conditions for the functional properties of components, which provides 
the boundary conditions for the structural properties of components, which provides the 
boundary conditions for successful semiotic signification and representation of components 
(Deacon 2006c, Slide 83-4). In the case of biological development of sense organs, for example, 
it is the 'backward' causal influence ofthe environment that conserves the random production 
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of elements sensitive to different kinds of environmental features. A general fact about the 
environment conserves specific but different kinds of organs that sense the same environmental 
features; and a general fact about different kinds of organs conserves specific but different 
genetic instantiations of organs that sense the same environmental feature (Goodenough and 
Deacon 2003-4, 7-8). 
3.4.1.4 Autocells and autocatalytic sets 
In the teleodynamic systems most discussed- biological organisms and human persons-
symbol systems such as strings of DNA and human languages act as the memory component of 
the system guiding future versions. Deacon notes, however, that the memory component does 
not have to utilize symbolic reference. As long as an ongoing dynamic system of interdependent 
processes can vary with respect to an environment- whether or not that variation is encoded in 
symbols- and that variation influences the future of the lineage, natural selection can create 
information (Deacon 2006b, 136). Deacon's published accounts of teleodynamics have focused 
on the organization of a theoretically simplest organized teleodynamic system- what he calls an 
autoce/1. Precisely because it is a theoretically simplest account, it ignores the feature that 
Deacon himself has argued can appear in other forms of teleodynamics- symbol function. 
Following Peirce, we can consider these non-symbolic, simple variations in component dynamics 
with respect to an environment indexes, since they contribute to system persistence through 
their direct connection with the environment. This suggests that Peirce's categorization of signs 
is relevant to the evolution of teleodynamic systems. 
Deacon's autocell is an example inspired by biology; the thought experiment he explores 
distinguishes between an autocatalytic set and an autocell in a way highlighting important issues 
involving teleodynamics. Before describing even autocatalysis, however, we need to examine 
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catalysis briefly. According to Deacon, a catalyst in a chemical system is a "shape-mediated 
molecular stickiness that affects rates of chemical reaction." When a molecule (or several 
together) facilitates the specific reactions of other molecules with each other above what would 
happen by random chance, and the facilitating molecule(s) do not get permanently changed in 
the process, they act as catalysts for a reaction. Thus, a catalyzed system is not the result of 
simple thermodynamics, but a combination of thermodynamics and 'shape factors.' In a closed 
system of chemical reactions, the presence of a catalyst will shift the ratios of chemical products 
away from what it would otherwise be. This could be described as an Emergentl phenomena, 
demonstrating how 'shape factors' bias simple thermodynamics; in this respect it is similar to 
the property of liquidity (Deacon and Sherman 2007, 13-14; Sherman and Deacon 2007, 885). 
If this is catalysis, an autocatalytic set is an Emergent2, "morphodynamic chain reaction." 
Imagine a catalyst, A, bonds together certain molecules in such a way that they more easily 
become a different molecule, also a catalyst, which we will call catalyst B. Further, imagine 
catalyst B does the same thing for catalyst A; it has properties that bond together certain other 
molecules in such a way that they become catalyst A. This reciprocally reinforcing relationship, 
in certain conditions, will produce a runaway effect. If there are abundant raw materials for 
both catalysts, if a reaction starts with only one molecule of either A orB, then the number of 
catalysts A and B will double with each iteration80 (Deacon and Sherman 2007, 15). Of course, 
this doubling is dependent on the continued, unlimited presence of substrate molecules for its 
80 An iteration, in this case, would mean the process of one catalyst facilitating a reaction producing the 
other catalyst, and that new catalyst facilitating a reaction producing a second copy of the first catalyst. 
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existence. If this presence of substrate molecules were to be limited, the autocatalytic set 
would eventually cease.81 
If that is an autocatalytic set, Deacon describes an autocell as a system of components 
made up of two independent, but linked, morphodynamic, Emergent2 processes. The first is an 
autocatalytic set, as just described. The second morphodynamic process is molecular self-
assembly, which is the "runaway production of similar forms because of shape-fitting 
interactions." Molecular self-assembly is similar to crystallization, based on molecular binding, 
and produces structures in nature such as cell walls and protein shells of viruses. Like an 
autocatalytic set, molecular self-assembly continues as long as there is inflow of new molecular 
parts that do the assembling. Deacon asks us to imagine that one of the catalysts produced by 
an autocatalytic set is also susceptible to self-assembly into some kind of hollow structure. If 
this were the case, in the presence of adequate substrate and at least one catalyst, "self-
assembling molecules would spontaneously form shells in proximity to molecules of the 
autocatalytic set of which they were the by-products." They might enclose some, or even all, of 
the substrate and catalyst molecules comprising the autocatalytic set {Deacon and Sherman 
2007, 16).82 
This arrangement of two morphodynamic processes- an autocatalytic set and molecular 
self-assembly, where one particular molecular component is a member of each process-
creates an interesting situation vis-a-vis the conditions for the persistence of both processes. 
Self-assembly needs a continuous production of molecular parts that self-assemble; 
81 The very success of an autocatalytic set guarantees the eventual exhaustion of substrate molecules if 
they aren't unlimited or if they don't increase in number at the same rate the autocatalytic set multiplies 
catalysts. 
82 Deacon has produced a short video demonstration of an autocell, which is helpful to grasp the concepts 
involved and their interdependence. See www.teleodynamics.com/?p=36. 
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autocatalytic sets need the physical proximity of substrates and catalysts to continue to produce 
catalysts, as well as needing to 'take a break' occasionally before exhausting substrate 
molecules. When both processes are linked together by the fact that one of the molecular 
components participates in each process, something like the origins of telos can be seen, 
justifying calling this system a teleodynamic, Emergent3 system. Through the one component 
that participates in two independent but mutually complementary processes, the activity of 
each process directly supports the existence of the other process, and indirectly supports its 
own existence. Autocatalysis, which produces catalyst components, supports the continuous 
production of closed shells; shell formation, which keeps substrates and catalysts in close 
proximity, shuts down autocatalysis as closed shells limit access to substrate. However, when 
shells break open, as they will at random due to energetic processes, autocatalysis can resume. 
This is particularly adaptive in environments where the presence of substrate waxes and 
wanes.83 There is a "synergistic relationship between processes that reciprocally support one 
another's persistence" (Deacon and Sherman 2007, 17). He has called this "reciprocal 
cofacilitation," and in other places, "indecomposable interdependence." Through this linking 
the autocell can out-persist either process on its own, given an environment of substrate waxing 
83 This environmental factor- the waxing and waning of available substrate- is actually important to 
Deacon's argument, especially if autocells represent an adaptation to an environment. In an open system 
where the substrate molecules for the autocatalytic set are not continuously present in abundance, but 
wax and wane at long enough intervals, autocatalysis would cease and catalysts would diffuse. 
Alternately, if autocatalysis is allowed to run unchecked, the substrate molecules would run out and 
eventually the catalytic molecules would diffuse. In either case, future times of 'waxing' substrate would 
not produce autocatalysis. However, if at least some of the shells produced by the self-assembly process 
-which break open randomly- hold together catalysts and substrates for long enough periods of time to 
outlive the 'waning' of some or all substrates, the autocatalytic set will re-initiate when exposed to 
substrate. In addition, shells slow down autocatalysis such that substrates are not prematurely 
exhausted. In both cases, the interdependence of the two processes contributes to the system's survival 
given environmental features having to do with the availability of substrate (Personal communication, 
2012). 
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and waning (Deacon 2006b; Sherman and Deacon 2007, 888). He further argues that 
persistence-generating complementarity justifies calling an autocell a concrete individual, a 'self' 
(Sherman and Deacon 2007, 888-9). 
Deacon posits that an autocell is possibly a robust enough platform to evolve adaptively. If 
alternative catalysts are present to the autocell's environment that are more effective as 
catalysts or self-assemblers, or if additional, complementary construction or catalysis is 
facilitated by the presence of other molecules, these might become a permanent part of the 
autocell, allowing the autocells including them to out-persist those without them. If this were to 
happen, the out-persisting autocell would owe its success to better 'fit' between it and its 
environment. To the degree that 'good design' is increased as a result of selective retention, 
adaptive evolution has occurred (Sherman and Deacon 2007, 890-1). Thus, an adaptive, 
teleodynamic system can exist without symbolic reference to facilitate its adaptability. The 
concept of the autocell will be taken up again when I discuss the implications of Deacon's 
work.84 
3.4.2 Nesting ofteleodynamic systems 
Deacon argues that different teleodynamic systems can become nested within each other, 
and this has happened in the case of human beings. Affordances provided by teleodynamic 
biological bodies have allowed teleodynamic human minds to develop; further, the affordances 
provided by teleodynamic human minds have allowed human culture to develop, which itself 
demonstrates forms of emergence. How is human culture an example of emergence? Deacon 
offers a biological analogy, so I will recount that first. The classic Darwinian account of the 
relationship of the environment to the evolution of biological organisms represents a 
84 See "Applying Peirce's categories of reference to," p. 111. 
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demonstration of Emergencel. Consequences of environmental selection pressures on the 
present generation of a biological lineage are "summed and integrated" in the next generation 
of individuals of that lineage, while the environment itself is not considered significantly 
changed by the organism. Thus, there is no 'top-down' effect, no morphodynamic, emergent 
effect of the organism's own behavior that changes the environment in such a way that affects 
the fitness requirements of future generations of that lineage (Deacon 2003a, 22). 
Besides this classic Darwinian account, however, other types of evolutionary effects 
connecting environment to organisms are discernible, and these look more like Emergence2. 
For example, in some cases an organism's adaptive response to its environment 'feeds-forward' 
to change the environment, which then exhibits top-down effects on the lineage of organisms. 
In these cases, the organism's own behavior affects what environmental selection pressures will 
be in future generations. Beaver dam-building exemplifies these so-called 'Baldwin effects.' 
When beavers developed genetic propensities to build dams, they affected their environment 
by creating ponds and lakes where they did not exist formerly; this environmental change in 
turn favored the evolution of aquatic adaptations in beavers. As aquatic adaptations in beavers 
developed, this in turn increased the advantage of having the propensity to build dams. An 
"ever-increasing ratcheting of interdependence" (Deacon 2003a, 22) created "beavers [that] are 
adapted to the ponds that they themselves create[, and] selected for their ability to produce the 
niches upon which they depend" (Goodenough and Deacon 2003-4, 13). According to Deacon's 
categorization of emergent systems, this is an example of Emergence2, morphodynamics. 
This biological analogy gives us some help understanding Deacon's conception of a human 
being in his/her cultural environment. Deacon argues that language-mediated culture also 
demonstrates a runaway Emergence2 dynamic. His fundamental argument in The Symbolic 
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Species is that the neurological basis of human mental life; the complexity, richness, form and 
representational ability of human languages; and the importance and influence of 
interpersonal, language-mediated culture, each have been drastically changed by the runaway-
effect of the ratcheting of interdependence between them. He writes, "The niche to which we 
are adapted - human culture - is a niche that we ourselves construct; we are selected for our 
ability both to produce and to inhabit culture-based niches. Since human culture is encoded in 
and acquired by symbolic languages, this means we have been selected for our symbolic minds 
in the same way that beavers have been selected for their dam-building skills" (Goodenough 
and Deacon 2003-4, 13). Humans existing in their culture represents a morphodynamic, 
Emergence2 variant of sociality acting on individual teleodynamic mental processes, which 
themselves are grounded in teleodynamic biological processes (Deacon 2003a, 23; Weber and 
Deacon 2000, 21). 
3.4.3 'Masking' is responsible for symbolic reference, and other reorganizations of 
systems that invite 'affordances' 
Deacon argues that masking phenomena, the 'mirror image' of Baldwin effects,85 are 
responsible for the origin of symbolic reference in language, as well as the reorganization of 
human sociality away from genetically-given patterns of hominid sociality. Deacon gives four 
examples of masking that highlight the dynamics of the process. The first two capture how 
tightly-constrained genetic processes in one domain become loosened through the loosening of 
environmental selection pressures, providing an opportunity for the organism to be re-
organized; the third applies this logic to how symbol use can originate in animals that use 
85 Instead of environmental effects tightening pressure on genes to produce specific adaptations due to a 
change of behavior in a species, pressure on certain genes is loosened as a result of a change in behavior, 
which destroys specific adaptations. 
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indexical reference; and the fourth applies this logic to how symbolic culture can become the 
'tail thatwags the biological dog' in terms of patterns of human sociality. 
The first example suggests why humans and other primates need to eat food containing 
Vitamin C. As Deacon and his colleagues summarize the argument, 
"Many animals endogenously synthesize ascorbic acid (vitamin C), but anthropoid 
primates have only a nonfunctional version of the crucial gene for this pathway. It is 
hypothesized that the loss of functionality occurred in the evolutionary past when a diet 
rich in vitamin C masked the effect of the gene, and its loss effectively trapped the 
animals in a fruit-eating lifestyle. As a result, the complex of abilities that support this 
lifestyle were evolutionarily bound together, forming a multi locus complex" (Wiles et al. 
2005, 177). 
The basic thrust of this story of 'masking' is as follows. In some past circumstance, 
environmental pressures selected for animals that produced ascorbic acid themselves. When 
that ability became genetically fixed in the lineage, those mutational variants less effective at 
this task were not as successful reproducing. However, at some point such animals found 
themselves in an environment with food already rich in ascorbic acid; the fitness of the lineage 
was no longer affected by mutations that compromised the self-production of ascorbic acid. As 
a result of the relaxing of this selection pressure, over time these animals found themselves 
unable to produce the chemical, and became reliant on their diet that included those foods. 
Fruit gathering and eating became a necessary behavioral features of the species, and produced 
a 'rebounding' selection pressure for a constellation of traits (such as color vision, tooth 
structure, and taste preferences) that led to successful fruit-eating. 
107 
The second example of masking Deacon gives86 involves loosening genetic constraints on 
neurological structures implicated in the production of songs in certain finches. In this case, 
greater song complexity resulted from masking effects. In the wild, minimally variable, innately 
pre-specified finch songs are controlled by a highly modularized brain system. When humans 
started domestically breeding a lineage of finches for color, and not for song, selection for color 
fitness masked selection pressures on song-production that contributed to breeding in the wild. 
Reduced selection pressures on song resulted in the degradation of innate song control systems, 
which allowed otherwise weak inputs from linked brain systems to influence song structure. 
This resulted in variable songs that were under the control of the individual finch to a much 
greater degree, and song production became responsive to learning through auditory 
experience. The neural complexity that went in to song production in these domesticated 
finches increased as a result of masking (Deacon 2006c, Slides 77-81). 
Deacon's third example of masking is found in The Symbolic Species, which I will briefly 
summarize. Recall from my description of symbol systems in the previous chapter that indexes 
are the result of repeated co-occurrences; associations between things, when noted and 
recalled, allow one thing to re-present another thing. This sort of learning is well-known in the 
animal world. Recall that symbolic reference is not the result of association, but rather the 
result of a non-necessary mapping of a set of objects with a set of symbol tokens. A symbol-
token refers as a result of the fact that it occupies the same node in a relational network of 
symbol-tokens that some characteristic of experience occupies in a relational network of 
experiences. 
86 This is not just a hypothetical history, as is the first example; it is the result of actual human breeding 
practices of animals. 
108 
In order to see an isomorphism between entire networks of symbols and their objects, the 
salience of particular associations between sign-tokens and their objects must be suppressed 
such that the deeper pattern of network relations can be seen. This 'suppression' task results 
from the activity of the pre-frontal cortex (PFC). One of the primary tasks of the PFC in the 
many connections it has with other parts of the brain is to suppress the activity of these other 
parts. It acts as the neural equivalent of a logical NOT function. Deacon argues it is when the 
PFC of an animal has developed to the point that it can weaken the salience of associations that 
a new kind of reference- symbolic reference- becomes possible. And once it exists, symbolic 
reference quickly changes the playing field of animal mental activity, masking selection pressure 
on indexical reference and creating conditions that put strong selection pressures on the 
development of symbolic abilities. Thus, the human brain now has a strong bias to search for 
deeper systematicities that are only revealed as a result of the loosening of indexical association 
skills. If Deacon's argument is sound here, this suggests a powerful, general principle that 
governs how indexical teleodynamics becomes symbolic teleodynamics: through the 
suppression of indexical relations that loosens whatever selection pressures exist on those 
relations such that complex, fortuitous higher-order isomorphisms can be registered through 
some sort of encoding connecting symbol-tokens and environmental features. 
The fourth application of the idea of masking suggests how symbolic culture has come to 
loosen patterns of biologically-given sociality in human beings. In a manner similar to the way 
finch brains have become reorganized and less genetically entrained with respect to song 
production, the ratcheting interdependence of brain, language, and culture have produced a 
'symbolic species' such that human sociality has taken on a variability and flexibility that differs 
from other hominids, as a result of cultural development. As an example, Deacon argues that 
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humans are the only "pair-bonded primate with significant paternal investment that lives in 
large multimale groups" (Sosis and Alcorta 2003, 272). Though there are significant biological 
restrictions against this sort of arrangement, humans, because symbolic culture has masked 
biologically given forms of sociality, have been able to live stably in such social arrangements for 
hundreds of thousands of years (if not longer, according to Deacon). Social organization has 
taken on a life of its own due to the effects of symbolically mediated culture.87 
3.4.4 Discussion of Teleodynamics 
3.4.4.1 Absences at the heart oftelos 
Perhaps the single most important point to be taken from Deacon is that "non-teleological 
self-organizational processes, when combined with natural selection, can produce true telos" 
(Deacon and Sherman 2007,6, italics mine). Because of this fact, concepts like function, 
purpose, fitness, meaning, and reference can be given tight scientific explanation, on the one 
hand, yet their distinctiveness from run-of-the-mill scientific explanation in terms of causality is 
preserved, on the other. Recall that what accounts for each of these terms on Deacon's 
explanation are least-discordant-remainders that have been 'piled up' upon one another. 
Deacon describes the persistence of a teleodynamic system as resulting from a least-discordant-
remainder dynamic composed of synergistic least-discordant-remainder-substrates. The 
'negative causality' of teleodynamic systems means they "are defined around a fundamental 
incompleteness," are "organized around specific absences," and have a "curious 'time-reversed' 
appearance." They "develop toward some target state of order" exhibiting what looks like a 
'"pull' from the future." The important scientific claim here is that "absent form can indeed be 
87 Indeed, Deacon's argument suggests we can turn the arguments of Tomasello (2003) on its head, and 
say that increasing symbolic abilities have caused the unique attendance to social cues that defines 
human sociality, rather than the other way around. At the very least, increased sociality and symbolic 
culture have co-evolved. See "Examples of evolved pro-social mechanisms in humans," p. 146. 
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efficacious, in the very real sense that it can serve as an organizer of thermodynamic processes" 
(Deacon 2006a, 143). 
When teleodynamic systems become nested within one another, as Deacon thinks they 
have in human persons existing in culture, what to our minds is merely "'conceivably possible'" 
can entrain material and energetic processes (Deacon 2006a, 144). Nested teleodynamic 
systems have such a wide-ranging ability to explore various dimensions of organizational 
possibility, including the biological and the mental, that Deacon argues: 
A symbolizing mind has perhaps the widest possible locus of causal influence of 
anything on earth. Minds that have become deeply immersed in the evolving symbolic 
ecosystem of culture- as are all human minds- may have an effective causal locus that 
extends across continents and back millennia ... With so many levels of amplification and 
causal inversion mediating between brain chemistry, conscious cognition, and symbolic 
evolution, it is no wonder that we experience symbolically mediated causality as almost 
completely disconnected from thermodynamic causality, even though it's very efficacy 
is founded upon it (Deacon 2006a, 149). 
Telos, on Deacon's account, is grounded in more mundane forms of physical organization, 
yet is able to limitedly transcend those mundane forms. Emergence has the potential to explain 
why dualisms of various kinds have been so prevalent in history, and why they ultimately need 
to be grounded in naturalism. Dualisms are prevalent because telos is not caused by matter and 
energy, but rather represents what is not eliminated by the relational and organizational 
interactions of matter/energy. Telos is afforded, not caused. Yet radical dualisms need to be 
rejected, as well, because the relational, referential, and semiotic are affordances of the 
material and energetic.88 
88 For an insightful account of this 'dualistic naturalism', see his analysis of Descartes and the soul, Deacon 
(1997, Ch. 14). 
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3.4.4.2 Applying Peirce's categories of reference to teleodynamics 
Because Deacon has gone to such lengths to track the evolution of telos within 
teleodynamics, I believe it is fruitful to try to apply semiotic categories to that evolution. 
believe it is possible to note that 'teleodynamics'- semiotic emergence- can be divided into 
categories, following Peirce, of iconic, indexical, and symbolic teleodynamics. 89 
Prior to explicating this section, a few words are in order. This section includes somewhat 
detailed biological and biochemical examples; it includes a fine-toothed analysis of these 
examples from the perspective of iconic, indexical, and symbolic reference. What is the payoff? 
I believe it is precisely here, in the distinctions between the forms of reference that can organize 
teleodynamic systems, that we grasp the central ideas necessary to further Rappaport's 
conception of religious communities. It is here that we can get a theoretical handle on the 
distinction between secular political and 'properly religious' ritually-organized communities. 
'Properly' religious communities are not merely adaptive systems better at adapting than 
political communities, as Rappaport thought. They adapt differently. The concepts developed in 
this section, detailed and somewhat tedious as it is, offers hope of a better analysis of the 
'cybernetics of the holy' than Rappaport was able to give. 
The first order of business is to note that Deacon has described an autocell as being robust 
enough to provide an organizational reference frame to ground 'aboutness' relations, and, in 
contrast, an autocatalytic set as a 'mere' morphodynamic, 2"d order emergent phenomenon. I, 
however, want to draw attention to the fact that the component catalysts of an autocatalytic 
set demonstrate circular causal closure, reciprocal co-facilitation and indecomposable 
89 In his most recent work on emergence, Deacon (2012), published as this dissertation was being 
defended, he addresses the issue of Peircian reference in teleodynamic systems, confirming the approach 
I am taking in this section, although his account is different than mine. I will note the difference in the 
appropriate passages. 
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interdependence, features which Deacon holds are the basis of telos. To see how, assume a 
simple autocatalytic set where a catalyst, A, converts two substrate molecules into another 
molecule, B, which in turn has the property of converting two different substrate molecules into 
another molecule, which happens to be molecule A. In an open environment, the continued 
presence of catalyst A depends upon catalyst B, and the continued presence of B depends upon 
A. Deacon argues that this kind of system does not demonstrate telos, though as we have seen 
in his description of an autocell, if molecule B also demonstrates the property of self-assembly, 
it would. His argument seems to be that because the circular causality of an autocell allows 
different parts to play different roles, an autocell demonstrates telos in a way that an 
autocatalytic set does not.90 In an autocatalytic set, however, the circular causality of the 
dynamic allows different parts to play similar roles, facilitating the continued presence of those 
component parts, demonstrating the most basic quality of telos. 
Catalyst A and catalyst Bin an autocatalytic set are distinguishable structures that both 
catalyze substrate molecules into new molecules. The circular causal structure of the 
interaction not only insures the continued presence of each catalyst, A and B, but gives the 
autocatalytic set the potential to index environmental features if these parts are also co-opted 
to play additional roles. This is in fact what Deacon has described in the autocell. Consider our 
90 Deacon has explained (Personal Communication, 2011) that his basic argument, pace my own, is that 
the dynamic synergy of two complementary morphodynamic processes constitutes the basis of telos, and 
is a necessary pre-condition for the question of reference. An autocell completes a work cycle, 
performing sufficient work to also reconstitute the capacity to repeat this cycle all over again; an 
autocatalytic set does not. The second morphodynamic process introduces a new dimension to an 
autocatalytic set's ability to resist dissolution and create the potential for self-repair, self-reconstitution, 
and even self-replication. He calls the synergy of the two morphodynamic processes a 'higher order 
orthograde dynamic,' and uses it as a definition of a 'self,' the most fundamental example of 
teleodynamic system. While I believe my point in the following passages is a logical point, immune to this 
factual clarification, the important idea is that he, too, introduces the notion of iconic and indexical 
reference to his discussion of the autocell. See fn 91. 
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autocatalytic set; A facilitates B, and B facilitates A. Suppose A' is suddenly enters into the 
environment. A' also facilitates the production of B, but, in addition, has the secondary property 
of self-assembly. In certain environments of waxing and waning substrate, this particular 
secondary property will contribute to the persistence of the autocatalytic set whenever it is 
catalyzed, and will soon outproduce catalyst A. Catalyst A', as it participates in autocell 
dynamics, can be viewed as being 'about' the environmental feature that supports its displacing 
catalyst A. The new process it facilitates falls into an interdependent relationship with 
autocatalysis, contributes to persistence, and references an environmental feature, waxing and 
waning of substrate. 
Thus, Deacon's own account suggests the organization of an autocatalytic set- and not just 
an autocell- provides an organizational reference frame that grounds the potential for 
'aboutness' relations. And here is the key move involving Peirce's categories in the description: 
if a key feature of iconic reference is that it provides the grounds for potential indexical 
reference to be registered, I suggest we consider an autocatalytic set an iconic, teleodynamic 
system. The key idea of an icon is that it provides the grounds for further distinctions later- it 
represents a placeholder for meaningful distinctions to be made. Given an autocatalytic set's 
circular causal structure, predictably re-appearing (and thus iconic) parts of the set might- by 
virtue of other supervening or morphodynamic properties relevant to a part- be co-opted to 
facilitate the persistence ofthe autocatalytic set by indexing, or being related to, environmental 
features that are relevant to persistence. And this suggests we consider the autocell an 
indexical, teleodynamic emergent system.91 
91 Deacon's recent account of the origination of indexical reference in an autocell is as follows: "The 
dependency of information on involvement in a teleodynamic process can be demonstrated by a slight 
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Both autocatalytic sets and autocells demonstrate telos -a circular causal structure and 
indecomposable interdependence undergirding persistence- just te/os manifesting different 
kinds of reference. The indexicality of an autocell is a further refinement of an already existing, 
indecomposably-interdependent iconic autocatalytic set. It is precisely the 'surplus' of features 
and potentialities supervening upon the particular parts of a reciprocally-organized autocatalytic 
set that can be co-opted in certain environments,92 and that justifies calling the system an iconic 
teleodynamic system. Catalyst A' of the system can register their environment and contribute 
to system persistence by virtue of living in two worlds at once- the world of basic system self-
complexification of the autogen [his new term for an autocell] model. In a discussion with two of my 
colleagues, Chris Southgate and Andrew Robinson, concerning the semiotic status of autogens, they 
proposed a modification that we all could agree involved a semiotic aspect. They argue that an autogenic 
system in which its containment is made more fragile by the bonding of relevant substrate molecules to 
its surface could be considered to respond selectively to information about its environment. Although our 
discussion concerned a slightly more subtle question (whether autogenic theory can help decide if 
iconicity or indexicality is more primary), its bearing on the nature biological of information is more 
illuminating. If an autogen's containment is disrupted in a context in which the substrates that support 
autocatalysis are absent or of low concentration, re-enclosure and replication will be unlikely. So stability 
of containment is advantageous for persistence of a given variant in contexts where the presence of 
relevant substrates is of low probability. If, however, the surface of the containing capsule has molecular 
features to which the relevant substrate molecules tend to bind, and in so doing weaken its structural 
stability, then the probability of autogenic replication will be significantly increased. The process will tend 
to be more stable in environments lacking essential substrates and less stable in environments where 
they are plentiful. Sensitivity to substrate concentrations would likely also be a spontaneous 
consequence of this bonding, because if binding of substrates to container molecules weakens the 
hydrogen bonds between containment molecules, it would follow that weakness of containment would 
be a correlate of the number of bound substrates. Higher substrate concentrations would make 
disruption more probable, and subsequent use of local substrates would deplete their concentration and 
make the replicated autogens more stable and more likely to diffuse to new environments. In 
evolutionary terms, this is an adaptation" (Deacon 2012, 442}. 
In my argument in this section, I am not saying an autocatalytic set demonstrates teleodynamics in 
actuality, but merely in potential; potentiality is registered by icons. It takes indexical reference, of the 
kind demonstrated (in my opinion) by a regular, 'non-sensitive' autocell, to fulfill that potentiality. Either 
way, the larger point I am making in this section is unaffected by the outcome of the debate between 
Deacon and myself. Iconic reference simply means the potential to reference indexically; this is the case 
whether you take that potential as first appearing in a morphodynamic set, as I suggest, or as first 
appearing in a teleodynamic autocell, as Deacon here argues. 
92 This is an insight taken from Meyering (2002}. 
115 
reproduction due to the circular causality of the system's organization, and the world of 
environmental features by virtue of its surplus supervenient and morphodynamic features. 
This suggests the origins of interpretation, interpretants, and interpretant-vehicles. 
Interpretation involves living in two worlds at once, seeing two things at once such that a 
comparison can be prosecuted, and acting based on an isomorphism between domains. A 
reciprocally-organized system having parts that interact with distinct environmental conditions 
can demonstrate a form of proto-interpretation when these environmental domains are linked 
together through the system's organization. Systems having components demonstrating 'dual-
citizenship' possess an 'interpretant-vehicle' in that independent domains are linked by a non-
necessary arrangement. 
So is an autocatalytic set an example of Emergence2 or Emergence3? Deacon says it is an 
Emergent2 phenomenon. The above consideration seems to me to suggest that the tricky, 
interesting answer is both. While it clearly represents a runaway, morphodynamic effect, an 
autocatalytic set also seems to meet the fundamental requirements for teleodynamics by 
providing the potential for differential preservation, without demonstrating such; it provides the 
space for environmental regularities to be registered and used. This seems to me to be the 
fundamental feature of iconic reference. As Deacon notes, "selective retention is only possible 
for self-reconstituting forms," and an autocatalytic set seems to meet the requirement of self-
reconstituting form. But beyond that, as shown in his own example of the autocell, the 
properties of one catalyst can be co-opted for self-assembly, indexing environmental conditions 
and contributing to the selective retention of the autocatalytic set (Sherman and Deacon 2007, 
891). 
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These considerations lead us to consider the following emergent pathway towards full 
symbolic teleodynamics in chemical, catalytic systems: 
First-order emergence (the supervenience of simple thermodynamics)- the equilibrium 
of a chemical system containing catalysts. This system demonstrates first-order 
emergence properties, such as an "average effect expressed globally via the relative 
linearity of the summed stochastic processes," and "no 'top-down' effects" (Deacon 
2006a, 128). 
Second-order emergence (the self-organization of morphodynamics)- the runaway 
amplification of catalysts in an autocatalytic set. This system demonstrates second-
order emergence properties, such as "microconfigurational particularities ... amplified to 
determine macroconfigurational [which] in turn further constrain and/or amplify 
subsequent micro-configurational regularities" (Deacon 2006a, 136). 
Yet an autocatalytic set has traits that suggest it is also more than this. Specifically, 
distinguishable parts (different catalysts) are reciprocally organized to create a system of 
indecomposable interdependence in far-from-equilibrium conditions, as discussed above. The 
reciprocal co-facilitation contributing to the persistence of an autocatalytic set provides the 
potential for parts of the set to be co-opted for their contribution to persistence, as Deacon 
describes in the autocell. This means an autocatalytic set also demonstrates 
Iconic teleodynamics (the evolution and semiosis of self-organizing systems)- the 
runaway amplification of catalysts in an autocatalytic set that potentially can index 
environmental regularities. Because some Emergent2, morphodynamic systems are 
made of distinguishable parts doing the same task to contribute to persistence through 
a self-organizing, circular causal structure, secondary part properties can potentially be 
co-opted if they produce structures or processes that increase the persistence of the 
system in an environment. In these systems, indexical reference of environmental 
features is potentially present through secondary features of parts, though otherwise 
the system is a morphodynamic, Emergent2 structure. 
What would cause an iconic teleodynamic system to become an indexical teleodynamic 
system? When what is only potentially co-opted is actually co-opted. Either new parts are 
introduced and replace old parts, or the environment changes in the presence of old parts, but 
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either way certain secondary features of the system suddenly become useful to the system's 
persistence given aspects of the environment. If this happens- if secondary features are co-
opted due to their usefulness to system persistence in a given environment- this produces 
Indexical teleodynamics (the evolution and semiosis of self-organizing systems)- an 
autocell. The reciprocal co-facilitation of a system of distinguishable parts or processes 
plays distinguishable roles in relation to distinguishable features of an environment. 
Secondary supervening or self-organizing aspects of parts of a self-recurring system 
have become the basis for affordances leading to adaptation and natural selection, 
contributing to survival by indexing environmental conditions. A 'center' of self-
reproduction and a 'periphery' of adaptation can be distinguished. 
Now I want to introduce another step in the evolution of teleodynamics- the step from 
indexical reference to symbolic reference in such a system. Deacon clearly believes that 
biological organisms and human persons are demonstrations of teleodynamics, and that they 
utilize symbolic reference; he just has not 'connected the dots' between his example of the 
autocell and such symbolic emergent systems. Symbolic reference requires the non-necessary 
(i.e. conventional) linking together of two independent systems, a pattern of a set of symbol-
tokens linked to a pattern of relations found in the system's interaction with its environment. 
Further, the pattern of the set of symbol tokens must be translated into material dynamics such 
that the symbols are responsible for the system's form. How an indexical system, such as an 
autocell, might become a symbolic system, like a living cell, is a complicated question, but I 
believe Deacon's discussion of the process of masking is a step in the right direction. Recall I 
suggested above that a powerful, general principle is: the suppression of indexical relations that 
loosens whatever selection pressures exist on those relations may allow complex, fortuitous 
higher-order isomorphisms to exist between systematic features of an environment and 
something serving as a symbol system. A deeper pattern of systematic, symbolic connections 
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can be activated.93 Whether or not this is the case, when symbolic reference takes over from 
indexical reference, a new kind of system/environment coupling (through biological genes or 
human languages) has begun, and a new kind of system has emerged. Additionally, when the 
symbol-tokens become shared with other systems, either across a lineage of organisms when 
genes are reproduced, or across a population of animals when languages are shared, a new form 
of communication is in effect. These emergent systems demonstrate: 
Symbolic teleodynamics (the evolution and semiosis of self-organizing systems)- a 
lineage of biological organisms. The reciprocal co-facilitation of distinguishable parts, 
including symbol-vehicles that can be decoded, play distinguishable roles in relation to 
distinguishable features of an environment. Symbolic representation constrains the 
development of the interpreting system in reliable ways, and multiplies loci upon which 
variation and natural selection can act. This leads to a greatly increased power of form-
variation and therefore persistence of the system in its environment, due to fitted ness. 
3.5 Four key principles of semiotic emergence 
I have now canvassed the thought of four thinkers who have forged ahead in theorizing 
about systems in which symbolic reference can meaningfully be said to occur. I want to take 
from this account four principles that I believe will be central to an account of symbolic 
teleodynamic social systems, otherwise known as religious communities. 
93 Deacon has made tentative steps to developing a theory in this direction, using proto-biological 
examples involving the 'double role' DNA can potentially play in chemical processes- as storage of 
energy, and as informational molecule (Personal communication, 2010). I believe this confirms the basic 
tack I have been taking concerning 'multiple superveniences' being co-opted, and masking effects 
suppressing indexical features such that symbolic reference develops. The clearest example in his 
published work of this dynamic is seen in the emergence of symbolic reference in certain apes, in my 
opinion. For the experimental evidence supporting this dynamic, as well as the claim that masking is 
central to recognizing a symbol, see Savage-Rumbaugh (1986). For Deacon's highly instructive 
interpretation of this work, see Deacon (1997). 
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3.5.1 Deacon's account of the evolution of nested semiotic processes and the role of 
suppression and masking 
In this section, I want to call attention to the fact that there may be different ways that 
human social organization might be considered emergent systems, and that suppression and 
masking might be critical to some of them appearing. We may be, following the cue of the finch 
example, degraded apes, as a result of the masking and 'domesticating' effects of culture. 
Symbolic culture represents a morphodynamic, Emergent2 phenomenon that feeds back and 
affects the mental and social development of human beings. That is, the top-down fitness 
benefits of minimal hominid symbolic culture might have reduced selection pressures on highly 
constrained neural pathways of the hominid brain, contributing to functional complexity in 
cognitive evolution, which then loosened genetically determined expressions of social 
organization, compensated for by further cultural development. Symbolic representation then 
allowed us to 'out-source' sociality to culture, making us more and more dependent on a 
constellation of traits supporting this ability (Deacon 2006c, Slide 82; Goodenough and Deacon 
2003-4, 10-14). Deacon writes, 
To the extent that culture came to provide hominids with useful information from the 
outside, any genetically established programs specifying overlapping kinds of 
information in the brain would be similarly masked from selection and would therefore 
become prone to degradation. As this occurred, hominids would become increasingly 
dependent on- indeed, addicted to- cultural information for their survival 
(Goodenough and Deacon 2003-4, 14). 
Rappaport's theory of religious ritual takes as its evolutionary starting point the idea that 
hominid sociality needed a functional replacement for genetically constrained ape sociality, 
which had become weakened as symbolic culture opened up possibilities for new and possibly 
conflicting forms of sociality to be conceived and considered (Rappaport 1999, 417-8). This 
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suggestion is clearly compatible with Deacon's conception of masking, and places Rappaport's 
theory in a more general theory of emergent hominid evolution. In addition, this suggests that 
we might profitably consider the organizing emergent features of sociality, and particularly 
religious sociality, in light of emergence theory. 
So what might be the theoretical status of the symbolically-mediated social organizations 
human beings participate in? Clearly, the impact of symbolic language allows forms of social life 
to develop that go beyond what is biologically-given; whether or not social aggregates of symbol 
users can be described as teleodynamic, Emergent3 systems demonstrating memory and 
selection, and whether these systems include indexical and symbolic variants, is precisely the 
question an analysis of Rappaport's vision of religious communities can help answer. Deacon, 
Durkheim, and Rappaport think that social organization is an emergent phenomenon. All three 
think that some sort of memory and selection plays into the organization of social systems as 
such. But Durkheim and Rappaport- whose accounts concern the origins of religion- have 
trouble distinguishing between political/secular sociality and religious sociality: Durkheim 
because he explicitly denies such a distinction, Rappaport because he does not have a nuanced 
enough conceptual tool to distinguish between them, despite what I believe are his clear 
intentions. I believe the issue will be determined by whether or not religious social organization 
can be distinguished from secular social organization in terms of the distinction between 
indexical and symbolic teleodynamic systems. And if in fact religious communities can be 
described as symbolic teleodynamic systems, a religious community would represent three 
different forms of semiotic emergent systems nested within each other: sacred symbol-
organized religious communities composed of linguistically-organized 'selves' composed of 
genetically-organized bodies. 
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3.5.2 Semantic Closure 
The concept of semantic closure contributes to a robust theory of semiotic emergence, and 
is a contribution of all four theorists, though the term is Pattee's. As Pattee discusses it, 
semantic closure means the autonomous, circular closure between the dynamics of the material 
aspects of a system and the constraints provided by the symbolic aspects of a system. Pattee's 
interpreters have emphasized that the force behind the idea of semantic closure is that 
constraints on the dynamics of a reproducing system are introduced symbolically from within 
the system itself, and passed on to future iterations of the system by the system itself. As noted 
earlier, symbolic records preserve the 'control constraints' of a system, and daughter 
generations "re-produce the parents' dynamical configurations by self-organizing their material 
components according to the inherited conditions" (Etxeberria and Moreno 2001, 5; Rocha 
2001, 4). Thus, interpretive autonomy is the crucial idea. 
Hofstadter described his version of semantic closure somewhat metaphorically as "an 
abstract loop in which, in the series of stages that constitute the cycling-around, there is a shift 
from one level of abstraction (or structure) to another, which feels like an upwards movement in 
a hierarchy, and yet somehow the successive 'upwards' shifts turn out to give rise to a closed 
cycle" {Hofstadter 2007, 102). In this cycling around, there is a 'symbol level' and a 
material/dynamic level; the symbol level reaches down and influences the material/dynamic 
level at the same time it is being determined by it. In Hofstadter's analysis of the critical 
mathematical sentence at the heart of the Godellncompleteness Theorem,94 there is 
autonomous closure between the dynamics of the material aspects of a system (i.e. the way 
94 Recall that Quine's English translation of it was: "preceded by itself in quote marks yields a full 
sentence." preceded by itself in quote marks yields a full sentence. 
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parts of the sentence are shuffled around, leading to the reproduction of the sentence) and the 
constraints provided by the symbolic aspects of a system (the fact that the shuffling actions 
reproducing the sentence are due to the instructions found in the parts of the sentence, when 
interpreted). 
Combining Deacon's emphasis on self-organization that is prior to symbol use, Hofstadter's 
emphasis on the self-referencing power of symbolic reference, Pattee's conception of semantic 
closure, and Von Neumann's distinction between self-reproduction and by-products, we can 
describe the activity that defines an emergent symbolic self. A symbolic self is 
the dynamic causal loop of interdependence seen when an aggregate's behavior 
reproduces symbols that serve as the initial conditions for an aggregate that exists 
because it can interpret symbols; when the reproduced symbols are interpreted, they 
re-create an aggregate's behavior to reproduce symbols that serve as the initial 
conditions of a system .... ad infinitum. 
Peirce gave a nice analogy of this. He describes a map of a country accurate enough to 
have represented on it itself, since it is a physical object that exists somewhere in the country it 
maps. But this representation of the map-within-the-map would also need to have on it a 
representation of the map that exists within this map: a third representation, a representation 
of the map-within-the-country that is present on the map within the country ... This process can 
continue ad infinitum. According to Peirce, this analogy gives a picture of the 'pure self,' the "I": 
it is the potential to represent again the map within the country at higher and higher resolutions 
(Peirce 1998e, 161-2). The 'ultimate and final' map is never precisely located as a point on the 
map; the mapping process rather demonstrates an incompleteness, as the map at any given 
resolution fails to include itself. 
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Each of these thinkers contributes something by which we can analyze the logical structure 
and symbolic organization of religious communities to a degree that Durkheim and Rappaport 
themselves could not, though they clearly had intuitions about the nature of religious 
communities that would warrant such an analysis. The fact that symbols functioning within an 
interpreting system can, in certain cases, create the infinite potential for reinterpretation offers 
a template for an active self. This would allow us to consider religious communities- if they 
adhere to the form I am describing- as a locus for self-reproduction and active agency in a 
manner similar to the way biological organisms reproduce their own DNA, requiring future 
decoding acts that will also reproduce DNA, and to the way human persons continually recreate 
their symbolic selves through a narrative that includes their own presence in constructing the 
narrative. Rappaport's conception of an adaptive cybernetic loop at the heart of religious 
communities is an attempt in this direction. His version of the loop does not include a 
characterization of the internal constraints on the system as symbo/s,95 since older cybernetic 
theory did not have such a concept. This means he does not theoretically differentiate between 
indexical and symbolic reference at the heart ofthe cybernetic religious community. This will be 
of central interest in following chapters. 
95 What might be confusing about this characterization is that for Rappaport one of the central organizing 
features of a religious community is its "Ultimate Sacred Postulates/' which are in fact embodied in 
human languages and thus in symbolic reference. So how can I say he does not characterize them as 
symbols? What I mean is that the Ultimate Sacred Postulates are not analyzed by Rappaport in terms of 
their function as symbols in the system he explicates. He makes much of the fact that successful USP's are 
not 'about' material things, and even that they are cryptic, paradoxical, and not understandable, which is 
important to their role; he doesn't capture how these cryptic, paradoxical, USPs may represent encoding. 
He does suggest backhandedly that one of their functions is to produce unity and numinous experience in 
adherents; this to me suggests the way forward to understanding their symbolic function. 
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3.5.3 Rocha's characterization of symbols 
One of the most helpful contributions given by followers of Pattee to a theory of symbolic 
semiotic emergence is criteria for identifying symbol-tokens in semantically closed systems. 
Since, as Pattee has argued, all symbol-tokens are also physical entities, it is possible to pass 
over, in the name of an all-encompassing materialist reductionism, the function of symbols in 
semiotic systems. What, then, are criteria that help us to say when we have passed over what 
are both physical and symbolic at the same time? Rocha offers three criteria, which I elaborate 
here (Rocha and Hordijk 2005, 13-14, 26). Their importance is that they give us a way to assess 
the function of Rappaport's "Ultimate Sacred Postulates" and "Cosmological Axioms" in a 
religious community, which he holds occupy the place from where all authority flows in a 
religious community. Rocha's criteria are: 
1. Dynamically incoherent memory: Symbol-tokens do not act directly based on their 
material/dynamic principles. These can be abstracted from, the causal action of 
symbol-tokens being formal rather than efficient, found in their relational and 
informational96 properties. Symbol-tokens, since not directly efficacious, have to be 
separated from direct material and energetic transaction, 'stored away' and accessed 
by structures able to interpret them. As Rocha noted, the syntactic structure of 
information in symbolic representations can be accessed and utilized without reference 
to its content, and is implemented in non-reactive structures. 
2. Construction code: The coded semantic 'content' of information in symbolic 
representations is decoded to construct dynamic configurations; representations 
encode alternative initial conditions for a dynamical system-environment coupling. The 
construction code is an example of an 'interpretant-vehicle' as outlined in the previous 
chapter. 
It is important to note a distinction between the syntactic features of symbol-tokens and 
the semantic features of symbol-tokens. The first characterization- 'dynamically incoherent 
memory'- focuses on the syntactic features: their physical variety; the alternative 
96 In the strict sense of representing a selection from among alternatives. 
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configurations they can inhabit; the way they are set apart from normal system dynamics. The 
second characterization-' construction code'- focuses on their semantic features: the rules 
used to translate them into another domain; the varieties of direct outcomes their translation 
results in. 
3. Self-organization and selection: Material structures constructed by symbolic 
representation exist under the constraints of self-organization and self-reproduction, 
and are pragmatically selected in an evolutionary process. This criterion identifies the 
critical role that feedback from the environment plays in culling variant symbol-tokens 
and their corresponding physical results. It is through this feedback that symbols 
representing varying potential initial conditions for self-development can vary 
intelligently with their environment, increasing the fitness of the organism over the 
long haul. 
In biology, we can see these three features in the fact that because any combination of 
nucleic acids is possible, and the length of DNA is unlimited, when translated by the consistent 
translation mechanism of tRNA and ribosomes into amino acids, arbitrarily complex 
combinations of amino acids can be constructed using DNA. What determines which will be 
constructed is not just DNA, but the results of the eventual dynamical system-environment 
coupling produced by the translation of DNA into proteins. 
3.5.4 Center /Periphery 
Several of the theorists I have analyzed have noted the importance of distinguishing 
between two aspects of any self-organized, symbolic teleodynamic system. The two aspects are 
those functions and parts of the system responsible for future iterations of the system itself, and 
those functions and parts of the system responsible for adaptation to environmental features. 
In fact, both are critical to the persistence of the system, but some features and functions of 
semiotic emergent systems are more central to that persistence than are others. 
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This distinction can be analyzed in terms of 'center' and 'periphery.' Rappaport has written 
helpfully on this topic; his analysis of 'adaptation,' taken in large part from Bateson, is still useful 
to frame the issues at hand, so I will summarize his perspective here. He argues that adaptive 
systems are organized in a hierarchy moving from less permanent structures and functions to 
more permanent, and that this organization best serves persistence. At the periphery of less 
permanent adaptations are short-term, reversible changes of state, and at the center are long-
term, irreversible changes in structure. The quickly mobilized reversible changes of state can, if 
the perturbation of environmental factors continues, 'sink down' into more and more 
permanent changes of state, eventually becoming irreversible changes in structure. This 
hierarchical organization of adaptation, often called 'Romer's Rule,' can be seen in the 
evolutionary history of lobe-finned fish. Romer argues that fish became adapted to dry land as a 
result of some fish being left high and dry during periods of desiccation, which at first resulted in 
relatively minor modifications in limb structure facilitating locomotion back to water, and which 
eventually diversified into structures supporting terrestrial life. The important point is that "the 
earliest terrestrial adaptations made possible the maintenance of an aquatic way of life" [italics 
mine]. The transformations in some peripheral systems made it possible to maintain more 
central systems unchanged. This suggests that the "subsystems of a normally functioning 
adaptive system are subservient to the perpetuation of the system as a whole" (Rappaport 
1999, 6-7). 
So how do the thinkers analyzed above address the issues of center and periphery? In Von 
Neumann's 'universal construction strategy' model,97 he distinguishes between parts 
97 See Von Neumann (1966, 86-7). For an analysis of 'universal construction' strategies versus 'dynamic 
description' strategies, see Etxeberria and Moreno (2001). 
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responsible for self-reproduction, and "byproducts" having some role outside of and secondary 
to immediate self-reproduction. Pattee and his followers note that there are two contradictory 
demands placed on self-organizing, teleodynamic phenomena such as biological life and human 
mental life. One demand is that processes remain continuous and maintain self-identity over 
time; the other demand is that the system demonstrates intelligently changing behavior. A 
dynamic system that is conservative and repetitious must also be flexible and interactive. 
Precisely because Hofstadter emphasizes the self-referring nature of the symbols in his 
analysis of the Godellncompleteness Theorem, he draws attention to the central role of 
symbolically-aided reproduction in a semantically-closed system. A contribution he makes that 
has been largely ignored, in my opinion, is his focus on the interpretant-vehicle, the translation 
code that links together symbols and dynamics that are not linked to each other naturally. He 
seems to suggest that the center of a self-reproducing semiotic emergent system is that 
translation code. Without consistency in the translation code, the symbols on one side and the 
material dynamics on the other could not reliably co-vary with each other, and the persistence 
of and exploration of alternatives in such a system could not proceed in an organized way. This 
would imperil the entire project of adaptive self-reproduction. The continued persistence of a 
consistent translation code is simply presumed in many accounts of symbolically-organized 
emergent system;98 Hofstadter calls attention to the fact that without it, the system could not 
adaptively change at all. 
Deacon's conception of teleodynamic systems clearly suggests a center and periphery; the 
'center' is the "indecomposable interdependence" between parts in a process whose 
98 For example, Richard Dawkins, in a book attempting to name the 'center' of biology, makes only a 
single, brief mention of the genetic code, without any comment on its ubiquity, permanence, or 
importance. See Dawkins (2006}. 
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organization demonstrates circular causal closure. This is the core organizing principle of a 
teleodynamic system. Reciprocal organization is a kind of unmoved mover, and is a locus of a 
resistance to change with respect to which other physical processes can be recruited and 
organized. It is an "organizational reference frame" with respect to the greater environment 
(Deacon and Sherman 2007, 22). The 'sameness' of the base state provides a sampling base 
that allows systematic differences to accumulate with respect to it. This center can be 
complemented by a 'periphery,' which is the system's structures and processes that undergird 
correlation to significant outside constraints imposed by the environment. According to 
Deacon, then, the ground of external adaptation is internal self-reproduction. He proposes the 
distinction between center and periphery can be seen in how multi-cellular organisms maintain 
cells that concentrate on passing on genomes to later generations (germ-line cells, eggs and 
sperm), and cells that engage in growth and niche-negotiation (Goodenough and Deacon 2003-
4, 9). The separable tasks show that these two roles are in fact distinct. We can add that the 
logic of center and periphery suggests that the more basic task- self-reproduction- is the one 
that grounds the other. 
The suggestion that the center is the interpretant-vehicle of the symbol system, which 
Hofstadter seems to suggest, needs to be squared with the suggestion that the center is the 
indecomposable interdependence of a self-producing, circular causal structure, which Deacon 
and Von Neumann suggest. I believe it is appropriate to side with Deacon and Von Neumann 
and consider the circular causality of interdependence to be the heart of a semiotic emergent 
process; this is why I suggested above that an autocatalytic set is the first demonstration of 
semiotic emergence- an iconic semiotic emergent. However, when we consider indexical 
semiotic emergents, such as the autocell, and symbolic semiotic emergents, such as a living cell, 
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we need to also ask what organizes such systems so that they both persist and intelligently vary 
with respect to their environment. For these systems, that task falls to the interpretant-vehicle 
-the component of the system that 'lives in two worlds' at the same time. lnterpretant-vehicles 
such as the genetic code and the catalyst that supports both autocatalysis and self-assembly, are 
what link two independent processes to make them one interdependent process. Once they've 
been established as such in a system demonstrating circular causal closure, they become that 
which is fundamental to system persistence, giving the system its adaptive structure. 
This analysis offers us a way to increase the specificity of Rappaport's analysis of religious 
communities. We will be able to focus on 'interpretant-vehicles'- both indexical and symbolic-
and how they function in such communities, as a means to helpfully distinguish between secular 
political systems that have the form of a semiotic emergent system and 'religious communities 
properly so-called.' 
3.6 Summary 
These four principles- hierarchies of emergent phenomena that can become nested 
through suppression and masking; semantic closure; Rocha's characterization of symbols, and 
'center and periphery'- offer tools for taking Rappaport's vision of religious communities and 
putting it on a sounder theoretical footing. Rappaport claims a religious community is a 
complex adaptive system, a cybernetic 'whole;' Durkheim had previously made the suggestion 
that a new form of agency- social agency, the social entity that thinks and feels through 
individuals- can be seen in religious community life. How justified are these characterizations? 
Is it appropriate to consider a social group- say the United States of America- as a 
teleodynamic system, exhibiting active agency with respect to its own persistence in an 
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environment? What about the Islamic community? Is there a difference between their 
organization that would justify distinguishing them? 
The above principles offer criteria that might allow us to make clear distinctions between 
various kinds of ritually-organized communities, and to offer a theory for why religious 
experience is only associated with one kind, those that have divine content at their center. 
Before we can look at that, however, we need to build a case for applying semiotic and 
emergent categories to human social forms. 
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4 Teasing apart biology and culture in human forms of sociality 
4.1 Distinguishing biological and cultural sociality 
A broad evolutionary psychology perspective with a robust view of culture as a locus for 
variation, selection, and reproduction allows us to distinguish between biologically-given forms 
of sociality and culturally-given forms of sociality. That both of these sources of sociality 
contribute to the specific social forms of human beings seems established. For example, one of 
the first and most important conclusion taken from social neuroscience- the study of brain 
systems and functions undergirding sociality in humans- is that there are fast, inflexible, 
automatic, implicit social cognitions, and slow, flexible, explicit, and mentally costly social 
cognitions (Frith and Frith 2008, 503). The fast, inflexible, and automatic social cognitions are 
those that come from our biological heritage; the slow, flexible, and explicit social cognitions are 
those that come from our symbolic, cultural heritage. That these two forms of sociality are 
distinct can be seen when they are placed in forced opposition to each other in laboratory 
experiments. 
Implicit race prejudice is when people respond to a different ethnic group's image with an 
unconscious and uncontrollable fear reaction, suggesting this kind of prejudice has a biological 
basis. Frith and Frith recount experiments concerning these biologically-mediated responses 
showing that some subjects, when shown faces from a different ethnic group, have an 
immediate fear response, located in the amygdala, which decreases over time, corresponding to 
a simultaneous increase of the activity of the pre-frontal cortex. 99 Post-experiment interviews 
suggest this result represents a subject's deliberate attempt to control and overcome an implicit 
99 The PFC is implicated in higher brain function, as well as the suppression of the activity of other bra in 
systems. 
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response through conscious reasoning (Frith and Frith 2008, 504). Prejudice, then, can take two 
forms -an unconscious, uncontrollable biologically-given fear reaction, and conscious, culturally-
given racial theories and biases. But the same detachment of biological and cultural sources of 
sociality means that culture can be used to suppress biological prejudice in service of reasoned 
arguments about race, as this experiment suggest. Similar results can be seen in certain 
laboratory experiments when an automatic social response- the 'fairness circuit,' which notes 
cheating and the inequitable disbursements of goods- can be overcome through rational 
argument (Frith and Frith 2008, 507). 100 
Further evidence for the distinction and possible opposition between biological and cultural 
forms of sociality is noted by McNeill (1995). Among soldiers who participate in close military 
drill, a unique kind of social warmth and commitment is established. McNeill has studied the 
emotional and evolutionary reasons for this. His conclusion is that this kind of social warmth is 
biologically-derived, and independent from forms of sociality that may be given by culture. He 
argues that keeping together in time "affects those who take part in it more or less 
independently of how they may have been connected (or divided) by prior experience." This 
suggests for McNeill that close-order drill is an important way for new social groups to define 
themselves apart from old, culturally-given group ties (52). He argues that in ancient Sumer, 
which is the first society he knows of that established close-order military drill, warfare and 
religion rested on different sources of social authority, and military leaders had a biologically-
given social tool that could rival the sociality of religion: rhythmic unity. He goes so far as to 
argue that the separation of politics and religion originated in the distinction between religious 
100 Through a kind of rationalization that justifies forms of greed, such as made famous by 'Gordon Gecko' 
in his "Greed is Good" speech in the movie Wall Street. 
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sociality and that inspired by close-order drill. Military units were "bound together and, if need 
be, psychologically prepared to defy both priests and gods, thanks to their collective emotional 
response to close-order drill" (106). He writes, "I suggest that the psychological impact of drill 
may well have been critical in keeping the military-political structure of ancient Sumer 
independent of, and sometimes at odds with, priestly-religious authority" (107). 
McNeill argues rhythmic unity-based sociality is not determined or guided by symbolic 
content. Rhythmic unity merely produces 'general feelings of good,' which can be put to use to 
support religion or politics, 'good' forms of sociality and 'bad' (as Hitler's rhythmically-based, 
united Germany attests) (149). In close-order drill sociality, the individual is linked to others by 
"a strange sense of personal enlargement" (2); symbolic content that may get attached to that 
feeling is attached by association, indexically. 
I will proceed with my argument in this chapter by assuming that cultural and biological 
forms of sociality in human beings are differently grounded, but both potentially subject to 
emergent principles as discussed in the previous two chapters. 101 
101 A comment seems appropriate to justify applying a theory developed to account for the aggregate 
behaviors of unthinking parts to a collection of thinking organisms. Molecules that exhibit liquidity, or an 
autocatalytic set or an autocell, or even the individual chemical processes that make up a biological 
organism do not exhibit an internal/external distinction where a set-apart, informational component is 
interpreted by a system, for the system. With an aggregate of chemical processes that make up a 
biological organism, however, collective behavior is determined by both informational properties of DNA 
and physical and behavioral characteristics of the structures and processes that self-organize under the 
biasing influence of DNA. To account for the emergent behaviors of an aggregate of such organisms- as I 
would want to do here- would require me to 'tell a story' as to how the informational component that 
biases group behavior is 'winnowed' to produce the types of group emergent behaviors the collection of 
organisms demonstrate. As groups demonstrate relational supervenient, morphodynamic, and 
teleodynamic properties, and those properties contribute to the differential survival of the informational 
component biasing group behavior, winnowing of the information component occurs. Since I've already 
tipped my hat to say I will be looking at biological and cultural forms of sociality, it is obvious that the two 
sources of information that get winnowed are genes and linguistically-encoded cultural information. 
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4.2 The emergence ofbiologically-undergirded social organisms 
If, as noted, humans have both biologically- and culturally-given sources of their sociality, 
to discuss the emergence of biologically-given social forms in humans requires referring to 
genetic theories of sociality, which apply equally to humans and microbes. In this section, I will 
follow in outline form Holldobler and Wilson's argument (2008, 32-35) concerning the evolution 
of biological sociality/02 applying Deacon's emergence categories to its interpretation. 
4.2.1 Emergence! sociality: simple aggregates of reproducing individuals in a 
competitive environment 
Emergencel sociality- competition among biological organisms- is not organized; it is a 
mere aggregate, a collection, where pressures to compete or leave the group outweigh 
pressures to cooperate.103 At this level of sociality, sets of alleles survive selection pressures by 
biasing the development of individual organisms such that they survive to reproduce better than 
other competing organisms possessing a different set of alleles. Any mutations that produce 
altruistic social behavior will not be passed on, simply because in an environment where 
competition is highly rewarded, altruism costs the possessor of such a trait more than those that 
do not possess it. Social organization cannot develop in this environment; in Deacon's terms, 
102 Holldobler and Wilson are proponents of a perspective called 'multi-level selection theory,' which says 
the phenotypes of genes can, under certain conditions, include more than the physical body of the 
reproducing individual. If interactions between individuals are systematic, stable, and robust, and they 
differentially affect the survival of genes responsible for that interaction, that interaction can be 
considered an 'extended phenotype.' Multi-level selection theory is mathematically equivalent to 
inclusive fitness accounts of individual selection processes; it is just explicit about what counts as a target 
of selection. I will follow multi-level selection theory without further comment in this section. For further 
accounts of this theory, see Dugatkin and Reeve (1994); Sober and Wilson (1999); Reeve and Keller 
(1999). 
103 Reeve and Keller (1999) argue cooperation, competition, and leaving the aggregate are three social 
behaviors that bear on the evolutionary success of organisms, and make up the three factors that need to 
be weighed to give a proper accounting of selection in multi-level selection theory. Their relative 
influence is the result of selection forces that are potentially in effect at any point in evolution. 
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biases towards sociality are washed out, and individual competition in aggregates represents a 
least-discordant-remainder averaging. 
4.2.2 Emergence2 sociality: feedback effects from interactions between individuals 
affords genetic support for cooperative behaviors 
In Emergence2 sociality- group selection leading to cooperative behaviors- if ecological 
conditions favor the survival of alleles that bias individuals towards group cooperation, these 
alleles will increase in the population relative to those that do not bias individuals in this way. 
Cooperative individuals will raise, on average, offspring with a better chance for reproductive 
success than selfish individuals. This can happen only if the between-group competition of 
populations of interbreeding individuals is a stronger selection factor than within-group 
competition between individuals. That is, if groups that cooperate better out-produce groups 
that do not, the altruistic genes will spread, despite the selection forces working against their 
spreading due to competition between individuals.104 This is a key caveat of multi-level 
selection theory, one that makes it consonant with the traditional concept of inclusive fitness. It 
is also the heart of the robust, affordance-based, contextual'feedback effects' that define this 
kind of sociality as E2 morphodynamics. 
The key morphodynamic principle is because in their particular environment cooperation 
between individuals can positively affect survival rates of those individuals, natural selection acts 
differently on the genes of those individuals than it would otherwise. Stable group interactions 
that make a difference to survival will be targeted by natural selection; the group level of the 
extended phenotype determines what genes are passed on; individuals will be selected that 
seek cooperation. 
104 So called 'weak altruism.' 
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A basic example of this kind of E2 altruistic sociality is sexual reproduction itself. In some 
ecological environments, mixing 50% of an individual's genes with 50% of another individual's 
genes in sexual reproduction enhances the survival of the teleodynamic lineage, as compared to 
the survival of the lineage when 100% of the genes undergirding asexual reproduction are 
reproduced. 105 Once established, sexual reproduction assures that the genes in both partners 
that lead to sexual reproduction- social behavior- will be reproduced. In sexual species there 
is an inescapably strong attractive force towards altruistic group behavior: the necessity of 
finding a mate (Reeve and Keller 1999, 11). 
Another common altruistic social behavior is the altruistic cooperation between parents 
and young that increases the rate of survival or number of offspring, or survival of relatives. 
Though 'parental investment' is a less common social behavior than mate selection is, it 
indicates how in certain environments behavior altruistic and sacrificial to the individual pays off 
for survival of the lineage as reproductive groups compete with one another (Reeve and Keller 
1999, 12). 
105 I chose the unusual formulation 'teleodynamic lineage' for a reason. 'Selfish gene' theories argue that 
the 'unit' of selection is the 'replicator' gene, based on the fact that genes are reproduced and 
phenotypes are not; they are relatively more permanent than are phenotypes. Most biologists who 
follow this line of reasoning- and there are many- would thus say 'enhances the survival of the genes' in 
place of my phrase. Selfish gene theory is well and good as a heuristic device, giving insight to 
phenomena such as extended phenotypes and intragenomic conflict. In terms of an ultimate explanation 
for biology, however, it is lacking; it does not offer a theory as to a) what a replicator is, how a replicator is 
a replicator, and b) how genes function as units of information, which is their strict definition. Genes 
function referentially, which means they require interpretant-vehicles such that they represent amino 
acids, proteins, cells, organisms, extended phenotypes like social groups, and the environment at large. 
These considerations mean that a more basic unit for biology than the gene is the semiotic process itself, 
describing the dynamics of a lineage of organisms. For example, the genetic code- the interpretant-
vehicle for biology- is exactly the same in all life on earth, and has been for as far back as we have 
evidence. The genetic code represents the ground for the possibility for a gene to be a unit of 
information, and is thus more basic than particular genes themselves. See Deacon (2004). 
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A third, even less common, altruistic social behavior demonstrating morphodynamic 
feedback effects is cooperation between related individuals if that cooperation will increase 
rates of survival or numbers of offspring. For example, if joint defense of nest and brood will 
increase the likelihood that alleles biasing individuals towards this behavior will be passed on, 
group cooperation may develop (Reeve and Keller 1999, 12; Hi:illdobler and Wilson 2008, 34). 
Behavioral ecologists note examples of this kind of behavior. A squirrel will give an alarm call 
warning noting the presence of a predator, though its own survival may be compromised by 
making the call. This call will benefit the local group of squirrels, increasing the chance the 
alleles undergirding this behavior are passed on. Evidence suggests that the more closely 
related a squirrel is to its local group of squirrels, the more frequent calls will be (Sherman 
1981). Plants genetically close to each other put in the same pot do not compete through 
aggressive root growth for soil nutrients. If they are genetically farther apart (but still of the 
same species), their roots will compete with each other (Dudley and File 2007). Mathematical 
analysis of biological theory suggests that even groups of unrelated individuals may cooperate 
for genetically-given reasons. For this to happen, group living must provide direct reproductive 
benefits for every member of the group, and opportunities for cheating must be limited (Reeve 
and Keller 1999, 12). 
4.2.2.1 Communication and ritualization 
Two importane06 genetically-determined morphodynamic feedback effects influencing 
sociality are communication and ritualization, and I will say a word about both. The first, animal 
communication and signaling, allows for the sharing of information about the affective states of 
106 Important in general, of course, but specifically important to the evolutionary background of religious 
community life. 
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individuals, and about the surrounding environment (Hauser 1996, Ch. 7). We can get a sense of 
what genetically-determined communication of affective states is like by considering human 
laughter and crying. Both behaviors are universal and noncognitive among humans, and rely on 
indexical reference. That is, they don't communicate what is so funny or sad, merely that 
something funny or sad is emotionally salient to the communicant (Deacon 1997, Ch. 11). 
Biologically-given communication that references information about the surrounding 
environment can be seen in honeybee dancing, where specific information about the distance 
and direction to a food source from the bee's nest is communicated (Holldobler and Wilson 
2008, 178). 
A second socializing product of morphodynamic feedback is ritualization. Reeve and Keller, 
who have provided important theoretical and modeling support for Holldobler and Wilson's 
account of group selection, argue that though selection forces leading to cooperation may 
outweigh selection forces leading to competition or leaving the group in certain ecological 
environments, this doesn't mean the latter two selection forces don't continue to exist. For 
example, in many sexual species, the only time individuals cooperate is in courtship and 
copulation (Reeve and Keller 1999, 9). The fact that mating, parenting, and undertaking 
common effort for mutual benefit are relatively rare social behaviors among species, and 
infrequently engaged in, means important but rare cooperative forms of behavior require a 
peculiar kind of signaling to initiate and guide cooperation. This is the biological background for 
the process of ritualization. 
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Ritualization generally refers to genetically-determined behavior patterns governing the 
interactions of two or more individuals of a species. 107 Ritualization 'closes the gap' between 
individuals that normally do not interact, in order to accomplish social tasks (d'Aquili and 
Laughlin 1979, 155). Ritualized behavior is "active and reciprocal communication" that "(1) is 
structured; (2) is stereotyped and repetitive in occurrence over time; and (3) results in greater 
coordination of conspecifics toward some social action, purpose, or goal" (Laughlin, McManus, 
and d'Aquili 1979, 29). The distributed nature of a ritual across multiple individuals means that 
ritualization is the formalization of a pattern of responses. Ritualized behaviors are cooperative 
interactions, giving participants pre-established parts to play. As each participants plays his 
part, it affects the way others play (Smith 1979, 54, 65). In effect, ritualization is an outcome of 
morphodynamic, self-organizing feedback effects of sociality on genotypes. Ritualized behaviors 
have their effect by eliciting neurophysiological responses in the co-participants in the ritual 
(Alcorta and Sosis 2005, 344). 
Ritualization, as a means for effecting social coordination, can be seen most commonly in 
the three areas that represent the most common forms of animal social behavior- mating, 
parental care, and group coordination of food gathering. Formalized courtship rituals are the 
most obvious of these, corresponding to the necessity of coordinated mating in sexual species. 
The goal in mating rituals is to synchronize the two potential mates to allow successful 
copulation (Smith 1979, 66). There are also many varieties of ritualized parent/offspring 
interactions; nest begging is one example, seen in many bird species. Bird parents respond to 
the open mouth of their chicks with food offerings in a ritualized way; this ritualized response is 
107 Not all ritualized behaviors are for coordinating individuals, but I am here focusing on those that are. 
Further, not all ritualized behaviors in animals are genetically determined, as we will see in the next 
section. 
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cunningly exploited by other birds, such as the cuckoo (Dawkin~ 2006, 249). Ritualized behavior 
coordinating collective action is a third common type of ritualization. Honey-bee dances as well 
as the collective singing of wolves before a group hunt are ritualized behavior coordinating 
group behavior (Laughlin and McManus 1979, 85). 
Animal rituals suggest a particular evolutionary substrate; they "draw on gestures or 
behaviors from other social contexts and recombine them into distinctive signals," where these 
"recombined signals don't relate to instrumental activity but to social communication" 
(Watanabe and Smuts 1999, 100). The presence of biologically-given ritual, especially in the 
lives of the young of higher animals, may feedback and influence the development of the animal 
in a pro-social direction (Laughlin, McManus, and d'Aquili 1979, 35), perhaps even influencing 
the evolution of sociality itself. 
4.2.3 Emergence3 sociality: social organisms 
Are there other forms of biologically-given sociality beyond those noted? Particularly, do 
we see evidence of biological sociality that is more than E1 and E2 variants of genetically 
determined sociality? Is there teleodynamic, biologically-grounded sociality- Emergence3? 
Recall that E3 requires that there be, in addition to feedback effects, memory plus variation and 
selection (the latter two together representing information). 
I believe there are at least two biologically-given forms of animal sociality that demonstrate 
memory plus variation and selection. In both cases the social behavior of aggregates of 
individuals is stored and reproduced in secondary biological systems, secondary loci, themselves 
underdetermined for that task by genotype. In these examples, social memory and the 
potential for variation and selection among social variants is genetically afforded but not 
genetically determined. 
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4.2.3.1 Eusocial insects 
The first example of teleodynamic sociality is found in eusocial ('true' social) insects such as 
some species of termites and ants. These so-called 'superorganisms' are an aggregate of 
individuals whose group adaptive traits, such as the division of labor and communication 
patterns between them, demonstrate non-genetic memory, variation and selection. 
Superorganisms are made up of specialized castes that act together as a functional whole. 
Different superorganisms- even within the same species- differ in colony size and worker 
specialization, rate of information exchange, number of different behavioral acts performed by 
the colony, and amount of collaboration between colony members. This is due to colony-level 
selection pressures (Holldobler and Wilson 2008, xx, 6, 9, 157-8). 
Members of the same colony rarely show genetic differences. More often than not, all 
colony members- including the reproductive queen and the nonreproductive workers- have 
the same genotype, from which differences in the environment launch a newborn individual on 
a developmental pathway that leads to different castes. This differential expression of genotype 
is called the 'norm of reaction,' which is the "pattern of phenotypic variability in response to the 
array of particular states of the environment." Genes do not determine which caste an 
individual will belong to, but rather caste plasticity. Environmental conditions turn the 
expression of genes on or off. In a superorganism, social organization is both programmed, 
since the varieties of possible phenotype are given by the genome, and flexible, in that what 
phenotypic traits are expressed are given by the environment. Environmental conditions that 
determine castes are things like larval nutrition, temperature, winter chilling, negative feedback 
loops of communication among nestmates that regulate the proportions of castes and the tasks 
they undertake, egg size, and age of queen (Holldobler and Wilson 2008, 136, 29, 155). 
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The way the plastic norm of reaction reacts to a range of influences serves as a secondary 
locus of memory and variation for the social organization of eusocial insects. The social 
organization actually seen in any particular superorganism is based on environmental selection 
pressures put on the norm of reaction, only indirectly putting selection pressure on the 
genotype by putting selection pressures on what possible norms of reaction exist (Holldobler 
and Wilson 2008, 35). 
4.2.3.2 Sociality mediated by a nervous system 
There is a second form of teleodynamic animal sociality that demonstrates memory plus 
variation and selection; it is of more interest to the purpose of this dissertation. This is the 
sociality found in animals where their nervous systems have evolved to the point that both the 
'wiring' of the nervous system in development and the patterns of connections eventually 
established are underdetermined by genes, and open to environmental/earning. In this case 
memory- stored representations of interactions and behaviors with others- can affect what 
types of social behaviors an aggregate of animals will demonstrate. What nervous systems learn 
becomes a new locus for selection among variant forms of social organization, based on 
different kinds of selection pressures (Deacon 2000). I will give examples of this sort of brain-
determined animal sociality seen in primates. 
King (2004) describes the relationships of African apes she studied as //apes-in-interaction." 
They converge together on an agreed upon way to treat a movement or vocalization //as a 
request for sharing, or an act of reassurance after a frightening event, or an invitation to 
reconcile" (6). She criticizes much of the literature on ape sociality because it emphasizes the 
transmission of signals from a sender to a receiver, instead of what she has witnessed, //co-
regulated social communication" (12). For example, she describes the relationship between two 
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gorillas she studied over time as "neither invariant nor hardwired." The outcome of their social 
behavior depends "on the sum of the choices each social partner makes moment by moment" 
(16). 
Higher ape sociality includes playful social behaviors that have no obvious function other 
than to celebrate sociality itself. Kohler (1973/1925) notes that apes enact what look like 
primitive group dancing, based on spinning in place. Groups of apes will stretch out their hands 
and spin around together, sometimes following a rough circle around a post. They will keep 
time with one another, stepping heavily on one foot to create an approximate rhythm. They will 
wag their heads as well, in time with the steps, and seem to be "full of eager enjoyment of their 
primitive game." Kohler found he could join with them, even initiating the game. He writes, "It 
seems to me extraordinary that there should arise quite spontaneously, among chimpanzees, 
anything that so strongly suggest the primitive dancing of some primitive tribes" (314-5). 
There is also evidence that non-genetic, conceptualized ritual facilitates sociality in 
primates such as chimpanzees and baboons. Whereas the ritualization we examined previously 
involved genetically determined patterns of fixed action sequences, rituals in higher animals 
display a freedom and flexibility based on learning and conceptualization of goals. We should 
probably characterize these rituals as determined neither by symbolic culture nor genes- they 
are functionally equivalent to genetic rituals but a result of non-linguistic representation in the 
brain. Laughlin and McManus (1979) note that there are very persistent 'exchange rituals' in 
chimpanzees that seem to go beyond the mere sharing of food, and seem similar to human 
exchange rituals. These rituals reinforce the structure of cooperation, coordination, and 
redistribution of scarce resources on terms other than who happens to be strongest. They 
appear to directly challenge the forms of sociality chimpanzees practice that are more firmly 
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rooted in genetic predisposition. Instead, they reinforce the idea of a shared 'cognized 
community' in play among them. A number of factors suggest that these rituals involve 
conceptualized understandings of social coordination: aggression is rigidly forbidden in such 
exchanges; the time taken to eat the game is much longer than is actually required; there is a 
strict adherence to role during the exchange; an inordinate amount of social communication 
occurs during the exchange period; and every member of the community eventually participates 
in the consumption of meat (106-7). 
A striking example of ritual determined neither by genes nor symbolic language is discussed 
by Watanabe and Smuts (1999) in their investigation of male baboon social behavior. Their 
findings are directly pertinent to the line of reasoning that Rappaport uses in his 
conceptualization of ritual. Young baboons have superior fighting ability than do older baboons, 
which gives them mating advantages, but old males compensate by forming alliances, mediated 
through ritualized greetings. For example, two older males who engaged in greeting rituals 
more than any other pair also had the most reliable and longest standing alliance, and were 
routinely successful in taking fertile females from younger males (103}. 108 Watanabe and Smuts' 
analysis of broader field data suggests that "Pairs of [baboon] males whose greetings 
demonstrate reciprocal symmetry of roles form coalitions significantly more often than 
expected and are opponents less often than expected, whereas males with asymmetrical 
greetings show the opposite pattern" (104). 
Their field experience suggests greeting rituals in social yet very competitive baboons 
convey intentions within a non-linguistic behavioral context (99). Baboon greetings have no set 
108 Note this implies 'niche construction,' since there would be selection pressure on secondary behaviors 
that might help facilitate the development of conceptualized ritual demonstrated here. This could create 
a positive feedback loop. 
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time and partner, they are often not completed successfully, and the neutral social context of 
the greeting suggests that the greetings are volitional and not instinctual. Watanabe and Smuts 
argue that a completed greeting conveys a message about the greeter's willingness to play by 
the rules. It is an opportunity to express "good intentions in a world of otherwise unpredictable, 
highly competitive individuals" (104). To successfully complete a greeting raises the possibility 
of cooperation in other situations, while a failure to greet indicates a lack of mutuality (105). 
Watanabe and Smuts applied Rappaport's theory of ritual to their work with baboons for 
the very specific reason that it offers a 'third way' between genetically-determined sociality and 
symbolic culture-determined sociality. How does baboon ritual demonstrate this? In 
Rappaport's theory, the ritual form is a conventionally given (not evolved) learned behavioral 
context (not symbolic) for coordinating social action. Ritual imposes a standard of conduct 
beyond the will of each participant. It is a mutually induced conformity, and it results in 
behavioral invariance, which can become an iconic representation of reliability, certainty, and 
truth. It is a ground upon which further social cooperation may be built (101). 
The forms of great ape sociality King and Kohler noticed, and the chimpanzee ritual 
Laughlin and McManus, as well as Watanabe and Smuts, investigate, represent non-symbolic 
but intentional communication of signals.109 The form of reference they exhibit is indexical, 
referencing mutuality, but they are determined by learning and experience, not by genes. The 
passed-on, learned behaviors stored in individual great ape nervous systems represent a 
secondary locus of memory, variation and selection to act on social organization. 
109 As opposed to crying or laughing, which are also non-symbolic, but are non-intentional 
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4.2.4 Examples of evolved pro-social mechanisms in humans 
Both genetically-driven and non-symbolic, intentional ritual might have 'feedback effects' 
reinforcing other genetically-driven pro-social instincts in animals. Here I will discuss briefly 
some of the evolved pro-social mechanisms we seen in higher mammals, including humans, as 
possible examples of such evolved pro-social instincts. These pro-social mechanisms probably 
evolved to support mating, child-rearing, and corporate 'stag hunt' efforts. 110 
• Oxytocin is a neurotransmitter which has been tied to prosocial responses of mammals, 
including humans, in sexual copulation, social recognition, pair bonding, stress 
reduction in anxiety-producing social situations, the willingness to take social risks, and 
maternal behaviors (Lee et al. 2009; Bartz and Hollander 2006, 520; Kosfeld et al. 2005, 
675). 
• In humans, there are different nerves to transmit light, pleasant touch than to transmit 
hard, unpleasant touch. Tactile stimulation of the light kind releases several important 
sociosexual hormones (Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005, 319). 
• In humans, there is an 'appetitive/consummatory system' for affiliation that evolved to 
promote prosocial behaviors. This can be summarized as strong motivation in response 
to a stimulus towards some action that directly leads to some biological aim, followed 
by strong satisfaction and relaxation. Consummation is inherently rewarding, 
producing quiescence, sedation, rest, and parasympathetic nervous system activity 
(Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005, 319-20). Glassman and Buettner argue that by 
this system "humans are drawn together to form a community by traits that function in 
a prerational manner. .. The direction the community takes after it comes together is 
based on a complex interaction of this prerational activity and the way it interacts with 
social history" (Depue and Morrone-Strupinsky 2005, 354). 
• In humans, "engaging in coordinated physical exercise with another individual gives rise 
to a heightened sense of social bonding" (Cohen et al. 2010, 106}. Results of such 
coordinated exertion include strong pro-social responses and a sense of boundary loss 
and oneness with others (Mueller, Agamanolis, and Picard 2003, 566-7; McNeill1995, 
2, 8). Cohen et al. suggest that feedback from the synchronicity and coordination of 
behavior might be involved (Cohen et al. 2010, 106-7). 
110 A 'stag hunt' refers to a kind of corporate endeavor that benefits everyone much if undertaken, but 
costs everyone something. 
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This last example of a prosocial mechanism might have evolved to facilitate corporate 
hunting, similar to the way wolves are known to howl collectively before a group hunt. Even in 
the present, military drill is not primarily used for training for combat, but for the socialization of 
the unit, to prepare them for working together on a dangerous task (McNeill1995, 38). Festive 
dancing is a related, widespread activity that may co-opt the prosocial responses coordinated 
physical exercise produces, and may undergird the ability of human groups to gather in much 
larger groups than chimpanzee groups. McNeill notes that hunting and gathering groups tend to 
break apart when food sources are low, and regather when they are more bountiful. 
Regatherings are always accompanied by dancing (McNeill1995, 22-3). 
If these are examples of evolved prosocial mechanisms that demonstrate a feedback effect 
from ritualization on genes, or perhaps conceptualized ritual, is there any way to discriminate 
between these? Do we see pro-social mechanisms that exist only in humans, presumably as a 
result of the conceptualization of ritual in higher apes?111 Both Tomasello and Savage-
Rumba ugh note that great apes have tremendous difficulty coordinating themselves to each 
other to support intimate forms of communication and the sharing of intentions (Tomasello 
2005; 1999, Ch. 2; Savage-Rumba ugh 1986, Ch. 6). Humans do this very easily, starting as early 
as 9 months (Tomasello 1999, Ch. 3). It is possible that implicit, automatic forms of intimate 
social cognition that humans demonstrate, including gaze following, imitating the actions of 
others in conversation, tracking the knowledge of others, and tracking the goals and activities of 
others (Frith and Frith 2008, 504-5) evolved in the human lineage alongside of and in 
relationship with the conceptualized forms of sociality discussed above (chimpanzee food 
sharing rituals, greeting rituals). One of these traits- imitating the actions of others ('the 
111 Or perhaps alongside of the growth of symbolic communication that produced culture. 
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chameleon effect')- has been shown to strongly biases humans towards prosocial behaviors 
(Frith and Frith 2008, 505). 
In addition, humans as well as great apes demonstrate an evolved mechanism that 
theoretical biologists tell us is crucial for any social organization based on conceptualized 
cooperation to develop- cheater detection mechanisms. Fehr and Gachter write: 
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently 
cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they 
will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of 
cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the 
evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signaling 
theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism .... the altruistic punishment of defectors is a 
key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that 
individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material 
gain. [In our experiments, we] show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment 
is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative 
emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. 
[The results of our experiments] suggest that future study ofthe evolution of human 
cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment (Fehr and 
Gachter 2002, 137, italics mine). 
This 'fairness circuit' causes individuals to lose in the short run, but the group to gain in the 
long run (Frith and Frith 2008, 507). That a 'fairness circuit' of emotional responses would 
represent a genetic adaptation to support non-kin sociality (i.e. conceptualized versions of 'the 
group') fits in well with 'weak altruism' models of group selection among unrelated individuals, 
where a distinguishable population out-produces other populations of the group due to evolved 
social mechanisms. 
4.3 The emergence of symbolically-undergirded cultural sociality 
We have examined how 'superorganisms' and animals with sophisticated nervous systems 
can demonstrate teleodynamic forms of social organization, utilizing indexical reference at a 
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different locus than that of genes to record past and influence future behaviors as a form of 
social memory, demonstrating variation and selection. Further, we saw this locus develops and 
changes in 'real-time/ within the lifespan of individual (super)organisms; it is distributed across 
many individuals, as the aggregate interacts and individuals learn the patterns of effective 
interactions.112 
One genus of great ape- the lineage homo- at some time in the past 4 million years 
developed the potential for non-genetic, distributed, symbolic memory to undergird its sociality, 
such that a system of symbol-tokens maps onto systematic elements of social experience 
through grammatical languages, as we see in human societies everywhere. The implications of 
this were nothing short of revolutionary, as significant as the emergence of life from non-life 
(Tomasello 1999; Deacon 1997). The presence of language within hominids was already having 
an effect on their (our) social forms even prior to the full development of 'language about 
sociality.' At first, this influence was probably overshadowed by the sociality given by biology, 
as well as by indexical forms of intentional communication influencing sociality, but as Deacon 
has pointed out, masking effects can weaken the force of our biological sources of sociality, as 
well as the force of indexical reference, and initiate socio-cultural'niche construction.' Growing 
numbers of individuals began to relate to each other through symbolic maps of experience, 
masking other ways of relating, and putting genetic pressure on individuals to have a 
psychological nature manifesting a preference for relating to each other via symbolic maps. 
Eventually, this masking effect allowed the 'off-loading' of sociality from genes and intentional 
indexes to symbolic culture, creating a "hybrid brain-culture" (Donald 2001) that underlies the 
112 See Donald (2001) for an account of the distributed aspects of culture, of which we can consider these 
as primitive versions. 
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two different sources of social processing that social neuroscientists note. 113 This represents an 
Emergent3, symbolic form of teleodynamic organism sociality, when viewed from the 
perspective of aggregates of biological organisms. It is what we call symbolic culture . 
.. 
Because cultural sources of sociality became an independent (and even preeminent) source 
of social organization in humans, we can describe the organizational effects of individuals 
sharing a symbolic language using emergence theory, just as we described the organizational 
effects of individuals sharing genes using emergence theory. What do these emergent effects of 
language-sharing on sociality look like? 
4.3.1 Emergence! effects on sociality of sharing a language 
Emergencel dynamics in the organization of human sociality due to sharing a symbolic 
language involve 'averaging out' relations between individuals. Sharing a communicable 
language does two things contributing to this averaging out effect. First, it extends the 
conditions for sociality by making it possible to share experiences with others who have not had 
the same experience, and with whom we are not directly related. Second, it homogenizes 
human experience through a least-discordant-remainder selection process acting on 
communicated representations of experience. Participating in a 'shared public model of reality' 
extending beyond what is directly experienced by each participant, and used by each and all 
language user- including even non-kin- creates powerful and new reasons for using symbolic 
communication, including engaging in group endeavors that require sophisticated coordination, 
and extends the framework for sociality far beyond what is otherwise possible And the shared 
public model of reality suppresses idiosyncratic 'private worlds' and interpretations of 
experience that are not common or compelling enough to be represented publicly. An El effect 
113 See the beginning of this chapter. 
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of a shared language on sociality is a widely shared sense of a public, 'objective world. 1114 
Durkheim, in discussing this averaging-out effect, writes, "Because collective, these states of 
consciousness are impersonal, and turn us toward ends that we have in common with others, 
and by which we communicate with others" (Durkheim 1973, 162). 
4.3.2 Emergence2 effects on sociality of sharing a language 
Emergence2 dynamics in the organization of human sociality due to sharing a symbolic 
language involve how sharing a language affects certain kinds of relations between individuals, 
which then feed back into supporting the use of language. As a result, language-based forms of 
sociality become amplified at the expense of others. We have already looked at Deacon's 
example of humans as the only pair-bonded primate with significant paternal investment that 
live in large multi-male groups. This is perhaps related to the fact that via language, unrelated 
humans can bond together to undertake corporate endeavors. 115 To the degree that successful 
large-scale projects supported by language gives language users an advantage in living, the use 
of language to coordinate large-scale tasks will be encouraged. Language will develop, 
differentiate, and support even larger or more abstract cultural endeavors. Sociality and 
linguistic culture will become self-supporting of each other, and human culture will grow in 
importance even as social forms develop in new and unexpected directions. 
4.3.3 Emergence3 effects on sociality of sharing a language 
Emergence3 dynamics in the organization of human sociality due to sharing a symbolic 
language would mean representations of sociality show up in language to act as memory, 
demonstrate variation and selection, and differentially organize relationships between 
114 Even the objective world of common inner experience. 
115 Of course, besides sharing a language, there are other environmental factors that must come into play 
for such living arrangements to develop. For examples, see Diamond (1997). 
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individuals sharing the language. Forms of sociality that exist because of shared language 
become represented, shared, discussed, and varied within the language. As with other 
teleodynamic systems, the memory component of cultural sociality- the representations of 
sociality- can function as memory either iconically, indexically, or symbolically. 
'Culturally-given sociality' is a sociality that exists 'in the head,' so to speak, within our 
shared mental maps. Language sharers do not just engage the world directly, as animals do. 116 
This fact marks an important shift in the history of sociality, and represents a critical move in the 
argument of this dissertation. I suggest that the different ways sociality can be represented in 
our shared mental maps- iconically, indexically, and symbolically- identifies what makes a 
religious community unique from other forms of culturally-given sociality. To be able to 
distinguish a) the fundamental 'humanity' of a person, from b) her membership in the 
communist party of Soviet Russia, from c) her being a part of the Buddhist Sangha, is to 
distinguish between different ways aggregates of symbol-users can be conceptually organized 
and represented in memory. An anthropologist from Mars, unfamiliar with human languages, 
would note that humans are merely a highly social species, and would not be able to see these 
different types of language-mediated sociality. That wars are fought for greed, or for 
democracy, or for God does not, to a first degree of approximation, change the fact of war, or 
the way war is conducted. And yet ... these distinctions do matter. They matter as a 'first 
derivative' to the actual organization of human social groups, and they matter directly to 
individuals and how they map themselves and others into their 'meaning systems.' For some, 
'being Muslim' is more meaningful than 'being American,' and 'being American' is more 
116 This is an immensely important point; I look to Deacon, Percy, and Durkheim as thinkers who 
contribute lucidly to this insight. See Deacon {1997); Percy (1975, 1983); Durkheim {1953, 1973, 
1995/1915). 
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meaningful than 'being human.' Differences in the meaningfulness of culturally-given sociality 
must come from somewhere; it is in the different possible ways of referencing culturally-based 
sociality that I want to locate the cause of differences in meaning, and where I want to position 
the question of the emergence of religious communities. 
To state succinctly my fundamental argument, I propose that iconic representations of 
selves-in-society correspond to humanity, 'human persons in communitas'; indexical 
representations of selves-in-society correspond to socio-economic-political man in society; and 
symbolic representations of selves-in-society correspond to pious man in the religious 
community. The first of these represents a default position, a 'first principle' simply 
acknowledging the effect of symbol use creating 'selves-in-society,' trading in the icon ism of its 
form of representation. The second of these represents socially-constructed forms of sociality, 
indexed to the pragmatic interests of individuals, established through consensus and 
agreement. The third of these represents sociality based on authority and the suppression of 
the normal experience of one's 'self' under the 'mystified' articulation of selves-in-society, 
trading in the systematic, encoded, and conventional character of symbolic reference. 
4.3.3.1 Iconic symbolic language effects on sociality- conceptions of persons 
celebrated in rites of communitas 
Iconic reference supporting teleodynamic cultural sociality can arise whenever a symbolic 
language is shared among individuals, as that sharing entails multiple interpreters are implicitly 
acknowledged. Recall from the discussion in Ch.2 that an interpreter is the system that makes 
judgments- interpretations- in all acts of comparison. In symbolic reference, indexical 
reference is suppressed and a 'point-of-view' arises from which the higher systematicity 
between a system of symbols and systematic elements of experience is acknowledged. When 
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language-users share a language, an interpreter is implicitly posited as existing in the 'other' 
with whom one shares a language. A 'community of interpreters' is created,not a mere 
aggregate of biological individuals. Thus, the positing of a community of interpreters- 'selves-
in-society'- is not a direct effect of language on sociality, as is having a shared 'objective' world 
(E1), or the feedback effect of large numbers of unrelated individuals living together as a result 
of a shared 'objective' world (E2); it is an indirect effect of representing those who share a 
cognitive map within that cognitive map. A new form of sociality is created, based on the 
shared identity produced by positing the 'other' as an interpreter like oneself. 117 
Turner's (1969) conception of communitas represents a classic example from religious 
studies that notices both the iconic characteristics of the 'self' as it exists in culture, and the 
relevant connection between that self and religiosity. I don't think his descriptions of 
communitas can be improved upon as a description ofthe iconic form of reference, as applied 
to the teleodynamic effects of sharing a symbolic language. Communitas is the iconic 
representation of the interpreter in a community of interpreters 
Turner writes that communitas is a "generalized social bond," blending lowliness and 
sacredness, homogeneity and comradeship. It is a precondition of having human society at all. It 
is the unstructured and undifferentiated community or communion of equal individuals {96). 
His characterization of communitas in its relationship to broader cultural sociality uses the same 
metaphor that Deacon uses when describing iconic reference in emergence- it represents the 
"emptiness at the center" which is indispensible in the functioning ofthe wheel. Communitas 
has an aspect of "potentiality," and "unprecedented potency." It has an "existential quality" 
that involves the "whole man in relation to others." This can be differentiated from the 
117 Royce made this idea a central feature of his philosophy. See Smith (1968); Royce (1968, Ch. 9). 
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structures of sociality that build upon this existential quality, which have a cognitive quality 
(127-8). Turner is "inclined to think that communitas is not solely the product of biologically 
inherited drives released from cultural constraints. Rather it is the product of peculiarly human 
faculties." It is the product of "men in their wholeness wholly attending" (128). Communitas is 
the ground for symbolically-aided social development, not biologically given programs and 
mechanisms (131). 
Besides describing communitas in terms that suggest iconic reference, Turner links 
communitas to religious conceptions of selves-in-society. Turner notes that communitas 
generates myths, symbols, rituals, philosophical systems, and works of art. It links personality, 
universal values, spirit, and soul (121, 128). As Durkheim notes, the soul has always been 
considered sacred, in opposition to the body. It seems a "spark of divinity" (Durkheim 
1995/1915, 265). I believe the soul is thought of in this way because to acknowledge one's ,self' 
-the interpreter in every act of interpretation- is to ,create' in the domain of explicit symbolic 
reference what previously did not exist there. Persons, as distinguishable from individuals, are a 
performative conceptual phenomenon within symbolic language, and having conceptions of the 
interpreting self naturally leads to conceptions of dualism, where the soul as the ,more' could 
not have come from matter, the ,less.'118 
4.3.3.2 Indexical symbolic language effects on sociality - ,selves-in-society' linked by 
organizational concerns 
Turner notes there are "two models of human interrelatedness" that necessarily coexist 
with each other. One is what we just analyzed- communitas. The second "is of society as a 
structured, differentiated, and often hierarchical system of politico-legal-economic positions 
118 Deacon does a nice job of analyzing this in the last third of the Symbolic Species. 
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with many types of evaluation, separating men in terms of "more" or "less" (Turner 1969, 96). 
In Peirce's terms, Turner suggests there are both 'iconic' conceptions of selves-in-society, and 
just-as-important 'indexical' conceptions of selves-in-society. 
The "communion of equal individuals"- the communitas noted above- is memorialized 
(i.e. acts as memory) in such political ideas as "All men are created equal, and are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness." This is most certainly not a fact of biological organisms of the homo lineage, whose 
skills and abilities vary wildly. It is a posited fact, an entailment of sharing a symbolic language, 
as interpreters must be posited as equals in the process of sharing interpretations with one 
another. But the second model of human interrelatedness Turner describes is a "structured, 
differentiated, and often hierarchical system." This model is the result of the human ability to 
symbolically construct pragmatic systems of cooperation between selves-in-society and 
legitimate social hierarchy according to principles that may well take individual differences into 
account. If the Declaration of Independence trumpets human equality, the Constitution of the 
United States focuses on the distinction between the 'natural' orders of human beings, 
particularly the differences between the 'one, few, and many.' 119 
How does the human cultural construction of sociality begin and develop? Consider how 
the morphodynamic effect of larger and larger aggregates of unrelated individuals bonded 
together by a common language creates natural divisions of labor to address corporate needs. 
When large numbers of people live together in small places, it tends to produce an unplanned 
yet robustly predictable organizational structure. Cities, by mere fact of their size, self-organize 
119 See the debate of the representatives to the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia on June 
7, 1787 (Farrand 1911). 
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into necessary and robust types of behaviors including a full-time division of labor, a soldier 
caste, and a caste dedicated to city self-maintenance (Campbell 1965, 42-46; Johnson 2001; 
Rappaport 1999, 421). None of these developments are planned; they are the result of 
feedback effects from having a shared symbolic map of experience, and cause human social 
groups to exhibit new forms of social reality not genetically determined. As these new and 
unplanned patterns of human organization become facts within the public, shared cognized 
models of selves-in-society, they can become starting points for the variation and selection of 
ideas of sociality. Self-organizing city dynamics, when conceptualized, become sources for 
theorizing about the division of labor and political organization. Thus, a morphodynamic effect 
of sharing a cognized symbolic map -large aggregates of individuals living in unplanned, 
emergent forms of social organization- when entered into those cognitive maps via memory, 
creates the possibility for variable, symbolically conceptualized, alternative social forms 
(Rappaport 1999, Ch. 1, 417-9). 
Thus, the indexical teleodynamic 'effect' of sharing a symbolic language is our ability to 
construct 'society' through symbolic conceptualization. John Searle has helpfully discussed this 
process. He distinguishes between regulative and constitutive 'rules' that govern genetically 
underdetermined forms of sociality. Regulative rules regulate already-existing biological 
behavior; constitutive rules create or define new forms of behavior. Thus, there are regulative 
rules for eating ('salad before main course before dessert;' 'don't lick your fingers') and 
eliminating waste ('use a bathroom;' 'wash your hands afterwards'), and constitutive rules for 
voting and playing chess. Constitutive rules define moves in a game such as chess- without the 
rules, there simply is no chess-playing, whereas without regulative rules for eating, eating can 
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still occur. Regulative rules are based in biology more directly, constitutive rules are only 
indirectly tied to biology (Searle 1969, 33). 
Searle shows how constitutive rules depend crucially upon possibilities created by 
language. They represent possible modes of acting that explore the potentiality of symbolic 
reference. Searle attempts to catalog the potentialities inherent in symbol-use, the new 
possibilities for communication that having a language at all affords. He argues that there are 
five such 'illocutionary acts': Assertives, where we tell people how things are; Directives, where 
we try to get people to do things; Commissives, where we commit ourselves to doing things; 
Expressives, where we express our feelings and attitudes; and Declarations, where we bring 
about changes in the world through our utterances (Searle 1979, viii).120 My own analysis, based 
on sign usage in animals, is that indexical reference is sufficient for performing Assertives, 
Directives, Com missives, and Expressives; symbolic language is not required for these acts. 
Consider a dog that brings an empty bowl to her owner as a type of assertive; an ape who gets 
excited and pulls his peers to a surprising food source as a directive, baboons who indicate 
willingness to cooperate in greeting rituals as a commissive, and human crying as an expressive. 
However, I agree with Searle that Declarations require symbolic reference. These require a 
subjunctive space, the ability to express alternatives within a system. This necessarily is 
dependent upon the systemic features of symbolic reference. 121 
So when Searle defines language as engaging in "rule-governed behavior," he is saying 
language is what grants the possibility of constituting culturally-based sociality. You cannot 
challenge on moral grounds biologically-given forms of sociality, uphold a constitution, or use a 
120 A performative utterance as I have been using it is an example of a declaration. 
121 Walker Percy is helpful here; see Percy (1983). 
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currency indexically or iconically. While baboon greeting rituals can establish the grounds for 
mutual trust between non-symbol users, there is no way to specify, without symbol use, 
alternative possible conditions wherein that trust can be expressed. To organize a social 
aggregate on the basis of a constitution is more like agreeing to play a game of chess than it is 
like agreeing to cooperate in getting mates. It relies on potentials only created by symbol use. 
Precisely why do I characterize this emergent effect of cultural sociality 'indexical'? Aren't 
constitutions composed of 'symbols'? Doesn't this mean the effect of a constitution on sociality 
is a symbolic effect? This confuses the means of the effect with the use the effect is being put. 
Symbolic characterizations of how selves-in-society should organize do, obviously, use symbols, 
but the way these symbols link together the psychic order of individuals to the conceptualized 
social order of aggregates of individuals is direct. This is an important point to explicate. 
When we analyzed the emergence of the adaptive, teleodynamic autocell, we noted that a 
crucial feature was a process or structure demonstrating 'multiple supervenience' that allowed 
independent domains to be linked. One particular structure in the autocell was relevant to both 
self-organization and autocatalysis. This enabled two independent processes to be linked 
together in one system demonstrating reciprocal cofacilitation. How the two domains were 
linked, and how the future presence of the autocell was ensured, was a result of the direct, 
physical association of processes contributing complementary functions. It was not the result of 
a conventional code linking the two processes. 122 This justified characterizing it as indexical and 
122 The presence of a conventional code is implied in the first two of Rocha's criteria. Dynamically 
incoherent memory means one domain must not be directly reactive with another domain, and 
construction code means that the non-reactive domain must influence the development of the active 
domain through a consistent representational system which translates the nonreactive domain into the 
active domain. Barbieri makes the argument that the presence of a conventional code linking functions is 
crucial to identifying life from non-life. When Eco suggests that identifying conventional codes is the sine 
qua non of semiosis, Deely responds that this suggestion, though technically incorrect (that would rule 
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not symbolic.123 In a similar manner, the explicit, shared, symbolic conceptualization of social 
forms among language speakers directly links together the psychic worlds of individuals, 
including their identities as interpreting selves, and the organization of relationships between 
individuals in their shared cultural conceptualizations. Through explicit, symbolic 
conceptualizations of selves-in-society, individuals are able to directly link, more or less happily, 
their own selves to the mutually-submitted-to, rule-based, constructed social systems that they 
abide by as participants. 
Consider a hungry man who arrives at a restaurant at 10pm, only to be told that the 
'restaurant is closed.' The patron, who exists to himself not just as a biological individual in 
need of food, but also as a self-in-society, recognizes the authority of the restaurateur to close 
her restaurant according to the sign in the window. The patron may be extremely hungry; the 
closing of the restaurant may not be convenient to him, or even in his best interests. Yet 
because of the shared symbolic order mediating between the patron and the restaurateur, no 
fight breaks out, no food is demanded, no threats made. The system of conventional rules that 
both patron and restaurateur abide by directly mediates between the hungry man as 'self,' and 
the expectations put on relational interactions with others as 'society.' The inequality that some 
people got to eat at the restaurant that night, and the hungry person did not, is brought under 
rules that explicitly determine this is a fair outcome, one that takes precedence over the needs 
of the hungry person. The hungry person himself, though perhaps individually hurt by the 
decision at that moment, recognizes that his life in many other moments is better off because of 
out indexical reference as being semiotic), is a crucially important aspect of symbolic reference. See 
Barbieri (2007); Eco (1979) Deely (2001, Ch. 17). 
123 Recall the reason why we used semiotic categories such as 'indexical' and 'symbolic' to describe the 
autocell is because of the capacity of an autocell to take up alternative functions that might allow the 
autocell to differentially survive in different environments. This means the autocell is adapting to its 
environment, and parts of it are indexing environmental features. 
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such mediating structures- these symbolically expressed rules that connect individuals to 
others. The system connecting self to society in some way makes sense to him. 
Indexical social teleodynamic systems result from the direct, symbolically-communicated 
tie between individual needs and desires, and social organization; words, directly addressing 
both the personal and the social, tie the two together in such a way that many individuals 
express support of the system by abiding by it. The indexical use of symbol systems to arrange 
cultural forms of sociality brings individual narratives of selves directly within larger narratives of 
societies.124 The memory component is demonstrated by the fact that relations between selves-
in-society are not a matter of the pure choice of individuals, but are determined in large part by 
whatever symbolized relations are agreed upon and passed on by the former generation. On 
the other hand, the organization of the system is adaptive in that individuals buy into it or make 
changes to it according to whether or not when implemented, the social system addresses the 
conceptualized needs of individuals living in aggregation under its terms.125 Conceptualized 
needs may include basic biological needs such as those addressed by economic arrangements, 
but also may address needs such as fairness, equality, happiness, and even aesthetic taste. 
124 When an aggregate of individuals is organized by symbolic culture, the informational component 
residing in specialists like story-tellers or institutions like universities or governments controls the patterns 
of human interactions as they are communicated and taken up by individuals. This represents 
simultaneously an indexical teleodynamic cultural version of sociality, and a symbolic teleodynamic 
biological version of sociality, due to the nested hierarchy it represents. That is, a distributed and direct 
cultural determination of sociality is afforded by genetic underdetermination with respect to neural 
development, symbolic reference, and culturally-given social forms. These have their own teleodynamics. 
125 Nonconceptualized needs and desires cannot be addressed by a publicly shared, cultural form of 
sociality. 
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4.3.3.3 'Symbolic' symbolic language effects on sociality -pious man and the religious 
community linked by indirect and encoded principles. 
We have traced the emergence of sociality through two independent domains- the 
biological realm, where genes produce social aggregates, and the supra-biological realm, where 
gene-products (nervous systems; norms of reactions of genotypes) allow varying versions of 
social aggregates to emerge. Of most interest to us are those forms of sociality that depend on 
the teleodynamics of culturally-given sociality, and how those dynamics exhibit iconic, indexical, 
and symbolic organizational forms. 
I want to pause to note that for almost every form of social emergence I've discussed so 
far, there have been claims made that they largely account for 'religious man.' Claims exist that 
religion is largely a product of genes, which bias us to participate in 'charismatic signals' 
supporting group tasks (Bulbulia 2009); that religion is largely the result of evolved tendencies 
for sociality such as what results from rhythmic entrainment (Alcorta and Sosis 2005); that 
religion largely results from the 'spiritualized' sense of the soul, of communitas, that results 
from symbolic reference (Turner 1969); that religion results from the social organism 
demonstrating downward causality on an individual (Durkheim 1995/1915). And claims exist, 
on the other hand, that none of these 'reductionist' accounts of religion capture what is truly 
religious about religion (Deacon and Cashman 2009). 126 Do we have any other choices? 
Precisely the value of an emergent account of sociality that distinguishes between emergent 
forms- supervenient, morphodynamic, and teleodynamic- and further distinguishes between 
the ways reference works in teleodynamic forms- whether iconically, indexically, or 
symbolically- is that it offers us another way to conceptualize religion, more along the lines that 
126 A claim I would support. 
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Durkheim and Rappaport suggested. So let us think through what must be the case, on first 
principles, based on the theoretical work of previous chapters, if a symbolic form of 
teleodynamic, culturally-given sociality exists. 
Most broadly, as a teleodynamic system, a symbolic teleodynamic system would take 
advantage of alternative possibilities for connecting the individual to the social in culture, such 
that the social form would reproduce by exhibiting memory, variation and selection. And as a 
symbolic teleodynamic system, what is peculiar to symbolic reference should be observable in 
such a social system as it exists in culture. But we can get more specific than that. In the 
previous chapter I summarized some principles describing what a symbolic semiotic emergent 
would be in the abstract; I mentioned that Rocha gave three criteria that are useful in that 
regard. I have used them to guide my thought here, and I want to recount them and say a bit 
more about their implications. These will be developed further in following chapters. Rocha's 
first criterion is dynamically incoherent memory, where symbol-tokens do not act directly on the 
organization of the aggregate based on their material/dynamic principles. The causal action of 
symbol-tokens is formal rather than efficient, and found in their relational and informational 
properties. The second criterion is a construction code, from which the encoded semantic 
'content' of information in symbolic representations is decoded to construct dynamic 
configurations; representations encode alternative initial conditions for a dynamical system-
environment coupling. The construction code is an example of an 'interpretant-vehicle.' 
Together, what these imply for a description of a symbolic teleodynamic social group as it 
exists in cultural representation is that whatever represents the conceptual heart of such a 
community, it would not have direct effects on sociality; it would not be seen to be directly 
efficacious in the social world by the force of ideas. It would lack a direct message linking the 
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individual to the social; 'what it would be about' would be a formal rather than efficient cause of 
sociality.127 Given their lack of direct causal efficacy, the concepts linking the individual to the 
social would have to be 'framed' and set apart from normal discourse about selves-in-society.128 
Further, the mental worlds of interpreting selves and the organization of relationships between 
individuals would be linked through a code. Something functioning as a consistent decoding 
device, an interpretant-vehicle, would translate the memory component as it is taken up by 
individuals into entailments for sociality. And when viewed from the perspective of the 
community, the proper functioning of the community would not be for the benefit of the 
individual directly, but for itself. 
The third of Rocha's criterion is self-organization and selection, describing how the material 
structures constructed by symbolic representation exist under the constraints of self-
organization and self-reproduction, and are pragmatically selected in an evolutionary process. 
This criterion identifies the critical role that self-reproduction plays, as well as how feedback 
from the environment plays in culling variant symbol-tokens and their corresponding translated 
results. As Pattee noted, a dynamic system that is conservative and repetitious must also be 
flexible and interactive. The 'environment' for a symbolic teleodynamic social system as it exists 
in culture would not be the physical environment, but rather other cultural and symbolic 
domains occupying the shared public space created by symbolic language. Competition would 
come from alternative conceptualized organizations of sociality- other symbolic teleodynamic 
social emergents, as well as indexical teleodynamic social groups. 
127 If we can consider language, used normally, articulating directly the connection of selves to society, as 
demonstrating 'efficient' causality. 
128 Hofstadter discusses the necessity of framed symbolic content in Hofstadter (1979, 166-170). 
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Rappaport, whose view I will unpack in the next chapter, concurs on the basic outline 
presented here. His thoughts on how a religious community differs from other social 
arrangements, based on the systematic, encoded, adaptive, and self-reproducing relationship of 
the social to the individual, captures the heart of a symbolic teleodynamic social emergent: 
Although liturgical orders129 are important in the regulation of social, political, and 
ecological relations in many societies, they cannot be said to 'reflect' or 'represent' 
those relations in any simple way ... Some liturgies make no reference to existing social 
arrangements or, if they do, they may at the same time signify entities transcending the 
existing social order and values from which the social order has, in fact, fallen away ... 
Liturgical orders in their wholeness do not simply or ultimately represent the social, 
economic, political, or psychic orders prevailing. They represent- which is to say they 
re-present- themselves (Rappaport 1999, 262). 
To Rappaport, then, I will turn, while making due acknowledgement of the views of 
Rappaport's great predecessor and inspiration, Durkheim. 
129 His term for a culturally-given and metaphysically-oriented ritual performative utterance; his views will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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5 The 'emergent' theories of religious communities proposed by Durkheim 
and Rappaport 
In chapter 1, I said Durkheim and Rappaport produced theories of religion that are close to 
the view of a religious community as a 'social cultural symbolic teleodynamic emergent 
system.'130 Both theorists argue that human beings are organized by biological forms of 
symbolic reference (DNA) and by cultural forms of symbolic reference (language). Particularly in 
Rappaport, this consideration leads him to think we might see the logic of biological evolution to 
be present in the emergence of cultural systems like religion. 
And both Durkheim and Rappaport, while working within the assumption that the gods as 
platonic entities do not exist, are concerned that a too facile kind of reductionism when applied 
to religious communities leads to false conclusions about religion. So for both, the question 
becomes, How do we produce a theory of religion rich enough to explain religious practitioner's 
experience of interaction with the gods, without relying on real supernatural entities? For both, 
how concepts of the divine link individual and social processes is a key piece of the puzzle, 
although how they relate those two pieces differs. Rappaport, in addition, adds a critically 
important piece when he describes the entailments of the ritual form when organized around 
symbolic visions of the unseen world. In what follows, I will trace the relationship of concepts of 
the divine, individual experience, and social organization in Durkheim and Rappaport, with an 
eye on how they both suggest yet fail to fully articulate the semantically-closed, symbolic 
teleodynamic form I think is most relevant for characterizing a religious community. 
130 To remind the reader, this compound term can be broken down as follows: 'social' because we are 
describing aggregates of human individuals in determinate relations; 'cultural' as opposed to biological, 
'symbolic' as opposed to iconic or indexical; 'teleodynamic' as opposed to morphodynamic or 
supervenient; and 'emergent' because the system demonstrates robust, multiply-realizable patterns of 
aggregate behavior where relations between parts trump the parts themselves in terms of system 
description and resulting qualities. 
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5.1 Durkheim's emergent definition of a religious community and its failures 
5.1.1 Emergence and internalized cultural sociality 
Durkheim's approach to religion in his opus on the topic, The Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life, simultaneously affirms religion as about something greater than the individual and denies 
that the 'something greater' exists in a 'spiritual' plane. Rather, the something greater is 
society. Durkheim argues that human mental life is a product of society, which is his name for 
the emergent features resulting from sharing a language with others. He argues that society- a 
community of interpretation131 - forms the concepts by which individuals in every society think. 
The 'atom' of public thought, the concept,132 is not the work of individuals in isolation, but "is 
fashioned by a single intellect in which all others meet" (Durkheim 1995/1915, 434-435). It is 
the product of the work of the community, and is common to all. Concepts are representations 
that "correspond to the way in which the special being that is society thinks about the things of 
its own experience" {436). Society's thoughts- what he calls collective representations- "add 
to what our personal experience can teach us all the wisdom and science that the collectivity 
has amassed over centuries" {437). For Durkheim, then, a community of interpreters represents 
a location for 'thought' to occur independent of the individual, as the thoughts individuals from 
every generation contribute to cultural life are sifted and selected from; the most persistent 
content becomes the ground for the next generation's enculturation. This means human 
culture demonstrates a 'top-down' influence on individual thought. Individuals who participate 
in symbolic culture are vessels through which 'society' thinks. We can consider this a 
teleodynamic social effect, exhibiting memory, variation, and selection. 
131 Royce's term, not Durkheim's, but relevant to Durkheim's point. I will continue to use this term as a 
replacement for Durkheim's society, since it captures what I think he is after most effectively. 
132 More specifically, Durkheim means the symbolically represented concept. 
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He argues that individuals and society are mutually cofacilitative- their relationship 
"moves in a circle." The individual gets the best part of himself from society, and "society exists 
and lives only in and through individuals." Note that the 'society' he is describing is not a mere 
physical aggregation of individuals, but rather the shared public space of symbolic culture; it has 
a reality only in its "place in human consciousnesses" (351). If the idea of it is extinguished in 
minds, Durkheim argues, society dies. It is this culturally supported kind of sociality that 'feeds 
the human soul;' biological sociality alone does not recognize, celebrate, engage and transform 
the self. 
For Durkheim, these facts press him to use fairly exalted language concerning the 
ontological status of societies, on analogy with the human person. Societies have an inner life 
and a "collective soul" (267). They are "a sui generis synthesis of individual consciousnesses" 
(426), and are not the result of "communication" between individuals, but rather result when a 
"plurality of individual consciousnesses enter into communion and are fused into a common 
consciousness" (160). Society represents a "subject" that "encompasses every individual 
subject" (443), a "consciousness of consciousnesses," the "highest form of psychic life" (445). A 
new avenue for explaining human mind and experience opens up "as soon as we recognize that 
above the individual there is society, and that society is a system of active forces- not a nominal 
being, and not a creation of the mind." Society is that "supra individual" reality that surpasses 
the individual but exists in and through the individual (447-8). This vision of a 
superconsciousness composed of aggregates of individuals sharing a symbolic world is, for 
Durkheim, what religious people mean by 'God.' For Durkheim, it is a worthy replacement for 
Platonized, spiritual versions of divine beings. 
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5.1.2 Why religion? 
Durkheim argues that normal, profane human thought is so chock-full of society's collective 
representations, they usually go unnoticed (214). Further compounding the difficulty of noticing 
society is that because society's profound effects are emergent (ie relational) effects, they have 
no obvious source. On the other hand, when the effects of society are noticed, they can easily 
be mistaken for something mystical. He writes, 
Because social pressure makes itself felt through mental channels, it was bound to give 
man the idea that outside him there are one or several power, moral yet mighty, to 
which he is subject ... The mythological interpretations would doubtless not have been 
born if man could easily see that those influences upon him come from society. But the 
ordinary observer cannot see where the influence of society comes from ... So long as 
scientific analyses has not yet taught him, man is well aware that he is acted upon but 
not by whom. Thus he had to build out of nothing the idea of those powers with which 
he feels connected (211). 
Durkheim seems to think that gathering together has an additive or multiplicative effect on 
the potency of society's emergent effects; when we gather, the thoughts and feelings society 
possesses strongly present themselves to individual consciousness (209-10, 212, 213). This 
effect accordingly dissipates when individuals disperse, setting us back on the road to animality 
(351). This means that gathering together is necessary to support the emergent social mind. 
And the effects of this gathering can be almost magical. Religious gatherings allow this abstract 
and non-physical active agent- this mind who thinks through them- to be conceptualized, 
albeit in a "transfigured" way, through the sacred elements of religious ritual. But gathering 
together does more than this; it is what actually constitutes and magnifies those effects (212). 
Let us examine these contributions of religion. 
Durkheim describes a religious community as "an aggregate that is united by commonly 
held visions of the sacred world and its relation to the profane, and translate this belief into 
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common practice" (41) The 'sacred world' for Durkheim is composed of metaphorical 
representations of 'society' as it exists as an emergent form of sociality. Thus, at its heart, the 
'sacred' is a representation of the abstract powers of the emergent social organism. To 
substantiate this claim, Durkheim follows anthropologists who studied the social organization 
and religious life of Australian Aborigines. He identifies the totem as that aspect of their culture 
that demonstrates sanctity, and analyzes its meaning for these groups. Durkheim argues that a 
large part of Aboriginal cultural organization is not given by family lineage, but by the fact that 
individuals bear the same name, which is also the name of a material entity. The material entity 
that identifies a clan is its totem. A totem is not just a name, but an emblem, like a coat of arms. 
The totem is the "clan transfigured and imagined in the physical form of the plant or animal that 
serves as totem" (100, 111, 208). For Durkheim, the 'essence' of totem ism is the collective and 
emergent force of the clan's sociality. That force- which is the source of religious belief- is 
conceived of in the form of the totem; the totem brings the collective mind to simultaneous 
collective attention. Thus, the totemic emblem is the visible body of that from which the 
benevolent and powerful actions of sociality seem to emanate (223). 
His attempt to articulate how the emergent qualities of 'society' are constituted through 
the totem is clearly an attempt to argue for a kind of performative utterance. How does he 
argue this? He first notes a mundane use of an emblem: it can "be useful as a rallying point for 
any sort of group" by "expressing the social unit tangibly, [making] the unit itself more tangible 
to all" (231). That is, a group having a mascot is reminded that it is a group by that mascot. But 
this for Durkheim "requires no argument." What he turns our attention to is the performative 
use of the emblem to constitute a special kind of sociality, the kind of sociality that has potent 
collective manifestations: 
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The emblem is not only a convenient method of clarifying the awareness the society has 
of itself; it serves to create -and is a constitutive element of- that awareness ... For the 
communication that is opening up between [individual consciousnesses] to end in a 
communion- that is, in a fusion of all the individual feelings into a common one- the 
signs that express those feelings must come together in one single resultant. The 
appearance of this resultant notifies individuals that they are in unison and brings home 
to them the moral unity. It is by shouting the same cry, saying the same words, and 
performing the same action in regard to the same object that they arrive at and 
experience agreement (231-2). 
Thus, for the Aborigine, the totem doesn't just symbolize a previously-existing sociality, it 
constitutes a particularly potent form of communion and common feeling out of individual 
consciousness and individual feeling. Because this special kind of sociality dissipates if it is not 
actively pursued, it is necessary to gather together in the name of sacred content to reconstitute 
and magnify it (352). 
Durkheim tries hard to capture what this potent kind of sociality produces; he suggests 
among other things it is responsible for the rarefied forms of concepts that make up the 
categories of mind by which we constitute shared public experience (43Sf.). But it is not just 
collective menta/life that emerges in sociality through the focusing effect of the totem. 
Collective mora/life is established when we gather. He writes, 
[Religious forces are] moral powers, since they are made entirely from the impressions 
that moral collectivity as a moral being makes on other moral beings, the individuals. 
Such moral powers do not express the manner in which natural things affect our senses 
but the manner in which the collective consciousness affects individual consciousnesses 
(224). 
He additionally argues the experience of gathering leads to the realization of collective and 
efficacious emotions which exhibit themselves in outlandish forms of behavior, such as intense 
and rhythmic dancing and psychological disassociation (218). These collective emotions-
"collective effervescence"- become associated with the clan's totem, which becomes a sign of 
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those feelings. The totem gets treated as if it was the reality causing those feelings (221-2). So 
besides producing social thought and moral sensitivity, religion produces "the feeling that the 
collectivity inspires in its members," objectified and magnified (230). 
Importantly, Durkheim argues that when people gather, it doesn't matter whether they 
gather to consider transfigured collective ideas, as in the case of religion, or collective ideals 
considered straightforwardly. That is, political gatherings produce the same effects as do 
religious gatherings. He notes: 
In the general enthusiasm of [the French Revolution], things that were by nature purely 
secular were transformed by public opinion into sacred things: Fatherland, Liberty, 
Reason ... we saw society and its fundamental ideas becoming the object of a genuine 
cult directly, and without transfiguration of any kind. All these facts enable us to grasp 
how it is possible for the clan to awaken in its members the idea of forces existing 
outside them, both dominating and supporting them- in sum, religious forces (215-6). 
So with respect to his theory of religion, Durkheim has four ideas on the table. 1) A 
community of interpreters represents a locus for thought that is separable from the individual. 
The downward causality of this locus acting on individual minds is what points us in the direction 
of something superior to the individual. 2) When tokens used to represent the emergent effects 
of the community of interpretation are set apart from normal usage, and when a group gather 
to consider those totems, the community of interpretation is (re)constituted and magnified. 3) 
The experience of this 'consciousness of consciousnesses' produces elevated emotional, moral, 
mental, and behavioral133 content that is shared by everyone involved; this 'collective 
effervescence' is associated with the totem, which acts as a reminder of the experience outside 
of collective gatherings. 4. The fact that societies traditionally maintained themselves by using 
133 Durkheim talks about this behavioral surplus as the exaggerated displays of collective effervescence, as 
well as unexpected and shocking group decisions made during the French Revolution. See Book 2, Ch. 7. 
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'transfigured,' religious sacred content in their gatherings is incidental to the emergent realities 
taking place in such gatherings. Any gathering with a focus on collective social ideals, such as 
those that occurred during the French Revolution, will do. 
5.1.3 The problem with Durkheim's conception of religion 
Durkheim clearly attempts to offer an alternative 'worthy of the gods' in his 
nonsupernatural account of religion, and in that attempt forges an emergent approach to 
religious communities without precedent. He argues for what I have called the Emergencel 
effects of symbolic culture on sociality when he says symbolic culture creates grounds for 
distinguishing public and objective thought from private and subjective thought and experience. 
Durkheim also argues for what I have called indexical Emergence3 effects of symbolic culture on 
sociality when he notes memory, variation and selection can occur independently from genes, in 
the way individual humans are 'enculturated' into the 'wisdom and science that the collectivity 
has amassed.' Finally, he describes societies using exalted phenomenological terms, such as 
'consciousness of consciousnesses.' 
But as I see it, his theory is lacking in two fundamental ways. First, the explanation he 
offers for how a totem serves as a constitutive source of sociality134 doesn't justify the claim that 
a totem is 'constitutive.' A moment's reflection on our previous analysis of Strange Loops will 
134 Recall, "The emblem is not only a convenient method of clarifying the awareness the society has of 
itself; it serves to create -and is a constitutive element of- that awareness ... For the communication that 
is opening up between [individual consciousnesses] to end in a communion -that is, in a fusion of all the 
individual feelings into a common one- the signs that express those feelings must come together in one 
single resultant. The appearance of this resultant notifies individuals that they are in unison and brings 
home to them the moral unity. It is by shouting the same cry, saying the same words, and performing the 
same action in regard to the same object that they arrive at and experience agreement." 
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reveal why.135 A totem is a physical "object" whose "appearance ... notifies individuals that they 
are in unison." That is, the totem is a sign of unity. But how does it create that unity? By 
merely appearing, as he says? If its appearance only plays a notificational role, its signifying 
function is direct and associative, like an emblem or team mascot. That means it doesn't create 
that unity, but is merely associated with a pre-existing unity. At best, it serves a role in 
reminding people that they have a unity. Because in Durkheim's explanation a totem plays a 
role notifying a group that they are in unity, he doesn't see what is actually distinctive about a 
totem in his explanation; he is able to conflate a religious symbol with a political symbol, 
thinking they perform the same task. What is missing in his explanation of the how the totem 
functions is an account of the way the totem plays a 'dual role' in the same manner a 
mathematical string can be both data and instructions to an interpreting mathematician. To be 
constitutive, Durkheim's totem would have to act on two distinct levels of interpretation, 
allowing the totem to be data and instruction, 'looping back on itself' self-referentially, such that 
it could facilitate the creation of something new. I will argue in the next chapter that a religious 
symbol, properly conceived, does precisely this. 
The second fundamental mistake of Durkheim's approach goes straight to the heart of his 
analysis. He doesn't recognize the vast difference it makes if society's emergent effects do not 
deserve the exalted ontological and phenomenological language he offers on its behalf. That is, 
if society is not a consciousness of consciousnesses, a supraindividual subject of active forces 
compelling us to thinks its thoughts and feels its feelings, then his comparison of society to the 
gods falls flat. In that case, there is a profound difference in what the sacred means to people 
135 In defense of Durkheim, consider the difficulty Hofstadter had in identifying a performative with the 
use of the word "I," as he traced the logic of the G IT over the course of two major treatments of the 
subject, Godel, Escher, and Bach, and I am a Strange Loop. 
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when the sacred is about divine beings and ways, as opposed to the emergent social effects of 
sharing a language. If what is set apart as sacred boils down to political, scientific, or moral 
conceptions- as it must if these do not represent the thoughts and feelings of a higher 
ontological being- they will have a very different effect on individual psychic experience than 
will set apart divine beings and ways.136 If Durkheim is wrong on this point, Berger's concerns 
noted in Ch. 1 very much apply to Durkheim's analysis: it misrepresents what is of interest to 
religious communities. 
Durkheim notices, correctly in my view, that both society and religion, in order to facilitate 
the emergent teleodynamic effects they have, must have a memory component, set apart in 
order to determine the social organization of future generations. This memory component 
biases future generations towards the outcomes of selection processes acting on past 
generation's cultural variety. 137 But this does not mean that the memory component represents 
its content in the same way for political and religious groups. As we saw in Ch. 2, representation 
in the form of memory can have iconic, indexical, and symbolic varieties. To note that political 
and religious sacred content might both be exemplifications of memory- a general category- is 
not to say that they function for the group by representing what they represent in the same 
way. Rappaport notices this and does his best to give theoretical articulation to the distinction 
between political and religious sacred content. 
136 Tumarkin (1983) presents a compelling case that the people of Russia, for most of the 201h century, 
were forced to submit to what I can only characterize as a 'forbidden experiment' by those behind the 
Soviet cult of Lenin. She thoroughly characterizes how Lenin's political ideals and person were self-
consciously presented as sacred in the way religious communities present divine beings and ways as 
sacred, with disastrous and sometimes even comic results. 
137 Tomasello (1999) called this a cultural'ratchet effect.' 
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5.2 Rappaport's emergent definition of a religious community and its failures 
Rappaport's final and most important statement on religion, Ritual and Religion in the 
Making of Humanity, takes up primary themes from Durkheim and gives them their most 
powerful articulation. Rappaport advances Durkheim because he sees religion as a result of 
ritual's formal and discursive properties, and not just the result of the collective experiences of 
people in their sociality (Lambek 2001, 248). Further, Rappaport notices the peculiar adaptive 
effects that ritualized divine content has on social organization. 
Rappaport attempts to ground Durkheim's intuitions concerning emergence and religion in 
the systems theory of Gregory Bateson, who has been called the most profound influence over 
the course of Rappaport's work. Bateson's work on adaptation and evolution as an 
informational process infused Rappaport's work after he met him in 1968. Rappaport realized 
the ritual form was stable and consistent enough to suggest human sociality is a kind of system 
that adapts to its surroundings by maintaining culturally important 'reference' values. From the 
1970's on, Rappaport was analyzing ritual from the framework of the 'cybernetics of the sacred' 
(Messer 2001, 6-7). 
Rappaport's cybernetic vision of a religious community is that of a unit "responding 
homeostatically to perturbations by modifying their symbol systems in order to maintain the 
truth value of certain fundamental propositions" (Parmentier 2003, 162).138 The key to this 
homeostatic system is found in ritual. Ritual, by its formal entailments, establishes the 
138 Importantly, what I have glossed as 'religious communities' in this statement is actually "human 
societies" in Parmentier's review. My change represents a better choice of words, I think, in articulating 
Rappaport's perspective on religion, though 'human societies' is truer to what Rappaport says at many 
points. Rappaport often suggests the equivalence of political and religious social organization; I hinted at 
this in Ch.l when I noted that in his theory, religious communities are 'more adaptive' than political 
communities- not necessarily qualitatively 'different.' But he, unlike Durkheim, seems to distinguish 
religion from society in qualitative terms at times. I will analyze Rappaport's position on this a bit at the 
end of this chapter and offer my own version of a religious community in the next chapter. 
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collective acceptance of fundamental postulates such that orderly social life can proceed as if 
there is absolute truth (Paul 2002, 524). In short, ritual'frames' whatever symbolic content is 
contained within it such that the content is taken as authoritative. It establishes what is 'center' 
and what is 'periphery' in cultural systems. Depending on what symbolic content is made 
central, social structures of great longevity and adaptability can result. 
Why is ritual needed to play the role he says it does? Rappaport sees ritual as reducing the 
differences between people caused by the "genetically unbounded human imagination" 
(Rappaport 1999, 321). Symbolic language makes possible conceptions of possibilities outside 
of what is proportioned by channels of sense perception, and outside of our needs and interests 
as biological organisms (Deely 2001, 488). Symbol tokens are manipulable independent of what 
they reference; this provides ways to explore possibilities in imagination. We can live through 
alternative characterizations of reality, not just our direct experience of it. We can inhabit 
worlds of our own creation. Science fiction, fantasy, mythology, metaphysics, utopian 
literatures, political theory, trans-human speculation- all are made possible by language. This 
creativity carries with it, however, the potential for chaos in human social forms, due to the fact 
that very different selection principles are possible for organizing what is most important in 
human experience. Rappaport calls these different ultimate selection principles- ideas of what 
constitutes the beautiful, good, and true- Logoi, or liturgical orders. He argues that they are at 
some levels incommensurate, and thus outside of clear normative judgments. Humans require 
some mechanism to establish logoi and coordinate social forms other than consensus or force. 
That is what ritual provides. When symbolic communication emerged, Rappaport argues, ritual 
was co-opted; it wasn't used to promote interindividual trust and mutuality, as it is in animals 
like baboons, but to validate mutual conventions, making them certain and unquestioned 
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(Watanabe and Smuts 1999, 106). Rappaport writes, "the replacement of genetic determination 
of patterns of behavior by their cultural (verbal) stipulation has conferred an unparalleled 
adaptability upon human kind ... But ... their members are no longer genetically constrained to 
abide by their conventions ... [ritual] is a functional replacement for genetic determination of 
patterns of behavior" (Rappaport 1999, 417-8). 
5.2.1 Hierarchies of meaning suggest hierarchies of ontology 
Characterizing religious communities in terms of their function in promoting sociality is not 
all to Rappaport's story, however. In the background of Rappaport's argument is a particular 
metaphysical vision of how meaning is hierarchically organized in human experience. Rappaport 
argues that symbolic meaning can be arranged in a hierarchy of three categories: meaning is 
found in taxonomies of different, illimitable words targeting differentiable and unique features 
of experience; in metaphors of similar, higher-order, abstract concepts that appear as uniting 
principles in multiple domains of experience; and in experiences of profound, symbolically-
mediated participation in the unity of experience (72).139 Rappaport notices that increases in 
subjectivity itself accompany this differentiable meaningfulness in symbolic engagement with 
the world. The overall argument of his book indicates he thinks these levels of subjectivity are 
the result of organizational features of nature (73; Ch. 13). This indicates Rappaport is working 
from more than a theory of religion; I suggest he has in mind a theory of emergent complexity. 
Rappaport is a theorist of religion working within the framework I have taken in this 
139 Deely, who like Rappaport uses Peirce's categories and metaphysics, approaches the history of thought 
by categorizing meaningful statements into scientific theories, philosophical doctrines, and religious 
dogmas. See Deely (2001, Ch.ll). 
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dissertation. My goal in engaging him is to take the improvements in systems theory that 
Deacon has made over Bateson and apply them to the study of religion. 140 
5.2.2 Rappaport theorizes ritual and culture link sociality and individual 
experience 
From the perspective of an anthropologist, religious communities are a unique form of 
social organization; while avoiding formal definitions of religion in his thesis, Rappaport seems 
to assume two universal aspects of religious communities: 
1. Religious communities foster peculiar and alternative forms of consciousness in 
individual participants that motivates their enthusiastic participation. 
2. Religious communities are organized into adaptive, cybernetic systems that greatly 
extend their persistence across time and people groups, and interface with other 
cultural forms. 
It is Rappaport's thesis that both of these identifying features of a religious community are 
the result of highly abstract, nonmaterial, metaphysical characterizations of the 'really real' 
world made possible by symbol use, when combined with the ritual form. I want to analyze 
Rappaport's take on both metaphysical characterizations of the really real and the ritual form. 
Then I will examine how these together contribute first to alternative forms of consciousness, 
and second to the adaptive, cybernetic form of a religious community. 
5.2.3 'Tokens of transcendence' 
Rappaport argues that a very special kind of symbolic representation is central to the 
psychic life of individuals and the coordination of public sociality that characterizes religious 
communities. At the center of a religious community are what I will call'tokens of 
140 Deacon, like Rappaport, was influenced by Bateson. 
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transcendence' 141 - the abstract and truest first principles that name and describe the real but 
hidden metaphysical world posited to ground the universe of experience. Tokens of 
transcendence define the fundamental character of the cosmos (278); their objects are not 
determinate things here and now, but rather foundational principles that stand outside of time 
and space. Their significata are "spiritual, conceptual, or abstract," and they necessarily require 
symbols to be represented (54). 
5.2.3.1 Ultimate Sacred Postulates 
Rappaport distinguishes Ultimate Sacred Postulates from Dominant Symbols in 
characterizing tokens of transcendence. Ultimate Sacred Postulates (USPs) are statements 
claiming the existence of divine beings or ways. Because these beings and ways are non-
material, "not of this world" (263-5), they create the ground upon which the cosmological 
structure is founded. An example of an Ultimate Sacred Postulate is found in the Taoist 
statement, "The Tao that can be named is not the true Tao." According to this characterization, 
no one can point to the Tao; it is defined by the inability to point to or index it. Because 
unindexed, the content of a USP is unfalsifiable, which Rappaport argues is critical for the 
longevity of religious communities, as well as the peculiar nature of the forms of consciousness 
associated with them. And since they are not material entities, not relatable to the five senses 
of human beings, it is a matter of interpretation that links anything in experience to USPs, and it 
is ongoing acts of reinterpretation that keep USPs central to human experience. Claims 
141 Rappaport uses several different terms to characterize this most central feature of religious 
communities' conceptual life- canonical messages, liturgical orders, logoi, ultimate sacred postulates, 
cosmological axioms, dominant symbols, material metaphors. Some of these are distinguishable from 
others, while some seem to be synonymous terms. I will distinguish the two most important, ultimate 
sacred postulates and dominant symbols, considering the two together to be 'tokens of transcendence', a 
term that characterizes their function for the community. 
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concerning USPs communities make may be revised over the course of time, while the USP 
technically remains the same being or way (427-8). 
Rappaport notes it is possible for some social groups to posit material entities and 
mundane ways of life for their USPs. An example might be the way the person and works of 
Lenin were made the center of the conceptual structure of the former Soviet Union. However, 
he considers these to be "inappropriate" as USPs, for reasons having to do with their limiting 
effects on the adaptability and longevity of such a cybernetic system (280). 
5.2.3.2 Dominant Symbo/s142 
If USPs name and describe what is hidden and immaterial, ultimately beyond the ability of 
humans to discern, how do we know anything about them at all? What connects 'their' world to 
'ours?' The second aspect of tokens of transcendence is critical and paradigmatic exemplars 
taken from the here-and-now world. These Dominant Symbols (DSs) are critical for the role they 
play giving 'traction' to Ultimate Sacred Postulates with respect to human experience, the 
organization of social life, and conceptions of nature. 
Dominant symbols (DSs) are paradigmatic relationships manifest in the social and physical 
world, constituted by a set of oppositions between qualities "in accordance of which the cosmos 
is constructed" (264). They are usually very simple and general; their application is thus 
correspondingly wide (254). Through Dominant Symbols, the meaning flowing from the unseen 
realm of Ultimate Sacred Postulates is transferred to natural things; conversely, natural things 
characterize USPs and interface with them metaphorically through Dominant Symbols. Thus, 
142 Rappaport usually uses the term 'cosmological axioms' to name this element; I have chosen to use 
'Dominant Symbols' because 1) he uses it at times, 2) other theorists of religion have used the term in a 
manner similar to the way Rappaport uses 'cosmological axioms,' and 3) 'Dominant Symbols' calls 
attention to their metaphorical quality better than does 'cosmological axioms,' which (I think, 
misleadingly) draws attention to their discursive quality. 
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divine objects are not completely unknowable, though hidden and immaterial; they can be 
understood to be good, dangerous, all-knowing, personal, just, joy-producing, empty, all-
encompassing, incarnated, etc (282). Their non-materiality means they can only be spoken of 
analogically, however; certain analogies or metaphors taken from this world characterize the 
non-material entities 1behind' this world better than do others. The goal of religious 
communities is to represent and embody these tokens of transcendence in human affairs, 
though they are believed to undergird even nature. Tokens of transcendence represent a 
"fundamental cosmology" (237, 166). 
The oppositional qualities Dominant Symbols embody are resolved and mediated between 
by ritual. Usually, the order, progress, and formal actions of ritual transform the relationships 
among the elements of DSs to effect change in this world (263-5). Rappaport discusses 'rumbim 
planting' among a people group in Indonesia, the Maring. They plant a vegetable called rumbim 
when the divine beings they serve say it is time to end warfare with another tribe. 143 Planting 
rumbim, however, doesn't just indicate what the divine entities say; it effects a spiritual 
transformation from a state of war to a state of peace. The act terminates warfare because 
rumbim-planting invokes metaphorical aspects of the spiritual realities the Maring believe in. 
The action is not directly efficacious; planting a particular plant by itself does not end warfare, 
but in Maring cosmology planting rumbim is a Dominant Symbol that captures something 
profoundly true about the 'really real' world that is behind this material world. Planting rumbim 
resolves tensions in this world by connecting the tension to an unseen realm where that tension 
is resolved. Rumbim planting represents- and maybe constitutes- the fundamental concepts 
143 These divine entities and their messages are accessed through alternative forms of consciousness. 
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of Maring cosmology. It captures the structural, spiritual terms by which the world is governed 
(237). 
Rappaport gives other examples of the connection between Ultimate Sacred Postulates and 
Dominant Symbols. In each case, DSs define what it means to be in proper relationship with the 
non-material USPs. They connect the ideal, nonmaterial world to a material symbol of the ideal 
in a manner which is held to solve the existential problem of human division and address 
meaninglessness in the world. He lists confessing the Shahada in lslam 144, praying the Shema in 
Judaism 145, and smoking sacred pipes in Sioux rituals 146 as connecting USPs to DSs, as well as 
connecting participants in the ritual to the 'tokens of transcendence.' In the Shahada, Allah (the 
USP), the person confessing, and Muhammad's expression of God's will in the Quran (the DS) 
are connected; in the Shema, Yahweh (the USP), the person(s) praying, and a particular tribe's 
history and legal code embodying God's acts and law (the DS) are connected; and in the canon 
of the pipe, Wankan-Tanka (the principle of beauty, harmony, goodness- the USP), the smoker, 
and pipe and tobacco as a microcosm of the universe (the DS) are connected (333, 277-8, 299). 
Without Dominant Symbols, USPs represent nonsense words referring to nothing-- 'Yahweh' 
and 'Wankan-Tanka' by themselves are as meaningful as "Twas brillig and the slithy toves ... " 
{345). With Dominant Symbols, USPs are designated and characterized by their tie to particular 
and paradigmatic relations manifested in social, moral, and natural phenomena (288). 
To summarize the distinction between Ultimate Sacred Postulates and Dominant Symbols 
and how together they represent 'tokens of transcendence,' Dominant Symbols reveal and 
144 A ritual statement that connects Allah to Muhammad -"There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is 
his messenger." 
145 A ritual statement that connects God with the people of Israel- "Hear, 0 Israel: the Lord our God, the 
Lord is one." 
146 A ritual act that connects the great Spirit Wankan-Tanka with the pipe and tobacco smoke. 
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characterize the divine nature or way and its effects, the Ultimate Sacred Postulates name and 
point to the unseen divinity (272-3). During a Catholic Mass a divinity is addressed that can 
neither be seen, heard, touched, smelled, or addressed physically; in the ritual, however, holy 
places, holy sounds, holy music, and holy words and addresses take the place of this absence 
(Murphy 1979, 326). The divinity is named by USPs, the divinity is accessed through DSs. 
5.2.4 The contribution of ritual 
I posited above (p. 179) that Rappaport believes two features contribute to the production 
of a community characterized by an invitation to alternative states of consciousness and an 
adaptive social organization. The first is the symbolic representations I called 'tokens of 
transcendence,' composed of Ultimate Sacred postulate and Dominant Symbols. The second is 
the ritual form itself. What does the ritual form contribute? 
The possible varieties of 'tokens of transcendence' are as unlimited as the human 
imagination, and their number is as many as there are cultures and religious communities. How 
are they taken as being true when the mere fact of their potential variety and multiplicity seems 
to invalidate this? Tokens of transcendence are made unquestionable by their presence in 
ritual, which has formal entailments for individuals who participate in the ritual. Rappaport 
highlights three of these entailments that mere participation in ritual creates. First, the 'atom' 
of ritual is the relationship of the performer to their own performance of invariant sequences of 
acts and utterances which they did not encode themselves. Ritual participants are inherently 
stating their acceptance of the tokens of transcendence by their participation in ritual. As Paul 
notes in his review of Ritual, to perform a ritual is to indicate both to oneself and to others 
acceptance of that order, obligating the performer to the central message of the ritual (Paul 
2002, 524). A performer becomes fused with the very message he or she both transmits and 
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receives through participation in ritual (Rappaport 1999, 283, 405, 118-9). The second way 
ritual makes tokens of transcendence unquestionable and true is what is represented in an 
invariant ritual is indicated to be without alternative, and changeless. Through its invariance, 
ritual declares what is true; it does not question or offer alternatives to what it presents. 147 The 
expression of tokens of transcendence through ritual represents an authoritative command to 
accept as singular what is represented. It offers a meta-message for what it encodes: 11Th is is 
the Word" {286, 345, 166). Rappaport explicitly equates these first two entailments of ritual 
with Austin's 'performative utterances,' but they are performatives of a peculiar type. They are 
what he calls 'metaperformative,' in that they not only bring conventional states of affairs into 
being, as performative utterances do ('the bar is closed'), but they establish the understandings 
defining states of affairs and the character of the cosmos in which those affairs have their place. 
Metaperformativeness implies a ritual community is acting as a demonstration of the authority 
of an unseen world order. To act according to a ritual order is to demonstrate a metaphysical 
entity as a social fact; through performance, the metaperformativeness of ritual demonstrates 
the tokens of transcendence have been taken as true. Ultimate Sacred Postulates are "not 
merely claimed, postulated or advanced, but...constituted by the performativeness intrinsic to 
liturgical orders themselves" (278-9). The truth of tokens of transcendence "is established in 
the mode or manner of their expression." Within human meaning systems, their truth is 
ontological rather than epistemological. 11 lf no one any longer recited the Shema," Rappaport 
writes, II'The Lord Our God the Lord is One' would cease to be a social fact, whatever the 
supernatural case may be" {279; 19, 295). 
147 That is left for homilies. 
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Some may balk at this articulation of the 'truth' of USPs; how can a group create the truth 
of the divine 'by their bootstraps,' as it were? Certainly there is more to the gods, more ways 
that we know the gods, than simply asserting their truth. This complaint leads us to the third 
way Rappaport believes ritual makes tokens of transcendence unquestionable and true. Ritual, 
combined with tokens of transcendence, fosters peculiar and alternative forms of consciousness 
in individual participants that motivates their enthusiastic participation. And this, as I stated 
above, is the first of Rappaport's two defining and universal aspects of religious communities. 148 
5.2.5 How ritual and tokens oftranscendence entail'numinous' experience 
Rappaport argues that ritual facilitates non-rational numinous experience that validates the 
content of ritual (373). How this happens is an unresolved difficulty in Ritual and Religion, in my 
opinion, as Rappaport offers conflicting accounts of how ritual performs this task. In this section 
I will articulate what I think is Rappaport's dominant account, reserving critique of it for my 
summary of Rappaport in this chapter. I will simply note now that he offers hints of an 
alternative account that I believe is more relevant and useful to his cybernetic theory of religion. 
Rappaport writes: 
To perform a liturgical order is to participate in it...and where the ritual is public, it is to 
join with others in this participation. Strong emotions may be engendered and 
consciousness altered in ritual and ... not infrequently there is feeling of 'loss of self'-
that is, loss of the sense of separation- and a feeling of union with the other members 
of the congregation ... To sing or dance in concert or in unison with others ... is, literally, 
to act as part of a larger entity, to participate in it; and as the radical separation of the 
everyday self dissolves in the communitas of participation ... the larger entity becomes 
palpable (403-4). 
148 The other defining and universal aspect of religious communities is an adaptive and cybernetic social 
form, which will be addressed below. 
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Rappaport here suggests the highly coordinated social behavior found in ritual dissolves 
normal consciousness into a kind of shared consciousness wherein the larger entity of the social 
unit becomes dominant in consciousness.149 The self and the other become blurred in 
communitarian ritual. He thinks the 'revelation of hidden oneness' is the core meaning of 
communitarian ritual; highly entrained group behavior is the origin of highest-order meaning, 
arising out of participation (380-1). 
So how does the meaningfulness of communitarian ritual found in highly coordinated 
sociality make tokens of transcendence feel true? By simple association, at least according to 
the dominant account found in Ritual and Religion. Rappaport writes that tokens of 
transcendence "seem to partake" of the meaningfulness and authority of the profound 
experience of ritually-induced communitas. He admits that it is "logically unsound" to draw 
conclusions as to the truth of tokens of transcendence from this association. But since it "does 
not trouble the faithful," it shouldn't trouble us (405). 
So tokens of transcendence get something from their association with ritual- a sense of 
their importance and truthfulness. But do they give back anything? Rappaport writes 
The unguided numinous, numinousness unfocused on Ultimate Sacred Postulates, in 
glorifying experience, sensation, and exultation themselves, not only does not sustain 
communitas [that gave it birth,] it encourages excess narcissism, disengagement, and 
hedonism (404). 
Thus, though ritual causes a kind of numinous experience of social oneness, this can be and 
needs to be channeled and associated with Ultimate Sacred Postulates in order to become more 
than the mere narcissistic pleasure of group communitas. 150 So USPs offer something to the 
149 Also see similar arguments on p. 225-6, 380-1. 
150 Why channeling social communitas through tokens of transcendence should make the experience less 
self-serving is passed over in silence by Rappaport, but I guess it has to do with the fact that something 
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numinous experiences found in ritual. This means that USPs and group numinous experience 
are cofacilitative: numinous experience needs USPs to help groups to get over the narcissism of 
numinous experiences; USPs need experiential confirmation to be established as true. Ultimate 
Sacred Postulates partake of the immediate and undeniable quality of an altered state of 
consciousness found in highly-coordinated sociality, and the group numinous experience gains 
'direction' from USPs in order to be sustained (405, 398). This, then, is the third way that the 
ritual form entails the certainty of associated tokens of transcendence. Ritually-coordinated 
sociality produces altered states of consciousness involving oneness that becomes associated 
with tokens of transcendence, giving them a 'presence' and meaningfulness they otherwise 
would not have. 
So we have outlined how the ritual form combined with tokens of transcendence 
contribute to the peculiar and alternative forms of consciousness that motivates enthusiastic 
participation in religious communities. Now I want to take up how these contribute to the other 
defining aspects of religious communities- their adaptive, cybernetic form. 
5.2.6 How ritual and 'tokens of transcendence' support adaptation and the 
cybernetic form of religious communities 
Ritual gives a form or structure to behavior. In ritual, a pattern of relations between 
individuals is established distinguishable from the individuals themselves; individuals may come 
and go, but the form of the ritual they participate in remains the same. Further, the form of 
ritual is distinct from the content of ritual that ritual establishes as authoritative. Ritual is "the 
performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely 
other than the group- namely, the USP- is considered to be the source of the experience, and thus it 
contributes to group humility. 
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encoded by the performers" (24). Ritual acts as a 'backbone,' a permanent and authoritative 
procedure by which individuals and ideas engage each other in a guided and structured way. 
Ritual behavior is a 'frame' for its contents (26, 31). The ritual form makes such content difficult 
to change; there is a conservative aspect to ritual behavior, the central concepts framed by it 
protected to a large degree. 
Yet for Rappaport, there are varying degrees of 'sanctity'- unchangeableness- associated 
with different 'layers' of the conceptual structure of religious communities, giving them an 
adaptive, cybernetic form. This deserves further articulation. Rappaport, taking a cue from 
systems theory, believes religious communities are organized conceptually according to a 
biological principle of adaptation called 'Romer's Rule.1151 This rule suggests that evolutionary 
changes in components of systems support the persistence of the systems of which they are 
part. According to this rule, there is a hierarchy of responses to perturbations that starts with 
making adjustments among more peripheral elements first, and only affecting more central 
elements as necessary. This preserves some aspects of systems as more enduring and defining 
than others. Romer's rule suggests that the fundamental question to be asked of any 
evolutionary adaptation in a system is, What does it maintain unchanged (413-4)? Rappaport 
writes, 
Properly ordered adaptive systems are hierarchical with respect to specificity of goal or 
purpose ... their goals or purposes form continua running from highly specific in 
specialized subsystems to highly general at more inclusive systemic levels ... the goals of 
specialized subsystems are instrumental, in the service of the fundamental goals of 
adaptive systems as wholes, which is simply to continue to play the existential game 
(424, italics mine). 
151 1 mentioned this briefly in Ch. 3. 
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Thus, the survival of the religious community as such is the central organizational effect of 
its organizational form. Rappaport believes that Ultimate Sacred Postulates are at the 
unchanging center of religious communities, surrounded by 'protective belts' of layers of 
concepts and principles that are more changeable. The first such layer is the Dominant Symbols 
we have discussed; these are general and metaphorical; they rarely change in the course of the 
evolution of religious communities, although they can occasionally be added to or subtracted 
from. At the next layer are things like ritual prescriptions, taboos, commandments- rules for 
living in accordance with USPs as revealed to us through DSs. Even more peripherally are 
sanctified forms of sociality like political agreements, compacts, and rules for economic 
exchange that ultimately rely for their justification on USPs in some manner; and even beyond 
that are sanctified tokens such as vows, pledges, promises, and the like (427). Those in the 
center are unchangeable, general, and important; as we move towards the periphery they 
become more specific, changeable, and pragmatic. For a religious community "to accord a 
higher degree of sanctity to propositions, interests, goals than their specificity warrants is to 
impede flexible response to changing circumstances by narrowing the range of conditions under 
which the system can ... persist" (443). Rituals of religious communities tend to focus on the 
tokens oftranscendence, since ritual framing is what makes tokens of transcendence without 
alternative, true, authoritative, and the source of numinous experience. 
USPs, which are at the center of this organizational form, are nonmaterial, without 
character, and refer to nothing. Recall "the Tao" designates something that if it could be named 
(indexed), would not be the Tao. Rappaport notes that this 'emptiness' of meaningful content 
at the center of a religious community is central to the community's adaptability. "Ultimate 
Sacred Postulates do not in themselves specify particular social or material goals, or the proper 
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means for fulfilling them. Specifying nothing they can apparently sanctify anything" (427-8). 
This emptiness at the center allows a religious community to adapt to change in the larger 
cultural and social environment. This is done through interpretation, since the ongoing religious 
community must interpret USPs through DSs in order to connect them with more temporally 
bound cultural institutions or conventions. Any particular sanctioned connection between the 
divine and institutions and conventions is vulnerable to change, yet USPs themselves are not 
challenged by this process. They can sanctify both conventions and changes to conventions 
(428). To be organized according to Romer's Rule insures religious community longevity in the 
face of alternatives and competition. It provides the necessary formal backbone for an 
otherwise arbitrary carving of experience for a community, and it insures that the community 
can adapt and change to fit into a wide range of environmental conditions. 
This brings us to the last point I want to highlight from Rappaport's cybernetic vision of 
religious communities. What, for Rappaport, is the environment a religious community must 
adapt to? According to Rappaport, the environment a religious community must respond to is 
the actual physical and biological environment with which human social groups must interact to 
wrestle their subsistence. The cybernetic 'feedback loop' that defines a religious community 
includes environmental conditions which switch on and off variable ritually-given courses of 
action. Simple examples include rituals done when harvest is approaching, when a child begins 
to enter puberty, when rain does not come, etc. Prevailing environmental conditions are 
'imported' into the variable rituals that reflect environmental concerns. This means that the 
overall behavior of religious communities is determined both by tokens of transcendence, and 
by environmental conditions given cosmological meaning when considered as signals (266, 273). 
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Rappaport writes, " ... indications of environmental conditions are [triggering] causes ofthe 
purposeful instrumental actions stipulated by the rules for conducting ritual cycles" (274). 
Rappaport notes that because a religious community is, at the end of the day, an adaptive 
cybernetic organism in an environment, it is possible to detail different ways that religious 
communities may fail to be adaptive and 'die.' For example, a persistent ecological crisis that 
ritual is supposed to address and solve may start to challenge individual belief in the efficacy of 
the ritual. This 'crisis of faith' may reveal itself when individuals challenge the way the ritual is 
currently being practiced, or the worthiness of the ritual priests, or by the suggesting that 
higher-order rules are being violated in a way that makes the ritua I fail. Or even, rarely, when 
individuals question the efficacy of the Gods themselves, who might find themselves abandoned 
or replaced by others (429-436). 
Because a ritually-organized religious community can adapt by a hierarchy of more central 
and less central conceptual products, Rappaport notes that even the ideas and divine names 
found in Dominant Symbols and Ultimate Sacred Postulates may not be the oldest component 
of a religious community; the oldest thing may be the lineage of ritual order itself (337). He 
postulates that when viewed from the perspective of 50,000 to 100,000 years of homo sapiens 
history, divine names and how they are characterized have come and gone; yet "despite the 
birth of gods and their banishment, liturgical continuity has remained unbroken from the 
moment when first our ancestors spoke words in ritual" (341). 
5.2.7 How individual experience and adaptive sociality reinforce each other 
Because ritual, for Rappaport, generates numinous experience, and numinous experience 
generates commitment to an adaptive hierarchy of conceptions crowned by USPs, ritual 
coordinates both individual experience and adaptive sociality. The individual finds USPs 
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meaningful, and the social organization founded in ritual is robust, adaptive, and long-lived. 
Rappaport suggests ritual protects the quasi-autonomy of the individual's psychic life and the 
social community's organization at the same time it links them; ritual reduces the disordering 
effects of one realm from affecting the other, while at the same time linking them to facilitate 
an ordered relationship between them. On the one hand ritual protects social processes from 
infection by inimical psychic processes like doubt, ambiguity, and fear, as ritual acceptance 
communicates to oneself and to others that one believes such-and-such. On the other hand, 
ritual protects psychic processes from inimical social process like oppressive material or social 
conditions, as people are "usually willing to put up with much hardship for the sake of God or his 
anointed" (432; 102-3). 
5.2.8 Summary of Rappaport 
Rappaport's fundamental contribution to religious studies is that he offers a theory as to 
how "commitment...to an external, definable, and transcendent authority" (Hunter 1991, 444) is 
an entailment of the ritual form when combined with tokens of transcendence. Because ritual, 
when framing tokens of transcendence, produces a type of performative utterance- what he 
calls a 'metaperformative'- it communicates in a particular way and has a particular kind of 
effect on those who participate in them. This is the core of Rappaport's theory (Robbins 2001, 
594). 
It is instructive to note how Rappaport's conception of ritual complements and even 
completes Geertz's definition of religion, which is: (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) 
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura 
of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (Geertz 1973, 90). The 
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problem Geertz's definition faces is, How does (1) cause (2L (4) and (5)? By themselves, I do not 
believe symbols can do all that he asks them to in this definition. Only in combination with the 
metaperformativeness of ritual can symbols have such effects; it is this combination that gives 
the religious community a systematic and emergent character. Religion is not just a system of 
symbols; nor is it merely ritual behavior. As Lambek notes, language and embodied 
performance combine to make religion (Robbins 2001, 604). According to Rappaport, religious 
communities are ritually-structured metaperformative utterances articulating dominant 
symbols, which compose (3) and entail (2L (4L and (5) of Geertz's definition. Geertz sensed this 
problem in his definition; he suggested in the same chapter he offered it that imbuing sacred 
symbols with persuasive authority is the name of the game. He also said that the ritual 
experience of mass trance allows both the formulation ofworldview and ethos, and the 
authoritative experience confirming that worldview and ethos (Geertz 1973, 112, 118). But 
curiously, ritual is missing from his definition of religion. 
Rappaport puts ritual at the foundation of religion; as Keane has noted, this is a 
characterization that both mystics and modernists might reject. What about belief, morality, or 
alternative experience (Robbins 2001, 603)? I would argue, following Rappaport, that unless 
these are taken up by social forms that are robust, that entail peformativity, that demonstrate 
an adaptive organizational structure, and that reproduce themselves, they are not, in 
themselves, religion. 
5.2.9 Rappaport's confusion 
Now I want to articulate the weaknesses of Rappaport's theory, when viewed from the 
theoretical perspective developed in the second and third chapters of this dissertation. 
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5.2. 9.1 Rappaport's theory does not clearly distinguish between religious and 
political USPs 
Recall that Durkheim explicitly argued there is no distinction between religious and political 
sacred elements; the only thing that matters is that they are set apart and held sacred. 
Rappaport does not want to make this mistake; his argument throughout the book is that there 
is an important distinction to be made between them. The clearest he is on this topic is when 
he describes how an adaptive cybernetic social unit would be most adaptive if there were 
'empty' conceptions at its center, such that these could justify or criticize any possible social 
order. But to say empty USPs are better than political USPs is not to say they function differently 
than these in producing the social forms he describes as religious. For example, when he 
attempts to characterize USPs at the beginning of Ch. 9, he argues, as I paraphrase him, that 'at 
the center of ritual communities are, either explicitly or implicitly, set-apart, highly significant 
sentences. That is how we recognize ritual communities to be religious.' This description is 
vague enough to include atheistic societies that give sanctity to works such as those of Mao, 
Lenin, or Marx. Rappaport acknowledges this; he notes that such societies justify "these 
writings through arguments that seem theological" as well as through ritualized events involving 
these work (i.e. May Day Parades). Yet he characterizes this kind of social organization as 
'idolatrous' (Rappaport 1999, 309). This leaves the reader unsure as to what it is that identifies 
religion- the fact that ritually-based community set apart sacred content, or that they set apart 
non-idolatrous USPs. 
To be a 'better' USP than another is to undersell the real differences between political and 
religious USPs, in my opinion. We get a hint in Rappaport that he acknowledges there is a 
distinction to be made between political and religious USPs based on whether or not they are 
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encoded; the quote I offered at the end of the last chapter (p. 165) speaks of how tokens of 
transcendence do not reflect or represent social, political, economic, or psychic orders in any 
simple way. 152 But he also calls USPs of religious communities "cryptic" and "nonsense," 153 
saying "it is important that no one understand" them (428). I suggest there is an important 
difference between nonsensical USPs and encoded USPs. I argue in the next chapter that a 
much better characterization of the difference between political and religious USPs is based on 
how they function semiotically in organizing the community; there is a distinction to be made 
between the indexical and symbolic use of sacred content. I believe the reason Rappaport 
emphasizes the paradoxical, cryptic, and nonsensical qualities of USPs- and thus their 
'emptiness'- is he is viewing them as non-indexical, rather than as symbolic. I suggest their 
'cryptic' character is due to their being encoded with respect to sociality and normal human 
experience, which they link together. 
5.2. 9.2 His theory doesn't explain religious experience adequately 
Rappaport argues the meaningfulness of USPs comes from their association with ritual 
communitas, ritual oneness, and that there is nothing about Ultimate Sacred Postulates in 
themselves making them efficacious in promoting numinous experience. Though he adds the 
vague claim that numinous experience would be hedonistic without USPs, he contradicts even 
this when he asserts that association with USPs is no guarantee of healthy numinous 
experience; he writes, "the numinousness of the Nuremberg rallies should never be 
forgotten"(404). This seems to suggest that negative political ideology as easily as properly non-
152 And I will make reference in the next chapter to several quotes in earlier works that specifically 
describe the encoded nature of religious content, although these descriptions do not make it into Ritual 
and Religion. 
153 See a fuller list of his adjectives describing USPs on p. 144. 
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material USPs can be experienced numinously as a result of ritual. The content of USPs seems 
to be inconsequential; they 'borrow' meaning from ritual communitas. 154 
In fact, Rappaport, most of the time, argues the meaningfulness of religious experience 
couldn't possibly come from the meaningfulness of USPs, because for him, proper religious USPs 
are defined precisely by their lack of meaning. Rappaport describes Ultimate Sacred Postulates 
as being, besides non-material, not apparent, not manifested in material relations, not logically 
necessary, not empirically verifiable, not conducive to our discursive rational selves, paradoxical, 
meaningless, mysterious, irreducibly cryptic, best accessed by nonsense syllables, socially empty, 
vacuous, incomprehensible, and nonsensical (289, 391, 427-8). Indeed, as discussed, he thinks 
this meaninglessness to be critical to their success at the organization center of an adaptive 
social organism. 
The problem I see with arguing the meaningfulness of USPs comes from their association 
with ritual communitas arises from this fact: the types of experiences seen in religious 
communities do not seem to be the result of generic 'heightened sociality' merely associated 
with Ultimate Sacred Postulates, such as might have been found in Hitler's rallies. Even the 
briefest of forays into anthropological literature concerning religious experience confirms this. 155 
Rappaport himself notes that the ritual of rumbim planting is initiated by the order of 'Smoke 
Woman,' the "intermediary between the living and all other categories of spirits." Shamans 
154 He does add one caveat- if USPs are nonmaterial, they are therefore unfalsifiable; this contributes to 
their acceptance when associated with the real and powerful experience found in ritual. See 404-5. 
155 Consider Clifford Geertz's classic analysis of the Balinese religious trances he witnessed: "Notions of 
who (or 'what') [the two key spirits channeled in Balinese religion are,) are equally diverse and even 
vaguer- but they seem to play only a secondary role in the Balinese' perception of the drama. It is in the 
direct encounter with the two figures in the context of the actual performance that the village comes to 
know them as, so far as he is concerned, genuine realities. They are, then, not representations of 
anything, but presences. And when the villagers go into trance they become ... part of the realm in which 
those presences exist. To ask, as I once did, a man who has been Rangda whether he thinks she is real is 
to leave oneself open to the suspicion of idiocy" (Geertz 1973, 117-8, first two italics mine). 
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communicate with her in all-night seances involving the deep inhaling of native cigars, and she 
communicates to the living the wishes of the dead (237-8). This seems far beyond an 
association of heightened sociality with particular USPs. By Rappaport's argument, the mascot 
of a team associated with the unity of a stadium of fans cheering on its team, the swastika 
associated with the unity of a Nazi party rally, and the cross associated with the unity of 
celebrants of the Roman Mass should equally produce the kinds of experiences Geertz describes 
of the Balinese and Rappaport describes of the Maring. That they don't suggests there is more 
to the story than association of symbols with social effervescence. 156 
But what happens when we note the entailments of the ritual form when attached to 
meaningful Dominant Symbols in combination with USPs, and not just to meaningless USPs?157 
Rappaport, agreeing with Bloch (1974), suggests when the words spoken in ritual are not the 
participants own words, and additionally are authoritative (as they necessarily are to those 
participating in ritual), they imply extraordinary speakers. This implication is made explicit when 
nonmaterial USPs are named within ritual as the 'source' of the authority pronouncing the truth 
of Dominant Symbols. Rappaport writes, "If those participating in a liturgical order take its 
canonical words to be those of God, the recitation of those words established God's existence as 
a social and, more particularly, a metaphysical fact" (Rappaport 1999, 303). When this happens, 
156 I am not saying some individuals are not able, in cheering stadiums or Nazi rallies, to disassociate from 
mundane experience. I am saying two facts strongly militate against this happening in any narratively 
important way, for either the individual or the group. The first is that sporting events and political rallies 
are not supposed to be situations in which disassociation occurs; these events are related to ultimately 
mundane affairs of everyday life. In these settings, individuals aren't expecting anything to trigger 
disassociation. Second, even if someone were to disassociate in such a setting, there would be no social 
expectation or support for such an occurrence. It wouldn't be valued or conserved. I will explain in this 
section and the next chapter why both of these are the case in religious communities, due to the presence 
of tokens of transcendence. 
157 This is ultimately why I propose that 'tokens of transcendence'- the combination of USPs and DSs- is 
the 'unit' of religious community content that best gives Rappaport what he wants. 
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the nature of this divine being or way is established, not just the divine's existence. With the 
addition of Dominant Symbols, the subject of the USP (the Lord, the Tao) is authoritatively 
characterized. Consider, for example, that what is 'announced' in certain Jewish rituals are not 
just USPs such as the Yahweh's name and 'oneness'- 'Here 0 Israel, the Lord our God is One1158 
-but a plethora of Dominant Symbols connected to the USP, such as the Exodus from Egypt, 
establishing the circumstances, reasons, and terms of the Lord's relationship to Israel. From 
these, ritual has meaningful content, which serves as a guide in the way God should be 
experienced. Thus, Rappaport's theory suggests an alternative to simple ritual communitas as 
an explanation for where the meaningfulness of USPs comes from. And this alternative is much 
more promising as an account of real religious experiences like those where 'Smoke Woman' 
and 'Rangda' act as presences to the community. 
Rappaport seems to acknowledge, in the examples he gives, that Dominant Symbols, when 
tied to non-material USPs, are the symbolic heart of religious ritual. In the examples he gives 
taken from the Maring, the USPs have to do with spirits that have no material referent and are 
immutable, and the DSs serve to associate these spirits with elements and relations of the 
material and social world in a set of structural oppositions that apply to both (Rappaport 1999, 
268). Yet Rappaport doesn't seem to recognize that this organizational form- which he makes 
so much of when he talks about adaptive cybernetic religious communities- might also be the 
source of religious experience. Or at least he doesn't do this most ofthe time. He makes 
confusing claims about USPs at times, writing, counter to his more common account, that they 
158 Technically, this statement of Yahweh's 'oneness' includes a Dominant Symbol- unity, as opposed to 
emptiness- but my point is that without other Dominant Symbols linking Yahweh to the people of Israel, 
you would be hard-pressed to know what Yahweh's oneness could possibly mean to the community 
worshipping him. 
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are causal in facilitating numinous experience, such as when he notes "the surpassing 
meaningfulness of religious experience ... emanates from [Ultimate Sacred Postulates;] ... it is 
hidden in their depths" (391). 
To summarize, when USPs and DSs together- tokens of transcendence- are made 
authoritative through ritual performance, they become a picture of the divine will or truth. Who 
or what the divine is is given by USPs; what the divine will or truth 'says' is given by Dominant 
Symbols. These act as an invitation for participants to view the world in a particular way, to 
experience the world in a particular way. It is this alternative view of Rappaport that I think is 
the important one, and that I will follow upon in the next chapter. Ritual metaperformatives 
involving Dominant Symbols as tokens of unseen Ultimate Sacred Postulates clothe 'conceptions 
of a general order of existence with such an aura of factuality they seem uniquely realistic.' 
5.2. 9.3 Rappaport's cybernetic loop confuses meaning with biological adaptability 
Rappaport's cybernetic circuit attempts to tie Ultimate Sacred Postulates and Dominant 
Symbols- a society's most abstract and theoretical cultural products- with humanity's 
biological ground, arguing that the response of the environment to religion's ecological effects 
feeds back into religion to produce adaptive responses at the level of rules, Dominant Symbols, 
and maybe even Ultimate Sacred Postulates. He writes that religious experience itself is 
sensitive to how well the overall religious cybernetic circuit "maintain[s ecological] variables 
defining adaptation in viable ranges" (Rappaport 1971a, 72). 
Gillison (2001), writing in critique of Rappaport, has specifically called into question 
Rappaport's vision of the relation of environmental ecology to the symbolic content of religious 
ritual. She studied the same tribe in New Guinea that Rappaport studied, and says that 
environmental relations and decisions are not ritually regulated, but regulated through 
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discussion, negotiation, and consensus. She argues that Rappaport, because of his theory, 
largely ignores the role of consciousness in Maring decision making. Rappaport, according to 
Gillison, is forced by his cybernetic circuit to believe that for a people to be in touch with nature 
and to understand it, they are required to act together thoughtlessly, as they carry out the 
dictates of ritual in the name of the divine USPs. Rappaport shifted environmental decisions to 
the unconscious realm of religious symbols, and ignored individual consciousness as a deep 
structure in itself, making larger, systematic issues over-dominant in his thinking {297, 292, 299). 
This critique is helpful, in my opinion. Rappaport believes religion represents a cybernetic 
circuit connecting religious symbols to environmental ecology; it represents a culturally-afforded 
adaptation mechanism of human social units to their ecological environment. This position 
suggests that what should motivate religious participation is human respect for the 
environment, as that is what religion is for. Hence, Rappaport suggests that when a community 
is no longer organized with respect to its environment by its religion, as in the case of politically 
and technologically advanced societies, the symbolic components of religion no longer have a 
tie with the cybernetic circuit that makes it adaptive, and it becomes maladaptive and 
pathological (Rappaport 1999, 447-9). 
This seems to me to be a mistake, and the mistake flows from envisioning religion as a 
cybernetic circuit connecting tokens of transcendence to the biological environment, rather a 
cybernetic circuit connecting tokens of transcendence to a cultural environment. This is a 
curious mistake for Rappaport to make, because he so strongly develops the idea that religion 
represents a response to the chaos created by language, not to the chaos of organisms in their 
environment. He has made a strong case throughout Ritual and Religion that the religious 
community is an emergent phenomena, a cybernetic system made up of cultural products and 
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the ritual form, producing new experiences in individuals and unexpected social organization. 
This would suggest that we shouldn't posit a direct ecological and biological reason for religion's 
presence. But he confuses this by arguing religion functions for a biological need- ecological 
self-maintenance. 
I suggest the distinction I was at so much pain to distinguish in the last chapter between the 
sociality of biological individuals and the sociality of language-sharers- a community of 
interpreters- is relevant here. The function of tokens of transcendence in a religious 
community, when structured through the ritual form, has entailments for representations of 
community within a community of language-sharers. This is where its effects are played out. 
Only indirectly do the tokens of transcendence of religious communities affect the physical 
ordered existence of biological individuals in an environment. For participants in ritual, their 
individual and corporate religious identity exists first and foremost in their heads, where the 
conceptualized version of their religious selves must interact with the other versions of their 
selves and the society in which they live, much of which comes from the 'shared public space' of 
wider symbolic culture. Ritually-authorized tokens of transcendence do in fact affect the 
ordered existence of biological individuals, but that is not primarily why they exist or where they 
exist. Thus, an account of the cybernetic circuit of the religious community should account for 
its effects on the cultural environment in which tokens of transcendence share mental space. 
Feedback from culture is where the cybernetic circuit finds its completion. Things like 
secularism, other religions, political identities, aesthetic and moral sub-communities, economic 
identities, utopian speculation, and scientific narratives are the 'environment' of a religious 
community, which is first and foremost a cultural, not physical, entity. Rappaport, while 
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outlining the conditions for the existence of such a religious 'creature,' failed to discern the 
proper boundaries for defining it with respect to biological and cultural constraints. 
5.3 Summary 
We outlined a general theory of 'semiotic emergence' in chapters 2 and 3; we have applied 
emergence theory to the origins of biological and cultural sociality in humans, and suggested 
some 'first principles' for how we might think of a 'symbolic teleodynamic' socio-cultural 
organism, in chapter 4; and we have examined the two thinkers who have produced the most 
complete accounts of religious communities as emergent phenomena in this chapter. I hope 
that it is clear now that up-to-date emergence categories give us theoretical leverage in thinking 
about religious communities. This is true because a) two of the most important thinkers in 
religious studies have thought in along these lines, and b) the theory of emergence I have 
outlined productively allows us to recognize problems in the work of these thinkers. The 
fundamental problem both Durkheim and Rappaport fail to solve is how to properly conceive 
the distinction between a political or economic or even aesthetic social group, organized around 
central and set-apart 'first principles,' and a religious community. Rappaport, in my opinion, has 
come closest to achieving this, arguing that something about the emptiness of USPs is important 
for adaptive longevity of social groups. But as I have argued, his dominant conceptualization of 
how divine symbolic content links the psychic experiences of individuals to the socially adaptive 
form is lacking. I suggest this is due to the fact that he didn't distinguish between the indexical 
and symbolic function of tokens oftranscendence. 
Now it is my task to advance a 'theory of religion' utilizing these categories, with at least 
sidelong glances at the mountains of anthropological and sociological data others in religious 
studies have produced. 
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6 Religious communities as a 'symbolic teleodynamic' socio-cultural 
organism 
In this chapter I will attempt to use the theoretical vehicle of 'symbolic social 
teleodynamics' to recast Rappaport's theory of religious communities. Notice that I have, up to 
now, usually preferred the term 'religious communities' over 'religion' to identify the object of 
my study. Perhaps now the reason why I have done so is clear. As both Durkheim and 
Rappaport testify, an emergent approach to religion suggests the religious community is the 
proper object of study for studying 'religion.' It is to the religious community that the different 
categories of emergent phenomena apply. 'Religion,' on the other hand, is a vague term that 
points to different items associated with religious communities. In this chapter, I will try as 
much as possible to bring theorists of religion other than Durkheim and Rappaport into the 
conversation, to connect the ideas of the theoretical position I develop with more common, 
descriptive accounts of religion. The basic strategy of the argument is that a symbolic 
teleodynamic characterization of religious communities should synthesize into a comprehensive 
system features of religious communities that, on their own, have long been suggested by those 
in the field. 
6.1 Defining 'religion'- the psychic, the social, and a peculiar type of sign 
connecting them 
Csordas (2001), in a critique of Rappaport, notes that Rappaport is missing something like a 
'transducer' to connect the ideal world of meaning, the sacred, and the numinous, and the 
material world of existence (232). I believe this critique points to the lacunae I articulated in 
Rappaport's theory of 'religious experience,' where the meaningfulness of tokens of 
transcendence is a result of ritually-established 'communal oneness,' which individuals associate 
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with the content of religious culture. lfthat is how religious experience works, from the 
perspective of the individual it just so happens that the content of religious culture is arranged 
in a hierarchy of 'center' and 'periphery,' making the religious community an adaptive system. 
Participants in the religious community are not really engaged by the symbolic content; it's as if 
the communal oneness provided by ritual participation overrides any need for meaningfulness 
individuals have, any reasons for embracing the content. How else should we interpret 
Rappaport's comments to the effect that for the individual, what is associated with ritual does 
not matter? True, the adaptive success of a community bound by ritual is better supported by 
nonmaterial USPs, but from the individual's perspective, it doesn't matter whether the content 
of USPs is Nazi ideology, Buddhist theology, or allegiance to a leader like Lenin or Mao. With 
respect to Rappaport's dominant theory of religious experience, Csordas is correct. 
But what if we follow Rappaport's secondary account, where the meaningfulness 
experienced by religious participants is connected to meaningful Dominant Symbols attached to 
Ultimate Sacred Postulates? From this perspective, subjectivity and individual psychic 
experience does matter, and that makes Rappaport's theory- when viewed from the side of the 
individual- concomitant with the descriptive accounts of religion found in religious studies. For 
in this version of Rappaport's theory, metaperformativeness produces interactions with posited 
hidden-but-profoundly-efficacious agencies and ways; participation in a ritual involves the 
communion or communication with authoritative unseen realities. On this read, Rappaport's 
theory, when viewed from the side of the individual, is in agreement with Wallace's influential 
anthropological definition of religion: "a set of rituals, rationalized by myth, which mobilizes 
supernatural powers for the purpose of achieving or preventing transformations in man and 
nature" (Wallace 1966, 107, italics mine). 
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If we follow the secondary interpretation of Rappaport on religious experience, then, ritual 
and tokens of transcendence produce both the adaptive organization of the community, and the 
psychic experience of individuals concerning unseen entities. This view of what religious 
participation produces has company within religious studies. Saler argues that the two main 
lines of definitions for religion from within religious studies are belief in the supernatural, and 
something special about people in their sociability (Saler 2000, ix). Geertz argues that religious 
systems impact both social and personality systems (Geertz 1973, 122). Turner argues the 
importance of religious belief and practices to maintaining and transforming human social and 
psychical structures (Turner 1969, 4). Lex argues that participants in religious ritual are not just 
changing their brain's function [i.e. their subjective psychological experience]; they are exposed 
to acts of others and symbolic meanings [i.e. to the social/cultural forms found in religious 
communities] (Lex 1979, 130). Wikstrom argues that in ritual, the individual's internal 
emotional dynamics and the surrounding religious culture are in interplay. To focus on one 
without the other misses the point. He thinks the interaction between "a socially transmitted 
and given worldview and the individual's emotional needs ... must be at the center of study" 
(Wikstrom 1990, 60, 66). Holloman hypothesizes a relationship between ritual as a group 
phenomenon and the mobilization of peak experiences which induce major shifts in the 
worldviews of individuals (Holloman 1974, 265). 
Following this line of thought, I propose an initial, vague account of what 'religion' is, 159 
which will be tightened throughout this chapter. Religion is an authoritative set of beliefs 
159 Since I have just stated that I want to focus on religious communities, not on religion, why am I using 
that term here? I wish to focus on the dynamics of the interaction of the social and the psychic- the way 
two independent systems are linked through religious content. While a religious community is the proper 
term from the perspective of emergent sociality, I am specifically highlighting more of the psychic aspects. 
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inviting a peculiar approach to individual experience that facilitates a peculiar kind of social 
organization, as well as a peculiar kind of social organization that establishes an authoritative 
set of beliefs inviting a peculiar approach to individual experience. 
6.2 'Where' does the religious community exist? 
I noted in the previous chapter that Rappaport misidentifies the /environment' of a 
religious community. Rappaport ignores the fact that religious communities exist as such in the 
shared symbolic space of religious participants, not as mere aggregates of biological individuals 
in an environment. An anthropologist from Mars, not knowing human language, would be hard-
pressed to distinguish a gathering of religious people from a gathering at a play, a musical event, 
a sporting event, a carnival, a dance club, a classroom, a political rally, or any other non-
utilitarian, non-pragmatic gathering of human beings. This is why /meaning matters' for religion 
-a religious community does not exist as such apart from meanings imputed to the gatherings. 
Paying attention to the difference between aggregates of biological individuals and 
different ways communities of interpreters are represented and constituted is critical to getting 
clear on what a religious community is, and avoiding the mistake I believe Rappaport made. 
Functional, sociological, /external' definitions of religious communities meet phenomenological, 
psychic definitions of private religion in the way concepts differently function within the psyches 
of members of communities of interpreters. The entanglement of public and private can only 
occur within the realm of conceptualizations of the 1Self' as an interpreter within the community 
of interpreters. 
I could use the more correct but awkward term religious community teleodynamics, but religion seems a 
good term to use to capture what I am after here. 
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6.3 How ritual and 'tokens of transcendence' invite a peculiar approach to 
experience and entail a peculiar kind of social organization 
If that which bridges the psychic and the organizational in religion is the way concepts 
function within the psyches of members of communities of interpreters, I need to specifically 
examine how religious concepts function. What is at issue in this section is how the ritualized 
symbolic content of religious communities contributes to the peculiar way participants approach 
experience, and the peculiar kind of social organization facilitated by that approach. 160 
6.3.1 The 'surplus' oftokens of transcendence distinguishes them from normal 
concepts organizing sociality 
If, as I claim, tokens of transcendence are to function as symbols in organizing sociality 
within the individual psyches of religious participants, the processes governing their impact on 
sociality must be formally similar to the processes governing the impact of symbolic language on 
the minds of language speakers. So how does symbolic language work? Symbolic reference, at 
its most basic, works because individual, disconnected indexical references have been 
suppressed so that a system of conventionally constructed symbols maps the systematic 
elements of experience.161 How would we translate this formal process into the domain of 
conceptualized sociality? How, for example, do tokens of transcendence contribute to the 
suppression of indexes, which would seem to mean the suppression of normal 
conceptualizations of social experience? I suggest the way tokens of transcendence are defined 
160 As outlined in the previous chapter, I will follow Rappaport to establish the converse: how a peculiar 
form of social organization establishes the authority of religious beliefs inviting a peculiar approach to 
experience. 
161 This can be seen most clearly in the set of experiments conducted by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh to teach 
chimpanzees to use symbolic language. See reference in fn 93. 
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is one aspect of this suppression, which I will analyze here. I will examine how they are then 
experienced in a later section. 
Rappaport, in an earlier work, says we can distinguish religious rituals from secular rituals 
when we note that the semantic content of a secular ritual is exhausted by the psychological, 
physiological, and social information transmitted by it. 162 The "semantic content of the ritual 
and the semantic content of the messages transmitted between those participating in the ritual 
are coextensive." Religious rituals are different; there, the messages transmitted in the ritual 
and the purposes of the ritual are distinct. That is, a ritual that might function to end warfare 
between the Maring is about pleasing the ancestors. Religious rituals always include an implicit 
or explicit reference to some idea, doctrine, or supernatural entity that has no material referent, 
making the semantic content of the ritual and the semantic content of the social messages 
transmitted between participants in the ritual not coextensive. He concludes "such lack of 
coextensiveness is characteristic, perhaps definitive, of religious rituals" (Rappaport 1971b, 29; 
1971a, 66-67). 
Terms like 'France' and 'Chinese' and 'Led Zeppelin fan' and 'Democratic' have meanings 
that organize the lives of people existing in a shared cultural world by either directly referencing 
a social organization or by referencing how individuals participate in their social organization. 
Swearing to uphold the Constitution in a ceremony authorizing some form of public authority 
means identifying what principles and ideas concerning sociality one will be held accountable to 
uphold. Social ideas do not appeal to additional facts unrelated to social organization, nor do 
they appeal to experience outside of what would be considered pragmatic, utilitarian 
162 Why he doesn't do so in Ritual and Religion is unclear to me; it would have allowed him to distinguish 
between secular and religious ritual better than he does, removing some of the vagueness that I criticized 
in the previous chapter. 
210 
experience for their confirmation. The symbolic content of religious communities is different. It 
both appeals to additional facts unrelated to social organization, and appeals to experiences 
outside of 'normal' experience for its confirmation. 
What accomplishes this is the presence of Ultimate Sacred Postulates within 'tokens of 
transcendence.' These function specifically to create something not there, to point to something 
not present in Dominant Symbols. Consider Durkheim's characterization of totemic religion. 
Totem ism, according to Durkheim, is not a religion of certain animals, or emblems, or persons, 
but rather the religion "of a kind of anonymous and impersonal force that is identifiable in each 
of these beings but identical to none of them." Totems are the tangible form in which an 
intangible substance linking many things is represented in the imagination; that substance or 
energy is the real object of the cult (Durkheim 1995/1915, 191). USPs always reference a 
postulated entity that is related to but different from what points to it. 
Additionally, Ultimate Sacred Postulates are posited as existing in ways impossible for us to 
know through normal experience. They say that the really real world is 'not accessible to 
normal consciousness.' In the language of theology, tokens of transcendence contain immanent 
and transcendent, apophatic and kataphatic elements. 163 Divine beings and ways are 
considered ideal things and not material things; like the mathematician's infinity, the divine is 
pointed at but not known through indexes. These considerations suggest that when tokens of 
transcendence are associated with sociality and other mundane matters that might be touched 
on by Dominant Symbols, they act to suppress the way these are normally conceived in the 
psyches of ritual participants. The deepest, most important elements of ritualized religious 
163 Religious ideas are characterized by both negative theology (divine things are not like this, and not like 
that ... ) and positive theology (divine things are like this, and are like that ... ). 
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pronouncements are not primarily about mundane and material concerns, even when they are 
referencing such concerns. Just as 'infinity' in the denominator of any fraction effectively 
reduces the fraction to zero, no matter how big the numerator is, the 'surplus' of tokens of 
transcendence cast a relativizing shadow over even those affairs of life that most helpfully point 
to them. And this is the case when the ritualized statements under discussion are about 
sociality in some way. For example, a statement about the Jewish people in the Hebrew 
Scriptures can be seen to be about the Christian community within a Christian community 
interpreting scheme. This is because 'God'- the unseen source of the statement- is separable 
from the mundane meaning of the statement, even when the statement is about mundane 
things. God's will- a matter of interpretation- can be seen to take precedence over any 
mundane meaning, and retroactively applied to such mundane meaning. 
Thus, the most important effects of tokens of transcendence are not primarily given by 
what they are mundanely about, but by what they are not about, their surplus. The 'specified 
absence' of an Ultimate Sacred Postulate suppresses the normal relationship between reference 
and what is referenced, and introduces the possibility of a deeper, coded form of reference 
connecting referent and reference. 164 Boddy has argued that religious statements are one step 
removed from normal statements about societies; they are "coded moral and political 
acts ... derived from thinking about one's relationships to others by thinking through the Other" 
(Boddy 1994, 423, italics mine). Geerts notes that what I have called tokens of transcendence 
don't directly refer to community; they provide (quoting Turner), "a set of structures of thought 
and feeling about the relationship between the living" and the supernatural realm (Turner 
164 What the code is will be discussed in section 6.3.3, "The peculiar effect of ritualized tokens of 
transcendence on the psyche," p. 216. 
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1974a, 6; Geerts 1990, 22). And Gardner notes participants in rituals are not looking to directly 
produce conventional states of affairs with respect to sociality, but to influence supernatural 
beings (Gardner 1983, 347-50). 
In summary, the way religious content is conceived is a key reason why religious content 
suppresses social references, pragmatically conceived. Its surplus with respect to the sensible 
that characterizes it means religious content, when made authoritative through ritual, 
references hidden but real entities and ways, whose concerns and doings and implications are 
from a different realm than mundane and pragmatic affairs, and whose entailments for those 
affairs are indirect, requiring interpretation. 
6.3.2 Tokens of transcendence point to mythic resolutions ofunresolvable tensions 
of human existence 
If Ultimate Sacred Postulates cannot be directly experienced, by definition, why go to the 
trouble of building communities around them, apart from pleasure of pure play? What does 
religious content potentially offer to human individuals and social groups? Following the lead of 
certain anthropologists, I believe religious content offers space- a location- in which 
ineliminable conflicts in human experience can be placed and 'mystically' resolved, and which 
can then be appropriated by communities of interpreters to ease existential pain and social 
strife. Religious content offers therapeutic existential truth to be appropriated by communities 
of interpreters. Tokens of transcendence, recall, are made up of two components- nonmaterial 
Ultimate Sacred Postulates, and Dominant Symbols. Together, these two offer a 'map' of the 
unseen world. They represent key places where what is not sensible- the divine- might 
become known through the sensible, where it can interact with human experience in 
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meaningful ways. The symbolic content of religious communities points to accessible locations 
where the transcendent can be appropriated for existentially meaningful reasons. 
This function of the symbolic content of religion is not a theoretical requirement; one can 
imagine (and perhaps point to) religious communities that harbor nontherapeutic symbolic 
content, harmful to individual and group flourishing. It is, however, suggested by several 
anthropologists who study religious content that it represents places where the transcendent 
solves irreconcilable human dilemmas. On this read, the therapeutic function of Dominant 
Symbols may represent adaptations of religious community teleodynamics, contributing to the 
community's survival. The perception that religious communities have resources to contribute 
to individual and social well-being would certainly represent one way that individuals would find 
religious community participation helpful. 
How do tokens of transcendence do the work of healing existential conflicts and dilemmas? 
Dominant Symbols are portrayed as ends in themselves, representative of the axiomatic values 
of society (Boudewijnse 1990, 6). According to Rappaport, they are characterized as being 
about the union of different ideas, and may push consciousness towards metaphor and gestalt 
thinking. They may reunite psychic, social, natural, and cosmic processes which life tends to pull 
apart (Rappaport 1999, 256-8, 262). Geertz, Turner, and Bloch each make this reunification of 
ineliminable conflicts the central feature in their definitions of the content of religious 
communities. Geertz, for example, tells a story from Bali exemplifying how sacred symbols 
unite the incoherent. In Bali, religious plays involve puppets as characters embodying different 
Balinese virtues that cannot coexist simultaneously, such as compassion, the single-minded will 
to action, and justice. The dilemmas the plays set up are resolved with mystical insight, coming 
from a realm in which ineliminable conflicts are posited as being in harmony. The divine offers 
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"a genuine comprehension of the realities of the human situation, a true perception of the 
ultimate rasa,"165 and with it "comes the ability to combine ... compassion, ... will to action, 
and ... justice" (Geertz 1973, 139). 
Turner notes that in Ndembu ritual, religious rituals use symbols that portray the "mystical 
unity of opposites" (Turner 1969, 63). In Ndembu Dominant Symbols, 
The unity of [the competition between major principles] is that of a tensed unity or 
Gestalt, whose tension is constituted by ineradicable forces or realities, implacably 
opposed, and whose nature as a unity is constituted and bounded by the very forces 
that contend within it. If these mutually involved irrepressibles belong together in a 
human being or a social group, they can also constitute strong unities, the more so if 
both principles or protagonists in the conflict are consciously recognized and accepted 
(83). 
He argues that the triangle shows up in their rituals because it represents the cosmic and 
social order in harmony, wherein "all empirical contradictions are mystically resolved." Both the 
transcendent cosmic order and the society practicing ritual are seen as a homogenous, 
unstructured unity that transcends its differentiations and contradictions. "Every opposition is 
overcome or transcended in a recovered unity, a unity that, moreover, is reinforced by the very 
potencies that endanger it. These rites are a means of putting at the service of the social order 
the very forces of disorder that inhere in man's mammalian constitution" (84-5, 92-3). 
Bloch suggests multivocalic Dominant Symbols are useful because they collapse oppositions 
- discontinuities within larger continuities- that need a solution. These oppositions are 
reflected and overcome in ritual symbols (Bloch 1992, 66). 
Since tokens of transcendence picture a set apart, ideal place where real human dilemmas 
can be posited as resolved, religious communities become the place where therapeutic truth-
165 Harmonious unification. 
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both individually and corporately- can be potentially mediated. Discursive thought cannot 
resolve the dilemmas, since they are dilemmas of discursive thought. That makes posited non-
discursive, mystical resolution an important aspect of human religious symbolism. Discursive 
ambiguity, Murphy notes, is an essential part of the union of oppositional dyads (Murphy 1979, 
319). 
6.3.3 The peculiar effect of ritualized tokens of transcendence on the psyche 
At the beginning of this chapter, I proposed a rough-and-ready definition of religion: 'an 
authoritative set of beliefs inviting a peculiar approach to individual experience that facilitates a 
peculiar kind of social organization, as well as a peculiar kind of social organization that 
establishes an authoritative set of beliefs inviting a peculiar approach to individual experience.' 
Then, I suggested that if religious communities are symbolic teleodynamic systems, the sociality 
produced would result from the active suppression of normal social representations. I described 
how tokens of transcendence have 'surplus' with respect to mundane reality and social life, and 
I suggested that when combined with ritual, the authority and truth of the surplus of tokens of 
transcendence is established, creating a 'specified absence' for the resolution of ineliminable 
conflicts in human affairs. Now, I want to look more deeply at the claim that religious 
community participation involves a peculiar way of approaching experience, linked to the 
suppression of normal experiences of sociality. As opposed to the way tokens of transcendence 
are defined, which I addressed in the section on their 'surplus,' I am now turning to the way they 
are experienced. 
Durkheim notes religious ritual has an effect suppressing normal experience and an effect 
inviting peculiar experience. He discusses this in terms of negative and positive cult. The 
negative cult is those aspects of religious ritual and belief that says 'flee the profane world;' the 
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positive cult says 'here is what you draw near to.' Ritual practices organize both the negative 
and positive aspects of experience necessary to have "bilateral relations" with religious forces 
(Durkheim 1995/1915, 330). He characterizes the 'negative cult' as a series of abstinences 
regarding normal experience; certain religious practices move normal biological and cultural 
activity away from the norm in some way. Disinterestedness in the normal way of everyday life 
unexpectedly exerts a positive influence on the religious life; by sacrificing some of our profane 
interests we "create for [the gods] the place in life ... which they are entitled" {320). For 
Durkheim, suppression of the 'profane' is a precondition to accessing the positive sacred (317, 
313).166 
In light of the metaperformative nature of religious truth Rappaport discusses, we can go 
beyond Durkheim's insights concerning suppression and note that when nonmaterial Ultimate 
Sacred Postulates such as the Tao or the Lord are authoritatively established as Truth for the 
ritually-organized community, they invite a curious inference. Since they are nonmaterial, and 
yet considered to be True, normal, biologically-given, mundane kinds experience cannot possibly 
be effective in grasping them. The very definition of such beings and ways is that they are 
beyond normal experience. While Dominant Symbols suggest ways they may be approached, 
drawing on normal experience, the Ultimate Sacred Postulates themselves suggest the divine 
can never be arrived at by such an approach. If they are to be experienced at all, normal 
experience must be suppressed, opening up the door for alternative forms of experience to be 
expressed through engagement with Dominant Symbols. 
166 It is important to understand that the term 'suppression' when used concerning normal biologically-
given activity can mean 'overindulgence' as much as asceticism. What is important is that normal forms 
of the activity are suppressed, not that the activity as such is suppressed. 
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When Dominant Symbols are authoritatively established as Truth for the ritually-organized 
community, they invite the inference that the unity of oppositions they embody is the way 
alternative experience should be structured and that this unity should be existentially 
appropriated and experienced by ritual participants. That is, if for Christians 'mercy and justice 
meet at the Cross of Jesus,' then simultaneous experiences of profound guilt and profound 
forgiveness are invited, while normal experience is suppressed through Christian ritual 
participation. Authoritative Dominant Symbols invite the parsing of alternative experience in 
the terms of the oppositions they symbolize. The experienced resolution of such oppositions 
will in turn serve as demonstration ofthe action of the really real, nonmaterial Ultimate Sacred 
Postulates. 
Ritualized tokens of transcendence invite the normal self to give up control, subverting 
normal experience and sociality. Ritualized behaviors more generally- without the unique 
symbolic content of religious ritual- will not produce the suppression of paramount reality and 
the alternative forms of conscious experience that are cultivated in religious ritual. This psychic 
entailment of ritualized tokens of transcendence is precisely what Csordas said Rappaport 
needed (above, p. 204)- a 'transducer' that connects his systems theory approach to religious 
sociality with the mental world of religious participants. 
6.3.3.1 Neuroscientific accounts of religious ritual 
Recent approaches by some neuroscientists to the study of religious experience points to 
the idea that suppression of normal experience and the invitation to symbolically-guided 
extraordinary experience is central to religious experience. Early neuroscientific approaches to 
religious experience, such as those proposed by Lex, and d' Aquili and Laughlin, while somewhat 
primitive due to the limited technology of neuroscientific investigation at the time, broadly 
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suggest that through religious ritual normally unlinked neurological systems are linked together, 
providing the grounds for extraordinary experiences as existentially meaningful human 
situations and dilemmas are considered. Lex, for example, considers the neurophysiological 
process of 'abreaction,' where individuals "reexpereince, under controlled conditions, intense 
emotional responses to stress-provoking stimuli, permitting discharge of affect with 
accompanying physiological readjustments" (Lex 1979, 142). She suggests that religious 
conversions and ritual trance are versions of this process, where, to use an example I mentioned 
above, through religious ritual the 'Cross of Jesus' could be experienced as a solution for 
unresolved guilt and shame- a healing abreaction. d' Aquili and Laughlin suggest that the 
ritually-produced simultaneous activation of both discursive and gestalt thought-producing 
brain areas (right and left brain), at the same time a myth structure highlighting opposites in 
tension is in mind, would produce the experience of their union. Through ritual, logical 
paradoxes and the awareness of polar opposites could appear simultaneously as antinomies and 
as logical wholes. This would be accompanied by the experience of orgasm-like affect as both 
brain sides fire simultaneously (d'Aquili and Laughlin 1979, 175-6). Both of these approaches 
highlight the specific manipulation of normal experience through symbolic content and ritual 
activity such that extraordinary experience is tied to the resolution of existentially meaningful 
dilemmas. 
Wildman, in a recent account of scientific investigation into religious experience, has 
argued that 'ultimacy experiences'- intensely meaningful experiences, whether content-empty 
(apophatic) or content-full (kataphatic)- have potent functional effects on self-understanding 
and behavior (Wildman 2011, 87). He suggests that neuroscientist Patrick McNamara's (2009) 
concept of decentering is an important key to understanding how religious experience involves 
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self-suppression and meaningfulness. I want to look at McNamara's theory here, since it both 
represents a state-of-the-art neuroscientific approach to the peculiar kind of experiences we call 
religious, and correlates well with the entailments of religious community participation as I am 
envisioning them. 
6.3.3.1.1 McNamara's neuroscientific account of religious experience 
6.3.3.1.1.1 The self 
McNamara argues the self- a symbolically-facilitated, neurological achievement- is the 
critical starting point for understanding the profound role and effects of religious experience. 
He notes that the brain systems crucial to a sense of self are precisely those that are implicated 
in religious experiences. Thus, religious experience may be responsible for developing or 
revising the sense of self. What does McNamara mean by a 'self?' He notes that human beings 
are capable of being strategic in pursuing their interests, and thus a self is the 'selecting' self 
that makes strategic behaviors possible. To have agency means having a sense of being the 
cause of some action, and of choosing between alternatives (xi, 28, 27). This sense of being the 
cause of some action and of choosing between alternatives is due to a representational complex 
in working memory, which becomes more complex and unified by obtaining control of a greater 
range of cognitive systems. The underlying brain structures for these abilities are the anterior 
temporal and prefrontal cortex. These brain regions send inhibitory efferents to a wide range of 
brains structures; damage to these regions leads to disinhibition, not a loss of function. This 
indicates these brain regions play a regulatory, suppressing role, and the sense of self they 
underpin is tied to this experience (45, 60, 62). 
McNamara notes that the 'executive self' he is describing is not just a passive awareness of 
Self, as has been noted to exist in dolphins and chimpanzees. The fronto-temporal region 
--
-->---~ 
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mediates what we consider to be the 'distinctively human.' He suggests that this may have 
evolved with the help of voluntary ritual (such as the baboon greeting rituals I discussed in a 
previous chapter). Later, the development of language provided the possibility of the "I," a 
conceptualized and symbolized self, as well as grammatical resources which facilitated a 
narrativized picture of the self. This fronto-temporal, language-facilitated narrativized Self has 
gained powerful inhibitory and regulatory roles over individual human behavior (141, 256). 
6.3.3.1.1.2 The divided self 
McNamara notes, however, that a completely unified, completely competent sense of self 
is not the reality of human experience. Different diseases such as multiple personality disorder 
(MPD), schizophrenia, and epilepsy have suggested that there may be several minds or 
subpersonalities within a single person. Following Haig (2006), he argues that in normal 
individuals, there exist many internal'agents' that differ over ultimate behavioral goals, 
reflecting different sets of strategic interests. This conflict, rooted in genetics, is reflected in 
consciousness (196, 34). 
Thus, a centralized executive self has the task of inhibiting desires and goals that are 
inconsistent with a single unified consciousness and unified set of goals, but it does not possess 
enough agency to bind and own all the intentional states associated with the brain. It usually 
does so well enough to prevent MPD, but not well enough to prevent angst and a sense of 
personal failure and suffering. McNamara suggests that the problem of the divided self, as it 
appears to us in self-consciousness, seems to be the fundamental problem religious 
communities prescribe solutions for. Religious communities trade on the fact that a centralized 
executive self can be developed, like a muscle (McNamara 2009, 30, 78-9, 22). 
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6.3.3.1.1.3 Transformation of the divided self via religion 
McNamara notes there is overlap in the neuroanatomy of the self and the neuroanatomy 
of religious experience. This overlap may be functional; religious experience may facilitate 
something the self needs. He believes religious practices function to facilitate transformation 
and growth of the Self, enhancing prefrontal executive functions and creating a sense of a 
unified self, an ideal self with a strong sense of agency and will. Even Buddhism, he suggests, 
which asserts that Mind and Self are illusory, devotes enormous amounts of energies to 
practices that extinguish the desires they believe define the self. If it is illusory, it is a powerful 
illusion (146, 147). I believe McNamara is right in his basic thrust here, though wrong in how he 
articulates it. I don't think it fits the data to suggest the ,function' of religion is to create a sense 
of a unified self with a strong sense of agency and will; his difficulty with the Buddhist example 
should be noted. Better stated, however, I think what he suggests is correct: religious 
communities cultivate disciplined ways to transform and subsume the self to a 'true' view of the 
self (whether as Self or non-self). How does this happen? 
The sense of self is malleable; the study of multiple personality disorders demonstrate 
personality states are related to brain processing abilities; the brain can and will reorganize to 
accommodate multiple personalities. Right prefrontal and temporal circuits are implicated in 
initiating and handling brain state/personality change. To change to a different ,self,' humans 
edit biographical memories to organize the narrativized sense of self defining them. Language is 
central to this task. An individual's self-model determines which memories and episodes will be 
considered autobiographical, which will be used to determine the 'facts' of the self (76, 255). 
Religious narratives and practices offer interpretations and models about what is possible 
for the self. The highest global standard for a self is the divine being or 'way' towards which the 
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religious ritual is oriented, and the practices of the religion serve to encourage the taking up of 
that global standard; participants in religious services "often actively attempt to take on the 
identity of the God -to become 'spirit possessed."' Private religious practices and participation 
in public rituals promote continuous transformation of the self towards these ideals. These 
narratives and practices integrate material about conflict concerning the present self into a 
resolution of that conflict in a higher, more complete self, which is experienced as a relatively 
conflict-free unified self (24-6, 148). McNamara writes, the "religiously inspired 'possible Self' 
therefore has the capacity to integrate some very fundamental internal conflicts" (53). 
6.3.3.1.1.4 Decentering 
The key element of this transformation of the self is decentering. Decentering involves a 
transient relaxation of central control that leads ultimately to greater self-control. It puts the 
individual in a receptive and integrative mode, and provides the protective cognitive scaffolding 
necessary to promote integration of cognitive and emotional content so as to put that content 
into service of a newly developing self. The self is transformed (5). Wildman agrees with 
McNamara that the neurological elements of self-constructs and the process of decentering are 
compellingly tied to the brain regions important in many types of religious experiences 
(Wildman 2011, 88). 
According to McNamara, decentering occurs in four stages: some impasse occurs in the 
experience of the present self because of conflict or conflicting desires. 167 It could be a defeat-or 
a discrepancy in self-concept and reality. Following this sense of failure of self, a suspension of 
agency, which might be facilitated by religious practices such as fasting, asceticism, ritual 
167 These may be the ineliminable conflicts of human existence that seem to be the theme of Dominant 
Symbols. McNamara thinks religious symbols constrain the search space to entertain only the "deepest 
solutions to the conflict." See p. 53. 
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performance, or drug ingestion, decouples the current self from control over executive 
resources. The current self is placed in a "suppositional logical space." Next, potential 
alternative selves are searched until a solution to the problem is discovered. These can come 
from a stock of existing identities, narratives of others, mythology, history, fiction, or dreams. In 
a religious context, the ideal self can be a deity or other supernatural agent, which makes 
religious ritual particularly effective in invoking the distinction between the self and the divine 
entity or way, highlighting failure of the self. Finally, the old self is integrated into the new 
identity of Self via "narrative devices/logic" (McNamara 2009, 49-52). 
Importantly, decentering does not occur in working memory; it is not merely 'trying on a 
new self.' It can be a conscious experience, but it is not something initiated by the actor; rather, 
it is what happens when the current self is suppressed in some way, and guidelines for 
alternative selves are ready at hand to be taken up. McNamara explains, "In a religiously 
constrained decentering search process, the old Self suffers a defeat or is temporarily inhibited 
via a ritual or ascetical process ... During the religious practice or ritual, a supernatural agent is 
held up to ... take the place of the old Self" (52; 45). The suppressed, original self is 'decentered' 
and a new, ideal experience of selfhood replaces it. 
McNamara offers empirical support from two directions for this account of religious 
decentering. From the side of religious narratives, McNamara follows Propp (1968) in noting 
recurrent motifs in human myths. In most myths, a hero suffers a defeat or challenge, and must 
suffer exile to address it. On the journey he meets some magical being that puts him to the test, 
and when he passes it, he receives some magic gift. Now he meets his adversary or challenge 
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strengthened, and triumphs. Then he comes home, no longer recognized by his friends (51). 168 
McNamara argues the phenomenology of religious experience also supports a theory of 
religious decentering. The initiating event in religious experience appears to be a reduction of 
intentionality or volitional control. What follows is enhanced imagery and negative affect, 
followed by internal dialog and inward attention, followed by relaxed volition and positive 
affect. Finally, alteration in awareness and perception occurs. McNamara thinks this order 
suggests his theory of decentering: the enhancement of internal dialog, as well as alteration in 
awareness, is correlated with the displacement of self to a suppositional space and search for 
the ideal self. And the integration of self with the new corresponds to positive affect (151). 
6.3.3.1.1.5 How religion facilitates decentering 
What triggers decentering? According to McNamara, decentering always begins as an ego 
defeat- the ego is exposed as incompetent or small in the face of internal crises, external 
circumstances, or posited divine beings and ways. But religious communities have produced 
many techniques to support decentering. Here I will list some of them. 
Intentional religious practices such as those that obtain in initiation rites, prayer, 
meditation, reading scripture, listening to sacred music, etc. may prime the religion 
circuit to make decentering more likely. This is possible because beliefs, emotions, 
cognitions and cognitive practices influence neurochemical activity, which is crucial to 
changing brain states (187, 137). 
Religious narratives, which are taken as truly representing the unseen realm, often 
involve divinely ordained setbacks and defeats, which can reduce agency and trigger 
decentering in those who take such narratives seriously (211). 
168 This is almost identical to Joseph Campbell's summary of the mythological structure of world religions: 
"A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous 
forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious 
adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man." See Campbell {1968, 30). 
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Religious language has peculiar characteristics, and these features shift the source and 
control of speech away from the individual and to the putative superior agent. 169 In 
ritual acts involving religious language, the individual sets aside his own identity to 
participate in the identity of the speaker whose voice is characterized through the 
language. Thus, religious language marks the onset of decentering and may facilitate it 
as well. Self-consciousness is reduced so the spirit can speak, and the fusion of the old 
identity with the new is facilitated (207-208). 
He notes the decentering involved in performative ritual acts, following Rappaport. To 
participate in acts not formulated by one's self is to suspend identity, volitional control, 
and intentional states. Once decentering is triggered, the ritual takes over control of the 
individual, the individual putting themselves in the hands of the ritual. Ritual 
constitutes a safe holding place for individual identity. Later, that identity is 
transfigured and 'handed back' to the individual (208ff, 219-220). 
The authoritative content of ritual may trigger decentering, as these messages, as an 
entailment of the ritual form, represent authoritative messages from the divine. 
Individuals, through their participation in ritual, are encouraged to identify with the 
messages and internalize them. The sense of individual self is reduced and the sense of 
the divine is made large as the divine speaks and teaches through ritual. In ecstatic 
settings, the individual is invited to embody the deity; in less ecstatic settings, to bond 
with the deity. "In both cases the decentering process ends with the elevation or 
transfiguration of the Self via the acquisition of divine qualities" (220). 
Masks and religious dramas appear to facilitate decentering. Masks and participation in 
religious dramas make it easier to access alternative identities. Adopting the mask of a 
god means suppressing your own identity and acquiring a supernatural identity. Strong 
forms of this decentering such as those that obtain in religious possession, is a broad 
cultural phenomena; 74% of all cultures evidence possession beliefs. Possession, as 
with all decentering, should be considered a by-product of the way the brain constructs 
identity (170-1, 174). 
He asks rhetorically whether sacrificial blood, the presence of which is accompanied by 
some discomfort, triggers decentering (223). I would suggest it does, as it involves the 
intentional killing of an animal, which is inherently uncomfortable and intense, as well 
as the sacrifice of wealth, for the sake of invisible entities and paths. Any religious act 
that, in Rappaport's words, is 'intense,' becomes an index of how 'real' the posited 
entity is believed to be that asks or demands individuals give up comfort or value on 
169 McNamara references Dubois (1986) on this topic. 
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their behalf. Intense symbolic acts invite sobriety and seriousness, suggesting unseen 
USPs are so important that they have earned the right to such behaviors from humans. 
This can trigger decentering. A similar result can be seen in the effects on others of acts 
of martyrdom, which point to the importance of the unseen reality in the name of which 
the martyrdom was performed. 
I would add that attitudes and behaviors expressing worship trigger decentering, as the 
content focuses attention on the postulated non immanent entity for which the 
community has gathered. Wildman has argued that religious musical worship is really a 
'front' for manipulating psycho-social triggers found in corporate participation in 
rhythmic movement (Wildman 2011, 232), but I would suggest that the opposite is 
possible as well: religious communities may use all sorts of psycho-social triggers to get 
people into the situations (like musical worship of divine beings and paths) that cause 
decentering and the authentic experience of the higher selves latent in religious 
community participation. 
All of these triggers of decentering are made possible by symbolic reference and 
communication, wherein the self being decentered is a narratively-based, symbolically realized 
self, as is the self being taken up. The possible, the subjunctive, the ideal, the past as well as the 
future play a role in defining 'who' the self is, and who it will become. 
6.3.3.1.2 Several comments on McNamara's approach 
I want to make two comments concerning McNamara's approach, and my appropriation of 
it. The first I hope will widen the scope of application of his theory to realms outside of 
'anomalous' experiences. Properly speaking, decentering does not occur in working memory, 
nor is it something initiated by the actor; this would suggest that decentering can only happen in 
experiences like spirit possession, being 'born-again,' or momentous experiences of nirvana or 
sunyata. A moment of transformation is highlighted, one discontinuous with the previous 
history of the individual. But this does not seem to be the only way that transformative religious 
experience can be appropriated. Wildman (2011) and Wildman and Brothers (1999) have 
helpfully distinguished between discrete and extended religious experiences defined by 
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subjective judgments of ultimate significance. Discrete experiences tend to overlap with those 
that are judged as being anomalous with normal experience, while extended experiences tend 
to be "dynamic, socially embedded processes of orientation and control in relation to the 
cosmos, the social world, and one's self" and/or "gradual and chronic experiences of personal 
change or self-transcendence" (Wildman and Brothers 1999, 359, 361). I suggest, following this 
characterization, that we can extend 'decentering' to mean the kind of transformation of self in 
the image of the divine McNamara describes, whether it occurs in a 'slow burn' or 'fast burn' 
mode. More specifically, the kind oftransformation occurring in either case is not primarily 
occurring through the activity of mundane conscious experience and actions taken by the 
conscious self, but rather through activity 'in the depths' of the human psyche. The need to 
unify the many disparate evolved 'selves' that inhabit the individual mind- which, according to 
McNamara, the conscious self evolved to meet- can occur more powerfully through the 
appropriation of ultimate selves. And this is the case whether mundane consciousness seems 
strongly 'displaced' in discrete and 'anomalous' experiences of appropriation, or only 
'complemented' in extended experiences of appropriation. 
My second comment on McNamara's approach is I do not think we should conceptualize 
the decentering process in terms of mere imitation, or of replacing one 'computer program' self 
with another, even if McNamara's language sometimes suggests this. Let us recall the 
difference between a 'designed machine' and a self-organizing process, as discussed inCh. 1 
concerning Deacon's views on emergence. Decentering and 'taking up' a new, higher Self 
involves an act (or extended acts) of spontaneous imagination on the part of the decentered 
individual, biased but not determined by the stock of 'existing identities' from which the 
individual's spontaneous responses draws. It is fundamentally a creative act, not a programmed 
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act. What I envision here is related to what Csordas {2001) suggests. He says almost all 
religious communities practice forms of what he calls 'embodied imagery'- a religiously-tinted 
imaginative and spontaneously produced bodily and sensory engagement with the world. 
Embodied imagery is a Dominant Symbol-guided 170 form of numinous experience that projects 
those DSs onto current individual experience of oneself, the other, and the cosmos at a level far 
more specific than general tokens of transcendence. Embodied imagery gives tokens of 
transcendence specific, here-now material referents for participants (233, 239). This kind of 
imaginative engagement in some cases is conceived of as a source of 'revelation.' Csordas 
thinks embodied imagery is critical to the ongoing project of religious community life because it 
introduces a 'living' and spontaneous aspect to religious life. The sacred is not just 'dead letter,' 
nor does it only speak in generalities or about the past. 
6.3.3.1.3 Corroborating support for the concept of decentering 
Others who have studied the neurological effects of religious involvement on the individual 
psyche have pointed to something similar to decentering as an important and coveted outcome 
of religious community participation. Boddy, for example, has characterized spirituality as a 
capacity to reformulate identity, and to heal. She thinks definitions of the self and the 
relationship of religion and psychiatry are grounds for discussions about spirit possession (Boddy 
1994, 424, 427). Holloman theorizes that religious rituals induce stress, and then guide 
mind/brain processes by providing new frameworks for the reorganization of the psyche leading 
to a different equilibrium state. She theorizes that much of the effect of religious ritual on the 
psyche are like rites of passage, having the goal of psychological transformation (Holloman 
1974, 275-6). Wildman has noted that the phenomenology of religious experience suggests five 
17
° Csordas uses the term 'sanctified,' but in my terms, sanctified means 'guided by Dominant Symbols.' 
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dimensions of human experience that can be experienced intensely- depth, horizon, scale, 
complexity, and mystery. He notes that the intense experience of each these dimensions 
involves a failure of cognition. The breakdown of practical perception and cognition is where 
experience can become "existentially potent and cognitively meaningful;" he believes these 
experiences of cognitive failure may trigger decentering (Wildman 2011, 141-2).171 D' Aquili and 
Laughlin (1979) have noted that antinomies are ever-present in myths, and proposed solutions 
to those antinomies also exist in myth. But psychologically satisfying solutions to the antinomies 
cannot be found just by positing they are resolved in myth. They contend that when myth is 
combined with a mechanism that specifically affects the brain in ways that produce alternative 
forms of experience, a sense of resolution of the antinomies can occur. Something intimately 
tied to myth but extraneous to it must be invoked to demonstrate the resolution. The 
experienced resolution thereby reinforces the mythic structure itself (161-2). They write, "What 
really appears to maintain the force and persistence of religious ritual is the ineffable 
experience, the intense positive affect experienced by a participant, associated with the 
resolution of a crucial antinomy, usually the resolution of the god/man antinomy" (172). 
Deacon and Cashman (2009) have argued that religious communities have developed narratives 
that juxtapose emotionally laden imagery, with the point of inducing powerful emergent 
emotions. These have the ability to transform identities and reorient priorities. They argue "the 
functional re-organization that follows this [experience of emergent emotion's] ascent in 
level. .. may offer novel means of cognitive integration and emotional synergy, analogous to that 
generated in aesthetic or eurekic experiences ... this involves a transformation of one's personal 
171 Following McNamara, I would think that besides the five dimensions of human experience that can be 
experienced intensely Wildman suggests, we should consider personality or personhood, since that is the 
central aspect of at least some religious experiences. 
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identity, not merely ideas and percepts ... one's own subjectivity undergoes an emergent 
transition of a sort" (514; 512). Bloch (1992) has argued that in religious ritual, one leaves a part 
of oneself to gain a vitalized and better part of oneself, which has social implications. The here-
and-now is left by a move towards the transcendental, where it is viewed as supremely 
desirable and the here and now is of no value. But there is a return to the here and now, and in 
it, the transcendental is not left behind, but attaches to those who made the move. The return 
is not an abandonment of the transcendental but a conquest of the here and now by the 
transcendental. By choosing to be dominated by the transcendental to the point of (symbolic) 
death, the ritualite returns to dominate the here and now (5-6). 
6.3.3.2 Summary 
What is so compelling to individuals participating in religious communities? We can 
answer, along with Deacon and Cashman, that the answer is a unique kind of experience, 
different from the kinds of experiences we share with primates. Piety, awe, equanimity, self-
transcendence, and conversion are unique religiously-oriented experiences (Deacon and 
Cashman 2009, 507). The suppression of normal experience- Durkheim's negative cult- allows 
for the experience ofthe numinous other, the positive cult, as the potential for such experiences 
is directed by the particular content of the religious community in question. When ineliminable 
oppositions within the current self are juxtaposed in mythical resolutions made authoritative 
through ritual, decentered and transformed selves- selves in the image of the divine- can 
result. As one abandons responsibility for oneself to the divine, the consciousness that normally 
dominates experience becomes displaced, and extraordinary, alternative consciousness 
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becomes compelling (Rappaport 1999, 377). 172 And as we just saw Bloch argue, this 
transformation of the self has implications for the sociality of religious groups as well. 
6.3.4 Experiencing the self, experiencing the divine 
Broadly, McNamara's theory suggests there is a meaningful connection between the 
individual self and religious community participation, mediated by tokens of transcendence. 
The self, itself an achievement over evolutionary history, is managed and transformed through 
religious community participation in ways that solve existential dilemmas. Religious community 
participation leverages the transformation of the individual self towards the divine, the vision of 
which is shared by all participants in the community. This picture resonates with the comments 
of those who participate in religious communities, and is consonant with the teleodynamic 
organizational structure of the larger religious community. In this section I will examine some 
evidence suggesting religious communities view the transformation of the self towards the 
divine as a priority of spiritual development; the way religious transformation is implicated in a 
teleodynamic organizational structure will be examined in the next section. 
Consider the work of Nasr (1989) writing within the Islamic tradition. In summarizing the 
way the soul arrives at faith, he writes, "Perhaps the most immediate experience of man is his 
subjectivity, the mystery of inwardness and a consciousness which can reflect upon itself, 
opening inwardly unto the Infinite which is also bliss" (147). But merely realizing our subjectivity 
as distinct from our experience of objects isn't enough for faith. "Supreme knowledge which 
can deliver us requires realizing the relativity of the soul; but going beyond the realm of the soul 
requires the transformation of the soul itself. This is why the soul must become disciplined by 
172 This is Rappaport's paraphrase of William James. 
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spiritual virtues" given through the traditions of the Islamic religious community (312-3, 316). 
When this happens, the soul participates in the 'really real' truth which is suprahuman (311). 
Or consider the work of Augustine (4th century), writing within the Christian tradition. For 
Augustine, God cannot be found in the realm of external material nature; as Cary describes 
Augustine's argument, one must "awaken to a different kind of vision, one that has been going 
on all along in the soul without being noticed ... if the soul could only see itself, it would begin to 
see what non-bodily things are like" (Cary 2002, 64-5). For Augustine, the proper progression 
for an individual to understand spiritual matters is to start outward, proceed inward, and 
eventually find rest upward. The "key moment in all these efforts to execute the project of 
inward turn comes when the mind or reason turns from looking inward to looking upward and 
discovers that immutable Truth is implicit in all its judgments" (66). But mere mental 
acknowledgement of an inner world that points to an upward world is not enough; one must 
experience the transformation of the presence of the upward world for oneself. Internal 
philosophy must yield to eternal religious revelation (Augustine 1961, Bk VIII and IX). 
Or consider the Yogic tradition in Hinduism. Brahmanical Hinduism proposes that there is 
an essential self in all persons, all selves, called atman, which is a spiritual essence and which 
transmigrates from life to life. Atman is permanent, unchanging, and to be radically 
distinguished from the changing mental and physical processes that are usually associated with 
the human self (King 1999, 80). Release, within the yogic tradition, consists of rediscovering 
within oneself that unity, that Soul pre-existing the human soul. "This ... is accomplished in 
contemporary human consciousness by the practice of yogic meditation" (Reat 1990, 153). As 
McNamara notes, yogic meditation is centered in cessation of thought or the cultivation of non-
attachment to mental states and bodily desires, and attachment to the immortal soul, the 
233 
higher consciousness. In yoga, there is a conscious effort to quiet the mind, dampen desire and 
craving, and dethrone the self; decentering occurs when an old self is shed and one attaches to 
and becomes a higher Self (McNamara 2009, 54). 
Or consider the work of Sekida (1975), writing within the Zen Buddhist tradition. He 
discusses the work of 'zazen'- sitting concentration- in brokering the religious truth of 'no-self' 
to correct the problematic sense of self humans have. He describes the sense of self as 
composed of three 'nen.' First nen is outward looking action, absorbed in the object of thought 
-the observation 'It's fine today.' It works unconsciously. Second nen is reflection upon first 
nen, looking inward and noting the perspective from which first nen occurred. Second nen is 
awareness of the observation; it notes 'I had been thinking it is fine today.' Third nen is a 
further reflecting act of consciousness that makes 2nd nen accessible to mind, and consolidates 
all thought that has gone before into a narrative. In third nen, a progression of self-awareness 
develops, connected to moods, forming personality. Third nen allows us to put a symphony 
together as a single work, and not a string of sounds. 'I recognize my thinking, therefore I know 
I am.' The work of zazen is to deconstruct, step by step, the natural but incorrect conclusions 
drawn from the movement from outer to inner, through meditation techniques guided by 
Buddhist Dominant Symbols. 173 The narrative tie of third nen, as well as the reflexivity of second 
nen, are negated through sitting concentration to arrive at a string of individual moments of 
experience with no necessary connection to each other. This allows the individual to recognize 
the Buddhist Truth of impermanence, which reveals that a self is a conventional reality that has 
no ontological substance, and thus can be deconstructed and manipulated for the sake of 
173 For an argument that Buddhist meditation is not 'context-free,' but rather guided by Buddhist 
theology, as well as a comparison of how Buddhist meditation is experienced differently than Hindu 
meditation because of theological differences, see Brown (1986). 
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personal well-being. Patil (2007) notes that in the Tibetan Buddhist school, following thinkers 
such as Dharmakirti (6th century), even the truth of impermanence is not a truth to be held as 
permanent. The practice of Buddhist meditation- not its philosophical formulation -leads one 
to the truth. Buddhism is not about assenting to a proposition, but having an experience, 
mediated by the revealed 'way' of Buddhism, that you are not what you thought you were. 
We see, then, there is support from diverse religious community practitioners that 
something like decentering resolves problematic aspects of self-hood. Through the 
authorization of religious truth, brokered by ritual and tokens of transcendence, the normal self 
is suppressed, and the otherwise hidden divine is revealed. 
6.3.5 Decentering of the psyche and symbolic social teleodynamics 
So far, then, we have gotten some confirmation from religious thinkers that McNamara's 
emphasis on the self- and the role of religion in transforming that sense of self- seems to be 
on the mark. But the importance of this observation is not exhausted; the transformed self, 
guided by Dominant Symbols, is part-and-parcel of creating a teleodynamic religious community. 
When ritual participants gather together and suppress normal consciousness and social relations 
through submission to the same 'specified absence' (Durkheim's negative cult) religious content 
provided by Dominant Symbols (Durkheim's positive cult) then can act as encoded social 
memory. Negative and positive cult bias the decentering process in the group towards images 
of the divine, allowing the divine to manifest in corporate relations. All are coordinated by the 
organizing potency of this specified absence -like spokes of a wheel coordinated with the hole 
of a wheel's hub. This is precisely the kind of dynamic that Durkheim describes as 'collective 
effervescence.' We can see that the key to this phenomenon is the 'negative space' provided by 
the hidden USPs with respect to normal consciousness. Tokens of transcendence create and 
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bias alternate states of consciousness to reveal the 'really real' supernatural entities and ways, 
which are experienced both individually and corporately. And a new form of sociality is 
manifested 'through' the mediation of tokens of transcendence taken up in alternative 
consciousness. 
This indirect and encoded form of sociality reproduces itself for two reasons: first, because 
the effect of 'guided decentering' creates profound experiences resolving existential oppositions 
in individual experience and corporate life; this means tokens of transcendence create value. 
Second, it reproduces itself because USPs are 'empty' with respect to mundane experience and 
sociality; this means religious truth is not easily threatened by changes in time, geography, 
cultural conditions, political organization, etc. It can continue to remain relevant in varying 
circumstances, as long as Dominant Symbols, the experiences they broker, and the existential 
dilemmas they resolve continue to remain valuable. 
Religious communities, thus, have a general form and a particular manifestation. The 
general form of the community is given by the structure of ritual, making sacred and 
authoritative nonmaterial, non-social content, which helps suppress normal consciousness and 
social forms. The particular form of the community is given by the effect of its particular 
Dominant Symbols on alternative forms of consciousness, the self, and sociality. It is the general 
form which allows us to entertain the category religious community as distinct from other forms 
of social organization. It is the particular form, the content-biased religious community, which 
gives religious communities the ability to adapt, and to be differentially successful in 
reproducing themselves over time and cultural development. Competition with other religious 
communities in terms of the perceived relevance of the existential dilemmas resolved by 
Dominant Symbols are key aspects determining outcomes in this competition. 
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It has long been noted that religious content mediates an indirect relationship between the 
religious community participant and the religious community itself. Though Durkheim says the 
actual entity making the religious person stronger is society, the individual perceives that he or 
she is made stronger by communing with the divine (Durkheim 1995/1915, 416-21). 
Malinowsky (1978/1935) notes that the ritual actions of participating individuals address the 
unseen world, not other human beings. However, the effect of religious content on human 
beings contributes towards social integration towards specific goals. The content of religious 
communities creates confidence, enhances hope, stimulates perseverance and effort; and thus 
has an indirect effect on social organization (246). McManus (1979), in an analysis of potential 
ritual effects on consciousness, notes the suppression of normal consciousness through ritual 
solves an important problem in the transmission of existentially important social information. 
Rather than varying the message to fit each individual member, ritual suppression requires that 
all members 'regress' to the simplest, most basic stage of moral development, which can be 
considered a form of decentering (McManus 1979, 234). The goal in the ritual recreation of the 
individual would be unidimensional information processing, where reality is created outside the 
person and handed down by authority (240). Thus, ritualized content forms the 'memory' 
component of the matrix that organizes social structure, and holds social and cognitive 
structures together. It controls the information capabilities of the individual at the structural 
level, and influences what cultural content is passed on (245). Wikstrom (1990) notes religious 
communities connect four things: individual psychic motives, religious myths that somehow 
touch these psychic needs, a kind of 'play' of religious imagination, and socio-cultural realities. 
It does this through the mediation of a special reality-map consisting of an existentially relevant 
frame of interpretation pointing to a cosmic Thou (Wikstrom 1990, 64). 
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To summarize, religious communities link the psychic and the social through the ritualized 
performative establishment of 'tokens of transcendence,' which simultaneously create a) a 
robust and conservative social order, and b) a creative and imaginative 'psychic order.' Both are 
facilitated by a decentering process that transforms the self towards divine content and biases 
social forms in a common direction of cooperation. 174 A graphic illustration of the 
interdependence I picture would be as follows: 
Suppression of normal con-
sciousness and spontaneous 
production of new, divinely-
patterned 'selves' resolving 
existentially meaningful intel-
lectual, moral, and experien-
tial dilemmas 
Social relationships 
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systematized by 
'absent' Ultimate 
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adaptive, self· 
reproducing symbolic 
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form resolving social 
dilemmas 
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Individual psyches 
Figure 2: Religious communities as social symbolic teleodynamics 
174 Cf. McNamara (2009, 258). 
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A hidden systematicity in tokens of transcendence connects the individual to the religious 
community, as conceived within the 'mental maps' of a community of interpreters. Normal 
experience and sociality is suppressed and alternative 'selves' interact with each other based on 
the shared terms producing their alternative selves. The ritual form establishes as True the 
absent content- the USPs -characterized by Dominant Symbols, resulting in the suppression of 
normal individual consciousness and sociality. And this changes the character of interactions 
between ritual participants, as each makes room for the divine to express itself. An adapting 
and self-reproducing religious community, distributed across the 'mental maps' of many ritual 
participants, can, I think, reasonably be considered an emergent, symbolic teleodynamic entity. 
6.3.6 Some clarifying comments 
6.3. 6.1 Distinguishing indexical from symbolic teleodynamic cultural forms 
I want to be clear as I can in distinguishing how religious forms of sociality differ from 
normal forms of sociality, which also involve 'selves-in-society' made possible by symbolic 
thought and publicly shared in 'mental maps.' Consider the organization of human beings linked 
by their common commitment to a constitution, for example, the US constitution, whose 
preamble is an explicit performative utterance: "We the people, in order to form a more perfect 
union ... do ordain and establish this constitution of the United States of America." This, in the 
terms of Ch. 4, is an indexical form of social teleodynamics. The content of the words has direct 
effects on normal consciousness for the forming of patterns of social interaction. Normal 
consciousness, interpreting words in a normal way, find that those words directly address issues 
of social organization. The 'utterer' in the performative is clearly the aggregate of language 
users, and the 'hearer' is clearly individuals operating within normal forms of consciousness. 
The term 'United States of America' is a name for the relationship between the people 
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producing the performative 'We the people ... ' Now consider the organization of a community of 
people linked by their common commitment to tokens of transcendence, for example, the 
Christian community linked by the performative 'I baptize you [into the Christian community] in 
the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.' This also creates a social group, but does so by 
virtue of a posited nonimmanent entity which is the ground of the relations between members. 
'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit' does not index the social group, but instead acts as a relational 
placeholder with respect to normal sociality and psychic experience, indirectly referencing 
alternative forms when translated through decentering. It functions symbolically in relation to 
the social. In this example, the 'utterer' is the posited nonimmanent divine speaking through 
the communities' ritual submission to the divine's existence, and the 'hearer' is the alternative 
consciousness of decentered 'selves.' Both the divine 'utterer' and the decentered 'hearer' are 
created through ritualized tokens of transcendence that are specifically not experienced through 
normal consciousness, and not about social organization. 
6.3.6.2 Comparing the formal characteristics of a religious community to biology 
The religious community having this form is organized in a manner formally similar to a 
biological lineage: the 'tokens of transcendence' function as DNA, biasing the way individuals 
participate in social organizations that have a tendency to reproduce themselves. As DNA is 
'empty' with regard to direct effects in the world of proteins, so tokens of transcendence are 
'empty' with regard to direct effects on consciousness and sociality; when interpreted as 
authoritative through decentering, however, they become potent and transformative. The way 
tokens of transcendence are taken up into consciousness through decentering functions like the 
genetic code, which translates the nonreactive DNA into a reactive form of protein action. This 
creates a form of sociality created indirectly 'through' the tokens of transcendence, producing a 
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social entity organized around an 'absent' center. Like a biological lineage, this social order is 
both adaptive and self-reproducing; it is adaptive because it is able to order or criticize almost 
any social, cultural, or material order. It is self-reproducing because the ritual form protects and 
re-presents the tokens of transcendence that organize it, and because the role of tokens of 
transcendence is valued by individuals and groups, as the Dominant Symbols resolve existential 
and social dilemmas. 
6.3.6.3 Religious communities are both conservative and adaptive 
The 'life' of a religious community comes from two sources. One is the way present, here-
now interactions with the divine are always being generated through decentering in an ongoing 
participation of individuals in the community. The living presence of the divine influences the 
course and flow of religious life for a community above and beyond what individuals, motivated 
by more mundane and normal concerns, may want or expect. Some changes to the actual 
behavior of a group of people bonded together by ritual engagement result from the 
expectation of the divine's own spontaneous presence. On the other hand, the fact that 
Dominant Symbols are deeply protected by the ritual structure, living closer to the 'center' of 
community life, gives the community a certain, conserved 'feel.' 175 Dominant symbols create 
biases and boundaries to experience and behavior that can be deemed appropriate, even over 
long periods of time. Yet even these deeper structures, if environmental conditions are 
appropriate, can change. 
How? Through the second source of 'life' of a religious community. The content of 
religious communities over long periods of time is a result of the formality and historicity that 
characterizes religious community dynamics. The spontaneous character of religious life just 
175 Kydd (2008) has recently made a very similar argument. 
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described, as well as the way these communities must interact with a larger cultural 
environment, adds new experiences and new interpretations of experience into the mix. New 
Dominant Symbols and re-interpretations of old ones can arise, and these may differentially bias 
the character and reproductive success of the community. Selection processes conserve 
Dominant Symbols more adaptive for the religious community than those in the communities' 
present 'vocabulary.' Revolutionary change can occur within the overall bias ofthe community; 
prophets can reinvigorate old movements and heretics can found new movements. As Pattee 
noted, a dynamic system that is conservative and repetitious can also be flexible and interactive. 
I suggest that something like a 'least discordant remainder' selection process finds the 
optimal relationship between the conservative ritual preservation of tokens of transcendence, 
and the adaptive variations of decentered individual experience. 176 Religious communities that 
survive and prosper are those that facilitate a balance between the preservation of the 
ritualized community as a whole, and the variation of content in such a community that allows it 
to adapt to changing cultural and social realities. 
6.3.6.4 Symbolic social teleodynamics links the psychic and the social to produce two 
1poles' of religious organization 
The organizational structure of a teleodynamic social entity linking together psychic 
experience and social organization through symbolic reference explains why there seem to be 
two 'poles' or sources of religious social organization, as some sociologists have noted. 
Seligman et al. suggest ritual and sincerity are two complementary ways by which social 
organization is facilitated. Sincerity is social interaction organized by beliefs about what the true 
176 See Figure 2, p. 238. 
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state of affairs is, freely acknowledged and entered into by the individual and therefore 
meaningful to him/her. Ritual is social interaction organized by a subjunctive, as-if world; it is 
entered into whether or not it is felt to be 'true for me.' Formality, repetition, and constraint 
define this approach to sociality. Authority for the ritualist lies in acceptance of social 
institutions; in the case of sincerity, it relies on individual experience and inner states (Seligman 
et al. 2008, 6-9, 116). Why do these two poles define sociality, their "integration" with each 
other "an endless project" (129)? The authors venture no theory, but we can. For religious 
communities, each pole is entailed by the organizational structure of symbolic social 
teleodynamics. The presence of sincerity as an ideal type is due to the individual psychic effects 
of authoritative tokens of transcendence taken up into alternative consciousness. The presence 
of ritual as an ideal type is due to the conservative formal structure of symbolic teleodynamics 
that preserves the overall trajectory of a history of interactions with tokens of transcendence 
taken up into alternative consciousness. One is its immediate 'psychic truth,' the other its 
extended 'social truth.' The two poles are interlocked in a symbolic teleodynamic religious 
community, since a) the meaningfulness of religious experience reinforces the organizational 
structure whereby ritual sociality establishes the truth of tokens of transcendence, and b) the 
organizational structure whereby ritual sociality establishes the truth of tokens of 
transcendence is the source of the meaningfulness of religious experience. 177 
177 This sentence can serve as a more formal characterization of the initial, vague account of religion 
I offered at the end of section 6.1: Religion is an authoritative set of beliefs inviting a peculiar approach to 
individual experience that facilitates a peculiar kind of social organization, as well as a peculiar kind of 
social organization that establishes an authoritative set of beliefs inviting a peculiar approach to individual 
experience. 
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6.3.6.5 Accounting for 'liberal' religion and communities that eschew the anomalous 
A theory of religion such as is being proposed in this dissertation might be criticized for 
being too focused on 'decentering' and 'alternate forms of consciousness,' as well as for 
proposing too strong a standard for judging a religious community. Isn't it a fact that many 
people who participate in religious communities do not experience such exotic forms of religious 
experience?178 Isn't it also the case that entire religious systems- Confucianism and Judaism, as 
well as liberal Christianity, come to mind- are biased far away from the 'sincerity' pole, and do 
not actively facilitate anomalous religious experience? What about these people, and these 
communities? 179 In his critique of William James' Varieties of Religious Experience, Pascal Boyer 
argues a point that equally could be leveled against my own approach, suggesting that 
overemphasis on the 'spectacular' gives the impression that there is a 'pure' form of religion 
that includes special kinds of experiences that exceptional people experience, and the masses 
degrade. Boyer's take is that instead of the masses being led into religion by the exceptional 
experiences of a 'pure' religion, the exceptional experience is merely an outlying form of 
mundane religion- religion that is not much more than a conglomeration of biases resulting 
from our evolutionary history (Boyer 2001, see especially 307-310). This is an important 
criticism, because the force of my theory is that something like decentering is a requirement for 
a symbolic teleodynamic socio-cultural system to develop. It is decentering that provides the 
interpretant-vehicle that decodes tokens of transcendence into an adaptive social form. 
178 Hay and Morisy (1978) report that 57% of British people who say they have some religious beliefs have 
"never in their life" had a religious experience, while 45% of regular British churchgoers say they have 
never had one. 
179 Actually, I think this is very much overstated, and I will use Confucianism as an example to demonstrate 
this in the next chapter. 
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I think there is a 'third way' that negotiates between thinking 'real' religion requires 
anomalous experience, and thinking real religion is merely the result of mundane consciousness 
or evolutionary biases. First, against Boyer's specific dismissal of the exceptional religious 
practitioner as an outlier to what 'real' religion is, it seems fitting to note that it is the outlier 
that is held up as the paradigmatic religious practitioner in most religious communities. The 
'heroes' of religion- those that found movements, re-inspire old movements, and are deemed 
as especially 'blessed'- are those that in some way or another are held to be particularly close 
to or possessed by the divine. Saints and prophets, as well as Christs, Sages, and Bodhisattvas, 
are those whose exemplary embodiment or channeling of the unseen divine set the 'plumb line' 
for everyone else. If Boyer wants to point out the cognitive conditions that allow us to be 
religious more easily in this way rather than that way, I support his task. But I would argue that 
what inspires and (re)produces the 'religious life' is a formal entailment of the way ritual makes 
USPs and DSs present, alive, and true for participants, and this involves decentering at some 
level. 
As noted above, I believe decentering should be considered a root process in both 
individual religious transformation and corporate community life, whether it is implemented in 
'discrete' or 'extended' modes. 180 One way to argue this is to imagine that the mental activity 
that 'decodes' tokens of transcendence works at a level other than normal conscious activity in 
both discrete and extended modes. In discrete modes, the conscious mind is strongly displaced, 
translating into more 'spectacular' manifestations of religious experience in line with 
McNamara's account. In extended modes, the conscious mind is never completely or even 
primarily displaced, translating into more extended and chronic manifestations of decentering. 
180 See my comments in section 6.3.3.1.2, "Several comments on McNamara's approach," p. 227. 
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Spectacular cases draw attention to this 'non-conscious activity of the divine,' which is why they 
are held up as exemplars, but their 'work' takes place even through more extended cases. In 
Wildman's treatment of religious experience, he suggests that both discrete and extended types 
of 'ultimacy' experiences are existentially potent, involving the transformation of behavior, 
personality and beliefs. He suggests they both can be brought under the conceptual scheme of 
decentering. He writes, "When the qualities of the [decentering] experience are unusual 
(unfamiliar, unexpected), the experiences lie in the overlap between ultimacy and anomalous 
experiences. When the qualities of the experience are usual (familiar and perhaps highly 
ritualized and deliberately cultivated), the experiences lie in the ultimacy-but-not-anomalous 
domain" (Wildman 2011, 88). 
I believe decentering is potent in both modes for reasons given by the formal structure of 
religious community dynamics.181 The metaperformativity of religious ritual entails that 
participation in ritual cannot but involve the claim, to oneself and to others, that the USPs at the 
center of religious life are true, and are in fact 'speaking' or presenting themselves to and 
through the community organized through ritual. This formal fact means an invitation to make 
room for the action of such divine beings and ways in one's experience is implicit in participation 
in such a community. At some level, this formal fact must have some effect on participants, 
suggesting that even those who do not have strong religious experiences are creating 'low-
grade' cognitive space for mild kinds of decentering experiences. Or at least the formal fact 
suggests that these individuals should follow the lead of those who do have strong religious 
181 At least at a 'structuring' level of explanation; recall Dretske's distinguishes between 'triggering' and 
'structuring' causes, fn. 67, p. 91. What I do not address here is what specific brain regions and processes 
might underlie the two different modes. Wildman and Brothers (1999) take steps in this direction, as 
does McNamara. 
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experiences. There is a central cognitive proposition latent in any religious community's 
organization: the divine exists; it is present to and in the community in certain ways; and it will 
manifest itself only as the community submits to it. 
Since ritual participation implies the cognitive pronouncement of the divine presence, 
communities that do not normally demonstrate discrete manifestations of decentering can, in 
certain environmental conditions, exhibit a flowering of the discrete. Viktor Frankl, a 
psychologist who survived the Auschwitz concentration camp, notes that the extreme 
conditions forced upon Jewish prisoners there, surprisingly to him, released tremendous 
religious piety and profound charismatic experiences through Jewish traditional religion, which 
was lying latent in the background of the secular Jews brought to Auschwitz. This religious 
training provided the scaffolding for meaningful, anomalous interaction with the divine, as 
conceived through Judaism (Frankl1963). Frankl argues that this was a tremendous source of 
strength for many, fortifying them to survive the hardships placed upon them psychically, even if 
many of them did not survive physically. 
In summary, the formal entailments of religious community organization produce a 
potential for decentering and symbolic teleodynamics that, when embraced, represent a 'full 
flowering' of the potential for such a community. This can be seen in either 'fast burn' or 'slow 
burn' approaches. An advantage of a 'fast burn' approach is that it calls attention to the 'work 
of the gods' in decentering, as opposed to 'slow burn' approaches that can, at times, plausibly 
be criticized as being 'dead works.' The advantage of 'slow burn' approaches is that such 
communities have a much stronger grip on controlling extreme manifestations of anomalous 
experience, and can appear more 'rational' when rationality has become a cultural norm. Either 
mode, when dynamic and cultivated en masse, can be engines of individual religious piety, as 
247 
well as that which insures the ongoing preservation of the peculiar kind of social organization a 
religious community represents. 
6.3.6.6 Can revealed texts be alternatives to ritual in creating metaperformativity? 
Here, I want to address what may be perceived as a 'ritual bias' in the descriptions of 
religious communities I have followed. Are all religious communities necessarily ritually 
organized? Is it possible that authoritative texts may also serve as the organizing principle of 
religious communities? Robbins has critiqued Rappaport on this basis, suggesting that ritual is 
efficacious as the source for religious communities only in cultures that have a general 
skepticism about language. In cultures that do not have such skepticism, where people believe 
that language can convey truth, ritual is considered 'empty;' in these cultures, ritual becomes a 
place for liars to hide, a place for insincerity. Barker, for example, in his response to Robbins, 
notes that in Protestant sects language is trusted as a vehicle of the truth, and thus ritual is 
dismissed; the real force behind religious community life is in truthful texts and appropriate 
inner states (Robbins 2001, 597-9). So Robbins and Barker suggest that in examples such as 
Protestantism, the 'reliable Word' replaces 'dead and insincere ritual,' and that Word has the 
same effect on religious community life that Rappaport says ritual has. Rappaport, in superficial 
agreement with this position, acknowledges that text-based religions can arise, but argues that 
this creates problems in that sacred written texts cannot be changed in service of adaptation. 
Thus, he says, ritual's ubiquity results from the fact that there are no satisfactory alternatives for 
the meanings and effects ritual produces (Rappaport 1999, 444, 31). So we might read 
Rappaport as dismissing Robbins' and Barker's argument. I believe that careful consideration of 
the principles of symbolic semiotic emergence adjudicates helpfully here. 
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Let us examine how an authoritative text functions in a text-based religious community. 
Recall that the first of Rocha's criteria for identifying a system that uses symbolic reference is 
'dynamically incoherent memory'- set apart content only indirectly efficacious on the system 
upon which it acts as memory. I suggest this involves two ideas: this memory must be inert 
with respect to what it informs, and it must be both preserved and manipulable apart from what 
it informs. The idea of an authoritative written text does in fact meet these criteria, and does so 
apart from the practice of ritual. To believe something is an authoritative, divine text is to treat 
it in a different way than other texts. It is read in a different way, honored in a different way, 
used to authorize other things in a different way, and disagreed with in a different way. As a 
text, it is protected from change and direct criticism, and as authoritative, its value is honored 
not for its role as 'text,' but for its role in mediating the divine to human consciousness. Special 
contexts and special people and special orientations of people are reserved for approaching the 
text. 
Rocha's second criterion is a 'construction code,' something that takes encoded memory 
and translates it into actual effects in the dynamics ofthe system. I argued above that in 
religious communities, this is a result of decentering and taking into alternative consciousness 
divine content that Dominant Symbols communicate. To believe a text is a sacred text, a divine 
text, is to approach it in a way that facilitates decentering. Thus, its content, just like the 
content of ritual, is taken up into alternative states of consciousness in a way that other kinds of 
texts are not. 
Third, Rocha's third criterion is self-organization and selection. Rappaport thinks that since 
written sacred texts cannot vary, they lead to stagnant religious communities that cannot adapt, 
and that they oversanctify the trivial. But this is to ignore two fundamental facts. One is that 
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lineages of religious communities can and do change their sacred texts over time, adding to 
them, and taking away from them as deemed necessary, usually under the influence of an 
individual or movement viewed as particularly blessed. The second fundamental fact 
Rappaport's argument ignores is that a community's interpretation of a text can change over 
time. Sometimes, the text's use in alternative consciousness is protected, while interpretation 
of the text with respect to normal consciousness changes. Religious traditions have long 
histories of interpreting their texts to normal consciousness in ways adaptive to cultural and 
social change, leaving the same texts free to do their work in alternative consciousness when 
taken up as authoritative. 
But there is a further fact relevant to both of these examples that may yet save Rappaport's 
focus on ritual. Who is authorized to make changes in texts and in interpretations of texts, and 
how is that authority passed on? Who decides that this text and not that text is authoritative, 
and how is that authority passed on? Even the mildest version of changes to texts-
reinterpretation- may change how and even whether the text will influence alternative 
consciousness. This means alternative experience will be guided differently in some 
communities than in others, even though they have the same texts at the core. Is there 
anything to hold as invariant and authoritative different interpretations of religious texts within 
a religious community? 
Something else besides texts must be invoked to stabilize religious communities. Without 
the grounding of some sort of community authority concerning which texts and which 
interpretation texts are 'correct,' interpretations of texts may multiply and potentially lead to a 
failure of the community to reproduce its tokens of transcendence. I believe these problems 
warrant the conclusion that ritual-based communal authority is required to ground the variety 
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of possible interpretations of sacred texts, and this authority is passed on from generation to 
generation in a religious community. 182• 183 
6.4 Example ofthe interaction - a Haitian sevis 
Perhaps the best exemplar I have found in the anthropological literature analyzing a 
religious community in terms that suggest symbolic teleodynamics is Lowenthal's (1978) analysis 
of a Haitian voodoo service (sevis). Against functional explanations of religious participation 
prevalent in some approaches to religious studies, he suggests we need to notice the nature of 
the rewards motivating individual participation. Lowenthal analyzed Voodoo, known for its 
practice of spirit possession, in terms of the relationship between religious belief, sociology, and 
individual psychic experience. He notes what is definitive of spirit possession (a psychic 
experience) is its presence in collective performances (a ritual and social feature) and its origin 
in a belief in spirits (a theological feature) (411). Together, these three influence both the 
psychic organization of individuals, and the social organization of aggregates. This analysis 
makes for a highly instructive account of what I describe as symbolic teleodynamics. 
182 For example, community decisions must be made about which sources will be used to educate 
newcomers, children, and religious leaders about the proper interpretation of texts. That pastors-to-be of 
certain religious communities will go to Gordan-Conwell Seminary and not the Harvard Divinity School, or 
not go to seminary at all, is not written in any sacred text, but, in fact, is a certainty. 'God has spoken his 
Word without error' is a statement acting as a token of transcendence, and authorized by a kind of ritual 
authority when only pastors trained at Gordan-Conwell are allowed to preside over such congregations. 
These kinds of rituals, establishing tokens of transcendence concerning the divinely revealed way of 
interpreting a text, marks the identity and boundaries of whole types of religious communities, and makes 
a difference in the way sacred texts and charismatic experiences will be interpreted and used by those 
religious communities. This in turn changes the way texts and experiences will contribute to community 
self-reproduction. See Wagner's (2001) discussion of religious education and Rappaport's theory. 
183 A similar argument can be made for communities organized around charismatic experience, though 
there, the problem is that experience alone may undersanctify the important. Experience is not self-
interpreting, and unless guided by authoritative tokens of transcendence, communities guided by such 
experience can fail to reproduce their tokens of transcendence as well. Consider the fact that meditators 
progressing through the same meditative stages in three Asian religious communities (Mahayana and 
Theravada Buddhism, Yogic Hinduism) come to very different conclusions about what was experienced, 
the nature of reality, and the kind of social group they should belong to, depending on the authorization 
and symbolic function of dominant symbols within those communities (Brown 1986) 
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In what follows I will trace key moments in his account almost word for word, paraphrasing 
slightly and changing the order for clarity, interspersing occasional direct quotes and my own 
[bracketed] terms for clarity: 
A sevis [ritual performance] is structured, organized, and experienced in relationship to 
two things- basic theological tenets concerning the lwa (ancestor spirits) [USPs], and a 
particular aesthetic principle governing collective performance [DSs]. The aesthetic and 
performative feature of a sevis is tied integrally to its theological and devotional ends. 
The folk theory of possession is responsible [decentering- the 'construction code']. The 
lwa themselves know how they want to be honored, and assert themselves in services 
to secure their desires [metaperformative production of the collective experience of the 
divine]. This is why possession is central to the sevis. To induce possession is the goal, 
as it demonstrates the pleasure of the lwa at the sevis. During sevis, participants are in 
the presence of supernatural beings; they are natural and real, the dance itself 
demonstrating how real they are. The "concept of possession and a principle of 
performance together constitute the essential features ofthe cultural context within 
which each sevis unfolds" (410, 402-3, 405, 411). 
A 'hot' sevis is an involved and enthusiastic service, when the happiness of people and 
the happiness of the lwa are obviously manifest [the latent potential of ritual 
surrounding USPs and DSs is activated]. A 'hot' sevis is not just one that has been 
effective at bringing on trance, however. "Rather, this effectiveness helps to create a 
subjective reality for the sevite in which the essence of worship comes to be 
participation in the collective creation of song and dance" [social impact of decoded 
tokens of transcendence] For those unpossessed, dancing is not dancing for the lwa, 
but dancing with the lwa- they are sharing in the act of aesthetic creation with the gods 
themselves, making it "perhaps the ultimate satisfaction of voodoo worship ... no 
performances equal in intensity, enthusiasm, and involvement those which include the 
lwa as participants" (404, 405, 407). 
The sevis performance shapes the aesthetic experience of worshippers [social impact of 
decoded tokens of transcendence]. They receive great satisfaction in creating a thing of 
beauty, which is appreciated by both humans and supernatural beings. The "lwa are 
said to love song and dance ... [voodoo services] are a design for satisfying the appetites 
of the lwa." These performances are open to all and enjoyed by all. Group participation 
creates a stage on which individual improvisational skill is realized. Yet individual 
performances are ultimately merged into the total group production, no matter how 
gifted the individual performance is [whole-part organization- Emergence3]. "Haitian 
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aesthetic sensibilities are closely tied to the notion of full participation in the act of 
creation, rather than to passive contemplation or appreciation. It involves individual 
creativity and collective participation. There is a holistic, social component- implying 
the presence of both human and spiritual persons- that makes the individual dances 
meaningful in a way it wouldn't be otherwise [symbolic teleodynamics] (407, 409, 399) . 
The sevis is a ritual performance that orders the relationship of humans and spirits, as 
well as says what form of organization and tone of interpersonal relations and 
cooperation matters [symbolic teleodynamics]. The "theological and experiential 
significance of worship within this religious system emerge from the ritual process 
which successfully articulates this set of culturally patterned expectations with a 
particular mode of collective participation" (410, 398, emphasis mine). 
Note how the twa- nonimmanent spiritual beings, or Ultimate Sacred Postulates-
organize both individual psychic experience involving decentering and experiencing the divine, 
as well as a social organization that is indirect, supernaturally-tinged, and biased by the 
particular tone the Dominant Symbols in voodoo entail. Individual Haitians don't gather 
together for the sake of sociality; they gather together to experience the twa, whose presence at 
a sevis provides an experience of profound aesthetic harmonization of individual, group, and the 
'really real.' Dominant Symbols include the aesthetics of dancing with the gods, leading to the 
principle of individual/group co-creation of artistic expression; conceiving of the twa as dead 
ancestors, leading to the principle emphasizing family lineage as continually determinative of 
individual life, and the personal characteristics of the twa as given by voodoo belief, leading to 
their appearance in particular decentered personalities taken up during the ceremony and 
afterwards as well. Note that a Haitian Voodoo sevis could potentially survive regardless of 
what political, economic, and other cultural relations obtain, yet could bias all of these forms of 
social organization towards those that reflect the Dominant Symbols contained in voodoo. And 
note how the sociological facts of performance and the psychic experience of possession are 
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merged under a mystical interpretation where the tension between individuality and sociality is 
resolved. 
This, then, is a picture of how religious communities involve an authoritative set of beliefs 
inviting a peculiar approach to individual experience that facilitates a peculiar kind of social 
organization, as well as a peculiar kind of social organization that establishes an authoritative set 
of beliefs inviting a peculiar approach to individual experience. The ritually-authorized tokens of 
transcendence create the expectation of decentering, and guide the types of experiences to be 
had; the divine selves to be taken up and the higher sociality to be expressed resolve tensions 
created by the realities of Haitian life. The collective experience of many individuals makes 
gathering ritually an attractive and valuable fact of Haitian life; the sevis will continue to 
organize Haitian life as long as it has this value. And the sevis will insure that the experiences 
had will involve meeting with the lwa. The Haitian sevis is a teleodynamic social form, one that 
takes advantage of a new locus for symbolic reference: a 'specified absence' created by tokens 
of transcendence taken up in alternative forms of consciousness that indirectly guide sociality as 
conceived among a community of interpreters. 
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7 Summary and two test cases 
I have two goals in this chapter. The first is to connect very explicitly the principles I 
garnered from analyzing the work of Hofstadter, Pattee, Von Neumann, and Deacon to what I 
have said in previous chapters about religious communities as symbolic teleodynamic systems. 
The second is to utilize this theory of religion in two 'test cases,' which will allow me to make 
explicit the differences between indexical and symbolic teleodynamic social systems, and 
demonstrate the usefulness of this theory to address problems in religious studies. 
7.1 Religious communities and the principles of symbolic semiotic emergence 
Despite the shortcomings of Durkheim's and Rappaport's accounts, they are, in my opinion, 
the most helpful'theories of religion' to date. By thematizing the powerful entailments of an 
emergent social mind (Durkheim) and the ritual form (Rappaport) on both social organization 
and psychic life, these thinkers have created the groundwork for a powerful and robust theory 
of religion. I have attempted to build on their approaches by applying to their work updated 
categories taken from emergence theory. In this section, I want to specifically acknowledge how 
religious communities as characterized in the previous chapter are organized according to the 
principles of symbolic semiotic emergence, as I distilled them from the writings of Von 
Neumann, Pattee, Hofstadter, and Deacon. 
To begin, I want to acknowledge the formal similarity of Rappaport's definition of ritual, 
"the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely 
encoded by the performers" (Rappaport 1999, 24), with one of Deacon's definitions of 
teleodynamics, "via memory, constraints derived from specific, past, higher-order states ... get 
repeatedly re-entered into the lower-order dynamics leading to future states" (Deacon 2003a, 
297). If participants in ritual do not encode their own actions, they necessarily must be the 
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result of a kind of memory. Both Deacon and Rappaport conceive their object of study to 
involve an organizational structure repeatedly recreating itself as a result of a kind of memory 
imposing itself on the present. Further, both Rappaport and Deacon emphasize the circular 
causal structure of teleodynamics and ritually-organized religious communities, respectively 
(Rappaport 1999, 411-2, 422; Deacon 2003a, 284), and both consider their subjects as 
organizationally related to living things (Rappaport 1999,408-9; Deacon 2006a, 137-8). 
These general comparisons of teleodynamics and ritual religion don't distinguish between 
indexical and symbolic forms, as I attempted to do with respect to teleodynamics inCh. 3. Recall 
Rocha, working within Pattee's explication of semantic closure, proposed three rules for 
identifying when symbol systems are at work in systems. I want to look at these rules, 
comparing them to my description of religious communities. 
7.1.1 Rocha's criterion 
Levy (2001) notes that when Europeans exploring Tahiti first encountered Tahitian social 
forms, they saw that a certain subset of Tahitian social behaviors involved events conducted in 
unusual places that were held to be loci of dangerous and more-than-natural power; the events 
were bounded and isolated from ordinary space and time by boundary markers; they involved 
anthropomorphic images of nonmaterial beings; they were presided over by specialized 
officiants; and the performance of the events had a canonical, invariable form. The formal 
features of these behaviors signaled they were not for or about utilitarian or everyday human 
goals. The setting, language, rigid formality and resistance to improvisation suggested that the 
message transmitted was from an authoritative but nonmaterial source, generating the idea and 
experience of the sacred (147-8). 
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We can note from these characteristics three general ideas that suggest religious 
expression. The social gatherings we tend to characterize as religious 1) involve content 
'framed' or set apart from normal content in some way; 2) are about entities and ways posited 
as not accessible to normal experience directly, but that affect human affairs in important ways; 
and 3) demonstrate a repeated, highly structured social form. These three characteristics 
suggest Rocha's three criteria for semantic closure.184 
7.1.1.1 Dynamically incoherent memory 
Rocha noted that symbol-tokens do not act directly based on their material/dynamic 
qualities, but indirectly, based on their relational and informational properties. The causal 
action of symbol-tokens is formal rather than efficient. Symbol-tokens, since not efficacious 
directly, have to be separated from direct material and energetic transaction, 'stored away' and 
accessed by structures able to interpret them. The syntactic structure of information in 
symbolic representations can be accessed and utilized without reference to its content. To 
summarize this criterion, 1) in their encoded form symbol-tokens are inert with respect to what 
they inform, and 2) while encoded they must be set apart from that which they inform, such 
that they are both preserved and available for manipulation. 
To illuminate the first of these- a distinction between their inert and potent forms-
Rappaport's idea of metaperformativity is critical. Recall this is an account of why tokens of 
transcendence are taken as authoritative. Stories of gods acting among human beings in 
characteristic and defining ways are just that- stories- to anyone who is contemplating the 
content of religion in a normal frame of mind. The tokens of transcendence of religious 
communities are 'inert' with respect to social organization when viewed from the perspective of 
184 The following is my summary of Rocha's criteria as I wrote them in section 3.5.3, p. 124. 
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normal consciousness. However, when they are embraced as authoritative and 'really real' 
through the performative authority of the ritual structure, normal consciousness is suppressed 
and they become potent and transformative, and the social groups organized by them takes on 
a symbolic teleodynamic form. The distinction between tokens of transcendence taken up in 
suppressed, alternative consciousness and tokens of transcendence examined from within 
normal consciousness is what makes possible apologetics, theology, and the academic discipline 
of 'religious studies' as distinct enterprises from devotional participation in religious community 
life. 
How are encoded tokens of transcendence set apart from the mundane? Most basically, 
this involves the theatrical and repetitive elements of ritual, which make clear that certain 
components informing religious life are distinguishable from others. That the Roman Mass 
offers a non-filling meal of bread and wine every week, and has done so for 2,000 years, sets 
apart that meal as distinct from other meals, and other mundane affairs of life. Tokens of 
transcendence may also be set apart by rules allowing only certain people to engage the 
material culture of the sacred, or that make criticism of them in their nonreactive form a 
punishable offense, or by the use of ostentatious wealth, human effort, or suffering to display 
the value of tokens of transcendence far beyond their mundane, practical, value. 
These facts suggest that tokens of transcendence, by being set apart and protected, as well 
as by not being directly efficacious on psychic or social relations, represent 'dynamically 
incoherent memory'- the symbol-tokens can be manipulated without reference to their 
function as information for the ritual community, and are implemented in non-reactive 
structures to normal conscious experience. 
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7.1.1.2 Construction code 
Rocha noted the coded semantic 'content' of information in symbolic representations is 
decoded to construct dynamic configurations; representations encode alternative initial 
conditions for a dynamical system-environment coupling. The construction code is an example 
of an 'interpretant-vehicle' as outlined in the section on semiosis. The construction code 
focuses on the rules used to translate dynamically incoherent memory into another domain, 
producing direct outcomes when translated. 
What in religious community life takes the set-apart, dynamically incoherent 'tokens of 
transcendence' and translates them into actual differences in the psychic and social worlds of 
communities of interpreters? What is this 'interpretant vehicle' that turns tokens of 
transcendence into a dynamical religious community coupled with its larger cultural 
environment? It is this: the decentering process biased by divine content that McNamara 
discusses, and the 'transducer,' the revelatory, embodied imagery Csordas discusses. 
Decentering is facilitated by the techniques used to prepare individuals to take up their 
nonreactive tokens of transcendence in the proper way, as discussed in the last chapter ("How 
religion facilitates decentering", p. 224). Tokens of transcendence, when taken as 
authoritatively stating the way the world is, bias the decentering process affecting both 
individual and group experience, particularly in collective settings. This is seen in the 'hot' 
voodoo sevis of Lowenthal, Durkheim's 'collective effervescence,' and in Rappaport's account of 
the ongoing, low-key, relatively private experience of daily prayer the orthodox Jew 
experiences.185 This process has implications for the way religious practitioners experience the 
185 
"Frequent performance of brief rituals, like the round of daily prayers of Orthodox Jews and their 
continued observance of mitzvoth (commandments) in the details of daily life may penetrate to the 
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community that shares in this decentering process, and implications for the broader culture 
when a significant proportion of people in that culture are influenced by such higher selves and 
such visions of sociality. Tokens of transcendence, when taken up as revealed truth in 
decentering, link together an individual's experience of a) themselves, b) the community of 
interpreters who share in the tokens of transcendence, and c) how they perceive the cosmos. A 
'world order' is enacted by these tokens of transcendence (Rappaport 1999, 272). 
7.1.1.3 Self-organization and selection 
Rocha notes that material structures constructed by symbolic representation exist under 
the constraints of self-organization and self-reproduction, and are pragmatically selected in an 
evolutionary process. This criterion identifies the self-reproducing capacity of the system, and 
the critical role that feedback from the environment plays in culling variant symbol-tokens and 
their corresponding physical results. It is through this 'reproduction with feedback' that symbols 
representing initial conditions for self-development can track intelligently with their 
environment, increasing the fitness ofthe organism over the long term. 
Rappaport makes several important contributions towards seeing religious communities as 
fitting this requirement. First, his articulation of the entailments of rituality explains how the 
ritual form serves the self-reproduction of the religious community. Because rituality creates 
the conditions for alternative kinds of experience that are meaningful, and protects the contents 
of the community as sacred, individuals across many generations and cultures have the 
opportunity and desire to participate in the ritual community, and will re-produce the ritual 
form that produced the experience in the first place. This gives religion a repeated, 
cognitive and affective bases of that behavior, and thus strengthen the ground upon which the order 
realized stands" (Rappaport 1999, 209). 
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conservative, and highly structured outward from. Second, Rappaport explains how a religious 
community is organized so as to be adaptive, as ritual hierarchically authorizes more and less 
central content. His argument is that the hierarchy of sacredness is also a hierarchy of stability, 
USPs being the most stable, DSs less so, rules even less so, etc. This allows a religious 
community to adapt to many different cultural environments. It also gives an order to how 
change will be manifested in a religious community: it will start at the periphery and gradually 
makes it way to the center, the depth of change determined by what is necessary for survival. 
Selection pressures, coming from changes in the larger cultural/political/social environment, will 
influence the experience of individuals participating in the religious community, and will 
determine whether or not they continue to participate. If tokens of transcendence still 
meaningfully invite alternative forms of experience by which mundane experience can be 
viewed and organized, the community will continue to be adaptive in its cultural or sociological 
niche (cf. Rappaport 1999,428, 429-30).186 A ritually organized structure, according to 
Rappaport, gives religious communities the robust and stable social form that can be noted by 
outsiders, regardless of whether they are familiar with the content. 
An important consideration of Rocha's third criterion is that religious communities should 
be bounded systems, as decentered participation in the ritually-sanctioned tokens of 
transcendence identifies who is in and who is out. An identifiable 'lineage' should reproduce 
self-same or highly similar Dominant Symbols that in turn lead to similar individual and 
corporate experience for members of the community, even if separated by time or distance. 
When different Dominant Symbols (or different interpretations of the same Dominant Symbols) 
186 I have supplemented Rappaport's account here with the idea that the tokens of transcendence must 
continue to meaningfully invite alternate forms of experience leading to decentering. He focuses on their 
'meaninglessness,' their 'mysteriousness.' This change is in line with my critique of Rappaport in Ch. 5. 
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produce decentering experiences perceived to be largely foreign to a community, they will be 
considered unfamiliar expressions of the divine, and some sort of 'discernment' practice. 
Community discipline such as excommunication will act to preserve the bounded set. 
InCh. 2, I noted that teleodynamic systems are linked by morphodynamic continuities, not 
energetic continuities; they are linked by similarities of form, not by the same dynamic process. 
A dinosaur species long extinct can be 'resurrected' in theory if the DNA from that dinosaur 
survives. Religious communities are linked over the ages by formal, informational components, 
not necessarily by continuities in (secondary) religious culture, the social status of members, 
economic conditions, political/legal codes, national identity, or background beliefs the 
community holds. The lineage of a religious community is based on similarities in the way 
tokens of transcendence are taken up in decentering, not in similarities in surrounding, 
secondary, mundane beliefs entertained by such communities. 
I argue Rocha's three criteria are seen in the dynamics of religious community life, as Levy's 
account of Tahitian religious forms shows, but more importantly in the different components of 
religious life articulated inCh. 6, each of which, on their own, are supported by traditional 
religious studies scholarship. 
7.1.2 Deacon's account of the evolution of nested semiotic processes and the role of 
suppression and masking 
I discussed at different points how Rappaport and Deacon agree that biologically-given 
hominid sociality might have become 'masked' with the development of symbolic culture. 
Symbolic culture represents a new locus for semiotic emergent processes to act. Rappaport 
proposes that the freedom of symbolic culture to consider alternative social arrangements and 
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ultimate views of the cosmos created the opportunity and need for a functional replacement for 
genetically constrained sociality, which ritual, among other possibilities, provides. 
When we turn our attention to symbolic social teleodynamics, we are not concerned with 
the masking of biological forms of sociality, but rather with the suppression of cultural 'indexes' 
of sociality so that symbolically-encoded sociality develops. I have argued this means the 
suppression of normal consciousness and normal conceptualizations of culturally-afforded 
sociality, allowing alternative experience-guided social organization. Metaperformativeness is 
the source of this suppression, as participation in ritual entails the combination of authority and 
nonmaterial referents which invite the suppression of both normal consciousness and 
expectations concerning sociality in the face of the 'really real' given by tokens of 
transcendence. This condition, distributed across a ritually-organized community, produces new 
possibilities for how 'selves-in-society' are conceptualized and experienced. 
7.1.3 Semantic closure and the creation of a 'self 
In the summary section of chapter 3 (p. 121), I captured the key elements of four thinkers 
with respect to semantic closure as follows: 
Semantic closure is the autonomous, circular closure between the dynamics of the 
material aspects of a system and the constraints provided by the symbolic aspects of a 
system. Constraints on the dynamics of a reproducing system are introduced 
symbolically from within the system itself, and passed on to future iterations of the 
system by the system itself. 
When applied to religious communities, the 'dynamics of the material aspects of a system' 
are the outcomes on sociality- the reproduction of the ritual form; the experiences of 
'collective effervescence'; the implications for mundane forms of sociality- that 'fall out' of the 
psychic experiences of individuals connected through the ritualization of tokens of 
transcendence. Ritual organization of human populations is a recognizable, robust 'canonical 
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form' that religious social life has, noted by Europeans in Tahiti, Durkheim, Rappaport, and many 
others. The 'constraints provided by the symbolic aspects of a system' is the way the psychic 
experiences of individuals is biased by tokens of transcendence and in turn influences the way 
sociality exists in our shared mental maps, making certain conceptualizations and experiences of 
sociality attractive and robust. Tokens of transcendence guide decentering, creating new selves 
and new ways for individuals to approach their religious community, giving the community a 
'supernatural tinge,' as well as a particular tone, value, appeal, usefulness, and meaningfulness, 
depending on the larger socio-cultural environment. If tokens oftranscendence are found 
meaningful by communities of religious participants, the ritual form will continue to exist and 
adapt, creating the grounds for new decentering opportunities which will take up tokens of 
transcendence in psychically and socially meaningful ways. 
In my summary section of Ch. 3, I further characterized a symbolic, active, 'self' as what 
results when symbols functioning within an interpreting system create the infinite potential for 
reinterpretation. I noted Peirce's analogy of the 'pure self,' the '1,' as the potential to represent 
the location of a map of a country within the map of the country, at higher and higher 
resolutions. Because a new, smaller map at higher and higher resolutions can forever be 
created, a final 'map within the map' can never be determined as a point on the map, but 
merely as the possibility of the map at any given resolution to include itself. Rappaport gave 
religious communities a nice characterization that points in this direction of religious 
communities as self-organizing phenomena. He writes, "Although liturgical orders are 
important in the regulation of social, political, and ecological relations in many societies, they 
cannot be said to 'reflect' or 'represent' those relations in any simple way ... They represent-
which is to say they re-present- themselves" (Rappaport 1999, 262). What makes the content 
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of religious communities self-representing, and religious communities self-reproducing, is the 
ritual form that at the center sets apart a 'specified absence'- the tokens of transcendence. 
This creates a placeholder for leveraging decentered and meaningful individual experience 'in 
the name of' those tokens, and this entails potentially endless re-production of divine content 
and the community. The dynamics of such a social organism are not dependent upon the social, 
cultural, political, or economic conditions of life, but supportive of the continued existence of 
the cybernetic religious system; thus, these sorts of social organisms exist first for themselves, 
not for their utilitarian value. Certainly, however, their social and psychic utility is one 
constraint determining which religious communities will survive in the long run. Secular states, 
and other mundane conceptualizations of a community (e.g. 'Led Zeppelin fans), on the 
contrary, exist within mental maps for their social utility; they do not exist 'for themselves' 
(Rappaport 1999, 440). 
Rappaport says that authoritative tokens of transcendence give religious communities 
grounds to judge mundane states of affairs according to whether or not they adhere to the 
broad principles found in those tokens of transcendence. They give ritual participants the 
'ought' to which the 'is' must conform (Rappaport 1999, 133). This implies that religious 
communities, which exist first for themselves, and make judgments concerning other aspects of 
culture and environment, are in a reciprocal relationship with its cultural environment, both 
affecting it and being affected by it. This reciprocity results from the religious community having 
the means to judge and determine aspects of culture within a certain range, and from the fact 
that the wider environment of culture puts selection pressures on religious communities, 
affecting their adaptation or extinction. This account suggests a religious community is an 
emergent, symbolic, teleodynamic entity with respect to cultural sociality in the same way a 
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biological organism is a symbolic teleodynamic entity with respect to non-living chemical 
processes, and that a human person is a symbolic teleodynamic entity with respect to hominid 
psychology and social forms. The potential implications of this will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
7.1.4 Center/Periphery 
InCh. 3, I said that in symbolic teleodynamic systems, non-necessary 'rules' like the genetic 
code and the Godel code, which are not laws of nature, are critical for linking otherwise 
independent domains. They are interpretant vehicles, and serve as the 'center' of symbolic 
teleodynamic systems. What plays the role of the interpretant vehicle in a religious community, 
and what domains does it link together? Through the effects on the psyche of authorized, 
posited 'really real' divine beings and ways, the decentering process is the center of a religious 
community. In that process, normal consciousness and mundane affairs and social forms are 
suppressed, and a divinely-given conception of the self-in-society is taken up. The experience of 
this self, when multiplied across many ritual participants, produces a uniquely organized 
community, the 'religious community,' whose structure can be adaptive and self-reproducing. 
This is a different 'center' than Rappaport proposes. He suggests the center is the 
protected, relatively invariant, nonmaterial USPs. In one sense this is correct. In terms ofthe 
conceptual scheme of a religious community, USPs are the center. But a religious community is 
not a conceptual scheme; it is a dynamic relationship between individual psyches and 
conceptualizations of communities that demonstrates circular causal closure, and which reveals 
itself over time. In this dynamic relationship, individual psyches and social organization are 
linked together by the intermediary of divine beings and ways. These beings and ways have 
their existence in the many, sometimes corporate, decentering experiences of ritual 
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participants. Rappaport argues that USPs authorize all other aspects of religious communities, 
but I suggest it is the way USPs are experienced that authorizes all other aspects of religious 
communities. These experiences, when adaptive given the larger cultural environment, create 
the conditions for the continued participation of individuals in the ritual form that makes sacred 
the USPs. It is the circular causal closure of USP and collective ritual form, mediated through 
alternative experiences, that defines religious communities as such. This is why Rappaport is 
right in suggesting that in the long view, it is the formal organization of psychic experience and 
sociality that is the oldest component of religion; the names and characterizations of the divine, 
old as they might be, are not as old as the organizational structure defining a religious 
community as a symbolic teleodynamic entity. 
As I mentioned briefly in my account of the different modes of decentering (p. 245), 
viewing the center of the religious community as the decentering process has ramifications for 
understanding the rationale behind the presence of conservative and liberal versions of religious 
communities, in cultures where conditions are such that these distinctions can be made. I will 
explicate this a bit in the next chapter, in the section 'New types of truth,' p. 308. 
7.2 Two Test Cases 
Now I want to turn my attention to using Rappaport's theory of religion, recast using the 
concept of symbolic social teleodynamics, to deal with 'test cases' in religious studies that have 
posed problems or pushed the limits of explicit or implicit ideas about what 'religion' is. The 
goal is to demonstrate that having explicit and well-developed categories for thinking about 
religion can usefully deal with these 'outliers.' 
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7.2.1 Confucianism 
7.2.1.1 Introduction to the problem 
In introducing a text exploring whether Confucianism is a religion, Neville (1990) argues 
that there are three defining aspects to a religion, summarized as: 
1. A cosmology, defining the "fundamental structures and limits of the world and forming 
the basic ways in which cultures and individuals imagine how things are and what they 
mean." 
2. Ritual, which is finite sets of repeatable and symbolizable actions that epitomize187 
things a tradition takes to be crucial to defining the normative place of humans in the 
cosmos. 
3. Procedures for "fundamental transformation aimed to relate persons harmoniously to 
the normative cosmological elements, the path of spiritual perfection." 
As my argument has developed in this dissertation, I am in wide agreement with Neville's 
summary, as I have argued that each of these could be considered an entailment of a symbolic 
teleodynamic form of social organization. Specifically, I have suggested that a religious 
community, if it holds to the form I have described, will have concepts of the divine, composed 
of non-indexing Ultimate Sacred Postulates and analogical Dominant Symbols, together which 
characterize the way in which the invisible world is relevant to the visible world. It will have a 
means by which these 'tokens of transcendence' are set apart and authorized, which I have 
argued is the function of the ritual element of a religious community. A symbolic teleodynamic 
religious community will invite and provide room for decentering and the transformation of the 
person to a 'higher self' that is implied in the dominant symbols. This invitation for 
transformation comes as a formal entailment of rituals surrounding tokens of transcendence, 
and it is experienced as the divine making itself manifest. And together, these features of a 
187 I would suggest set apart and authorize in addition to epitomize, following Rappaport. 
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symbolic teleodynamic religious community create a special kind of community, 'a community 
of saints,' linked together by the fact that they share in the same tokens of transcendence. This 
community will manifest reproduction/variation/selection, leading to intelligent development in 
its cultural environment. 
So the question I will explore in this section is the question, Is Confucianism a religion? 
According to Neville, there are those who say no, who see Confucianism as a way to perfect 
certain important social relations. For this group, there is nothing else to sagehood than to 
conform to normative ways of life. Those who say yes argue "some version or other of the 
classical Nee-Confucian thesis that true humanity is fully achieved only when the usual run of 
life is transformed so as to manifest Principle in a full and perspicuous way." We will examine 
examples of both claims, getting a sense of the argument. Then, from the perspective of a 
'symbolic teleodynamic' conception of religious communities, we will examine the evidence 
concerning Confucianism, concluding with a particular look at the life of a 'modern Confucian 
sage,' Okada Takehiko. 
7.2.1.2 The view of Seligman et al. 
First, let us examine a view of Confucianism that would be hard to characterize as 'religious' 
by any definition ofthe term. It is contained in Seligman eta I.'s Ritual and its Consequences 
{2008). This book, which is a rich source for understanding the deep appeal of a ritual way of 
life, is notable, to this reader at least, for its lack of reference to theological or religious 
elements in its exposition of ritual. Specifically, there is almost no mention of a hidden realm 
inaccessible to normal rational and pragmatic experience and forms of life. 
When the authors offer an example of ritual that fits the view they wish to promote, they 
turn to an early Chinese text on ritual called "Nature Emerges from the Decree" (Xing Zi Ming 
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Chu), which they note is a recently excavated text from the fourth century bee. In what follows, 
I will utilize mostly direct quotes of their explication and expansion of this text, though changing 
the order somewhat and occasionally adding close paraphrases and transitional phrases for 
clarity: 188 
According to "Nature Emerges from the Decree," it is up to humans to build patterns of 
relationships out of this fractured world. There are only actions, and it is up to humans 
to ritualize some of those actions and thereby set up an ordered ethical way of life. The 
reason why this is necessary is humans are containers of emotional energies. These 
energies are constantly being dragged out by our encounters with things, including 
others. The Way, here defined as movement itself, starts with our dispositions and the 
ways that our energies cause us to interact with other things. The goal of human 
growth is to move from our dispositions to "propriety"- responding to things properly, 
instead of by immediate disposition. And the repeated study that makes this possible is 
based upon ritual and related forms of practice- a canon of proper behavior that has 
been built up through past responses. 
Ritual is a repertoire of these patterns of relationship, a repertoire that is endlessly 
growing, constantly changing, and always in danger of becoming inadequate. The 
criterion for which actions from the past should become part of that ritual canon is 
whether their continued performance helps to refine one's ability to respond to others. 
This canon consists of the set of songs collected as the Book of Songs, the speeches 
collected in the Book of Documents, the rituals collected in the Book of Rituals, and the 
music collected as the Music.189 Originally, these appropriate songs, speeches, and 
rituals were merely a small subset of the many responses humans gave to their lived 
situations. But the later-born sages deemed some of these actions exemplary, and as 
such defined them as part of a ritual canon that people in general should enact. Sages 
put them into an order and built an educational curriculum out of them. The goal of 
such an enactment would be to refine one's own dispositions: by reenacting exemplary 
actions from the past, one trains one's responses so that one can achieve propriety. 
To expand upon the teaching of this text, one of the goals of ritual is to train 
practitioners to be able to act as ifthere were a ritual telling them what to do. In the 
Analects of Confucius, the distinction is made between ritual and humaneness. 
Humaneness is perhaps best understood as simply the way that one acts ritually when 
188 Taken from Seligman et al. (2008, 32-35). 
189 These are older classical texts Confucius appealed to. 
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there is no ritual to tell one what to do. The practice of ritual should help direct proper 
conduct in a situation outside of the proper context of a known ritual. For example, one 
trains a child to say 11thank you." For the first few years of this, it is just by rote, but the 
hope is that the child, as she grows, will be able to express equivalent forms of 
expressing gratitude in situations where a simple 11thank you" would be inappropriate. 
If one spends one's life doing rituals properly, then one gains a sense of how the 
subjunctive world constructed out of those rituals could be constructed in situations 
without a ritual precedent, or in situations where ritual obligations conflict. For early 
Confucian thinkers, there is an even higher level than humaneness: the highest example 
of ritual action was to become a sage. But one can define a sage as simply someone who 
acts properly in any given situation, whether or not there is a ritual precedent to guide 
his action. 
I do not suggest Seligman et al. mean this account of one particular Chinese text to be a 
picture of 'Confucianism;' they use it as an example of a ritual approach to life they feel is 
valuable. But the important fact is this text, and the authors' explication of it, makes use of 
many of the same terms and themes that those who think Confucianism is a religion make use 
of- terms such as Ritual, Humaneness, the Way, and Sage190 - but here, these terms are used in 
such a way that nothing 'mystical' or religious is invoked. This demonstrates that it is possible to 
interpret Confucianism, as Neville noted, as merely a way to perfect certain important social 
relations, and that there is nothing else to sagehood than conforming to normative ways of life. 
Key moves in this approach are 
a) To use purely pragmatic criterion for deciding which actions from the past should 
become part of the ritual canon- i.e. 11Whether continued performance of them helps 
to refine one's ability to respond to others." 
b) To define the Way as something known to normal experience- i.e. "movement itself." 
c) To describe the process of development and growth of an individual as something one 
does to and for oneself- e.g. It refining one's own dispositions;' It reenacting exemplary 
actions from the past;" and ~~training ones responses." 
19
° Capitalized, italicized terms throughout this section represent technical terms in Confucianism. 
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d) To consider the sage as simply someone who acts properly in any given situation. 
If this text is representative of Confucianism, then I think it is not difficult to see that it fits 
none of the criterion of a symbolic teleodynamic social entity. But what do others say? 
7.2.1.3 The view of Ames 
Let us turn to Ames (2003L who notes certain key terms in Confucianism have cosmological 
significance, and uses the term religious to describe Confucianism, although his account 
down plays the importance of a hidden realm inaccessible to normal rational and pragmatic 
experience and forms of life. The overall effect of Ames' argument suggests descriptions of a 
Confucian approach to religiosity can be conceived in generic enough terms to 'soften-to-the-
point-of-silencing' concepts of the hidden-but-real divine. 
Ames writes that his primary goal is to defend Confucianism from those who misrepresent 
it from opposite sides: from those who offer a 'Christianized/ Heaven-centered interpretation 
of classical Confucianism; and from the "default claim" that Confucianism is merely a secular 
humanism. Ames suggests there is a personal transformation in Confucianism: a 
transformation of the quality of one's life in the ordinary business of the day (165). In his 
analysis of the classical Confucian text Doctrine of the Mean, we get an idea of how that 
transformation occurs, and to what end: "sustained attention to achieving equilibrium by 
staying centered in the familiar affairs of one's life ... leads ultimately to religious experience and 
pays off in religious dividends" (170). 
But what does Ames mean by 'religious' when he talks about religious experience and 
religious dividends? He argues that in the Confucian corpus, it boils down to a "focused 
appreciation of the complex meaning and value of the total field of existing things through a 
reflexive awakening to ... one's own participatory role as co-creator" (177). This is an important 
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sentence in his overall argument; let us unpack it a bit. First, note that none ofthe terms need 
be interpreted as theological terms. Neither 'focused attention' nor 'meaning and value' nor 
'total field of existing things' nor 'reflexive awakening' nor 'co-creator' require analysis in terms 
of the categories suggested by 'tokens of transcendence.' For example, Ames defines 'co-
creativity' from the Confucian perspective as "getting the most out of one's experience" (166). 
And 'reflexive awakening' seems to be covered by the realization that human growth is both 
"shaped by and contributes to the meaning of" the total field of existing things (165). Further, 
Ames notes that the Doctrine of the Mean suggests humans have everything they need to 
achieve realization without reference to something transcendent, and the world is sufficiently 
served by such human creativity that it need not appeal to divine intervention (177). 
But buried in these descriptions is at least one key idea that, when Ames describes it, does 
seem to point in the direction of hidden, divine content. What is meant by the idea that human 
co-creativity contributes to the meaning of the total field of existing things? Ames elaborates on 
this idea in terms that appear to be theological statements. He suggests that in classical 
Confucianism, becoming centered in the familiar relations of life (exemplified best by family life) 
produces a "harmony that is achieved through patterns of deference." As one learns to extend 
deference into the world, "one ultimately be~omes a co-creator of cosmic proportions in 
nurturing the processes of heaven and earth" (170). 
Certainly, becoming a co-creator of cosmic proportions, nurturing the processes of heaven 
and earth, goes beyond what normal experience might expect to get out of practicing certain 
deferential behaviors towards family members. So why would one believe that deferential 
behaviors towards family members has this effect? This idea seems important to understanding 
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Confucianism somehow. But Ames does not expound on what the source of this belief is, or 
how it fits in to the other aspects of Confucian life he develops. 
For example, his account of sagehood- the end goal of the process of personal 
transformation in Confucianism- is described in terms that require no elaboration or appeal to 
the hidden realm. And Ames writes that the practice of Ritual, which is how one learns and 
practices deference and supposedly becomes a co-creator of heaven and earth, is simply 
learned patterns of deference performed individually and elegantly. Ritual is the uniqueness of 
a participant as one engages the aesthetic project of becoming a person, achieving a disposition, 
an attitude, a posture, an identity. It is personal performance revealing one's worth to oneself 
and one's community, the creative elaboration of one's self within one's life (173, 5). If these 
characterizations are correct, how could a Confucian think by it he or she is becoming a co-
creator of cosmic proportions through Ritual? 
Thus, though Ames attempts to use terms like 'religious' to explain and capture the essence 
of Confucianism- e.g. Rites "are value-revealing life forms that attract emulation and inspire 
religious devotion" (174)- he hasn't developed any aspects of Confucian practice that seems to 
fit the description of a religious community as a symbolic teleodynamic entity. If Ames is right, 
Confucianism could not be considered a religion on those terms. But what if we take the 
cosmological idea noted by Ames (becoming "a co-creator of cosmic proportions ... nurturing the 
processes of heaven and earth") as having causal relevance in a Confucian worldview? 
7.2.1.4 The view of Ching 
Julia Ching (1986) has argued that Confucianism has deeply mystical elements, and that 
these elements have been significant throughout the course of the Confucian heritage. Her 
account is notable for its emphasis on "higher consciousness" and "something greater than" the 
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individual, actively sought as the source of sage hood and propriety by many of the 'leading 
lights' of Confucianism. 
She begins by describing the religious context of Confucius himself, noting that his language 
and arguments are grounded in an inherited religious view of the Lord on High- Heaven. At the 
time, this was a supreme and personal deity. Ching notes that though Confucius was largely 
quiet about god and the afterlife, he says it was Heaven that both gave him his message and 
protected him. And though he was skeptical about ghosts and spirits, he believed human beings 
are accountable to a supreme being. Though he only discreetly mentions Heaven, his own self-
description suggests a man who cultivated an interior life with the goal of grasping the will of 
Heaven so deeply that his instincts were transformed, and he learned to appreciate the things of 
the spirit (65-6). 
Two early Confucians, Mencius and Hsun-tzu, though very different in certain respects, 
each developed a mystical approach to the individual in proper social relations. Mencius, when 
writing about the correct inner disposition for Ritual, alludes "to the presence in the heart of an 
actuality greater than itself" (77). And while belief in a supreme god seems to have diminished 
in China after the time of Mencius, a mystical bent to Confucianism continued. Hsun-tzu didn't 
belief in heaven as a supernatural being or power, but instead, thought in terms of a "heavenly 
principle" which should regulate our natural likes and dislikes. This heavenly principle was our 
original, deep self. It is characterized by a particular aesthetic, harmony, which can be seen 
most clearly in Ritual and music. Ritual and music help us to bring to expression our inner 
equilibrium and tranquility, which ought to reflect the harmony between heaven and earth (66-
7). Hsun-tzu wrote "in the wisdom and completeness of their ceremonies and music, we see the 
directing power of Heaven and Earth" (68). 
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Ching notes a deep mysticism to the classic texts of Confucianism, as Sage-Kings are 
presented in dialogue with Heaven, as sons of Heaven receiving instructions and gaining 
blessings and protection (77). Even texts that seem to eschew this view of Heaven, such as the 
Doctrine of the Mean, describe how internal, emotional harmony puts one in touch with the 
processes of life and creativity. That harmony links Heaven, the cosmos, and the individual in 
his/her social relations suggests to Ching the traditional microcosm-macrocosm correlation 
between the inner workings of human mind/hearts and the creative processes of the universe 
(68). The Doctrine of the Mean clearly expresses the belief "that emotional harmony opens man 
to something greater than himself." According to Ching, this text supplied the impetus to a 
Confucian form of meditation (69). 
Ching moves on to examine Nee-Confucianism as it developed in the late first 
millennium/beginning of the second millennium. She is particularly interested in how Nee-
Confucian meditation- though perhaps inspired by Buddhist and Taoist versions- was 
consistent with a classical Confucian worldview, and even opened up classic Confucian themes 
for further development. She notes two sides to Nee-Confucian spirituality, understood under 
the over-arching terms 'diminution' and 'growth.' Neo-Confucians recognized the "need of 
'preserving the Heavenly principle and eliminating human passions"' (70). The idea was that 
"spiritual growth is possible only when accompanied functionally by a certain degree of self-
denial" (69). Through meditation, unity and harmony and knowledge of the moral self was 
sought, with the goal of self-improvement, allowing a fuller manifestation of the Heavenly 
principle within. Through Confucian meditation, one is returning to one's original nature (74). 
"Confucian meditation ... entails not just an examination of conscience, but is definitely oriented 
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toward a higher consciousness through the emptying of the self and of desires" (Ching 1986, 74-
5). 
For Ching, Confucian history demonstrates a thoroughly mystical perspective on human 
existence. Perhaps the single best exemplification of Ching's account of the Confucian 
perspective is found in her comment, "To become humane- that is, a perfect human being-
one must /preserve' and /nurture' the Heavenly principle within one's mind and heart" (71). It 
seems, then, for Ching mystical belief is at the center of Confucian thought. And this would 
seem to put her- at least superficially- at odds with the approaches of Seligman et al. and 
Ames, who focus on socially beneficent and aesthetic behavior, respectively. Lurking behind all 
of these accounts, however, has been the idea of personal change. Confucianism seems to 
involve a program for personal change; the question is, what kind of change does Confucianism 
promote? 
7.2.1.5 The view of Taylor 
In Taylor (1990), we find a focus on the idea of transformation as that which allows us to 
distinguish between a philosophical absolute and a religious absolute. The distinction is 
important for Taylor; in effect, philosophical absolutes changes how we think; religious 
absolutes change how we are. His argument is that in Confucianism, we have a clear example of 
a religious absolute that effects transformation. Taylor focuses on several different historical 
periods and aspects of Confucianism to make his point; I will draw on some of his analysis in a 
later section when I argue my own position. For now, I want to focus on his account of classical 
Confucianism, the role of the sage, and how Neo-Confucians sought to attain sage hood. 
Taylor begins his discussion, as did Ching, by asking what element of classical Confucianism 
demonstrates a cosmological aspect. He answers that it is the concept of Heaven, which was 
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the name of the high God of the Chou people. He suggests that for Confucius, "the relationship 
of humankind to Heaven" functions as an absolute. But the question Taylor asks is whether this 
cosmological principle functions as a philosophical absolute or a religious absolute. To be able 
to distinguish between these is, in my view, an important theoretical advancement Taylor offers 
to the debate. Taylor argues that for an absolute to function as a religious absolute, it "must 
provide for a relationship with the individual" (2). 
Taylor next asks us to consider in what respect 'relationship' can be established with an 
absolute. His answer is that an absolute involves a relationship with an individual if it involves 
personal transformation. This, in effect, is his definition of 'religion'; he writes, "Religion 
provides not only for a relationship with what is defined as the absolute, but provides as well a 
way for the individual to move toward that which is identified as the absolute." Ultimate 
transformation is the "quintessential characteristic in the identification of a religious tradition" 
(3, italics mine). If this is the case, the "question for the Confucian tradition is the degree to 
which Heaven, or the Principle of Heaven, establishes a relationship with humankind that 
provides a means of ultimate transformation, such that humankind might realize a transformed 
relationship and thus enter into a transformed state of being." Taylor suggests that we find the 
answer to that question in the Sage, who features large in both classical and Nee-Confucianism. 
Taylor argues that "in the relationship between Heaven as a religious absolute and the sage as a 
transformed person, we have the identification of a soteriological process and, as a result, the 
identification of the religious core ofthe tradition." Importantly, the Sage, in his/her 
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relationship to Heaven, serves as a model for the relationship of the Confucian tradition as a 
whole to Heaven (3).191 
Taylor's account of classical Confucianism focuses on the way in which a peculiar kind of 
power was supposed to be released through sagehood. That power was viewed as flowing from 
the cosmological structure of the universe. In classical Confucianism, to develop one's moral 
nature was not an exercise in developing one's potential only; it was, in addition, to establish 
correlation with the Way of Heaven. This was viewed as a establishing a relationship with an 
immanent, absolute principle {51). The Way of Heaven was viewed as being the "ultimate moral 
order of the universe itself of which humankind is but a microcosm." From this unseen but real 
source of authority, both human nature and the cosmos itself gained their moral nature. The 
great Sage-Kings of the past understood the Way of Heaven, and thus became conduits for the 
release of the power of Heaven into their rule (21, 24). Confucians, according to Taylor, asked 
the rulers of their day to take a risk that wasn't really a risk- to focus not on political power and 
strength, but rather on a return to the ways of moral virtue, particularly exemplified in the Sage-
Kings of the past. Because the moral nature of the individual was also the moral nature of the 
cosmos, getting into right relationship with Heaven would bring security, as the Way of Heaven 
itself would act to bring all things into order. No action beyond proper relationship to Heaven 
was needed. This Effortless Action would release moral virtue, resulting in political security and 
well-being (8-9, 14-16, 22). 
Since sagehood was such an important aspect of classical Confucianism, Taylor argues the 
works that recorded the deeds of Sages as they embodied the Way of Heaven became central 
191 This seems to be because Taylor imagines the soul of the Confucian tradition to be the production of a 
lineage of Sage-Kings. 
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for the Confucian tradition. These works became of II major import for the development of the 
individual and society alike, for they represent the deeds of those who understood the Way of 
Heave nil (24). The deeds of the Sages, which could be accessed in the present through the 
Ritual way of life, had the ability, as Confucius noted, to bring the noble person llback to 
essentials," and could transform him such that he could be 11 relied upon not to turn against what 
he stood for" (26, quoting Analects 6:27). In sum, then, the Sage way of life II manifests" the 
Way of Heaven to the world; since Confucianism had as its goal to transmit the Way, the Classics 
of Confucianism became the depository of the deeds of the Sages, and thus the model for how 
the Way was to be taken up in the present. Eventually, the 'Five Classics' of Confucianism would 
be engraved in stone and become state orthodoxy during the Han dynasty (30-32). 
Finally, let us look at Taylor's account of the process of attaining sagehood in Neo-
Confucianism. For neo-Confucians like Chu Hsi, the classics were useful because they had a 
11philosophical capacity to reveal. .. the underlying metaphysical structure revealed in all things," 
Principle (33). But when one approached the classics, it was to be done for their value in self-
cultivation, not as an exercise in philology (34). Since the classics were the quintessential 
expression of Principle, they could 11penetrate to the deepest layers of one's own nature" and 
were useful for 11Unraveling ... the depth of a person's moral and spiritual core, his true nature 
and mind" (35). This view ofthe classics and their role in transformation- though implemented 
differently in Nee-Confucianism than in classical Confucianism192 - was rooted in the same 
cosmological view that played a role in classical Confucianism: the relation of Heaven to the 
cosmos and to humanity. For Neo-Confucians, heaven is the unifying structure ofthe world; 
192 Specifically, through an emphasis on meditational techniques in Nee-Confucianism that distinguishes it 
from classical Confucianism's emphasis on ritual deference. 
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everything shares in it and is unified by it. Moral virtue unifies everything; Heaven and earth are 
one body; nothing is 'not oneself.' A heart that cannot bear suffering becomes the central 
moral response to a world seen it its unity. Thus, there can be no limit to Humanity when 
properly cultivated in oneself (132). 
7.2.1.6 Discussion 
Now that we have these four perspectives in view, what sense can we make of 
Confucianism in light of the categories suggested by symbolic teleodynamics? First, we must 
note that there are many aspects of Confucianism that seem to confound the discussion, and 
each confounding aspect acts as a mirror suggesting what each of our author's implicit theory of 
'religion' is. One confounding element is the fact that there seems to be an internal discussion 
within Confucianism itself concerning whether transformation occurs from 'outside-in,' as 
seems suggested by a 'sociological' strain of Confucianism, or from 'inside-out,' as seems to be 
suggested by an 'idealist' strain of Confucianism. 193 A second confounding element is the fact 
that the emphasis of classical Confucianism on the King and the State- which played out in 
Confucianism becoming state orthodoxy and the basis for determining political appointments-
can be contrasted with the another strand in Confucianism emphasizing the importance of self-
cultivation in every individual. 194 A third confounding element is the fact that Confucianism's 
origins were in an age where personal gods were the norm, yet the divine in Confucianism 
193 Fung (1966) argues that this debate- first seen in the differences between Mencius and Hsun Tzu, is at 
the heart of the Confucian discussion throughout the ages. Also, see Fingarette's (1972) discussion of the 
difference between Ritual and Humanity in Confucius' thought (46-57) for an 'outside-in' perspective, and 
Taylor's (1990) discussion of 'spiritual autobiography' in Nee-Confucianism (Ch. 4) for an inside-out 
perspective. 
194 Compare Taylor's (1990, 7) and Fung's (1966, 215) discussion of the 'traditional place' and 'proper 
sphere' of Confucianism in statecraft, to Tu's (1986, 10) discussion of Neo-Confucian concerns that the 
very institutionalization of Confucianism was the 'loss' of true Confucianism. 
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developed in an impersonal direction. 195 A final confounding element- perhaps the most 
important- is the fact that in Confucianism the 'ontology of the Absolute'- the way the divine 
is characterized- seems to develop away from a pole of a pre-existing, stable, transcendent 
'other,' and in the direction of a immanent, dynamic, patterning of the here-and-now. I believe 
much of the difference in the accounts of Confucianism in the works examined above can be 
seen to be based in commitments to one or another of these poles as the basis for defining 
religion. And I suggest none of these in themselves are relevant to the discussion of the status of 
Confucianism as a religious community. 
To make this point, I want to take up this last confounding element in a little more depth, 
as a proper understanding of decentering and its role in the teleodynamics of a religious 
community can helpfully clear things up. To do this, the positions of Ames and Ching must be 
contrasted, as I believe their differences lie in how they articulate the 'ontology of the Absolute.' 
Ames, as we have seen, tries to distinguish Confucianism from secular humanism, on the one 
hand, and a Western, Christianized 'religion' on the other. He argues that the Western, 
'worship' model of religion, which relies on something prior, independent, and external, is 
countered in Confucianism by a 'production' model of religion, where the quality of religious life 
is a consequence of the quality of communal life. In Ames' view of Confucianism, religion is the 
flower of a flourishing community, not its root. Since we can distinguish the Confucian view that 
humanity co-creates with the cosmos from the Western view that something prior, 
independent, and external created the cosmos, Ames thinks we should also be able to see why 
ordinary human experience, when properly lived, can be the source of intense religious 
195 Note that in Fung's history of Confucianism (1966, particularly Ch. 1), 'natural' is largely equated with 
'impersonal,' and 'superstition' (and religion) with 'personal,' and thus it is argued that Confucianism is 
philosophy, not religion. 
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experience (Ames 2003, 165-6). But, as I pointed out, when it comes to discussing what 
'religion' and 'religious' actually boils down to in terms of individual transformation, Ames 
suggests the practice of Ritual is simply learned patterns of deference performed individually 
and elegantly. Ritual is the uniqueness of a participant as one engages the aesthetic project of 
becoming a person, achieving a disposition, an attitude, a posture, an identity. It is personal 
performance revealing one's worth to oneself and one's community, the creative elaboration of 
one's self within one's life {173, 5). Though Ames argues that the Confucian goal is towards an 
immanent, here-and-now patterning of life that is religious, his account of how one achieves this 
seems thoroughly mundane, a matter of self-perfection and the expression externally of 
aesthetic grace. 
Ching's account, on the other hand, so strongly emphasizes the interior and mystical nature 
of transformation in Confucianism- the experienced reality of "the will of Heaven" and "the 
things of the spirit;"196 the desire for "something greater than [man]" 197 and a "higher 
consciousness;"198 the "quest for sagehood, which can only be understood with reference to the 
interior life ... and sometimes to mystical experience" 199 - that one wonders how any of the other 
authors we've examined could have had a different opinion. 200 The problem here, I think, is that 
her argument uses metaphors taken from the original context of Confucianism, as well as from 
the Western audience she is largely addressing. These metaphors suggest an 'ontological 
absolute' obviously removed from the here-and-now: a person (God) in a place (Heaven) and at 
a time (antedating human experience). The absolute is distant from regular human experience 
196 P. 66. 
197 P. 69. 
t9sP.75. 
199 P. 79. 
200 And I say this not as a scholar of Confucianism, but out of due respect for the wildly different opinions 
on the topic of Confucian transformation that are offered by Seligman et al., Ames, and Ching. 
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of the here-and-now. As Confucianism developed against these characterizations, however, its 
dominant symbols were transformed into metaphors involving a 'dynamic patterned absolute,' 
the Way: always present in every moment of the here-and-now, though requiring a type of 
'spiritual excavation' to become manifest.201 While Ching certainly notes the dynamic aspect of 
Confucian dominant symbols,202 she seems to overstate the way interiority and the distance it 
suggests from the here-and-now is necessary for Confucian spiritual practice; its dominant 
symbols more naturally lead to an emphasis on embodied practice. In fact, Taylor notes Neo-
Confucian debates concerning the value of meditation circled around the tension between the 
distance from the here-and-now presupposed by interiority, and the presentness that is the 
chief characteristic of the Way. 203 
So what does symbolic teleodynamics add to this discussion? I argued that an implication 
of viewing religious communities as symbolic teleodynamic entities was that the 'center' of a 
religious community was the way tokens of transcendence are taken up to produce decentered 
consciousness. That is, the way religious transformation occurs, to use Taylor's terminology. 
And one crucial aspect of this process is the suppression of normal experience, the necessary 
precursor to decentering. The critical point is if the Confucian Way is considered to exist largely 
hidden from normal consciousness, to recognize and embody the Way in the dynamics of the 
'here-and-now' requires the suppression of normal consciousness. The discipline of self-
cultivation required to attain sagehood must necessarily involve quieting and suppressing 
201 Fingarette's account of the chief metaphor of classical Confucianism- the Way- is very helpful in this 
regard. See (Fingarette 1972, 16-24). 
202 
"Confucian mysticism enables the person to perceive the profoundly dynamic character of the 
Heavenly principle within, the principle by which birds fly, fishes swim and human beings love virtue" (79). 
203 See Taylor (1990, 94). 
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aspects of human nature to allow the true, hidden nature of Humanity to be expressed. 204 So 
when Ames rightly explains how Heaven should not be thought of as a 'place out there,' but 
rather as an aesthetic manifestation 'here,' but at the same time doesn't acknowledge the 
hidden aspect of Heaven to normal experience, he misses the role decentering plays in 
Confucian transformation. And when Ching rightly notices the hidden nature of the Way to 
normal consciousness, but doesn't put enough emphasis on the immanent nature of that 
absolute principle, she can overstate the place of mystical interiority in Confucianism. 
This is why I think that Taylor, by placing emphasis on the nature of Confucian 
transformation, places the emphasis in exactly the right place. It is not how tokens of 
transcendence are characterized philosophically that is most central to a religious community; 
what is central is the way that they are taken up into suppressed conscious experience as the 
source of decentering. Seligman et al. and Ames- at least in the works we examined- do not 
consider how the tokens of transcendence of Confucianism are hidden to normal experience, 
and this forces them to argue that the Confucianism they examine is a 'way to perfect certain 
social relations,' 205 whether or not that was the expressed goal of their work. 
The way anomalous experience has been treated in Confucianism confirms that 
suppression and decentering is of profound importance to understanding it (and this in turn 
demonstrates the usefulness of a symbolic teleodynamic perspective to the problem). I have 
argued that anomalous experience is always at least invited through participation in a religious 
204 That quieting can occur in a multitude of ways in the Confucian tradition, both through disciplined 
embodied action, as well as through meditation techniques. A full account of this in Confucianism would 
be a project in its own right, but Fung, Taylor, Ching, and Fingarette each suggest different ways that this 
self-quieting occurs. Note particularly Ching's discussion of 'dimunition,' which strongly suggests 
Durhkheim's negative cult. Even Ames' account of how Confucius is portrayed in the middle chapters of 
the Analects offers a perspective on this. 
205 Please note again, as I have mentioned, that Seligman et al. are not taking the document they analyzed 
to be characteristic of all forms of Confucianism; they are using it to point to the view of ritual they favor. 
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community, through the way religious communities establish non-material, hidden truths as 
authoritative. And while decentering does not require it, anomalous experience can serve as 
the most spectacular demonstration of the efficacy of the hidden world in bringing about 
religious transformation. Does Confucianism have a place for anomalous experience? Scholars 
have rightly pointed to the 'ordinariness' that is claimed to be central to Confucian 
transformation/06 this, I think, provides the impetus to the approaches of Seligman et al. and 
Ames, where 'ordinary' meanings are given to key Confucian terms. But the ordinariness 
referenced in Confucian transformation is best thought of as the fact that the Way is to be 
found in ordinary experience- familiar experience such as family life- and not that the Way 
itself is ordinary. There has always been a mystical or ideal component to Confucianism 
suggesting anomalous experience of the Way. Confucius assumed a 'magic power' 207 that 
provided the basis for taking a 'risk that is not a risk' 208 in his arguments for moral reform to the 
political leaders of his day, and he stated that Heaven had 'given him' his task. Mencius, one of 
the leading initial interpreters of Confucius, speaks of the 'great flood of Spirit' that suggests a 
powerful experience during his meditative practice. 209 And the expectation of 'sudden 
enlightenment' in Chu Hsi,210 exemplified in the spiritual autobiographies of Neo-Confucian 
sages,211 demonstrates a friendliness to anomalous experience in Neo-Confucian life. Taylor, 
trying to summarize the historical data on anomalous experience in Neo-Confucianism, suggests 
206 See particularly Fung and Taylor on this point. 
207 Fingarette, ch. 1. 
208 Taylor, ch. 1. 
209 On this topic, Richey writes, "It is [on the topic of the great flood of Spirit] that Mencius is at his most 
mystical, and recent scholarship has suggested that he and his disciples may have practiced a form of 
meditative discipline akin to yoga ... While faint glimpses of what may be ascetic and meditative disciplines 
sometimes appear in the Analects, nowhere in the text are there detailed discussions of nurturing one's qi 
such as can be found in Mencius 2A2" (Richey). 
210 Fung, 305-6. 
211 Taylor, ch. 4. 
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the basic view during this period was that experiences of enlightenment were not something 
towards which Confucian practice should be oriented, since that would create an expectation 
that sudden enlightenment was something to seek after. They should, however, be something 
ordinary; correct self-cultivation might be expected to produce such experiences. Though not 
the 'endpoint' of Confucian self-cultivation, it is a sign of the emergence of true nature, and a 
prelude to correct application of one's moral efforts (Taylor 1990, 111-3). I suggest the reason 
Confucians throughout their history have been friendly to anomalous experience is that 
decentering- allowing the 'hidden' truths to be made manifest in individual consciousness- is 
part and parcel ofthe way Confucian tokens of transcendence are made effective in Confucian 
life. 
7.2.1. 7 Okada as example of a Confucian Sage 
As a final example of the way Confucianism demonstrates symbolic teleodynamics, let us 
consider Taylor's account of Okada Takehiko, a Confucian whom he knew and interviewed over 
a number of years. I want to consider Okada as a present-day Confucian seeking sage hood, 
defending a set of tokens of transcendence for the sake of individual transformation and social 
redemption. Taylor says when he first met Okada, he was struck by the difference between 
meeting a mere scholar of the tradition, and meeting someone in whom the tradition 'lives.' 
The distinction between these two kinds of people is both obvious and hard to capture. He 
notes that Okada's concern, instead of being primarily of academic interest, is for the "plight of 
his generation," since he feels the world is in "tremendous moral and spiritual decline" (Taylor 
1990, 140). Okada seems to be holding the world as he sees it to a universal standard, an 
absolute ideal, which he himself has embraced and had found personally transforming, and 
which the world has fallen from. In fact, Okada tells Taylor that the solution to the moral and 
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spiritual decline he sees is the practice of Confucian meditation, a practice that he has long 
embraced. Okada "says that it is these kinds of practices that will provide a means to solve the 
problems of the world in positive ways" (141). 
The reason why Okada believes Confucian meditation to be a universally powerful method 
of rectification can be gleaned from his comments on modern science. While he supports the 
progress of science, he is disturbed by the lack of connection between scientific and Confucian 
worldviews. But why would he think there should be a connection between them? Okada 
refers to Chu Hsi's view that human nature and the laws of nature operate on the same 
principle, that there is a natural relationship between them. The ethical nature of humanity as 
exemplified in Confucianism can and should be extended to the nature of all things. And 
conversely, if a scientific worldview fails to incorporate the ethical nature of humanity as part of 
nature itself, it will misunderstand nature (142). This is a clear example that Okada takes 
Confucian tokens of transcendence to be true;212 a hidden reality is the ground for both cosmic 
and human truths. But why would Okada be convinced that these particular tokens of 
transcendence are true, as opposed to others? Isn't he aware that there are other cosmological 
viewpoints on the world? And why would he think the ethical goodness of humanity is the true 
state of things? Aren't there other viewpoints on the 'true' nature of humanity? 
Okada answers both of these questions in the same way. He acknowledges there are other 
positions on the true nature of the cosmos and humanity, but he appeals to the deep inner 
experience that Confucian transformation has given him, confirming the truth of Confucian 
views. The goodness of human nature is not, for Okada, a product of rational inquiry, but a 
product of insight produced by deep inner experience. Through the introspective and 
212 For an account of the different ways 'true' can be considered, see "New types of truth," p. 309. 
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meditational techniques of Confucianism, the proof of the true nature of humanity and the 
cosmos can be found, as people take up the ongoing Confucian invitation to experience for 
themselves the goodness at the core of reality (144-5). This is an example of the way tokens of 
transcendence, when normal consciousness is suppressed, can be taken up to produce 
decentering, establish the experience of hidden truths revealed or manifested, solve existential 
problems, and provide the motives for reproducing the tokens of transcendence. And although 
Okada does not specifically discuss it, as individuals pursue this non-pragmatic, peculiar way of 
approaching experience en masse, Confucian tradition asserts that the social, communal forms 
produced will manifest the full flowering of the Way. 
Okada, in response to a further question by Taylor, takes an argumentative tack that 
confirms to me he is practicing Confucianism in a way conforming to symbolic teleodynamics. 
When specifically pushed by Taylor on whether he is advocating a universal Confucian way of 
salvation for all people everywhere, or merely a return to 'religion' in whatever manifestation it 
may appear, he responds by saying that since he is concerned with respect for human life, his 
concern transcends particular religious traditions, even the particularity of Confucianism. So it 
seems he is saying 'any religious tradition will do.' But he goes on to say he thinks Confucianism 
is better suited to provide the respect for human life he advocates, since its focus has always 
been on humankind. In Humanity, the Way of Heaven is reflected most perfectly. Thus, his 
overall argument, whether he recognizes it or not, is that the central concern of Confucianism is 
in fact the central problem of humanity- the central ineliminable opposition of real human 
experience. Though in human behavior we see a nature that disrespects human life, that 
problem is mystically resolved by discovering the Way of Heaven that is the real core of human 
nature. And that makes Confucianism the best choice for solving the problem. 
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I would argue he thinks this because metaperformative ritual authorizes tokens of 
transcendence to create a kind of truth, making the particular interests of Confucianism the 
universal problem of humanity. From Okada's perspective as a ritual participant, a Confucian 
response to this problem just 'happens' to be the solution. So he can think that his response is 
not coming from a Confucian-centered particularity, but rather from a pragmatic concern for 
solving a problem. What he doesn't note is that Confucianism selects one perspective from a 
large number of potential perspectives on human experience, and then offers the best solution 
to the problem highlighted by that particular perspective. This is further confirmed by a line of 
discussion between Okada and Taylor that superficially seems to contradict this 
characterization. Taylor says Okada believes we don't need to have Confucianism in the future, 
just a focus on the issue of human dignity. Particular, historically contingent Confucian 
doctrines may not withstand criticism, and may be only a vestige of the past; ancient teaching 
should not be a static embodiment of authority. 213 However, my take on this discussion is that 
Okada is merely renouncing a fundamentalist approach to the textual tradition; what he clearly 
is not abandoning is the belief that the hidden world exists as the Confucian tradition says it 
does. In fact, he seems so convinced the 'real' world exists in the way the Confucian tradition 
says it does, he doesn't feel the need to fight for the particularities of the actual, historical 
Confucian tradition itself. Okada tells Taylor "the essential Confucian teaching does not need its 
own reification" (Taylor 1990, 147, italics mine). 
213 This leads Taylor to equate Okada's position with the comment by Tu, "concern for the survival of the 
Confucian tradition ... must be subsumed under a broader concern for the future of humankind" (Tu 1986, 
20, quoted on p. 147) 
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7.2.1.8 Conclusion 
Taylor says Confucian scholars such as Tu point to Okada an example of the living Confucian 
tradition. And his account of Okada seems to confirm the expectations a symbolic teleodynamic 
view of Confucianism would predict. To the degree that Okada represents a lineage of 
Confucians seeking sagehood and building Confucian communities, going back through the Neo-
Confucians, Mencius, and ultimately to Confucius himself, we can profitably talk about 
Confucianism as a symbolic teleodynamic religious community. I could point to other aspects of 
the Confucian tradition that lead one to conclude it adheres to the formal characteristics of a 
symbolic teleodynamic entity. Particularly noteworthy is the way the tradition evolved in its 
cultural environment during the period of strong Taoist and Buddhist influences in China. There, 
the evidence suggests the tradition, while maintaining its boundaries, demonstrated intelligent 
variation, taking on ideas from other traditions in a particularly Confucian way, supporting a 
flowering of 'New Confucianism.' 214 
But I will finish this section with the observation that Ames' account of Confucianism is 
strongly reminiscent of Lowenthal's account of Haitian Voodoo, if we, pace Ames, take account 
of Confucian decentering in the way I think the evidence suggests. Ames, like Lowenthal, 
describes a particular aesthetic which binds together individual self-expression/personal 
development and the community in which the 'full flowering' of religious life occurs. If we note 
the element of decentering Ames ignores, we see that a ritually-authorized theological 
component- the Way and its manner of manifestation in human nature- Humanity- links 
together the psychic and the social under particular dominant symbols. This 'flowering' of a 
214 Particularly helpful in this respect is Fung's characterization of that history, and perhaps most 
persuasively, Taylor's (1990) account inCh. 5, which seems permeated by a concern for both boundaries 
and creative responses to challenges from without. 
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religious way of life is reproduced as the ineliminable oppositions of human life are mystically 
resolved in the space created by a community organized around tokens of transcendence. I 
suggest the overall arc of this section allows us to answer Neville's question about Confucianism 
in the affirmative- the large-scale trajectory of its organizational dynamics exhibits the 
characteristics of a symbolic social teleodynamic system. 
7.2.2 Deadheads and 'Spinners' 
So we have examined a 'classic' religious community that admittedly has posed problems 
for religious theorists. Now I want to turn attention to a 'not-so-classic' example. This example 
concerns a new religious movement, and, though unfamiliar, also points to the difficulty 
traditional implicit and explicit definitions of religion have with outlying cases. I think this 
example can be used to highlight the difference between a quasi-religious community- which I 
believe is best described as an indexical social teleodynamic systems- and what I believe to be a 
religious community proper, a symbolic social teleodynamic system. This example highlights 
how a symbolic teleodynamic religious community requires explicit and set-apart tokens of 
transcendence to function, while other forms of community have no use for tokens of 
transcendence. The example comes from sociological analyses of the followers of the musical 
group the Grateful Dead. In this section, I want to review what several theorists have concluded 
concerning the group often called 'Deadheads,' and compare that to a subgroup of Deadheads 
often referred to as the 'Spinners,' who later formed a church called the Church of Unlimited 
Devotion. 
7.2.2.1 Deadheads and sociological theory 
Martin (1979) argues that youth culture in general utilizes musical performances as 'secular 
rituals.' Secular rituals are defined as frames for experiences that offer opportunities for 
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communitas in nonmonolithic societies.215 The teenage years in general are rife with secular 
rituals, characterized by the use of symbols of "anti-structure"- which rock groups and 
performances exemplify- as a vehicle producing age-specific social solidarity. Different 
subcultures of people locate themselves socially around different star performers who act as a 
sacred 'totem' for that community. Sardiello (1994), noting this sociological characterization of 
youth music culture, suggests there is something more than this going on among Deadheads. 
Sardiello defines this community as an extended family drawn together by the Grateful Dead 
musical group for a concert ritual resembling a religious festival. He argues the 'spirituality' of 
Deadhead communities is "functionally equivalent to religious belief," since they "believe in a 
system of values which reinforces their individual and group identities" (124). Sutton (2000) 
notes that those who join the community of Deadheads are seeking (or at least are open to) 
communal mystical states at the concerts, and "any ritual culminating in the attainment of 
mystical experience is fundamentally a religious ritual because its purpose is exposure to 
extraordinary reality" (113). 
How is it that Deadheads experience "extraordinary states of consciousness through rituals 
at Grateful Dead concerts" (111)? Reist (1997) has compared Deadhead spirituality to that of 
tribal religious groups where the Grateful Dead themselves act as shamans to the community. 
From the 1960's on, the Dead have advocated the use of psychedelic drugs as a door to the 
transformation of consciousness. Reist notes that traditional shamans use this technique, and in 
addition to drug use, utilize percussive instruments, which create repetitive rhythms focusing 
attention and outcompeting stimuli from ordinary reality, and dancing. Grateful Dead shows are 
organized around these phenomena as well. Beyond these traditional shamanic techniques, 
215 Following Turner (1974b). 
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Reist suggests the highly improvisational style of the music produced at a concert are seen by 
band and audience a like as being a doorway to alternative forms of consciousness. Reist writes, 
[The bands] improvisational style of music is based on the idea that each of the 
musicians explore individual musical themes that come together in a gestalt that is 
greater than the sum of its parts. The audience also is a part of this gestalt and the band 
depends on a synergy with them to help build the energy for the show (191). 
Band leader Jerry Garcia confirms, 
When we get onstage, what we really want to happen is, we want to be transformed 
from ordinary players into extraordinary ones, like forces of a larger consciousness. And 
the audience wants to be transformed from what ordinary reality they may be in to 
something a little wider, something that enlarges them. So maybe it's that notion of 
transformation, a seat-of-the-pants shamanism, that has something to do with why the 
Grateful Dead keep pulling them in (184). 
If the band wants to be transformed into extraordinary players, what do Deadheads want 
to be transformed into? According to Sutton, for many Deadheads, what describes their 
motivation for continued participation in Grateful Dead shows is the possibility that individual 
consciousness will be transformed into 'group consciousness,' characterized by a euphoric sense 
of well-being and connectedness with others, a joyous sense of unity (Sutton 2000, 114-6). 
Reist expands on this theme: 
Though there is no explicit theology associated with the Grateful Dead, the band and 
their fans make repeated references to an unseen, indescribable force, sometimes 
called the X-factor, that manifests itself in the best performances and sets them apart 
from other shows. They regard an intense synergy between the band and the audience 
to be an indication of the X-factor's presence, but whether the X-factor IS that synergy 
or whether it is an external catalyst that creates that synergy is never really clear. The 
unnamed power is viewed as having a mind of its own that the band can facilitate, but 
not really control (Reist 1997, 189). 
This kind of alternative experience regularly encountered at Grateful Dead shows can 
become, for the Grateful Dead and Deadheads alike, "information on the nature of human life 
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and reality" (Sutton 2000, 121). The fact that the suppression of mundane consciousness is a 
component of the experience can suggest reality has a transcendent component, and the fact 
that a transformation occurs from individual to group consciousness suggests what that 
component is: the underlying unity of all things. While many 'fans' of particular musical groups 
may wear images taken from the band's iconography as a kind of identifying emblem, for 
Deadheads, that iconography can represent a totem in Durkheim's sense. Recall that for 
Durkheim, totem ism is not a religion of certain animals, or emblems, or persons, which are used 
as symbols, but rather a religion "of a kind of anonymous and impersonal force that is 
identifiable in each of these beings but identical to none of them." Individuals die, animals die, 
totemic images are replaced and erased, but the 'force' that unites them into a system 
remains. It is an immanent and impersonal divinity, without name or history, diffused in many 
things. An intangible substance linking many things is represented in the imagination; that 
substance or energy is the real object of the cult (Durkheim 1995/1915, 191). 
7.2.2.2 Spinners 
Now let us turn to a subgroup of Deadheads often referred to as the 'Spinners.' This was a 
small group (40 at the most) who followed the Grateful Dead while the band was touring. 
Spinners were vegetarian, and took vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. The members 
lived a largely nomadic existence until1990, when they bought a farm, and eventually became a 
church called the Church of Unlimited Devotion, based in Philo, CA. They were called 'Spinners' 
because of the spinning dance they performed both at concerts and as part of their religious 
devotions (Dempsey 1991). Hartley, who participated in the group from 1989-1992, says the 
group has an eclectic theology combining elements of Catholicism, Krishna Consciousness 
(Vasinava Hinduism), and Grateful Dead lyrics. One God communicates to humans through 
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scripture and the music of the Grateful Dead. The band, and particularly Jerry Garcia, is 
considered a channel or prophetic means by which God's energy is released. Dead shows are 
taken by this group as opportunities for religious services, carved out of the larger, non-religious 
Grateful Dead concert as a 'sacred space.' They did not have an alternative, self-encompassing 
religious service until the purchase of the farm (Hartley 2000, 131, 135). 
For Spinners, the concert experience, and primarily the music and lyrics of the band during 
the performance of a certain subset of their songs, reveal God's teachings. While the lyrics are 
not considered to be on par with Christian, Hindu, or other scriptures, they are considered 
similar to the poetry of Rumi: they are capable of being interpreted on multiple levels, both an 
obvious level, and a hidden, 'spiritual' level, that requires the listener to be in a spiritual place to 
comprehend. For Spinners, the most spiritual moments are Garcia's guitar solos. His music is 
seen as coming from the spiritual world (138-9, 140, 141). Spinners have decided opinions 
about what in Dead shows is conducive towards the worship of God, and what is not. Jerry 
Garcia and fellow guitarist Bob Weir are contrasted by the Spinners; Weir is seen as worldly and 
self-absorbed, while Jerry is seen as humble. These two represent good and evil ways of living 
life; overt sexuality, concern with appearance, and a focus on material pleasures is contrasted 
with asexuality and concern with the spiritual (137, 138). 
The Spinners set themselves apart from other Deadheads, believing that they are uniquely 
trying to live their lives according to the music and the morals coming from the music. Spinning 
in place together at Dead shows is a meditative practice for them; in spinning, the mind is 
quieted and the spinner is humble and submissive "to the Lord." Participating in group spinning 
requires a "surrender of self" which leads to a "deep level of understanding." As a result, 
spiritual effects such as clear thoughts, direction from God, and love are communicated. The 
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goal of spinning is described as to "dance with God." The fact that they spin together makes the 
experience more meaningful (141, 142, 129, 142-3, 149, 145).216 
Spinning both separates Spinners from other Deadheads, and serves as an invitation to 
other Deadheads to join them. Contrary to the goal of other Deadheads, for Spinners "the main 
focus at a show is on personal growth and personal devotional service." They also feel they are 
evangelizing at a show, setting an example. They are "bringing light to people." Spinners 
eschew LSD and the 'social' aspects of shows; the focus is on God. To take LSD would be to take 
the easy path, and avoid the struggle of personal growth. Only marijuana is approved for 
meditational use. To use LSD would put one on a "separate trip." They believe they have a 
different 'energy' than do regular Deadheads. For a member of the Spinners to go back to the 
free-form dancing style that many Deadheads display during the most improvisational part of a 
Dead show is considered a step backwards, leaving the meditative state to a worldly state. One 
Spinner who went back to doing LSD at shows and dancing free-form was looked down upon, as 
she was "resisting the grace" (147, 149, 146, 148). 
In spinning, spiritual work is being accomplished; it is often described as a struggle where 
one realizes and works through one's imperfections. It is described as being the way one takes 
another step towards spiritual maturity. What starts as a cosmic, blissful experience early on 
becomes a challenge from God to be perfected. You can be "feeling a lot of sin" while spinning. 
Mere devotion keeps one going, and eventually one will "break through" to a more deeply 
spiritual and encompassing experience (144). 
216 According to Hartley, Spinners were not aware of the Mevlevi order of Sufi Islam, the 'whirling 
dervishes' who practiced a very similar sort of spiritual dance, until someone pointed it out to them, long 
after they had adopted the practice. This suggests something about spinning has neurological effects that 
are supportive of decentering. 
297 
In attempting to interpret the Spinner phenomenon, Hartley first focuses on Durkheim's 
concept of effervescence, and the fact that when "people come together in circumstances very 
different from their everyday lives, when they dance and sing in the darkness, they experience a 
mass fervor that gives them a feeling they interpret as divine." But she realizes this 
characterization could be true of any rock concert, and isn't sufficient to account for Deadheads, 
let alone Spinners. Why don't all rock bands develop followers like Deadheads? She next 
suggests that perhaps the answer is the encouraged use of psychedelics and the spirit of love, 
community, and exploration coming from the Grateful Dead themselves. The Grateful Dead 
uniquely produce communitas. But she suggests even this isn't enough to account for the 
Spinners. Spinners are different than normal Deadheads; they don't watch the band perform; 
they don't listen to the lyrics on a 'natural' level, but a 'spiritual' level- as coming from God. 
Spinning is about focusing "on God 'as he comes through the music,' rather than focusing on the 
form of the music." For Spinners, their "experience at Grateful Dead shows produces mystical 
experience and provides opportunity to serve God" (Hartley 2000, 150-1, italics mine). 
7.2.2.3 Analysis 
Though participation in a Dead show could support some conclusions about transcendent 
reality, and undoubtedly for some it does, a critically important point to make about the 
Deadhead community is that such conclusions are not required or necessarily even desired by 
most participants. They do not gather in the name of any Ultimate Sacred Postulates. A 
particular kind of shared musical, rhythmic, and drug-induced experience is the source of 
Deadhead communal life, not any set apart, symbolically-encoded tokens of transcendence. 
The so-called 'X-factor' of a Grateful Dead show, which is experienced as the intense synergy 
between the band and audience, is left a vague entity. Garcia says this X-factor, "be it God or 
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whatever, has to do with us being open and getting together with the audience" (Sutton 2000, 
112). To characterize that which is considered by many the most important aspect of a Grateful 
Dead show as "God or whatever," is to say, in effect, that whatever is experienced at the show is 
not dependent on being named or characterized by tokens of transcendence. Deadheads, 
though they seek the kinds of experiences that give the term 'X-factor' a direct reference, do not 
seek to be possessed by named and defined spirits, though their behavior at concerts can look 
like they are: "at first glance it seems Deadheads exhibit[] a basic tendency toward 
possessional practices" (Sutton 2000, 117). 
As we have discussed, tokens of transcendence are specifically designed to identify the 
hidden cause of psychic experience and hidden center of social organization, and, specifically 
designed to be authoritative pointers to the nature of that hidden entity or way. Ultimate 
Sacred Postulates, because they name what is absent to experience, reify the source of 
alternative experience as a real entity or way whose existence is outside of normal experience. 
Dominant Symbols act as "powerful metaphors" to guide one's "conception of the unknown," 
linking one's normal experience to one's concept of the transcendent entity believed to shape 
or influence that experience (Reist 1997, 186).217 Without tokens oftranscendence, the 
Deadhead experience is just that- an experience of an aggregate of individuals, and it must be 
repeated again and again to remain relevant to that community. The source of the experience is 
not encoded and stored in manipulable memory, making the experience transportable to other 
contexts, or able to be privatized and engaged through individual psychic experience. 
For this reason, the kind of 'group consciousness' on display at Grateful Dead shows is not 
unlike what McNeill describes as "muscular bonding" (McNeill1995, 152). Military drill, like 
217 Reist here is following Geertz (1973). 
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Grateful Dead shows, involves prolonged movement in unison, and arouses profound emotions 
of well-being and a "strange sense of personal enlargement." McNeill describes a process of 
becoming bigger than life through participation in ritual performances or military drill, where 
one is cognizant only of keeping in step with others in prescribed order. He suggests that this 
kind of experience requires and has no definite external attachment or meaning; it becomes an 
end in itself.218 As the rhythm of muscular movement takes hold, consciousness is altered and a 
state of 'boundary loss' occurs; participants 'feel like they are one' (2, 8). 
While I do not want to reduce the experience of Deadheads to that of muscular bonding, 219 
I want to note that self-accounts of Deadheads suggest that the feeling of oneness described at 
Dead shows has to do with rhythmic entrainment (Sardiello 1994, 128-9; Reist 1997, 193). 
There seems to be at least as much in common between the experience of Deadheads and 
those participating in military drill as there is between Deadheads and participants in a Haitian 
sevis, as detailed in the last chapter. 
Group consciousness is certainly one kind of alternate conscious state, one that seems 
reproducible through certain set kinds of behaviors, independent of any 'theology' as found in 
tokens of transcendence. But it is not, in itself, definitive of a religious community, not even a 
shamanic religious community, as some of the authors I have been following note. For example, 
there seems to be agreement among these authors that because there is no 'guidance' offered 
to Deadheads via something that functions like tokens of transcendence, participants are free to 
218 This is a very important point. For the experience to be a meaningful experience, it would require 
interpretation. For it to be meaningful in the way that it offers insight into the 'really real' world, it would 
have to be interpreted by tokens of transcendence, as I am about to outline. 
219 Particularly because I think there is much to say about the shared consciousness of participating in 
musical performance. See Reist and Sutton on this with regard to the Grateful Dead; Spickard (1991) for a 
more general account of the parallels between religious consciousness and musical consciousness. 
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interpret the experience as they want. Reist notes that in 'real' shamanic religious communities, 
the shaman is considered to be a spiritualist who 
believes in the interconnectedness of all aspects of the universe, who deliberately 
enters altered states of consciousness to journey to a numinous world, and who returns 
to ordinary consciousness to present the information gained on this journey to her or 
his community through rituals and the manipulation of sacred symbols to facilitate the 
integration of the two worlds and nurture the community's physical, psychological, and 
spiritual health (Reist 1997, 188}. 
On the other hand, Deadheads "have little or no guidance or training when they embark on 
these journeys into the numinous." Grateful Dead concerts are a setting which provides 
"minimal procedural guidance for the use of psychedelics. The concerts provide the opportunity 
for troubled individuals to take drugs without the preparation and integration that shamanic 
groups provide" (Reist 1997, 196}. Sardiello agrees, noting that different individuals come to the 
experience "unaware," and what guidance they receive for interpretation is up to the group 
they happen to be with. He suggests people react differently to the drugs based on their own 
predispositions; those inclined to a spiritual approach "tend to refer to their connection to the 
Dead Head community in a spiritual way" (Sardiello 1994, 123}. Nothing in the Deadhead 
experience itself determines whether to take the experience as communication from spirit 
guides, revelation from the divine, a projection of the unconscious, as a potentially meaningful 
picture of the really real transcendent world, or as pure entertainment. 
The authors I have been citing use the present tense when talking about the Deadhead 
phenomenon (as have 1}, because at the time of their writing the phenomenon was still ongoing. 
But because the Grateful Dead and their fans did not ritually protect and enact the authority of 
tokens of transcendence- to become a Deadhead simply meant going to a Grateful Dead 
concert- there was nothing to insure the persistence of their community over time. Since the 
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death of Jerry Garcia in 1995 and the bands demise, Deadheads as such have ceased to be a 
cultural phenomenon. If we consider participating in a Grateful Dead show a ritual, the ritual 
was never connected with dynamically incoherent memory. In effect, the group experience of 
the music, so important in guiding the shared conscious experience of participants, functioned 
indexically to support the persistence of the community. Its direct effect on individual 
consciousness was a sense of group consciousness, and the direct effect of group consciousness 
was pleasurable to many individuals, leading to an increase in the likelihood of a repeated group 
experience of the music. The Deadhead phenomenon was not encoded as a token of a 
transcendent realm, was not able to be experienced outside the concert setting itself, and was 
not conceptualized independent of the group experience. There was nothing that made the 
Deadhead experience a unique ground for the experience, nor unique in the kind of sociality it 
produced. 
If we attempt to summarize the different types of non-biologically given sociality suggested 
by the account above of music fans, Deadheads, and Spinners, and include as well the baboon 
and ape rituals discussed inCh. 4, we see a spectrum of possibilities for sociality embedded in 
ritual. We can note that baboons and apes use ritual to facilitate trust and establish the grounds 
for coordination; Frenchmen and Led Zeppelin fans use ritually-established cultural products to 
identify and distinguish themselves from other culturally informed social communities; 
Deadheads use ritual to facilitate a pleasurable and alternative experience of sociality that 
suggests but does not require interpretation as a picture of the 'really real' unseen world; and 
Spinners use ritual to please and conform to a posited transcendent realm that has a particular 
character. 
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Let us examine the different cultural examples in a little more in depth. First, we noted the 
phenomenon of youth participation in music culture, where bands and concerts represent 
elements of anti-structure and communitas, and identify distinct subcultures through emblems 
taken from band iconography. For this group, set apart elements- concert participation, 
clothing, emblems, and public broadcasts of their musical choices- are taken up within normal 
consciousness as straightforwardly identifying them in contrast with the larger social world, as 
well as other subcultures. The ground of their communitas is their choice to reject larger social 
identification and to 'self-identify' as followers of bands that represent their values, tastes, and 
community. 
Second, we noted the 'spiritualized' form of community identifying followers of the 
Grateful Dead, which Sardiello distinguishes from other subcultures of bands and their 
followers. Among this group, extraordinary states of consciousness seem welcomed, and 
individuals are largely open to and in pursuit of an expansion of consciousness into 'group 
consciousness,' characterized by a euphoric sense of well-being and connectedness with others. 
Among this group, drugs, dancing, and active listening/participation in the improvisational 
musical style seems to be a key catalyst for the experience, which is taken as an end in itself, 
and the ground of their communitas. Theology is largely eschewed by this group; the 
experience of group consciousness is taken to speak for itself. 
Third, we can note the 'religious' form of community that takes place among the Spinner 
community, which Hartley distinguishes from the larger Deadhead community. For this group, 
participation in Grateful Dead concerts is seen as a means to devotion to God, who is revealed in 
certain sacred texts and to enlightened individuals who properly interpret the lyrics of certain 
Grateful Dead songs. For this group, to focus on the expanded consciousness found in the 
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Grateful Dead show without guidance from tokens of transcendence can be a distraction from 
the existentially all-encompassing and all-demanding task at hand, which is to focus on the 
individual's relationship with the 'really real.' This task is performed within the bounds of a set-
apart community that sees itself as dedicated for devotion to God, bearers of a divine 'message' 
to Dead followers at large. Their experience is not vague or meaningless; it is specific, powerful, 
and conceptualizable outside of the venue of its most important manifestations. They can 
'transport' their experience at Dead shows to other locations and even to private devotions. 
So how might we distinguish these three groups in terms of the categories of 
teleodynamics? What is gained by having such categories in one's mind as we analyze these 
three groups, each of which could be considered religious in the terms of some sociological 
theory or other? All three examples involve teleodynamic forms of conceptualized sociality; 
each has a memory component involving some culturally-facilitated token that points to and 
helps reproduce a particular kind of non-necessary sociality. 220 They are not the mere result of 
simpler self-organizing feedback effects resulting from having language or culture at all, nor are 
they merely the result of biologically-determined sociality. There are differences between these 
examples of cultural teleodynamics, however; the first two- generic musical subcultures and 
Deadheads- are distinguished not by how their sociality is represented conceptually, but how 
each involves a different reason to pursue sociality. Led Zeppelin fans define their community 
around shared musical tastes, and tokens of that musical taste represent that sociality. 
220 What that token is can be considered a cultural product even if it isn't precisely a linguistic product. 
Aesthetic musical taste, for example, isn't linguistic, but it is cultural. Aesthetic experience can reasonably 
be considered the result of the neurological flexibility that 'freedom from indexical reference,' due to a 
developed pre-frontal cortex, undergirds (Deacon 2006d). Such a brain may well be the result of the 
development of symbolic abilities in hominids; thus, aesthetic experience can be considered an 
unintentional consequence of linguistic abilities. The point I am making here is that 'culture' most broadly 
can be conceived of as 'freedom vis-a-vis biological entrainment,' facilitated but not exhausted by 
linguistic competency. 
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Deadheads base their sociality on the exploration of alternative states of consciousness, and 
tokens of that unity represent that sociality. In both cases, the teleodynamics of their sociality is 
organized indexically, in that the cultural expressions which represent their sociality do so 
explicitly and clearly. In fact, their teleodynamics are the same as citizens organized by the 
Constitution of the United States. Citizens utilize the memory of a political constitution to direct 
their sociality for certain pragmatic social reasons, Led Zeppelin fans utilize the memory of a 
particular expression of musical taste to direct their sociality for different social reasons, and 
Deadhads utilize the memory of a an alternative communal experience to direct their sociality 
for even different reasons. In each case, the memory for the community (education and training 
in a country's civic laws and procedures, tie-dye t-shirts and participating in the X-factor at Dead 
shows, naked angel stickers on an undergraduate's computer and the music playing at the 
parties she goes to) is direct in its sociological impact, taken up in normal consciousness as a 
clear representation of the community. 
Let us contrast this with the way the Spinners approach their sacred tokens. When they 
spin at the edges of a Grateful Dead audience, each one is looking at a specified absence; a 
hidden, nonmaterial source that facilitates decentering and the taking up of a specified higher 
self or way, and only indirectly establishes a kind of sociality. One who joins (or continually re-
joins) them is looking to a hidden-but-real USP- "God"- as the reason for their gathering. They 
don't identify themselves with that token because it expresses their musical tastes, or because it 
gives them an experience of expanded consciousness, or for pragmatic social reasons, but 
because they want to 'dance with God.' Since their group experience is conceptualized in a 
certain way, they will spin at concerts for devotions sake, and to give 'testimony' to other 
Grateful Dead fans of what this X-factor actually is. This God is pointed to by certain scriptures, 
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by certain experiences found in appreciating the emotional tone of Grateful Dead performances, 
and by taking the lyrics of certain Grateful Dead songs as utterances from God. But this God is 
different from all of these things. Because of this, Spinners expect to have more than an 
experience defined by shared musical taste, communal group consciousness, or pragmatic social 
purposes. They expect, rather, an experience of some determinate 'other' characterizing the 
'really real' world that is unknowable through normal consciousness. This 'other' has an 
identifiable impact and character, and will make itself known when the normal self is 
suppressed and a higher form of the self is spontaneously projected by imagination, revealing 
what that higher form of the self is doing or would say to them individually and corporately. The 
'decentering' process will not be easy; learning to suppress the self and spontaneously take up a 
higher self takes work, and it will require discipline and time. One who joins the Spinners is 
looking to be transformed in the image of that higher self. This symbolic teleodynamic 
organizational structure means the experience of God is more important than even participation 
in Grateful Dead shows.221 Unlike Deadheads, Spinners could still be a social entity today, after 
the Grateful Dead's demise. 222 
Because each Spinner is approaching their specified absence in this way, their social form 
will have a symbolic teleodynamic form. No individual will participate in the group for the 
group's sake, but for the sake of this 'absent' center that the name 'God' represents. This 
absence will leverage a common and mutually interactive group experience indicating God's 
presence, and commitment to future experiences leading to future iterations of the group. 
221 This theoretical point was actually demonstrated by the group's separation from their nomadic touring 
existence. 
222 Allegations of sexual impropriety among leadership of this group led to the group's disbanding in the 
mid-1990's. See Dempsey (1992). 
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Faithfulness to the hidden center will free spontaneous imagination to produce creative yet 
faithful insights into what this God will mean for them, both psychically and socially. Their 
experience is 'portable' beyond its origins in particular Dead shows because the source of their 
group experience is defined as not being due to their social gathering. 
Perhaps we can imagine regular Deadheads as representing a 'halfway house' between 
musical subcultures and religious communities like the Spinners. Deadheads seek altered states 
of consciousness, and even believe that a kind of suppression of individual consciousness can 
lead to community, based in the shared experience of a group consciousness. They are more 
than individualistic spiritual explorers collecting individual alternative experiences. However, 
the organizational form of their community does not include encoded, symbolic reference. 
Though a few Deadheads do seem to think through their experience in terms of tokens of 
transcendence (i.e. to them, the experience of expanded consciousness may seem to be 
"information on the nature of human life and reality"), a) these tokens are not required for 
community participation, and thus b) for most, no USPs ground the community's psychic and 
social experience in the 'specified absence' of a hidden center. The source of the experience 
can be 'God or whatever.' The source of Deadhead communitas can be conceived as completely 
natural. Without a hidden source, the experience of Deadhead communitas must speak for 
itself, and can only speak in the setting it appears for them. This situation is similar to what 
McNeil suggests is the case with 'muscular bonding.' There is no definite external attachment or 
meaning for the generalized emotional warmth of 'keeping together in time.' It can find various 
and even contradictory expressions depending on participant expectations. It can be tapped by 
both politics and religions. It becomes an end in itself. Identical movement of arms and legs 
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may "induce love or hate, exorcise danger, or invite possession by the spirits" (McNeill1995, 2, 
155, 64). 
Interestingly, the Deadhead phenomenon does suggest a potential evolutionary pathway to 
religious communities; McNeil notes this when he writes, "when words became available to 
explain and give meaning to the experience of dance-induced trance, dancing took on a new 
role in human society and became a prominent feature of many different religious systems" 
(McNeill1995, 47). While pursuing this observation exceeds the limits of this dissertation, it 
does suggest a direction for future research. 
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8 Entailments of symbolic social teleodynamics 
Having traced in this dissertation why we might think religious communities conform to the 
pattern of 'symbolic teleodynamics' extracted from the works of Von Neumann, Pattee, 
Hofstadter, and Deacon, and having applied the theory to two 'test cases/ I want to turn to a 
few of the important conceptual entailments that this interpretation suggests concerning 
religious communities. 
8.1 New types of truth 
Csordas has pointed out that a serious consideration of Rappaport suggests we 
acknowledge three types of truth that affect human relations- the sanctified truths of ritual, 
the necessary truths of logic, and the empirical truths of experience (Csordas 2001, 230). 
However, I think he conflates two kinds oftruth into 'the sanctified truths of ritual': those based 
on indexical teleodynamic social organization (number 3, below) and those based on symbolic 
teleodynamic social organization (number 4, below). This means there are four types of truth to 
be accounted for in human affairs, due in part to symbolic social teleodynamics: 
1. Necessary truths of logic- A;t~A. 
2. Empirical truths of experience- E=mc2, natural selection. 
3. Social performatives (indexical) instantiating the social contract or identifying oneself 
with a subculture- "The bar is closed;" wearing a tie-dye t-shirt. 
4. Religious performatives (symbolic) utilizing the authority of the ritual form to authorize 
tokens of transcendence and produce numinous experience and a teleodynamic social 
structure- "I baptize you [into the Christian community] in the name of the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit." 
The different kinds of truth ascend a 'meaning hierarchy/ as well as a 'particularity 
hierarchy.' The necessary truths of logic are requirements to think at all; they must be assumed 
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as a baseline, and are universal. As we move down the list, the 'truths' they capture require 
more acknowledgement of external context, become more existentially important, and become 
less universally accepted (that is, more people can reasonably disagree concerning them). In the 
case of type 4, religious performative truth, Parmentier notes that to the outside observer, 
performativity appears as completely socially constructed; yet to the insider, it appears as 
expressing a degree of order transcending nature and culture (Parmentier 2003, 163). The 
fourth type of truth even affects non-cognitive experiences of truth; as Wildman notes, "aspects 
of human life ... such as emotions and behaviors, mental stability and physical health" can be 
influenced by truths of type 4. Norms of "goodness or beauty in individual actions and cultural 
products, and optimal function in mind and body" are influenced by the kinds of experiences 
cultivated by religious community participation (Wildman 2011, 146). 
Spickard (1991) gives a nice picture of how type 4, religious truth, is established and 
confirmed in a religious community, and it is worth discussing. Navajo ritual is a performative of 
type 4, and as a performative it acts to determine how things will be in the present world by 
bringing it into contact with the eternal world. Spickard notes that the referent of the story in a 
Navajo ritual prayer, though cast as being in the mythical past, is not primarily 'there-then,' but 
'here-now.' The truth of the ritual brings into the present the perfection found in the 'really 
real' world; two separate worlds are merged into one through the ritual performance. Just 
believing that the natural and supernatural are joined is not enough to effect a cure; it is in living 
the conjuncture, through the prayer cycle, that prayer cures. While Navajo chants are social 
events in that many people are required, and conceptual events in that they make use of the 
Navajo worldview, they are primarily a form of alternative experience; they guide experience 
down channels that are supposed to reorient the inner and outer worlds. Navajo religion does 
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not just to heal social splits, or change ideas, but it creates an experience of harmony between 
self, society, and world (201, 202). 
What happens when a Jewish community can no longer take as a given the empirical fact of 
a Creator God's existence or the factuality of the Exodus from Egypt? When an Australian 
aborigine cannot believe that the Ancestors of their community were the first human beings, 
created during Dreamtime? The theory of truth implied by an emergent view of human sociality 
suggests that when conflict arises between the 'type 2' and 'type 4' truths, there are 
alternatives to either abandoning type 4 truths that depend upon decentering for their 
confirmation (as some liberal forms of religious life may advocate), or abandoning type 2 truths 
that depend upon empirical research for their confirmation (as some fundamentalist forms of 
religious life may advocate.) The confirmation of a religious community's tokens of 
transcendence does not come from their factual description of something outside of them, but 
from their experienced potency in alternative consciousness, when decentered spontaneous 
imagination creates manifestations of a higher Self or higher Way for the self. We know type 4 
truths are true because we experience their existentially meaningful resolutions of ineliminable 
oppositions in human psychic and social life when taken into alternative consciousness. This 
perspective gives religious communities reasons to a) maintain their tokens oftranscendence as 
sources for alternative consciousness, protecting decentering as the 'interpretant vehicle' that 
provides the grounds for semantic closure for that community; and b) accept type 2 truths 
dealing with their tokens of transcendence without fear that they will destroy community life. 
We can take them as false with respect to type 2 truth, and true with respect to type 4 truth. 
311 
8.2 The emergence of revelation and the divine/worshipper relationship an 
entailment of symbolic tel eo dynamics 
I discussed Rappaport's conception of 'metaperformativeness' in the previous chapter. 
want to expand upon that discussion here. In one of the few places he explicitly distinguishes 
'religious ritual' from more generic 'ritual,' Rappaport notes that a critical feature of religious 
ritual is that its source cannot be from 'us;' if it is, it ceases to be religious ritual. If some person 
introduces new rituals, they must disclaim responsibility for them, declaring (and perhaps 
believing) that the "new ritual was revealed to them by spirits or gods in dreams or in visions" 
(Rappaport 1999, 33). We can see now that the authority establishing 'revelation' comes not 
from the divine conceived as Platonically existing in some other world, but from the 
teleodynamics of a social organism existing in encoded form in the world of our mental maps, 
which the individual helps create and demonstrate as real by his/her own participation in ritual. 
The emergent entity 'reveals' through the ritual pronouncement of tokens of transcendence; 
the individual participants in the emergent entity experience revelation as they submit to those 
same ritual pronouncements. Metaperformativeness is the name for this 'by his bootstraps' 
authority, and is the result of three things: the 'emptiness' of the USP with respect to the 
possibility of normal experience; the curious way an authoritative source is implied by 
participation in ritual; and the biasing effect of Dominant Symbols. Together, these invite the 
suppression of normal experience and the experience of the 'revelation' of the deity or divine 
way's presence and 'truth,' manifested in decentering. 
The subjective experience of 'participation in the divine' is an entailment of the formal 
characteristics of the religious community as conceptualized here. Geertz notes that when ritual 
is accepted as authoritative, an ethos and a worldview flowing from a profound experience 
312 
results. Balinese religious trance, for example, allows people to directly experience living 
realties, not to merely hear of them. They are not represented; they are present. Participants 
in the ritual become a part of the realm in which those presences exist (Geertz 1973, 116, 118). 
Similarly, Wikstrom notes that ritual does not just provide opportunities to think, but to 
subjectively experience. In the Catholic Eucharist, for example, the words that accompany the 
sacrament do inform participants, but to participate in the sacrament is to become a part of the 
'partnership' that the words invite. A religious symbol with a ritual summarizes in itself an 
existential quality, not just a theory. It creates something (Wikstrom 1990, 61-63). Along these 
lines, recent experiments have shown that experience with ritualized religion has curious and 
measurable effects on participants. For example, Schjoedt et al. (2009) found that 'theory of 
mind' circuits in the brains of Danish Christians were activated when participating in improvised 
prayer, but were not while making wishes to Santa Clause. This suggests to the researchers that 
"praying to God is an intersubjective experience comparable to 'normal' interpersonal 
interaction." 
This entailment of religious community life was marvelously forecast by Durkheim, whose 
intuitive 'radar' concerning religion was not equaled in his time by the conceptual tools available 
to give it voice. Speaking vaguely, but in my opinion correctly, he argued that sacred beings gain 
their own existence from individual participation in religious community life; but from them 
participants have and maintain their own, transfigured being. Religious participants make, and 
are remade, by their god. As individuals gather in the name of the divine, they find the divine 
indirectly through the experiences their gathering gives them. Their shared faith is reborn, and 
private doubt and neglect is overcome. The circular nature ofthis experience is a natural 
outgrowth of the fact that religious life emerges out of sociality (or as I would put it, out of 
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symbolic social teleodynamics). Sacred beings are superior to individuals, but can live only in 
individual consciousness (Durkheim 1995/1915, 345, 350, 351). 
8.3 Seats of subjectivity? The occult power of spontaneous imagination within 
religious teleodynamics? 
Now I want to engage in a little speculation. Wikstrom raises the question of the 
ontological status of religious communities; Rappaport does; Durkheim does, Lambek does 
(Wikstrom 1990, 67; Rappaport 1999,409,411-2, 422; Durkheim 1995/1915, 426, 448; Lambek 
2001, 257). Part of my motivations for this dissertation was to take this intuition and put it on 
stronger footing: the conceptual structure of emergence, and specifically, symbolic 
teleodynamics. If a religious community is a symbolic social teleodynamic system, as I have 
argued, there is no need to posit a platonically reai'God' on the order of 'level 2 truth' that 
constitutes the 'special spark' of a religious community. Yet this should not be taken as 
evidence that divine beings and ways, differently conceived, do not exist. If religious 
communities, lineages of organisms, and human persons each demonstrates semantic closure, 
they each represents something important in nature: a self-reproducing and self-referencing 
dynamic process, upon which- at least in the case of the human person- subjective experience 
and qualia supervenes.223 This suggests a religious community might be 'worthy' of the 
appellations often lauded on them by believers and ritual participants when they say it bears a 
'higher' presence. 
I have argued that the formal characteristics of a symbolic social teleodynamic system, if 
they apply to the social organization of religious communities, create the subjective experience 
in individual consciousness of a divine/worshipper relationship; even as they create the 
223 As suggested by Chalmers (1996) with respect to human consciousness. 
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objective fact of a social entity that can be described as a symbolic teleodynamic system. And as 
just suggested, on analogy with the human person, this social entity might have some sort of 
qualitative experiences comparable to what humans experience as a subjective 'self.' What 
could this mean, both for individual experience and for ontological speculation on the nature of 
the divine? How might this fact impact the discussion of occult power that for many is the sine 
qua non of religious experience? 
Let me suggest, before tackling this, that squarely addressing the putative experiences of 
religious people in their communities is a politically and academically charged issues, going to 
the heart of what it means to be 'rational' and to be doing 'science.' 224 Van de Port (2005) has 
candidly discussed the difficulty of translating actual experiences he's had in his anthropological 
study of religion into the scholarly academic framework. For example, he recounts an 
experience of bringing a visiting friend to a Brazilian candomble service he was researching. At 
the service, a candomble priest who had never met either of them came up to his friend with a 
wild look in his eye, and gave him a very specific and accurate account of the factual and 
existential problems the friend was facing while trying to write a book that was not going as 
planned. The priest told him in rather unsettling detail what the problem was, and what he 
should do about it. This event highlighted for Van de Port the political nature of 'not believing in 
such things' within the academy. To his (and his friend's) eyes, the event was highly unlikely, 
even inexplicable. The fact that he 'doesn't believe in these things' became, for him, an act of 
not wanting to have to change his worldview, and not wanting to lose his academic credibility. 
He goes on to say religious communities cultivate stories that point to sui generis experiences of 
their communities that go beyond any conventional truth, and yet the strategy of the academic 
224 Plantinga (2009) discusses many of these issues. 
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approach to such things is to ignore them or reduce them to something else. 'Inexplicable' 
experiences like the one he recounts, he suggests, are at the heart of religious community belief 
(Van de Port 2005, 167, 175-6). 
Most religious theorists at least pay lip service to this fact. There is widespread 
acknowledgement that for the religious, ritual is not just saying something; it is doing something 
about the world. The 'doing' is often assumed to be the spiritual world's activity- the 'Work of 
the Gods,' 'spirit work' (Rappaport 1999, 47). What I am suggesting is it is an 'easy problem' to 
study how decentering and spontaneous imagination guided by Dominant Symbols point 
experience in a certain way. The question on the table is taking this a step farther: is there a 
'hard problem' to this study as well?225 Are meaningful religious experiences in any way 'guided' 
by the subjective consciousness of the divine being that is the religious community's subjective 
self? From the perspective of the individual participant, is there any reason to participate in a 
religious community other than the thrill of having an alternative experience that, at the end of 
the day, merely feels meaningful? Is there actual meaningfulness to be participated in? Is there 
any reason to believe that the 'prophecy' Van de Port's friend received wasn't just pure random 
luck, the result of an undirected decentering and spontaneous imaginative event guided by 
Dominant Symbols? Can we believe that the 'spontaneous production of imaginative 
engagement guided by Dominant Symbols' isn't random? While I did not attempt to raise the 
'hard problem' with respect to religious communities in this dissertation, I think I have made a 
strong claim that we might want to consider doing so. Religious communities, if they share a 
symbolic teleodynamic organizational structure with living things and human persons, deserve 
225 Following Chalmers (1996). 
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to be placed in that category of phenomenon in nature which may need to be considered in 
those terms. 
This is a difficult question to address, particularly because we need to keep in mind that the 
divine being I am saying may have to be taken into account is a result of the organization of 
individual alternative consciousness within the shared mental map of members of the religious 
community. There is no other 'actual' divine being to appeal to, on a symbolic teleodynamic 
emergent account of religious communities. But this is in fact a strength, since an appeal to a 
platonically real divine being, on many accounts, doesn't count as scientific explanation. 226 We 
are after something that the previous six chapters of discussion might be relevant to. There are 
two things, then, we need to account for. First, why would we think a religious community 
might have conscious experience? Second, how might this experience affect the experience of 
individual participants in the community? Starting with the first question, let us note that as 
strange as it seems, if done in a principled way, to posit something like consciousness to a 
religious community on analogy with human consciousness is no stranger than trying to explain 
human consciousness in the first place. Brains are aggregates of material objects; the 'problem 
of consciousness' is, in Chalmer's words, a 'hard problem.' Most theorists believe consciousness 
to be a result of brain organization and dynamics, and not the 'stuff' of which it is composed. 
This suggests the possibility that different systems having a similar formal organization should 
have similar subjective experiences. Chalmers (1996) has argued that a system functionally 
organized to realize abstract information states- states selected from an ensemble of 
possibilities- supports conscious experience. He takes his cue from the fact that when we see 
an information state registered phenomenally, we find the same state registered physically. 
226 Again, see Plantinga (2009). 
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Thus, he believes information can be seen as having a physical and a phenomenal aspect. 
Hofstadter (2007) has argued that physical systems have conscious experience if they model 
what's outside of them, and, based on the model, launch actions to engage the outside world. 
Both Chalmers' and Hofstadter's positions suggest systems organized using symbolic reference 
to adaptively engage an environment over time for the sake of persistence- what I have been 
calling symbolic teleodynamic systems- may experience that environment. These systems 
exhibit what Hofstadter calls 'top-down' (formal) causality, and adaptively change their lower 
level organization for the sake of overall system persistence. So what I am suggesting is this. 
Conscious experience in persons results from 'dumb' neurons organized in a functional and 
adaptive way, utilizing symbols to capture information and facilitate personal persistence. 
Similarly, religious communities as seats of something comparable to subjective conscious 
experience may result from 'dumb' individual interpreting selves organized in a functional and 
adaptive way within the shared mental maps of participants in a religious community, utilizing 
symbols to capture information and facilitate system persistence. The result of this may be 
something like a type of higher level subjective experience. 
What about the second question? What kind of experiences might participants in a 
religious community have, reflecting the 'subjectivity of the religious community'? Let me 
preface this discussion by saying this is necessarily a sketch- it would be a philosophical and 
phenomenological research project in its own right to get at what I am only gesturing at here. 
That said, the idea I want to superficially explore is that the 'higher self' one spontaneously 
creates and takes on through the decentering process may not be only spontaneous imagination 
engaging Dominant Symbols in existentially meaningful ways. It may also reflect in individual 
consciousness the subjective experience of the religious community as higher self. From an 
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objective viewpoint, as implied by the discussion in the second and third chapter, the 
'downward causality' by which the religious community as a 'subject' would act in the world of 
alternative consciousness and decentered psyches would not be the result of a 'force,' but 
rather a least discordant selection process. Successful religious communities, if they hold to the 
form I suggest, would represent a least discordant remainder of the interplay of spontaneous 
imagination, tokens of transcendence, and an adaptive and reproducing social organization as it 
exists within the mental maps of a community of interpreters. Many possible versions of 
alternative consciousness and higher 'selves' would be constantly produced within spontaneous 
imagination; the ones that persist would be those that contribute to the persistence of the 
organized higher order unit existing within the mental world of participants. 
This functional description may also have a subjective experience component. For the 
individual, the conscious experience of decentering and the spontaneous production of a 'higher 
self' may register 'in real time' those spontaneous projections that are concurrent with adaptive 
self-reproduction of the community. The feel of this experience in individual consciousness 
would correlate with the subjective conscious experience of the religious community as a self. If 
the conscious experience of the emergent, teleodynamic community can register in the 
conscious experience of the individual participant in the community, it would suggest that 
individuals can become 'virtuosi' in experiencing and interpreting the divine in individual 
conscious experience, as those interpretations are not just random projections of spontaneous 
imagination guided by dominant symbols. This would account for the "uncanny" and 
"unfathomable" aspect of supernatural agents possessing an individual (McNamara 2009, 169), 
as well as the possibility of becoming an expert in religious discernment and various forms of 
prophecy. This suggestion stays within the boundaries suggested by both Chalmers and 
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Hofstadter, since conscious experience of the religious community would accompany a 
functional and adaptive organizational structure. But it suggests that the conscious experience 
of individuals can be influenced by the conscious experience of groups- if they have them- of 
which they are a part, as the group is experiencing its environment. Clearly, the kind of 
suggestion I am making is a metaphysical suggestion, outside of the normal discourse of the 
sciences, even the religious sciences. But the question raises itself enough in the 
anthropological literature to merit speculation. 
Levy notes the difference between numinous experience in a religious community context, 
and 'regular' numinous experience, of which it is a special case. Ritual, he suggests, produces a 
special form of 'perception' different from that of 'normal' numinous experience, which is 
merely "adventurous encounters ... at the edge of social and intellectual space." Under ritual, the 
'products' of such adventurous encounters are subject to a type of craft and control, and set 
against the anxious experience of the randomly encountered nondivine supernatural. Ritual, 
thus, transforms the uncanny into awe, spirits into gods, the supernatural into the divine (Levy 
2001, 151). Spickard compares ritual participation to an audience listening to the same musical 
piece. The sociality that results from this kind of experience is that of living together 
simultaneously, experiencing things together. All the interactions are mediated by the music. 
There is a shared experience between composer, performer, and audience in music. Similarly, 
people experience time together in religious rituals; rituals help people to tune in to each other 
and share an inner state of consciousness. He argues that the experience of otherness often 
held to be characteristic of religious experience is not an unstructured individual experience, but 
a structured social experience, in that the numinous experience of ritual participants are shared 
in the flow of time (Spickard 1991, 196, 197, 192). Durkheim suggested something like this as 
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well, arguing that the experience of the individual in a religious community is brokered by the 
effects of a psychic operation by which a "plurality of individual consciousnesses enter into 
communion and are fused into a common consciousness" (Durkheim 1973, 160). McNamara 
suggests that a relationship with God is often characterized as a journey, having periods of 
infatuation, dryness, purification, and then deepened joy. He seems to suggest the overall 
narrative arc of the journey is the reality of religious experiences, more than the individual 
experiences themselves. This would make sense if the development of attunement with 
something is an important part of religious community participation. He also notes that 
characteristics describing religious experience include an enhanced sense of personal power, of 
being 'blessed,' and of having enhanced theory of mind capabilities. These, too, seem to be 
beyond the mere experience of spontaneous imagination of a decentered self, guided by 
Dominant Symbols (McNamara 2009, 17-19, 15) 
8.4 Summary 
If the formal structure of religious community dynamics is captured by this recasting of 
Rappaport's theory of religion, as I have suggested, something like the following might be a 
formal characterization of a religious community: 
An aggregate of persons linked together by ritual participation which authorizes beings 
and ways hidden to normal conscious experience, described by dominant symbols, such 
that they a) function to suppress normal consciousness and selfhood in individual 
participants and guide the structuring of alternative consciousness and spontaneous 
experience of higher selves, manifesting in the individual and the gathered group b) 
resolve existentially meaningful psychic and social oppositions, and c) lead to the 
reproduction of both the ritual community and the entities and ways described by 
dominant symbols. 
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That the community does not always live up to this characterization; 227 that a religious 
community also involves many other aspects of human life; that religious community life 
involves many aspects that can be independently and fruitfully studied by other sciences; that 
parts of such community life might have developed for reasons other than their role in 
producing a religious community- none of these facts takes away from the potential that lies 
latent in the functioning of religious community organizational dynamics. 
I suggest that recasting Rappaport's theory of religion in up-to-date categories of 
emergence theory suggests a religious community is best understood as a symbolic, social, 
teleodynamic system. If true, this means a religious community is a rare and special kind of 
system, similar in organization to living things and human persons. This suggestion invites 
speculation and research as to what supervening properties and qualia might characterize such 
a system, on analogy with the experience of human persons. And it suggests that empirical 
investigation into what participants in religious communities claim is their experience might be 
conducted without requiring in advance that such experience conform to canons of authenticity 
relevant for studying objects. 
227 Robert Neville has pointed out that individual persons do not always live up to the potential of being a 
single, overarching semiotic 'sign,' but rather are often divided and a conglomeration of many signs. He 
suggests this does not mean that we don't have the potential to be such, nor that religious communities, 
if my characterization is correct, do not have such potential (Personal communication, 2008). Similarly, 
biological lineages may go extinct, individual organisms may die, but the potential for survival as a living 
thing exists in the formal organizational structure of such organisms. 
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